Boyd v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART)

Filing 31

Order Accepting 20 Findings and Recommendations. The court denies as moot Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's race discrimination claims; denies Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's age discrimination claim; and grants in part and denies in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's retaliation claim ( Doc. 13 ). (Ordered by Judge Sam A Lindsay on 1/29/2019) (mla)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
RICHARD SHELTON BOYD,
Plaintiff,
v.
DALLAS AREA RAPID TRANSIT,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 3:18-CV-1326-L-BH

ORDER
Before the court is Defendant Dallas Area Rapid Transit’s (“Defendant” or “DART”)
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 13), filed July 26, 2018; Plaintiff Richard
Shelton Boyd’s (“Plaintiff” or “Boyd”) Response (Doc. 17), filed August 16, 2018; and DART’s
Reply (Doc. 19), filed August 30, 2018. On December 31, 2018, United States Magistrate Judge
Irma Carrillo Ramirez entered the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United
States Magistrate Judge (“Report”), recommending that the court deny as moot Defendant’s
motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s race discrimination claims; deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim based on a statute of limitations defense; and grant in part and
deny in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. On January 14, 2019,
Plaintiff filed Objections to the Report (Doc. 23).
In his Objections, Plaintiff states that he objects to “Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Retaliation
Claim, and further does herein formally Object to and provide Notice of Appeal to Dismissal of
Plaintiff’s Bus Accident Claim.” (Doc. 23 ¶ 9). Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s failure to provide any
accompanying factual or legal explanation for his objection, the objection is overruled as moot
to the extent that the magistrate judge declined to dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. The

Order – Page 1

magistrate judge, in denying in part and granting in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss, made
findings about which alleged incidents in Plaintiff’s pleadings constitute adverse employment
actions sufficient to support a retaliation claim. The magistrate judge determined that Plaintiff
sufficiently alleged a plausible claim of retaliation based on the March 21, 2018 incident, which
allegedly precipitated an adverse accusation being entered into his employment record and an
instruction by the DART Head of Dispatch that Plaintiff not call dispatch for any reason. (Doc. 20
at 15-16). The magistrate judge determined that these consequences of the March 21, 2018 incident
constituted adverse employment actions because the events could dissuade a reasonable employee
from filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) (Doc. 20 at 16). The magistrate judge concluded that these adverse consequences were
causally related to Plaintiff’s filing of his EEOC complaint based on a temporal relationship
between the two events. (Doc. 20 at 17). A few weeks prior to the March 21, 2018 incident,
Plaintiff, on March 2, 2018, filed his second charge of discrimination with the EEOC, claiming
that he had been harassed with a false accident charge and hearing in retaliation for filing an EEOC
charge in September 2017. (Doc. 2 at 9). Although the record did not clearly indicate the specific
dates on which DART entered accusations into Plaintiff’s employment record and instructed him
not to call dispatch, the magistrate judge concluded Plaintiff had pleaded sufficient facts to survive
the motion to dismiss, as a plaintiff is not required to establish a prima facie case of retaliation at
the pleading stage. (Doc. 20 at 11, 18) (citing Jenkins v. State Workforce Comm’n, 713 F. App’x
242, 245 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted)). In light of the less-stringent standard applied to pro
se complaints, the court agrees with the magistrate judge that Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a
retaliation claim based on factual allegations that, in retaliation for filing an EEOC complaint on
March 2, 2018, DART entered false accusations into his employment record regarding the March

