Randolph v. Dallas Independent School District et al

Filing 70

MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION re: 56 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff D.C.'s Deemed Admissions. The Court GRANTS Miles's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff D.C.'s Deemed Admissions (Doc. No. 57 ) and DISMISSES D.C.'s claim against Miles with prejudice. (Ordered by Judge Ada Brown on 1/14/2020) (aaa)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

D.C.,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; §
ALAN E. MILES, INDIVIDUALLY,
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Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-02981-E

MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION

Before the Court is Defendant Alan E. Miles’s Motion for Summary Judgment on

Plaintiff D.C.’s Deemed Admissions (Doc. No. 57). Having considered the motion, submissions,

and applicable law, the Court determines the motion should be granted for the following
reasons.

BACKGROUND

The following allegations are taken from D.C.’s First Amended Complaint. While a

student at Skyline High School in the Dallas Independent School District (DISD), D.C. was
assaulted by another student (Student 2) on campus.

Miles, a DISD police officer,

apprehended D.C. by “slanging him head first into lockers located in the hallway at the

school,” “plac[ing] D.C. into a chokehold with his forearm[,] and dragg[ing] D.C. several feet

down the hall and into a classroom.” D.C. was “held there,” where Miles “slammed [D.C.’s]

head against the desk.” Miles arrested D.C., who was charged with resisting arrest. The
apprehension and arrest “caused multiple contusions and bruised to D.C.’s neck, face,
forehead, and lips.”

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D.C. brought this action against Miles alleging claims for violations of D.C.’s Fourth

and Fifth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 17). 1 Miles filed a partial

motion to dismiss the Fifth Amendment-based section 1983 claim, and the Court granted the
motion (Doc. Nos. 27 & 37).

Miles subsequently served D.C. with requests for admission (Doc. No. 49-1; see also

Doc. No. 54). D.C. failed to timely respond to the requests, and Miles filed a motion to deem

matters admitted (Doc. No. 48). D.C. did not respond to the motion, which the Court granted

(Doc. No. 54), and D.C. has not moved to withdraw the admissions. Accordingly, the matters

in the requests for admission are deemed admitted and are conclusively established for
purposes of this action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36 and this Court’s Order (Doc.

No. 54). See FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(1), (a)(3), (b); 2 Murrell v. Casterline, 307 F. App’x 778, 780
(5th Cir. 2008) (deemed admission on essential issue can serve as basis for summary

judgment); Dukes v. S. Carolina Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 545, 548–49 (5th Cir. 1985).
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D.C. also sued DISD; the Court previously dismissed the claims against DISD (Doc. No. 38).
In pertinent part, Rule 36 provides:
(a) SCOPE AND PROCEDURE.

(1) Scope. A party may serve on any other party a written request to admit, for purposes of the
pending action only, the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1) related to: (A) facts,
the application of law to fact, or opinions about either; and (B) the genuineness of any described
documents.
***
(3) Time to Respond; Effect of Not Responding. A matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after being
served, the party to whom the request is directed serves on the requesting party a written answer
or objection addressed to the matter and signed by the party or its attorney. . . .

***
(b) EFFECT OF AN ADMISSION; WITHDRAWING OR AMENDING IT. A mater admitted under this rule is conclusively
established unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended. . . .

FED. R. CIV. P. 36.

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Among others, the following factual matters set out in Miles’s requests to D.C. are

admitted:

In October 2015, D.C. was involved in a physical altercation with Student 2 on the

campus of Skyline High School. Miles and another DISD police officer, Johanna Williams,

received a call about the fight and responded to the scene. Thereafter, D.C. attempted to start
a second fight with Student 2. To prevent the assault, Miles restrained D.C., who resisted by
pushing and shoving Miles and grabbing Miles by the throat. There were no lockers in the
“parking lot/courtyard” were the apprehension took place, and Miles did not “slang and/or
slam” D.C. into lockers during the apprehension.

Miles instructed D.C. to calm down and demanded that D.C. place his hands behind his

back. D.C. refused to comply, and Miles placed his left forearm around D.C.’s upper body and

“pulled,” but did not “drag,” D.C. to a school security office. This walk lasted less than fifteen

seconds, and there were no lockers in the hallway leading to the office. Miles continued to
try to subdue D.C., but D.C. continued to resist arrest. Miles and Williams were met by

campus officer Anthony Allen in the office, and Miles, with the assistance of Williams and

Allen, placed D.C. in handcuffs. Miles then arrested D.C. for disorderly conduct and resisting

arrest, search, or transport. Miles did not “slam” D.C. against a desk. D.C. was not injured
during the arrest, and his broken lip, neck and back pain, and contusions resulted from his
previous altercations with Student 2.

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Miles now has moved for summary judgment 3 on D.C.’s remaining Fourth

Amendment-based section 1983 claim, which alleges Miles used excessive force. Miles
asserts he is entitled to qualified immunity based on the deemed admissions.
LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows “there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 56(a); Norwegian Bulk Transp. A/S v. Int’l Marine Terminals Partnership, 520 F.3d 409, 411

(5th Cir. 2008). “A court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the

nonmoving party or, in other words, that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is

insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor.” Norwegian Bulk

Transp. A/S, 520 F.3d at 411–12 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

The “usual summary judgment burden of proof” is altered when the movant asserts a

qualified immunity defense. Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). When a

government official pleads qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to

demonstrate the defense’s inapplicability by “establishing a genuine fact issue as to whether

the official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law.” Brown, 537 F.3d
at 253; Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 194 (5th Cir. 2009). The court must view all

facts and reasonable inferences drawn from the record “in the light most favorable to” a

plaintiff opposing the motion, but the plaintiff cannot rest on conclusory allegations or

Miles also filed a motion to dismiss D.C.’s claim based on D.C.’s failure to comply with an order requiring him
to serve initial disclosures and responses to interrogatories and requests for production (Doc. No. 54). Because
the Court resolves D.C.’s claim on summary judgment, Miles’s motion to dismiss is denied as moot.

