M. v. Joshua Independent School District

Filing 8

Memorandum Opinion and Order denying 3 Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. (Ordered by Chief District Judge David C Godbey on 11/16/2022) (ykp)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
R.M.,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOSHUA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-1789-N

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This Order addresses Defendant Joshua Independent School District’s (“Joshua
ISD”) motion to dismiss [3]. Because Plaintiff R.M. pled facts sufficient to state a claim
for intentional discrimination under section 504, the Court denies the motion.
I. ORIGINS OF THE MOTION
This case arises out of a dispute regarding the alleged failure to provide educational
accommodations to a fifteen-year-old student with an intellectual disability. Compl. ¶ 1
[1]. During R.M.’s time in elementary school, Joshua ISD provided special education
services at her home campus and placed her with other students who could act as positive
behavioral models. Id. ¶ 2. When R.M. entered middle school in the fall of 2021, Joshua
ISD placed her in a functional academics classroom at a different campus catering to
students who had behavioral difficulties. Id. ¶ 4. Although R.M. typically does not exhibit
behavioral issues, exposure to misbehaving peers disrupts R.M.’s stable growth. Id.
R.M.’s parents removed her from special education and petitioned Joshua ISD for
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accommodations under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id. ¶ 5. R.M.’s
parents asked to place her in the home campus with appropriate support and
accommodations to facilitate her education. Id. Joshua ISD’s counterproposal would place
R.M. in the functional academics classroom in her home campus. Id. R.M.’s parents
rejected this proposal. Id. R.M. remained in the general education program without
accommodations or services. Id.
In August 2021, R.M.’s parents filed an administrative due process complaint
pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) based on Joshua
ISD’s failures to provide appropriate services. Id. ¶ 6. The administrative hearing officer
dismissed the claims on the basis that R.M.’s removal from special education deprived the
officer of jurisdiction to hear the complaint. Id. ¶ 6. R.M. struggled academically during
the 2021-2022 academic year due to the lack of appropriate support. Id. ¶ 19. R.M., by
and through her next friends, D.M. and R.R., filed suit seeking injunctive relief to place
R.M. in her home campus in the general education program with appropriate
accommodations, compensatory educational hours, and costs and fees. Joshua ISD now
moves to dismiss R.M.’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
II. Rule 12(b)(6) LEGAL STANDARD
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must determine whether
the plaintiff has asserted a legally sufficient claim for relief. Blackburn v. City of Marshall,
42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). “When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a district court
must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as . . . documents incorporated into the
complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Funk v.
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Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). A
viable complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). To meet this “facial
plausibility” standard, a plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court generally accepts well-pleaded facts as true
and construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Gines v. D.R.
Horton, Inc., 699 F.3d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 2012). But a plaintiff must provide “more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). “Factual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that
all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (internal citations
omitted).
III. THE COURT DENIES THE MOTION TO DISMISS
The Court denies Joshua ISD’s motion to dismiss because R.M.’s parents did not
refuse to consent to services, and R.M. has sufficiently pled intentional discrimination
under section 504.
A. R.M.’s Parents Did Not Refuse to Consent to
Services Under IDEA and Section 504
Joshua ISD argues that because R.M.’s parents revoked their consent, R.M. did not
qualify for services under IDEA or the section 504 program. Mot. to Dismiss 3 [3] (citing
34 C.F.R. § 300.300). At this stage of litigation, the Court must construe the allegations
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regarding the declination of services in R.M.’s favor. Gines, 699 F.3d at 816. The
complaint states that R.M.’s parents “refused the proposal,” and R.M. “was forced to attend
the general education classroom”; the Court infers that R.M.’s parents intended to continue
negotiations over the appropriate accommodations and did not decline section 504 services
altogether. Compl. ¶ 17. Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to dismiss.
B. R.M. Sufficiently Pleads Intentional Discrimination Under Section 504
Joshua ISD further argues that the complaint’s allegations regarding intentional
discrimination are conclusory. The Court disagrees. The complaint provides a litany of
details to support the allegation of intentional discrimination. Joshua ISD provided
services to R.M. at her home campus in general education classrooms throughout
elementary school and presumably had knowledge of her stable educational development.
See id. ¶ 14. But Joshua ISD provided R.M.’s parents no basis for changing this framework
that benefited R.M. for many years. Id. ¶ 15. Joshua ISD provided no explanation before
removing R.M. from the home campus where her siblings and friends would attend school
or moving her to a functional academics classroom for students with behavioral difficulties.
When R.M.’s parents raised these concerns and asked for appropriate accommodations
through a separate program, Joshua ISD proposed the same allegedly problematic
framework. Id. ¶ 17. The Court can infer bad faith and gross misjudgment from the sudden
changes, lack of explanation, insistence on the same plan despite parental concerns, and
the refusal to negotiate or compromise.
Furthermore, the Court is not persuaded by Joshua ISD's argument that Fifth Circuit
precedent undermines R.M’s claims. The Fifth Circuit has allowed placement on campuses
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with centralized services in cases where the “child may have to travel farther … to obtain
better services.” Flour Bluff Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Katherine M., 91 F.3d 689, 695 (5th Cir.
1996). But R.M. alleges that Joshua ISD decided to move R.M. to a separate campus solely
for the district’s convenience rather than any benefit to R.M. Compl. ¶ 15. Construing the
complaint in R.M.’s favor, the Court can infer that the district’s decision demonstrated bad
faith and gross misjudgment. Accordingly, R.M. has pled sufficient facts to state a claim
for intentional discrimination under section 504.
CONCLUSION
Because R.M. has pled facts sufficient to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the
Court denies the motion to dismiss.

Signed November 16, 2022.
___________________________
David C. Godbey
Chief United States District Judge

ORDER – PAGE 5