Ahrens v. City of Dallas et al
Filing
14
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The court, sua sponte, holds that Plaintiff's federal law claim must be dismissed because it is not ripe, and the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's pendent state law claims. Accordingly, the court denies as moot The City's 10 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and dismisses without prejudice this action. (Ordered by Judge Sam A Lindsay on 11/28/2017) (ran)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
KATRINA AHRENS,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE CITY OF DALLAS,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 3:17-CV-1414-L
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is The City’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint, filed June 30, 2017 (Doc. 10). Having considered the pleadings, motion, response, reply,
and applicable law, the court, sua sponte, holds that Plaintiff’s federal law claim must be dismissed
because it is not ripe, and the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
pendent state law claims. Accordingly, the court denies as moot The City’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 10) and dismisses without prejudice this action.
I.
Background
Plaintiff Katrina Ahrens (“Plaintiff” or “Mrs. Ahrens”) is a detective in the Crimes Against
Persons Division of the Dallas Police Department (“DPD”). She is also the widow of Senior
Corporal Lorne Ahrens (“Sr. Cpl. Ahrens”), also of the DPD. On July 7, 2016, after over fourteen
years of service with the DPD, Sr. Cpl. Ahrens was shot in the line of duty during an ambush on
protesters in downtown Dallas, Texas. He passed away the following morning, leaving behind his
wife (Plaintiff) and their two minor children.
Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 1
Plaintiff alleges that the City possesses extensive records related to the July 7th attack and
its aftermath, including “videos, audio recordings, statements, notes, and other records, depicting or
otherwise documenting the shooting of Sr. Cpl. Ahrens and his injuries and suffering leading to his
death (hereinafter ‘Sensitive Death Records’).” Pl.’s Am. Compl. ¶ 9 (“Complaint”). Plaintiff
further alleges that, pursuant to the Texas Public Information Act, the media have made numerous
requests for information that include the Sensitive Death Records. Plaintiff alleges she asked the
City not to release the Sensitive Death Records, but the City refused her request. Plaintiff attaches
to her Complaint a letter dated May 2, 2017, from Assistant City Attorney James B. Pinson to Casey
Griffith, Esq., Plaintiff’s counsel, which states:
To our knowledge, the City has released no crime scene photos or other
information related to the criminal investigation regarding the sniper attack on July
7, 2016. The investigation is still pending. After the investigation is closed, any
crime scene photos that are responsive to an open records request will be reviewed
and redacted in accordance with the [Public Information Act]. The City will not
disclose any sensitive crime scene images to nonenumerated persons without seeking
an attorney general ruling on whether they are confidential under Government Code
section 552.1085. Nor will the City disclose any confidential information in the
personnel file without seeking an attorney general ruling.
Compl, Ex. A (emphasis added).
Based on these alleged fact, Plaintiff brings federal and state law claims against the City.
With respect to her federal law claim, Plaintiff alleges the City threatens to violate her substantive
due process right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment by publicly disclosing “Sensitive
Death Records or other material relating to Sr. Cpl. Ahrens[.]” Compl. 5. She seeks a declaratory
judgment, pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, that she has privacy rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment in the Sensitive Death Records that prohibit the City’s disclosure
of the records in its possession. Plaintiff also asserts as pendent state law claims that the same threat
Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 2
of disclosure violates her right to privacy under Texas Constitution article 1, her common-law right
to privacy, and her right to prohibit disclosure of confidential information under Texas Government
Code section 552.101. In addition to her request for a declaratory judgment, Plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief against disclosure and “[a]ll relief to which [she] is entitled under Tex. Govt Code
§ 552.001 et seq.” Compl. 8.
With respect to her request for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, Plaintiff invokes
the court’s subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. See Compl. § 3. She also
alleges subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, the Declaratory Judgment Act. Id.
Notably, “the Declaratory Judgment Act is not an independent source of federal jurisdiction[,] [and]
the availability of such relief presupposes the existence of a judicially remediable right[.]” Schilling
v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 677 (1960) (internal citation omitted). As to her state law claims, Plaintiff
invokes the court’s supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See Compl. § 3.
The City has filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
arguing that dismissal is required because, among other things:
The Complaint fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim against the City because
it fails to plead facts sufficient to support an inference that (1) the Dallas City
Council promulgated or ratified (2) a specific official policy or custom having the
force of official policy (3) that is the moving force behind the threatened violation
of a constitutional right[.]
