Matthews v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration et al

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The Commissioner applied the correct legal standard in evaluating Plaintiff's claim for DAC benefits, and his decision that Plaintiff failed to establish a disability during the relevant time is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Rebecca Rutherford on 3/11/2025) (kcr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
ERVIE TERRELL M.,
Plaintiff,

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v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

Case No. 3:23-cv-02602-BT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Ervie Terrell M.’s 1 civil action seeking
judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of a final decision by the
Commissioner of Social Security denying his application for disabled adult child
(DAC) benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”). Pl.’s Am.
Compl., ECF No. 12. The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by
the undersigned for all proceedings. See Special Order No. 3-350 (N.D. Tex. Sep.
11, 2023); see also ECF No. 9. For the reasons explained below, the Court
AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision.
Background
Plaintiff filed his application for DAC benefits on his deceased father’s
earnings record in August 2021. Admin. R., ECF No. 16-1 at 196. 2 Plaintiff, who has
1 The Court uses only Plaintiff’s first name and last initial as instructed by the

May 1, 2018, Memorandum Re: Privacy Concern Regarding Social Security and
Immigration Opinions issued by the Committee on Court Administration and Case
Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
2 Citations to the record refer to the CM/ECF page numbers at the top of each page
rather than page numbers at the bottom of each filing.
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a tenth-grade education, alleges that he was disabled as a result of paranoid
schizophrenia beginning June 1, 1977, shortly before he turned 22 years old—on
August 24, 1977. Admin. R., ECF No. 16-1 at 196, 210-11. Since 2009, Plaintiff has
filed multiple applications for DAC benefits on the earnings record of his deceased
father. Admin. R., ECF No. 16-1 at 40-41, 52, 57. Plaintiff has been receiving adult
disability insurance benefits on his own earnings record since 1984. Admin. R.,
ECF No. 16-1 at 40.
Plaintiff’s claim for DAC benefits was denied initially and upon
reconsideration. Admin. R., ECF No. 16-1 at 56, 70. Thereafter, Plaintiff requested
a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), explicitly requesting that his
prison records from the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) be obtained.
Admin. R., ECF No. 16-1 at 15-16. The ALJ conducted a telephonic administrative
hearing on May 1, 2023. 3 Admin. R., ECF No. 16-1 at 26-38. At the hearing, the
ALJ advised Plaintiff he would subpoena the medical records from the TDCJ.
Admin. R., ECF No. 16-1 at 16, 34-35. In the subpoena, the ALJ requested
“Medical/Treatment Records.” Admin. R., ECF No. 16-1 at 16, 183. By letter dated
May 10, 2023, in response to the subpoena, the ALJ was informed that Plaintiff’s
medical records/“protected health information” since July 17, 1977, had been
destroyed in accordance with TDCJ Health Services Policy. Admin. R., ECF No. 161 at 16, 186-87.

3 Due to circumstances presented by the COVID-19 pandemic, the ALJ was unable

to conduct the hearing by video. Admin. R., ECF No. 16-1 at 15.
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In his written decision, issued on June 26, 2023, the ALJ found Plaintiff was
not disabled under the Act prior to August 24, 1977, when he attained the age of
22, and, therefore, not entitled to DAC benefits on the earnings record of his
deceased father. Admin. R., ECF No. 16-1 at 21. Utilizing the five-step sequential
evaluation, 4 the ALJ first found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity from June 1, 1977, his alleged onset date, through the date of the
ALJ’s decision. Admin. R., ECF No. 16-1 at 18-19. At the second step, the ALJ found
that there were “no medical signs or laboratory findings to substantiate the
existence of a medically determinable severe impairment prior to August 24, 1977,
the date the claimant attained age 22.” Admin. R., ECF No. 16-1 at 21. Because the
ALJ determined at step two that Plaintiff was not disabled, he ended the inquiry at
step two and denied the Plaintiff’s application for DAC benefits. Admin. R., ECF
No. 16-1 at 21.

