Stouffer et al v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The 30 motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Judgmentwill be entered for the defendant. (Ordered by Senior Judge A. Joe Fish on 2/19/2019) (zkc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

JOHN STOUFFER, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
VS.
J.P. MORGAN-CHASE BANK N.A.,
d/b/a CHASE,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:18-CV-0591-G

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is the motion of the defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
(“Chase”)* to dismiss the claims of the plaintiffs John Stouffer and Nancy Stouffer
(collectively, “the Stouffers”) (docket entry 30). For the reasons stated below, the
motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
This court’s memorandum opinion and order of December 12, 2018, granting
Chase’s motion to dismiss the Stouffers’ claims (1) pursuant to the Texas

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The plaintiffs incorrectly named JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as J.P.
Morgan-Chase Bank, N.A. d/b/a Chase. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (docket
entry 30) at 1.

Constitution with prejudice and (2) to quiet title without prejudice with leave to
replead, with more particularity, contains a detailed discussion of the facts of this
case. See generally Memorandum Opinion and Order (docket entry 26). On January
9, 2019, the Stouffers amended their complaint. See generally Plaintiff’s [sic] First
Amended Original Complaint (docket entry 29). On January 23, 2019, Chase filed a
second motion to dismiss the Stouffers’ claims against them on the ground that the
Stouffers have failed to state a cognizable claim pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
See generally Defendant’s Brief in Support of its Motion to Dismiss (docket entry 31).
The Stouffers did not respond to the motion.
II. ANALYSIS
“To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs must plead
‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” In re Katrina
Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1182
(2008). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not
need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). “Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all

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the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” In re Katrina
Canal, 495 F.3d at 205 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “The court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting Martin K. Eby Construction
Company, Inc. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court has prescribed a “two-pronged approach” to determine
whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). The court must “begin by identifying the pleadings
that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption
of truth.” Id. at 679. The court should then assume the veracity of any well-pleaded
allegations and “determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of
relief.” Id. The plausibility principle does not convert the Rule 8(a)(2) notice
pleading to a “probability requirement,” but “a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully” will not defeat a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678. The plaintiffs must
“plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “[W]here the well-pleaded
facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,
the complaint has alleged -- but it has not ‘show[n]’ -- ‘that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’” Id. at 679 (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). The

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court, drawing on its judicial experience and common sense, must undertake the
“context-specific task” of determining whether the plaintiffs’ allegations “nudge” their
claims against the defendant “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” See id.
at 679, 683.
The thrust of the motion is that the Stouffers have failed to state a claim upon
which this court could grant them relief. The court concludes that Chase has shown
that the Stouffers could prove no set of facts in support of their claims that would
entitle them to relief. Accordingly, the motion is granted.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Judgment
will be entered for the defendant.
SO ORDERED.
February 19, 2019.

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A. JOE FISH
Senior United States District Judge

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