Jones v. Dallas County

Filing 29

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON POST-REMAND SCREENING, GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND, SPECIFYING FURTHER ACTION BY THE CLERK, AND REQUIRING SERVICE BY THE MARSHAL: The Court will therefore GRANT the motions to amend [Dkt. Nos. 26 , 28 ] and SERVE this a ction on the County. And, because the Court previously granted Jones leave to proceed in forma pauperis under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, see Dkt. Nos. 6 , 7 , the Court now ORDERS, under Section 1915(d) and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3) and 4(j)(2), that the Clerk of the Court issue summons and that the United States Marshal serve process (to include Dkt. Nos. 3 , 22 , 25 - 28 . (Ordered by Magistrate Judge David L. Horan on 9/16/2022) (oyh)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
KYLE DAMOND JONES,
Plaintiff,
V.
DALLAS COUNTY,
Defendant.

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No. 3:21-cv-37-L-BN

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON POST-REMAND SCREENING,
GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND, SPECIFYING FURTHER ACTION BY
THE CLERK, AND REQUIRING SERVICE BY THE MARSHAL
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the Court’s
judgment dismissing Plaintiff Kyle Damond Jones’s complaint and remanded,
concluding that “Jones has sufficiently alleged a due process claim because he alleged
he was a pretrial detainee who was not separated from convicted detainees when
security and space in the County permit separation.” Jones v. Dall. Cnty., No. 2110617, 2022 WL 3334493 (5th Cir. Aug. 12, 2022) (citing Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d
1364, 1376 (5th Cir. Jan. 1981) (en banc), overruled on other grounds, Int’l
Woodworkers of Am. v. Champion Int’l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc)).
The Fifth Circuit entered judgment and issued its mandate, see Dkt. No. 23,
and United States District Judge Sam A. Lindsay “recommit[ted] this action to the
undersigned United States magistrate judge for further screening and proceedings
consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s opinion and instructions,” Dkt. No. 24; see also 28
U.S.C. § 636(b).
On September 8, 2022, the Court entered an order laying out legal standards

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applicable to civil rights claims against a municipality, such as the County, requiring
that Jones file an amended complaint. See Dkt. No. 25. The same day, the Clerk
docketed Jones’s Motion to Amend Complaint [Dkt. No. 26], and, consistent with the
order entered September 13, 2022 [Dkt. No. 27], Jones filed a second motion to amend
on September 14, 2022, explaining that his amended complaint is incorporated into
the second motion, see Dkt. No. 28.
“A person may sue a municipality that violates his or her constitutional rights
‘under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.’” Hutcheson v.
Dall. Cnty., Tex., 994 F.3d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983; citing
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)).
At the pleading stage, a plaintiff alleging a Monell claim “has two burdens: to
[plausibly allege] (1) that a constitutional violation occurred and (2) that a municipal
policy was the moving force behind the violation.” Sanchez v. Young Cnty., Tex., 956
F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
So, “[i]n municipal-liability cases,” the threshold question “is whether the
complained-of ‘act may fairly be said to represent official policy.’” Id. at 792-93
(cleaned up; quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694); see also Hutcheson, 994 F.3d at 483
(rejecting the argument that a district court errs by dismissing a Monell claim
without first analyzing the underlying constitutional violation). Cf. Jones, 2022 WL
3334493, at *3 n.3 (“granting Jones leave to file an amended complaint” and observing
that the Court’s “first dismissal did not put him on notice that his claim might have
failed on Monell grounds”).

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A plaintiff may proceed on a Monell claim only by
identify[ing] “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker
can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a
constitutional violation whose moving force is that policy (or custom).”
Pineda v. City of Hous., 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up).
Municipalities are not liable “on the theory of respondeat superior” and
are “almost never liable for an isolated unconstitutional act on the part
of an employee.” Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th
Cir. 2009).
Hutcheson, 994 F.3d at 482; see also Brown v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 985 F.3d 489, 497
& n.11 (5th Cir. 2021) (noting that where a plaintiff’s claim fails as to one prong, a
court “need not consider whether [his] claim also fails the other two Monell prongs”
(citing Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161, 168-69 (5th Cir. 2010))).
Solely for the purpose of screening, the Court finds that Jones has alleged
liability based on what he claims to be the official policy of the County. Cf. Jones,
2022 WL 3334493, at *3 (“[U]nder a liberal construction of his complaint and
subsequent filings, [Jones] has made clear that his claim is brought under the due
process clause, that he, as a pretrial detainee, was not separated from convicted
detainees, and that the remedy is to separate pretrial detainees from convicted
detainees. He also alleges the County has the space and facilities to separate pretrial
detainees from convicted detainees. These allegations are sufficient to allege a due
process claim that withstands screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).”);
Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 420 n.5 (5th Cir. 2017) (“In
affirming the district court’s dismissal, we do not rely on the district court’s
observation that ‘the housing of convicted inmates with pretrial detainees is not per
se unconstitutional.’ Housing pretrial detainees with DOC inmates is a violation of
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their rights ‘unless such a practice is reasonably related to the institution’s interest
in maintaining jail security or physical facilities do not permit their separation.’
Diamond, 636 F.2d at 1374. Alderson has alleged a violation of the rule against
housing pretrial detainees with DOC inmates, and nothing suggests that an
exception to the rule applies.” (emphasis added)).
The Court will therefore GRANT the motions to amend [Dkt. Nos. 26, 28] and
SERVE this action on the County. And, because the Court previously granted Jones
leave to proceed in forma pauperis under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, see Dkt.
Nos. 6, 7, the Court now ORDERS, under Section 1915(d) and Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 4(c)(3) and 4(j)(2), that the Clerk of the Court issue summons and that the
United States Marshal serve process (to include Dkt. Nos. 3, 22, 25-28) as follows:
Dallas County Judge Clay Jenkins
500 Elm Street, Suite 7000
Dallas, TX 75202
A courtesy copy of this order shall be provided to:
J.G. Schuette
Dallas County District Attorney
Federal Litigation Division
500 Elm Street, Suite 6300
Dallas, TX 75202
Email: [e-mail]
After docketing of this order, this case will remain referred to the undersigned
for further pretrial management.
SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 16, 2022
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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