“In evaluating a disability claim, the [ALJ] conducts a five-step sequential
analysis to determine whether (1) the [plaintiff] is presently working; (2) the
[plaintiff] has a severe impairment; (3) the impairment meets or equals an
impairment listed in appendix 1 of the social security regulations; (4) the
impairment prevents the [plaintiff] from doing past relevant work; and (5) the
impairment prevents the [plaintiff] from doing any other substantial gainful
activity.” Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 447-48 (5th Cir. 2007). The plaintiff
bears the initial burden of establishing a disability through the first four steps of
the analysis; at the fifth step, the burden shifts to the ALJ to show that there is
other substantial work in the national economy that the plaintiff can perform. Id.
at 448; Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
A finding that the plaintiff is disabled or not disabled at any point in the five-step
review is conclusive and terminates the analysis. Copeland, 771 F.3d at 923 (citing
Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995)); Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d
55, 58 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing Barajas v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 641, 643 (5th Cir. 1984)
(per curiam)).
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Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s 2023 decision and submitted
additional evidence to the Appeals Council. Admin. R., ECF No. 16-1 at 5, 9. The
Appeals Council found that the appeal did not provide a basis for modifying the
ALJ’s decision. Admin. R., ECF No. 16-1 at 5-8. Thereafter, Plaintiff, proceeding
pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this case.
Legal Standards
A. DAC Benefits
Every child of an individual entitled to old-age or disability insurance
benefits is entitled to DAC benefits, if the child was unmarried and under a
disability that began before she attained the age of 22 and was dependent upon the
insured individual at the time of death or, if the individual is living, at the time the
application was filed. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1). Where the claimant is 18 years or
older, as here, such benefits are referred to as DAC benefits. Fabian v. Berryhill,
734 F. App’x 239, 242 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.350(a)).
An adult child claimant is “disabled” under the Act if, during the relevant
time period, she was unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
B. Standard of Review
The Court’s “review of Social Security disability cases ‘is limited to two
inquiries: (1) whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence on the
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record as a whole, and (2) whether the [ALJ] applied the proper legal standard.’”
Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Perez v. Barnhart,
415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005)). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971); see Copeland, 771 F.3d at 923 (“Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla and less than a preponderance.”).
The ALJ, and not the courts, resolves conflicts in the evidence; the Court
may not “reweigh the evidence or try the issues de novo.” Martinez v. Chater, 64
F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Hence, the Court may not substitute its
own judgment for the ALJ’s, and it may affirm only on the grounds that the
Commissioner stated to support her decision. Copeland, 771 F.3d at 923. If the
Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, the findings are
conclusive, and the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed. Martinez, 64 F.3d
at 173. A reviewing court must defer to the ALJ’s decision when substantial
evidence supports it, even if the court would reach a different conclusion based on
the evidence in the record. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995).
Nevertheless, the substantial evidence review is not an uncritical “rubber
stamp” and requires “more than a search for evidence supporting the [ALJ’s]
findings.” Hill v. Saul, 2020 WL 6370168, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2020) (quoting
Martin v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1027, 1031 (5th Cir. 1984)), adopted by, 2020 WL
6363878 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2020) (Lindsay, J.). The Court “must scrutinize the
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record and take into account whatever fairly detracts from the substantiality of the
evidence supporting” the ALJ’s decision. Id. (quoting Martin, 748 F.2d at 1031). A
no-substantial-evidence finding is appropriate only if there is a “conspicuous
absence of credible choices” or “no contrary medical evidence.” Id. (citation
omitted).
Analysis
As succinctly summarized by the Commissioner, the general issue before the
Court “is whether substantial evidence and relevant legal standards support the
Commissioner’s decision that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act prior to
August 24, 1977, the date he attained age 22.” Def.’s Br., ECF No. 21 at 1. As
previously explained, in reaching the conclusion that Plaintiff was not disabled
during the relevant time period, the ALJ found that no medical record evidence
showed a medically determinable impairment prior to age 22. See Admin. R., ECF
No. 16-1 at 21.
Liberally construed, Plaintiff raises two specific issues for review. First, he
contends the ALJ erred when he issued a subpoena to obtain Plaintiff’s
medical/treatment records instead of his “entire prison record folder.” See Pl.’s
Am. Compl., ECF No. 12; Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 18. Second, Plaintiff contends that
evidence he submitted to the Court warrants remand. See Pl.’s Additional
Attachments to Compl., ECF No. 8; Pl.’s Am. Compl., ECF No. 12. In response, the
Commissioner argues that Plaintiff “has failed to establish that substantial

