Keyes v. Wells Fargo Bank NA et al

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 12 Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction filed by Albert Keyes. (Ordered by Judge Karen Gren Scholer on 3/6/2025) (kcr)

United States District Court
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS

DIVISION

ALBERT KEYES

§

v.

;

WELLS FARGO BANK NA, et al.

:

MEMORANDUM

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-2926-S-BN

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Albert Keyes filed this pro se action alleging violations of the Truth in Lending
Act, federal banking regulations, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, and Texas law. [ECF

No. 3]. On January 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint [ECF No. 11], and on March 5,
2025, Plaintiff filed a request for a temporary injunction (“Motion”) [ECF No. 12], seeking to stay
his eviction from

5323

Blaney

Way,

Dallas,

Texas

75227.

The request seeks

a temporary

restraining order to stay the eviction currently scheduled for March 7, 2025, and a preliminary
injunction after a hearing. See Mot. 4. For the reasons stated herein, the Court DENIES the Motion.
I. LEGAL STANDARD

As “[a] TRO is simply a highly accelerated and temporary form of preliminary injunctive
relief,” “[t]o obtain a temporary restraining order, an applicant must show entitlement to a
preliminary injunction.” Horner v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-665-D, 2017 WL 978100, at *1

(N.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2017) (cleaned up). Granting a preliminary injunction, however, “is an
extraordinary remedy which requires the movant to unequivocally show the need for its issuance.”
Valley vy. Rapides Par. Sch. Bd., 118 F.3d 1047, 1050 (Sth Cir. 1997) (citing Allied Mktg. Grp.,
Ine. v. C_D.L. Mktg., Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1989)).
To

obtain

preliminary

injunctive

relief,

a

movant

must

unequivocally

“show

(1) a substantial likelihood that he will prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that he will

suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) his threatened injury outweighs the
threatened harm to the party whom he seeks to enjoin, and (4) granting the preliminary injunction
will not disserve the public interest.” Bluefield Water Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Starkville, Miss.,
577 F.3d 250, 252-53 (Sth Cir. 2009) (cleaned up); accord Canal Auth. of State of Fla. v. Callaway,

489 F.2d 567, 572 (Sth Cir. 1974). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit “has
repeatedly cautioned that [such relief] should not be granted unless the party seeking it has clearly
carried the burden of persuasion on all four requirements.” Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d
382, 386 (Sth Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).
Il. ANALYSIS

In an exhibit attached to his motion, Keyes states that judgment was entered against him in
a justice of the peace court in Dallas County, Texas in Flight 2010 LLC v. Albert Keyes & All

Other Occupants, No. JPC-24-03233-52. See TRO Mtn. at 35. A review of the publicly available

filings in that case! show that the eviction proceedings were filed on November 1, 2024, and
judgment was entered against Keyes after a jury trial on December 10, 2024. Keyes appealed to

Dallas County Court at Law No. 5 in Flight 2010 LLC v. Albert Keyes & All Other Occupants,
No. CC-25-79-E. Judgment was entered against Keyes in that case on February 24, 2025, and a
writ of possession was issued on March 3, 2025. Keyes filed a notice of appeal to the Texas Fifth

Court of Appeals on March 5, 2025, the same day that he filed his motion for an injunction in this
Court.
Keyes motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in essence seeks

'

The

filings

are

available

through

searches

on

the

Dallas

County,

Texas

Courts

Portal

(https://courtsportal.dallascounty.org/DALLASPROD). A district court may properly take judicial notice

of public records in state court proceedings. See Stiel v. Heritage Numismatic Auctions, Inc., 816 Fed.
App’x 888, 892 (Sth Cir. 2020); see also Lowe v. Hearst Comme’ns, Inc., 487 F.3d 246, 249 n.3 (Sth Cir.
2007) (“All court records are presumptively available to the public and may be sealed only pursuant to the
conditions of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a.”).

to have this Court intervene in the state court proceedings to stay an order of a state court. As it

appears clear from the public court records that the relief Keyes requests would interfere with
ongoing state proceedings, the claims implicate abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971). In the alternative, to the extent relevant proceedings were concluded before the case was

filed, the injunction request is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Therefore, Keyes has not
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.
“Younger abstention is generally deemed appropriate where assumption of jurisdiction by

a federal court would interfere with pending state proceedings, whether of a criminal, civil, or even
administrative character.” Word of Faith World Outreach Ctr. Church, Inc. v. Morales, 986 F.2d