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assertions. Heinsohn v. Carabin & Shaw, P.C., 832 F.3d 224, 234 (5th Cir. 2016); Poole v. City
of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 630 (5th Cir. 2012).

ANALYSIS

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Courts
use a two-part test to determine if a government official is entitled to qualified immunity.

First, the court determines if the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Terry v.

Hubert, 609 F.3d 757, 761 (5th Cir. 2010). For an excessive force claim, “[t]he second prong
of the test ‘is better understood as two separate inquiries: whether the allegedly violated
constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the incident; and, if so, whether

the conduct of the defendant was objectively unreasonable in light of that then clearly

established law.’” Griggs v. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 313 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Tarver v. City
of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 750 (5th Cir. 2005)). Courts may decide which of the two prongs
should be decided first. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.

Miles contends the summary judgment evidence establishes he is entitled to qualified

immunity under both prongs of the defense. To overcome the defense, D.C. has the burden
to direct the Court to evidence establishing a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether

(1) Miles “violated a federal constitutional or statutory right or (2) the violated right was

clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Escarcega v. Jordan, 701 F. App’x
338, 341 (5th Cir. 2017).

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With respect to the first prong, D.C. alleges Miles violated his Fourth Amendment right

by using excessive force in apprehending and arresting him. To prevail on an excessive-force

claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of

force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly

unreasonable.” Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Elizondo v. Green,
671 F.3d 506, 510 (5th Cir. 2012)). His excessive force claim is “analyzed under the Fourth

Amendment's ‘objective reasonableness’ standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396

(1989). To determine the objective reasonableness of the force used, a court must balance

“the amount of force used against the need for that force, taking the perspective of a

reasonable officer on the scene without the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Poole, 691 F.3d at
628 (internal quotations omitted). Considerations include the severity of the offense,

whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and
whether the suspect resisted or attempted to evade arrest. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.

The summary judgment evidence precludes finding that Miles’s use of force was

clearly excessive. D.C. was attempting to assault Student 2 when Miles intervened. D.C.

resisted Miles’s efforts to restrain him verbally and physically by pushing and shoving Miles
and grabbing Miles by the throat. A reasonable officer present at the scene could have
perceived D.C.’s conduct as posing an immediate threat to the safety of Student 2 and Miles.
Indeed, D.C. admitted his conduct posed a serious threat to both Student 2 and Miles. D.C.
continued to resist efforts to restrain him, refusing to comply with Miles’s instructions to

calm down and place his hands behind his back. Miles then placed a forearm around D.C.’s

upper body and “pulled” D.C. to a school security office. D.C. continued to resist arrest, but
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Miles was able to place D.C. in handcuffs with the assistance of Williams and Allen. Viewed

objectively, the summary judgment evidence shows Miles reacted with “measured and
ascending” actions in his efforts to apprehend and arrest D.C. See Galvan v. City of San
Antonio, 435 F. App’x 309, 311 (5th Cir. 2010) (use of force involving “measured and
ascending responses” was reasonable when plaintiff resisted arrest).

D.C. alleged Miles “slanged” D.C. into lockers, slammed his head against a desk, placed

him into a “chokehold,” and dragged him “several feet” into a classroom, but the unsworn

allegations in his amended complaint are not summary judgment evidence. See Wallace v.
Tex. Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[P]leadings are not summary judgment
evidence.”). Further, the deemed admissions conclusively establish those events did not

occur. Balancing the amount of force used against the need for that force with “the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene without the 20/20 vision of hindsight,” see

Poole, 691 F.3d at 628, the Court concludes D.C. has failed to produce evidence showing

Miles’s actions were clearly excessive or unreasonable.

D.C. also is required to show he suffered an injury and the injury resulted “directly

and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive.” Stephenson v. McClelland, 632 F.
App’x 177, 184 (5th Cir. 2015). D.C.’s allegations that his apprehension and arrest “caused

multiple contusions and bruised to D.C.’s neck, face, forehead, and lips” do not constitute

competent summary judgment proof. See Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1047. And, D.C. admits that

none of his alleged injuries resulted from his interactions with Miles and, instead, were the
result of his altercations with Student 2. Without evidence of an injury or that any injury was

sustained as a result of his apprehension and arrest, D.C. cannot maintain an excessive force
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claim against Officer Miles. See Carlton v. Fearneyhough, No. 07-10676, 2008 WL 686595, at

*2 (5th Cir. Mar. 12, 2008) (when conceding he suffered no injury in defendant’s request for

admissions, plaintiff “failed to make out a prima facie case of an excessive force claim”).

By failing to demonstrate any evidence that Miles violated D.C.’s Fourth Amendment

right, D.C. cannot satisfy his burden of raising a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether

Miles is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the Court need not address the second
prong of the qualified immunity analysis.

CONCLUSION

D.C., by admitting facts demonstrating Miles’s conduct did not violate any of his

constitutional or statutory rights, fails to raise a genuine dispute of material fact on Miles’s

qualified immunity defense. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Miles’s Motion for Summary
Judgment on Plaintiff D.C.’s Deemed Admissions (Doc. No. 57) and DISMISSES D.C.’s claim

against Miles with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.

Signed January 14, 2020.

__________________________________________
ADA BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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