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evidence does not support the ALJ’s decision, or that the ALJ made an error of
law.” Def.’s Br., ECF No. 21 at 7. For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees.
A. The ALJ did not err in issuing a subpoena to obtain medical/treatment
records rather than Plaintiff’s “entire prison record folder.”
At the administrative hearing, the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s multiple
requests for the agency to obtain his prison records, and more specifically, for the
ALJ to subpoena records since July 17, 1977, from the TDCJ. Admin. R., ECF No.
16-1 at 16, 19, 30, 32, 126, 251-55, 272, 291-92, 298, 300; Admin. R., ECF No. 16-2
at 1. In the subpoena, the ALJ requested “Medical/Treatment Records from July
17, 1977” and “any other evidence . . . relating to the above matter.” Admin. R., ECF
No. 16-1 at 16, 183. By a letter dated May 10, 2023, the ALJ was informed that
Plaintiff’s medical records/“protected health information” since July 17, 1977, had
been destroyed in accordance with TDCJ Health Services Policy. Admin. R., ECF
No. 16-1 at 16, 186-87.
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ did not issue the proper subpoena to obtain his
“entire prison record folder,” and he states the entire folder would show the
“beginning of” his disability, or that he “started treatment for mental health” prior
to August 24, 1977. See Pl.’s Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 at 4-6; see also Admin. R.,
ECF No. 16-1 at 80-81, 126, 189-92, 254, 291-92; Admin. R., ECF No. 16-2 at 11.
Plaintiff further maintains that his “entire prison record folder” would provide
evidence of his behavior, discipline, diagnosis, “who was [sic] doctor when
treatment began,” and that he worked “a job that was set aside for inmate [sic] with
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medical.” See Pl.’s Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 at 5; see also Admin. R., ECF No. 16-1
at 79-80, 192; Admin. R., ECF No. 16-2 at 22-24.
Plaintiff misunderstands the ALJ’s obligations to develop the record. It is
true that “[t]he ALJ owes a duty to a claimant to develop the record fully and fairly
to ensure that his decision is an informed decision based on sufficient facts.” Brock
v. Chater, 84 F.3d 726, 728 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). But, as the
Commissioner points out in her response, “Plaintiff’s contention overlooks the
fundamental requirement to obtain disability benefits is for him to provide medical
evidence of disability during the relevant period.” Def.’s Br., ECF No. 21 at 4 (citing
20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a)). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521 (“Your impairment(s) must
result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities than can be
shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.
Therefore, a physical or mental impairment must be established by objective
medical evidence from an acceptable medical source.”).
Here, the ALJ advised Plaintiff at the hearing that he “could not find the
claimant disabled without adequate medical records to support his claim.” Admin.
R., ECF No. 16-1 at 16, 33-35, 37. And, the ALJ specifically stated that he had “fully
complied with the duty to fully and fairly develop the record.” Admin. R., ECF No.
16-1 at 16. Upon review of the entire record, the Court finds that, in accordance
with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(b) and Social Security Ruling (SSR) 17-4p, the ALJ made
every reasonable effort to help Plaintiff obtain medical evidence from his own
medical sources and entities, including resorting to the use of a subpoena. See 20
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C.F.R. § 404.1512(b) (explaining the agency’s responsibility for obtaining
evidence); SSR 17-4P, 2017 WL 4736894, at *5 (explaining the agency’s duty to
assist claimants in developing written evidence).
For these reasons, the Court determines that Plaintiff has failed to show that
the ALJ made a legal error or violated agency policy in requesting Plaintiff’s
medical/treatment records, rather than his “entire prison record file.”
Further, the Fifth Circuit has consistently held that reversal for an alleged
failure to adequately develop the record is warranted only where a claimant can
show that he was prejudiced. See Brock, 84 F.3d at 728-29 (citation omitted). In
the absence of a showing of prejudice on the part of the claimant, an administrative
decision should not be reversed. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009)
(reversal of an administrative decision on account of error is not automatic, but
requires a determination of prejudice). Here, the Court agrees with the
Commissioner that Plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating prejudice by
showing that further developing the record to obtain his “entire prison record
folder” “could and would have adduced evidence that might have altered the
result.” See Brock, 84 F.3d at 728-29 (citation omitted); see also Jones v. Astrue,
691 F.3d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 2012) (“A mere allegation that beneficial evidence might
have been gathered . . . is insufficient to meet this burden [to show that prejudice
resulted from an error].”). 5

5 Even assuming the ALJ could have obtained Plaintiff’s “entire prison record

folder” by subpoena, Plaintiff has stated that folder would not contain medical
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B. Additional evidence Plaintiff submitted to this Court does not warrant
remand.
With his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff submitted a May 15, 2015 letter from
Kayla Strange at North Texas State Hospital and an August 26, 2013 “Individual
Treatment History Report” from Terrell State Hospital. See Pl.’s Am. Compl., ECF
No. 12 at 7-8. Plaintiff also attached these records to his Original Complaint. See
Pl.’s Additional Attachments to Compl., ECF No. 8 at 2-3.
The Commissioner argues that this additional evidence does not warrant
remand. Def.’s Br., ECF No. 21 at 5. The Court agrees.
The ALJ considered these additional records. See Admin. R., ECF No. 16-1
at 19-20; Admin. R., ECF No. 16-2 at 2-3. Upon review, he correctly noted, “[t]he
dates of admission in both facilities are well after the date the claimant attained
age 22 on August 24, 1977.” Admin. R., ECF No. 16-1 at 20.
To warrant remand, evidence must first be “new” and not merely cumulative
of what is already in the record. Pierre v. Sullivan, 884 F.2d 799, 803 (5th Cir.
1989). In addition, “the evidence must be ‘material’; it must be relevant, probative,
and likely to have changed the outcome of the Secretary’s determination.” Id.

records for the relevant period prior to August 24, 1977. Admin. R., ECF No. 16-1
at 190-93; id. at 191 (“Please don[’]t send for medical records[.] There or none[.]”
[sic]). In addition, as previously noted, in response to the subpoena, the ALJ was
informed that Plaintiff’s medical records/“protected health information” since
July 17, 1977, was destroyed in accordance with TDCJ Health Services Policy.
Admin. R., ECF No. 16-1 at 186-87.
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Because Plaintiff provided evidence to the Court that was cumulative of
evidence in the record the ALJ considered, that evidence does not warrant remand.
In any event, this evidence is not material, as it does nothing to establish that
Plaintiff was disabled prior to August 24, 1977, when he turned 22. As such, this
additional evidence does not warrant remand.
Conclusion
The Commissioner applied the correct legal standard in evaluating Plaintiff’s
claim for DAC benefits, and his decision that Plaintiff failed to establish a disability
during the relevant time is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the
Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
March 11, 2025.

____________________________
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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