962, 966 (Sth Cir. 1993); see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1987)
(recognizing, in case between private parties implicating interests in real property, “importance to
the States of enforcing the orders and judgments of their courts” and necessity of “proper respect

for the ability of state courts to resolve federal questions presented in state-court litigation”).
The doctrine requires that federal courts decline to exercise jurisdiction where three
conditions are met: “(1) the federal proceeding would interfere with an ongoing state judicial
proceeding; (2) the state has an important interest in regulating the subject matter of the claim; and ,

(3) the plaintiff has an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional
challenges.” Bice v. La. Pub. Defender Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 716 (Sth Cir. 2012) (cleaned up); accord
Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). The United
States Supreme Court has recognized that Younger abstention is appropriate where a federal
plaintiff requests an injunction that would have the practical effect of interfering with execution of
a state-court judgment. See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 13-14 (“Both Juidicef v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327

(1977),] and this case involve challenges to the processes by which the State compels compliance

with the judgments of its courts. Not only would federal injunctions in such cases interfere with
the execution of state judgments, but they would do so on grounds that challenge the very process

by which those judgments were obtained.”); Elna Sefcovic, LLC v.

TEP Rocky Mountain, LLC,

953 F.3d 660, 671 (10th Cir. 2020) (“[B]oth Juidice and Pennzoil involved requests to directly or
indirectly thwart state court compliance processes.” (citing Joseph A. ex rel. Corrine Wolfe v.
Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1272 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Younger governs whenever the requested relief
would interfere with the state court’s ability to conduct proceedings, regardless of whether the
relief targets the conduct of a proceeding directly.”))).
In

addition

to

meeting

the

first Middlesex

condition,

Pennzoil

makes

clear

that

an

injunction interfering with a state court judgment and writ of execution in and of itself implicates
important state interests. See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 13-14. The state also has important state
interests in regulating the eviction process. Texas law specifies that jurisdiction for eviction
proceedings lies with the justice courts. Tex. Prop. Code § 24.004. State law also establishes the
process for appealing to county court. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 26.042(e); Tex. Prop. Code
§ 24.00511-.0054. Finally, it sets out the requirements and limitations to appeal a county court

decision to the state court of appeals, including a process to stay the eviction during that appeal.
Tex. Prop. Code § 24.007. For a federal court to bypass that process and enter an order staying or
enjoining a state would harm the state’s interests in establishing and enforcing its own laws,
processes, and judgments. See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 13-14; see also Weaver v. Parker, No. 6:23-

cv-454-JDK-KNM, 2023 WL 7232851, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2023), (finding that Texas has an
important interest in real property rights (citing Chamberlain v. 624 Orleans, LP, No. 1:11-cv140, 2011 WL 1627080, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2011) (finding that process set up by Texas for
eviction proceedings evidences important state interest))), report and recommendation adopted by

2023 WL 7221343 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2023).
As to the ability to raise federal claims, Keyes was provided with the opportunity to present
his case before a jury and an avenue for appeals. Furthermore, Keyes has not shown that he did
not have an adequate opportunity to raise any federal claims. See Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 15

(“[W]hen

a litigant has not attempted to present his federal claims in related state-court

proceedings, a federal court should assume that the state procedures will afford an adequate
remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.”); Gates v. Strain, 885 F.3d 874,
880 (Sth Cir. 2018) (“The relevant question is whether the would-be federal plaintiff has the

opportunity to raise his federal claims in state court.” (emphasis in original) (citing Moore v. Sims,
442 US. 415, 425 (1979))); Chamberlain, 2011 WL 1627080, at *3 (discussing opportunities to
challenge eviction process under state law).

To the extent that there are other relevant state judicial proceedings such as the initial
foreclosure proceeding that had already concluded at the time this lawsuit was filed, the federal
district court lacks jurisdiction “to modify

or reverse” a state proceeding under the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine. Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 382 (Sth Cir. 2013) (“‘Reduced to
its essence, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds that inferior federal courts do not have the power
to modify or reverse state court judgments’ except when authorized by Congress.” (quoting Union
Planters Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 462 (Sth Cir. 2004))); accord Liedtke v. State

Bar of Tex., 18 F.3d 315, 317 (Sth Cir. 1994); see also Jordaan v. Hall, 275 F. Supp. 2d 778, 789
(N.D. Tex. 2003) (noting that the doctrine prevents “thinly veiled attempt[s] to circumvent the

state appellate process and to collaterally attack — in the guise of a federal civil rights action — the
validity of a state court [judgment] and other related orders”); but see Miller v. Dunn, 35 F 4th

1007, 1012 (Sth Cir. 2022) (“Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable where a state appeal is pending when

the federal suit is filed.”).

III. CONCLUSION
The Court therefore DENIES

Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order and

preliminary injunction [ECF No. 12].
SO ORDERED.

SIGNED March 6, 2025.

Marhud

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE