White v. Ford Motor Company et al
Filing
22
Memorandum Opinion and Order granting 6 Motion to Dismiss/Lack of Jurisdiction. The court grants the Rule 12(b)(2) motion of National and Ram and dismisses White's actions against them without prejudice by Rule 54(b) final judgment filed today. (Ordered by Senior Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 10/24/2024) (ykp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
ZACH WHITE,
Plaintiff,
VS.
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS,
INC., et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 3:24-CV-2139-D
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
In this removed action, plaintiff Zach White (“White”) asserts various state-law claims
against five defendants, including, in pertinent part, National Products, Inc. (“National”) and
its subsidiary, RAM® Mounts (“Ram”). National and Ram together move to dismiss under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow, the
court grants the motion and dismisses this action without prejudice as to National and Ram
by Rule 54(b) final judgment filed today.1
I
This lawsuit arises from a single-car motor vehicle accident in which White suffered
significant
injuries.2
On
August
28,
2022
White
crashed
his
employer-
1
The first amended complaint refers to National and Ram, collectively, as “Ram.” The
court sometimes does so as well in this memorandum opinion and order. See infra note 3.
2
The court recounts the background facts favorably to White as the nonmovant.
“When a court rules on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without holding
an evidentiary hearing, as in the present case[] . . . the court must accept as true the
issued Ford F-450 pickup truck. His truck was equipped with a laptop stand that was
designed and manufactured by Ram. White struck his head on the Ram laptop stand and
suffered serious bodily injuries.
White filed this suit in Texas state court. In pertinent part, White asserts state-law
products liability claims against National and Ram. One of the defendants—Ford Motor
Company (“Ford”)—with the consent of two other defendants whose joinder was not
challenged as improper—removed the case to this court based on diversity of citizenship.
National and Ram now move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The court is deciding the motion on the briefs, without an evidentiary hearing or oral
argument.
II
A
The determination whether a federal district court has in personam jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant is bipartite. The court first decides whether the long-arm statute of
the state in which it sits confers personal jurisdiction over the defendant. If it does, the court
then resolves whether the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with due process under the
United States Constitution. See Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 335 (5th Cir. 1999).
Because the Texas long-arm statute extends to the limits of due process, the court need only
consider whether exercising jurisdiction over National and Ram would be consistent with the
nonmover’s allegations and resolve all factual disputes in its favor.” Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco
Co., 188 F.3d 619, 625 (5th Cir. 1999).
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.; Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco
AB, 205 F.3d 208, 214 (5th Cir. 2000).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant when (1) that defendant has purposefully availed
himself of the benefits and protections of the forum state by
establishing “minimum contacts” with the forum state; and (2)
the exercise of jurisdiction over that defendant does not offend
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” To
comport with due process, the defendant’s conduct in
connection with the forum state must be such that he “should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court” in the forum state.
Latshaw v. Johnston, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999) (footnotes omitted) (first quoting
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); then quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
B
A defendant’s contacts with the forum state may support either general or specific
jurisdiction over the defendant. See Mink, 190 F.3d at 336. “A court may assert general
jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all
claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic
as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The paradigm forums in which a corporate defendant is at home[] . . . are the corporation’s
place of incorporation and its principal place of business.” BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S.
402, 413 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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But the “exercise of general jurisdiction is not limited to these forums; in an
exceptional case, a corporate defendant’s operations in another forum may be so substantial
and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). An exemplary case is Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342
U.S. 437, (1952), in which “war had forced the defendant corporation’s owner to temporarily
relocate the enterprise from the Philippines to Ohio[,]” whereupon “Ohio became the center
of the corporation’s wartime activities.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“By comparison, specific personal jurisdiction is narrower and attaches only when
there is a sufficient connection between a defendant’s forum-related contacts and a plaintiff’s
causes of action.” Shambaugh & Son, L.P. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 91 F.4th 364, 372 (5th Cir.
2024).