City’s Mot. to Dismiss 7. The City further argues that once the court dismisses Plaintiff’s federal
claim, it should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her remaining pendent state law
claims and dismiss them without prejudice.
In response to the City’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff clarifies that she is not seeking to state
a claim against the City for section 1983 violations. Instead, she states:
Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 3
Mrs. Ahrens seeks a declaratory judgment recognizing her Fourteenth
Amendment right to privacy in the Sensitive Death Records. This is made clear in her
First Amended Complaint. She does not, at this time, contend her rights have been
violated or seek damages under § 1983, or otherwise. The City, however, incorrectly
contends Mrs. Ahrens seeks “redress for violations” of her Fourteenth Amendment
rights. And its entire Motion is based on this false understanding of Mrs. Ahrens’
lawsuit. She did not mistakenly fail to include reference to § 1983 in her First
Amended Complaint. It was intentionally avoided because, again, Mrs. Ahrens asks
the Court for a declaratory judgment before disclosure of Sensitive Death Records
occur. No plaintiff could ever prevent a violation of a right secured by the
Constitution from occurring in the future if the Monell pleading standards for § 1983
claims identified by the City were imposed.
Pl.’s Resp. 1-2 (original emphasis).1 In its reply, in addition to reurging the arguments set forth in
its motion to dismiss, the City maintains that no implied direct constitutional right of action can lie
against a municipality and, therefore, the court should dismiss Plaintiff’s federal claims pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her
pendent state law claims. Reply 1.
II.
The Doctrine of Ripeness
The City, in its motion to dismiss, has not raised the issue of whether Plaintiff’s request for
declaratory judgment under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act is ripe for adjudication.
Nevertheless, a federal court has an independent duty, at any level of the proceedings, to determine
whether it properly has subject matter jurisdiction over a case. Ruhgras AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,
526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own
1
Plaintiff’s statement that she is not invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is perplexing to the court. In this case, there
is simply no other means of seeking redress for the City’s alleged violations of her Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process rights. In relevant part, section 1983 states that any person, acting under color of state law, who deprives
a United States citizen “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” shall be liable to
such citizen. Although not intimating any views on the merits of Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim, her failure
to invoke the protection of section 1983 renders her claim untenable. See generally Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
144 n.3 (1979) (Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights
elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.”).
Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 4
initiative even at the highest level.”); McDonal v. Abbott Labs., 408 F.3d 177, 182 n.5 (5th Cir.
2005) (A “federal court may raise subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte.”) (citation omitted).
Article III of the Constitution confines the federal courts to adjudicating actual “cases” and
“controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. In an attempt to give meaning to Article III's “case or
controversy requirement,” the courts have developed a series of principles termed “justiciability
doctrines.” United Transp. Union v. Foster, 205 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2000). One such doctrine
is ripeness. “Ripeness doctrine ‘is drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and
from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.’” Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly
Springs, 697 F.3d 279, 286 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43,
58 n. 18 (1993)); Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 670 n. 2 (2010)
(“Ripeness reflects constitutional considerations that implicate Article III limitations on judicial
power, as well as prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Ripeness is “peculiarly a question of timing whose basic rationale is to prevent the courts,
through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements.” Opulent Life Church, 697 F.3d at 286 (internal punctuation and citations omitted).
The ripeness doctrine separates those matters that are premature because the injury is speculative and
may never occur from those that are appropriate for judicial review. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
“Declaratory judgments cannot be used to seek an opinion advising what the law would be on a
hypothetical set of facts.” Vantage Trailers, Inc. v. Beall Corp., 567 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted). A case is ripe for adjudication if all remaining questions are legal and further
factual development is unnecessary. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New
Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 5
Orleans, 833 F.2d 583, 587 (5th Cir. 1987). A claim is not ripe if it “rests upon contingent future
events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Texas v. United States, 523
U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (internal punctuation and citations omitted). Two key considerations exist for
courts evaluating the ripeness of an action: “the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” New Orleans Pub. Serv., 833 F.2d at
586 (quoting Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149).
In the present case, Plaintiff brings her federal claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act,
which provides: “In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United
States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of
any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.”
28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (emphasis added).