Order – Page 2

21st incident and prohibited him from contacting dispatch, which interfered with his ability to
perform his job.
To the extent Plaintiff objects to the partial granting of Defendant’s motion to dismiss, * the
court overrules the objection as meritless, as Plaintiff failed to offer any argument in support. The
magistrate judge granted in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss the retaliation claim in so far as
the claim alleged that Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action when DART investigated
Plaintiff’s bus accident that occurred on October 21, 2017. The magistrate judge determined that
DART’s investigation into the October 21, 2017 bus accident, and the investigation’s conclusion
that the accident was preventable, did not constitute an adverse employment action because
Plaintiff did not allege he suffered any consequences following the outcome of that investigation.
(Doc. 20 14). The magistrate judge explained that “[a] record of infraction or ‘written reprimand,
without evidence of consequences, does not constitute an adverse employment action.’” (Doc. 20
at 14) (citing Thibodeaux-Woody v. Houston Cmty. Coll., 593 F. App’x 280, 286 (5th Cir. 2014)
(citation omitted)). In his Objections, Plaintiff does not properly address the magistrate judge’s
findings by alleging facts that he suffered adverse consequences as a result of the bus accident
investigation. As the court agrees with the Report’s conclusion and Plaintiff has failed to
adequately address it, the objection is overruled.
The court also notes, sua sponte, that the August 28, 2017 incident is not a sufficient basis
for Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, even though the Report does not explicitly address it. In his
Addendum to Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, on or around January 2017, he filed a complaint
against Manager Anthony Ragins (“Ragins”) with Ragins’s direct manager. (Doc. 11 at 2).
Plaintiff’s complaint related to Ragins’s accusations that he was “living” in the “quiet room,”

*

The court construes Plaintiff’s objection to the dismissal of the “Bus Accident Claim” as an objection to the
magistrate judge’s partial dismissal of his retaliation claim based on allegations relating to the bus accident.

Order – Page 3

which is a designated space for DART drivers to rest in between shifts. (Doc. 11 at 2). Plaintiff
was subsequently advised he was no longer allowed in the “quiet room.” (Doc. 11 at 2). He alleges
that he “requires rest due to his age, and all other employees are allowed to use the quiet room for
rest.” (Doc. 11 at 2). Plaintiff alleges that this incident is “part of his record and reviewed for raises
and career advancement.” (Doc. 11 at 3).
This incident does not constitute impermissible retaliation because Plaintiff’s complaint
regarding Ragins’s statements is not considered protected activity under the ADEA. To state a
prima facie retaliation claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),
a plaintiff must show “(1) that he engaged in a protected activity, (2) that there was an adverse
employment action, and (3) that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action.” Heggemier v. Caldwell County, Texas, 826 F.3d 861, 869 (5th Cir. 2016)
(citation omitted). With regard to the first element, a plaintiff has engaged in protected activity if
he has “opposed any practice” forbidden by the ADEA. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(d)). “Critically,
the plaintiff need not establish that the practice opposed was actually unlawful, but only that he
had a reasonable belief that the employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices.” Id.
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff has not alleged that, in making the complaint
against Ragins, he informed DART management that he felt Ragins’s accusations about his
“living” in the “quiet room” related to Plaintiff’s age. He has also not alleged that he told DART
management that his being barred from using the “quiet room” was an act of age discrimination.
Plaintiff’s complaint against Ragins gave the employer no notice that he was speaking up in
opposition to practices he perceived to be discriminatory and, thus, did not constitute protected
activity for purposes of establishing an ADEA claim. Gonzales v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Assoc.,
733 F. App’x 795, 798 (5th Cir. 2018) (“These complaints are not protected activities because they

Order – Page 4

did not reference discrimination or any other unlawful employment activity.”) (quotation marks
and citation omitted). The magistrate judge, accordingly, correctly did not construe this incident
as a proper basis for Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
Having reviewed the record in this case, Report, and applicable law, the court determines
that the findings and conclusions of the magistrate judge are correct, and accepts them, as
supplemented by this opinion, as those of the court. Accordingly, the court denies as moot
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s race discrimination claims; denies Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim; and grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claim (Doc. 13). The claims that remain for trial are
Plaintiff’s age discrimination and retaliation claims under the ADEA, to the extent that the
retaliation claim is based on adverse consequences resulting from the March 21, 2018 incident.
It is so ordered this 29th day of January, 2019.

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Sam A. Lindsay
United States District Judge

Order – Page 5