This circuit applies a three-step test for determining specific
personal jurisdiction: (1) whether the defendant has minimum
contacts with the forum state, i.e., whether it purposely directed
its activities toward the forum state or purposefully availed itself
of the privileges of conducting activities there; (2) whether the
plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of or results from the
defendant’s forum-related contacts; and (3) whether the exercise
of personal jurisdiction is fair and reasonable. If a plaintiff
establishes the first two prongs, the burden shifts to the
defendant to show that the exercise of personal jurisdiction
would be unfair or unreasonable.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
C
“The district court usually resolves the jurisdictional issue without conducting a
hearing.” Ham v. La Cienega Music Co., 4 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir. 1993). In addition to the
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complaint, “the district court may consider the contents of the record before the court at the
time of the motion, including affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony, or any
combination of the recognized methods of discovery.” Quick Techs., Inc. v. Sage Grp. PLC,
313 F.3d 338, 344 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
When a court rules on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction without holding an evidentiary hearing, it must
accept as true the uncontroverted allegations in the complaint
and resolve in favor of the plaintiff any factual conflicts posed
by the affidavits. Therefore, in a no-hearing situation, a plaintiff
satisfies his burden by presenting a prima facie case for personal
jurisdiction.
Latshaw, 167 F.3d at 211 (footnote omitted). “This liberal standard, however, does not
require the court to credit conclusory allegations, even if they remain uncontradicted.”
Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 2000 WL 35615925, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 15, 2000) (Fitzwater, J.) (citing Felch v. Transportes Lar-Mex SA DE CV, 92 F.3d 320,
326 n.16 (5th Cir. 1996)), aff’d, 253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (affirming,
inter alia, this conclusion).
III
The court concludes that White has not made a prima facie showing that the court has
personal jurisdiction over National and Ram.3
3
The first amended complaint treats National and Ram, parent and subsidiary, as a
single entity. Because the court lacks personal jurisdiction over National and Ram regardless
of their organizational structure, it likewise analyzes National and Ram, collectively, as Ram.
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A
The court first determines whether White has made a prima facie showing of general
jurisdiction.
Ram is a Washington corporation headquartered in Washington. This is not “an
exceptional case” in which Ram’s operations in Texas—designing, manufacturing, and
selling a product that it knows will reach the Texas market—are “so substantial and of such
a nature as to render [them] at home in [the state of Texas].” BNSF Ry., 581 U.S. at 413
(internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Douglass v. Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha,
46 F.4th 226, 242-43 (5th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(concluding that Japanese company’s United States contacts, which were substantial “in
absolute terms” and generated “about $1.47 billion in consolidated revenue every year[,]”
were not “so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in the [state
of Texas]”); Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 1987) (“In short,
that Beech products flow into Texas does not create a general presence in that state. Each
transaction was completed outside of Texas. The laws of Texas neither protected nor
benefited Beech.”); compare Perkins, 342 U.S. at 448 (holding that Ohio could exercise
general jurisdiction over Philippine mining company that moved its operations to Ohio) with
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984) (holding that
Texas lacked general jurisdiction over Colombian corporation that sent CEO to Texas for
contract-negotiation session; accepted checks drawn on Texas bank; purchased helicopters,
equipment, and training services from Texas-based company; and sent personnel to
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Texas-based company’s facilities in Texas for training). Accordingly, Ram is “at home” in
Washington, not Texas. See BNSF Ry., 581 U.S. at 413.
B
The court considers next whether White has made a prima facie showing of specific
jurisdiction.
White contends that Ram purposefully “availed itself of the privileges of conducting
activities in Texas[,]” P. Resp. (ECF No. 15) at 2, ¶ 10, by: marketing its products through
its website to commercial entities that do a significant amount of business in Texas, such as
White’s employer; placing the laptop mount that injured White into the stream of commerce;
and partnering with a Texas company named Can-Am Wireless.
In the context of products-liability cases, like the case presently
before us, an analysis involving a stream-of-commerce metaphor
is often employed to assess whether the non-resident defendant
has minimum contacts with the forum (our factor 1). As the
Supreme Court has explained, courts use the metaphor to allow
for jurisdiction where the product has traveled through an
extensive chain of distribution before reaching the ultimate
consumer. The stream-of-commerce doctrine recognizes that a
defendant may purposefully avail itself of the protection of a
state’s laws—and thereby subject itself to personal
jurisdiction—by sending its goods rather than its agents into the
forum.
The Fifth Circuit has found this doctrine and thus minimum
contacts satisfied so long as the court determines that the
defendant delivered the product into the stream of commerce
with the expectation that it would be purchased by or used by
consumers in the forum state. In other words, mere
foreseeability or awareness is a constitutionally sufficient basis
for personal jurisdiction if the defendant’s product made its way
into the forum state while still in the stream of commerce. But,
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the defendant’s contacts with the forum state must be more than
random, fortuitous, or attenuated, or the result of the unilateral
activity of another party or third person.