The court applies the following three-step inquiry when determining whether to decide or
dismiss a federal declaratory judgment action: (1) whether the declaratory action is justiciable, a
threshold issue; (2) if it has jurisdiction, whether the court has the authority to grant declaratory relief
in the present action; and (3) if it has jurisdiction and authority, whether to exercise its broad
discretion to decide or dismiss the action. The Sherwin Williams Co. v. Holmes County, 343 F.3d
383, 387 (5th Cir. 2003); Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Wolfe, 212 F.3d 891, 895 (5th Cir. 2000). If
the action is not ripe for adjudication and therefore not justiciable, the court need not reach the
second or third steps. Shields v. Norton, 289 F.3d 832, 837 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e must not proceed
until the issue is ripe—until we have that case or controversy.”). Thus, even actions for declaratory
relief, which by design permit pre-enforcement review, require the presence of an actual “case” or
“controversy.” United Trans. Union, 205 F.3d at 857; see also Orix Credit Alliance, 212 F.3d at 896
Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 6
(recognizing that although “applying the ripeness doctrine in the declaratory judgment context
presents a unique challenge . . . , a declaratory judgment action, like any other action, must be ripe
in order to be justiciable.”); Roark & Hardee LP v. City of Austin, 522 F.3d 533, 544 (5th Cir. 2008)
(“[A] ripeness inquiry is often required when a party is seeking pre-enforcement review of a law or
regulation.”).
III.
Analysis
A.
Federal Law Claim
As previously stated, Plaintiff is not alleging that the City has violated her constitutional
rights, but is instead asking the court to issue a declaratory judgment as to her substantive due
process right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment in the Sensitive Death Records, as well
as injunctive relief to prohibit the City from disclosing records in its possession. Having carefully
considered the pleadings, motion, response, reply, and applicable law, the court concludes that the
controversy Plaintiff seeks to resolve through a declaratory judgment and injunction is largely
hypothetical and speculative.
As Plaintiff acknowledges in her Complaint, and as set forth in Exhibit A to her Complaint,
supra, the City has not released any Sensitive Death Records and has promised to maintain their
confidentiality until the criminal investigation is concluded and to consider whether to release them
only after such time as the Texas Attorney General issues an open records decision specifying such
records are not exempt from disclosure under the Texas Public Information Act. The Sensitive
Death Records Plaintiff seeks to prohibit the City from releasing, and the certainty of the records
being released, are wholly unknown. A request for relief based on contentions regarding what the
Texas Attorney General may or may not decide once the issue arises is conjectural, and asks the
Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 7
court to provide an advisory opinion on a hypothetical situation. Otherwise stated, further factual
development is required, as Plaintiff’s request for declaratory judgment and associated injunctive
relief does not take into account or consider the potential that the Texas Attorney General may rule
that the records are confidential under Texas Government Code section 552.1085, in which case they
will not be disclosed. As such, this is a matter in which the remaining questions are not purely legal
ones. In addition, the court concludes that withholding a court decision at this time will not cause
a hardship to Plaintiff, as she may always seek relief once her claims are not speculative and the
factual record has been developed leaving only legal questions for the court to decide. For these
reasons, the court concludes that Plaintiff’s request for a declaratory judgment and injunction does
not present a justiciable controversy. Without a case or controversy, this court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal law claim. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed without
prejudice.2
B.
State Law Claims
Having dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff’s federal law claim as not yet ripe for
adjudication, the court now decides whether it will exercise jurisdiction over her state law claims.
A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed
all the claims over which it had original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).... In
cases where all of the federal claims are dismissed before trial, the general rule is that
a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if the court has
dismissed all claims over which it had [] jurisdiction.
Priester v. Lowndes County, 354 F.3d 414, 425 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). As this action is
in its early stages of litigation, the court can think of no legal harm or prejudice to Plaintiff if the
2
In light of the court’s determination that Plaintiff’s request for declaratory judgment and associated injunctive
relief under federal law is not ripe, it need not reach the City’s argument that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against
it for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 8
state law claims are handled by a state court. These claims present issues of state law that are better
decided by Texas courts. In the exercise of its discretion, the court declines to consider the merits
of Plaintiff’s state law claims, and instead dismisses without prejudice these claims. Plaintiff
remains free to file these claims in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (tolling state statute of
limitations for at least 30 days when court dismisses claim over which it declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction).
It is so ordered this 28th day of November, 2017.
_________________________________
Sam A. Lindsay
United States District Judge
Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 9
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