Calhoun v. State of WA DHS Child Support Division et al
Filing
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AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER SEVERING DEFENDANTS AND TRANSFERRING CASES: On July 2, 2018, Mr. Calhoun's claims against Defendants State of WA DHS Child Support Division and J. Stevenson will be transferred to the Western District of Wash ington; Mr. Calhoun's claims against Defendants Los Angeles County Division of Child Support and Sandra Gonzales will be transferred to the Western Division of the Central District of California; and Mr. Calhoun's claims against Defendants State of MN DHS Child Support Enforcement and Ashley L. Parker will be transferred to the Third Division of the District of Minnesota. If an objection is filed, the order of severance and transfer is stayed pending further order of the Court. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge David L. Horan on 6/11/2018) (rekc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
RHOME J. CALHOUN,
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§
Plaintiff,
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V.
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STATE OF WA DHS CHILD SUPPORT §
DIVISION; LOS ANGELES COUNTY
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DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT; and §
STATE OF MN DHS CHILD SUPPORT §
ENFORCEMENT, ET AL.,
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Defendants.
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No. 3:18-cv-1477-N-BN
AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER SEVERING
DEFENDANTS AND TRANSFERRING CASES
Plaintiff Rhome J. Calhoun, who currently resides in Dallas, Texas, brings this
pro se action, ostensibly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, attacking child support judgments
entered against him in Washington, California, and Minnesota. See Dkt. Nos. 3 & 4.
United States District Judge David C. Godbey has referred this action to the
undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b) and a standing order of reference.
Mr. Calhoun asserts that the state judgments entered against him are each void
because each was signed “Coram Non Judice.” Dkt. No. 3 at 1; see id. at 2 (“I am asking
this Court to protect my U.S. Constitutional 14th and 4th Amendment rights by ordering
these three agencies to vacate and close the orders that were opened ‘Coram Non
Judice.’ I am also asking to be refunded the full amount that has been seized from me
and my family in the amount of $108,434.48. I am also asking that my U.S. Passport
rights be restored, to have Minnesota DHS Child Support Enforcement to stop
reporting a debt to TransUnion and Equifax and to cease and desist from all
communication with me and my current and future employers through Withholding
Orders.”).
To begin, Mr. Calhoun’s claims may be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
under which
“federal district courts, as courts of original jurisdiction, lack appellate
jurisdiction to review, modify, or nullify final orders of state courts.” The
doctrine applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.”
Mosley v. Bowie Cty., Tex., 275 F. App’x 327, 329 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting,
first Weekly v. Morrow, 204 F.3d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 2000), and then Exxon Mobil Corp.
v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).
“Federal courts have consistently applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as a bar
to federal jurisdiction over matters related to the family disputes of divorce and child
support.” Evans v. Williamson Cty. Gov’t, No. A-15-CV-436-SS, 2015 WL 4621449, at
*4 (W.D. Tex. May 28, 2015) (collecting cases), rec. accepted, 2015 WL 4624708 (W.D.
Tex. July 31, 2015); see, e.g., Glatzer v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 108 F. App’x 204, 2004
WL 2091406, at *1 (5th Cir. Sept. 20, 2014) (per curiam) (affirming “the district court’s
application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine” to a plaintiff’s constitutional claims
implicating a California custody and child support order because those claims were
“inextricably intertwined with the state court order” (citations omitted)).
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But the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has recognized that,
“[u]nder some circumstances, a federal court may review the state court record to
determine if the judgment is void.” Mosley, 275 F. App’x at 329 (citing United States
v. Shepherd, 23 F.3d 923, 925 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1994), which held that a Texas judgment
is only void if “the rendering court (1) lacked jurisdiction over the party or his property;
(2) lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit; (3) lacked jurisdiction to
enter the particular judgment rendered; or (4) lacked the capacity to act as a court”).
Mr. Calhoun arguably raises at least the last point in this action. Cf. id. (noting
that the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction is not triggered by “claims
of constitutional violations in the enforcement of [ ] state child support judgment[s
that] do not involve” determining “which parent should receive custody, what rights
the noncustodial parent should have, how much child support should be paid and
under what conditions, or whether a previous court’s determination on these matters
should be modified”).
Because Mr. Calhoun has brought a pro se action that, based solely on the face
of the complaint as filed, may not be barred – or at least clearly barred – under either
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or the domestic relations exception, the Court determines
that the fairest course of action is to sever his claims into three separate suits and to
transfer each suit to the proper venue.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure “21 establishes that, ‘On motion or on its own,
the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.’ FED R. CIV. P. 21. Since
Rule 21 does not provide any standards by which district courts can determine if
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parties are misjoined, courts have looked to Rule 20 for guidance.” Acevedo v. Allsup’s
Convenience Stores, Inc., 600 F.3d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 523 F.2d 1073, 1079 (9th
Cir. 1975)). Applicable here, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2)(B) provides that
defendants “may be joined in one action” if “any question of law or fact common to all
defendants will arise in the action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2)(B). While Mr. Calhoun may
be claiming that each state judgment is void because each was entered coram non
judice, this thematic assertion necessarily raises legal issues that are unique to the
validity of each judgment, which prevents the Court from concluding that Mr. Calhoun
has shown that there are questions of law common to all defendants under Rule 20.
Therefore, this action will be severed into one action for each state judgment.
And, since this action has been filed in the wrong district, each new action will be
transferred to the district and, where applicable, the division in which it could have
been brought.
Venue in a civil rights action is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). See Davis v. La.
State Univ., 876 F.2d 412, 413 (5th Cir. 1989). This statute provides that venue is
proper in the judicial district: (1) where the defendant resides; (2) where a substantial
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; or (3) if there is no
district where the action may otherwise be brought, in any judicial district in which
any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
The Court may transfer a case to any proper judicial district or division “for the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice,” id. § 1404(a); see also
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Hardwick v. Brinson, 523 F.2d 798, 800 n.2 (5th Cir. 1975), or may transfer a case filed
in the wrong district or division “to any district or division in which it could have been
brought,” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). A district court may raise the issue of venue sua sponte.
See Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 886 F.2d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Empty
Barge Lines II, Inc. v. DREDGE LEONARD FISHER, 441 F. Supp. 2d 786, 789 (E.D.
Tex. 2006) (collecting cases).
Accordingly, under Sections 1391(b)(1) and (2), and consistent with the
undersigned’s authority granted by Rule 2(a)(3) of the Court’s Miscellaneous Order No.
6, on July 2, 2018,
•
Mr. Calhoun’s claims against Defendants State of WA DHS Child
Support Division and J. Stevenson – the address of these defendants
provided by Mr. Calhoun being in Everett, Washington, see Dkt. No. 4 at
1, in Snohomish County – will be transferred to the Western District of
Washington, see 28 U.S.C. § 128(a);
•
Mr. Calhoun’s claims against Defendants Los Angeles County Division of
Child Support and Sandra Gonzales – the address of these defendants
provided by Mr. Calhoun being in Commerce, California, see Dkt. No. 4
at 1, in Los Angeles County – will be transferred to the Western Division
of the Central District of California, see 28 U.S.C. § 84(c)(2); and
•
Mr. Calhoun’s claims against Defendants State of MN DHS Child
Support Enforcement and Ashley L. Parker – the address of these
defendants provided by Mr. Calhoun being in Stillwater, Minnesota, see
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Dkt. No. 4 at 1, in Washington County – will be transferred to the Third
Division of the District of Minnesota, see 28 U.S.C. § 103(3).
This 21-day period affords Mr. Calhoun an opportunity to file an objection to
Judge Godbey within 14 days after being served with a copy of this order. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 72(a).
If an objection is filed, the order of severance and transfer is stayed pending
further order of the Court.
This amended memorandum opinion and order supercedes the memorandum
opinion and order entered earlier today, before the Court received clarification from
Mr. Calhoun concerning the defendants named.
SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 11, 2018
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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