Zoch v. Magna Seating (Germany) GmbH, 810 Fed. Appx. 285, 289-90 (5th Cir. 2020)
(cleaned up).
Although White has shown that Ram delivered its laptop mount into the stream of
commerce with the expectation that it would be purchased or used by consumers in Texas,
he has not made the requisite showing that Ram’s laptop mount “made its way into [Texas]
while still in the stream of commerce.” Id. Ram’s website lists a Texas company, Can-Am
Wireless, as a “partner[]” and “factory certified Ram® vehicle mount installer[.]” P. Resp.
(ECF No. 15) at 6. Ram therefore foresaw or was aware that its products, such as the laptop
mount that injured White, would be purchased or used by Texas consumers, who might need
to visit Can-Am Wireless’s Cedar Park, Texas store for certified installation services.
Compare Zoch, 810 Fed. Appx. at 291-92 (emphasis omitted) (concluding that car seat
manufacturer that knew that its seats “would be placed in vehicles ultimately destined for the
United States generally” could not have “reasonably expected that its product would be sold
or used in Texas” where plaintiff did not provide “any evidence that [the manufacturer] was
aware that any of its seats . . . would likely end up in Texas”) with Sherri Hill, Inc. v. Amarra
USA LLC, 2020 WL 10056075, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 2020) (citation omitted) (“Amarra’s
website directs its customers to the physical addresses of these Texas retailers. This evidence
makes it apparent that Amarra was aware that its products, including the Subject Works,
were sent to Texas retailers to be purchased by Texas residents, and that Amarra intentionally
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placed its products directly into the stream of commerce.”), rec. adopted, 2020 WL
10056150 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2020).
Even so, White has failed to make a prima facie showing that Ram’s laptop mount
made its way into Texas while still in the stream of commerce. White alleges that Ram’s
laptop mount was installed in his employer-issued Ford F-450 pickup truck and that his
employer does a significant amount of business in Texas. But it is unclear from these facts
how the laptop mount made its way into Texas. On the one hand, White’s employer could
have purchased the laptop mount, or the pickup truck with the mount pre-installed, in Texas,
meaning that the mount likely entered Texas in the stream of commerce. On the other hand,
however, White’s employer is a company comprised of various business entities, none of
which is incorporated or headquartered in Texas. White’s employer therefore might have
received the laptop mount outside of Texas before issuing to White in Texas the pickup truck
that contained the mount, in which case the mount likely did not enter Texas in the stream
of commerce. See, e.g., Eddy v. Printers House (P) Ltd., 627 Fed. Appx. 323, 327 (5th Cir.
2015) (per curiam) (concluding that printing press did not enter Texas in stream of commerce
because once it “was installed in Mississippi, it exited the stream of commerce because the
Mississippi buyer was a consumer of the product, not a distributor or retailer”).
Because the court is unable to determine from White’s prima facie showing how the
Ram laptop mount ended up in Texas to begin with—let alone that it entered in the stream
of commerce—Ram’s “mere foreseeability or awareness” that its laptop mount would be
purchased or used by consumers in Texas “is [not] a constitutionally sufficient basis for
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personal jurisdiction.” Zoch, 810 Fed. Appx. at 289-90; see, e.g., Eddy, 627 Fed. Appx. at
327 (alterations in original) (“The fact that the original buyer of the press sold it to another
entity, which then sold it to another entity, clearly establishes that the press found its way
into Texas not through any intentional act taken by TPH but through ‘the unilateral activity
of . . . third [parties].’”). Consequently, the court holds that Ram lacks minimum contacts
with Texas, and the court cannot exercise specific personal jurisdiction over National and
Ram. See Shambaugh & Son, 91 F.4th at 372 (“This circuit applies a three-step test for
determining specific personal jurisdiction: (1) whether the defendant has minimum contacts
with the forum state, i.e., whether it purposely directed its activities toward the forum state
or purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities there[.]”).
*
*
*
For the reasons explained, the court grants the Rule 12(b)(2) motion of National and
Ram and dismisses White’s actions against them without prejudice by Rule 54(b) final
judgment filed today.
SO ORDERED.
October 24, 2024.
_________________________________
SIDNEY A. FITZWATER
SENIOR JUDGE
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