v. Wooderts et al
Filing
13
OPINION and ORDER OF DISMISSAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(B) and UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B): Wooderts's right to recovery of monetary compensatory damages for emotional distress is barred under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) and under the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(2), and as he seeks only monetary damages in his complaint and more definite statement, all claims must be dismissed. Therefore, all of Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 1915A(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). [Emailed copy of order to Betty Parker, ED/TX.] (Ordered by Judge Terry R Means on 9/26/2011) (klm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
LEVI WOODERTS Jr.,
(BOP No. 29639-077)
VS.
§
§
§
§
§
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.§
CIVIL ACTION NO.4:10-CV-423-Y
OPINION and ORDER OF DISMISSAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§
1915A(B) and UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
This case is before the Court for review of pro-se inmate and
plaintiff Levi Wooderts Jr.’s
case under the screening provisions
of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B). Wooderts, an inmate at the
Bureau of Prisons’ FCI--Fort Worth facility, filed a civil complaint
seeking damages against the United States of America, the Department
of Justice; the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the South Central
Regional Office of the Bureau of Prisons, and individual defendant
Dr. Capps.(Compl., Style.) In compliance with a Court order,
Wooderts filed a more definite statement of his claims. In the
complaint and more definite statement, Wooderts alleges claims
arising from his transfer from FCI--Seagoville to FCI--Fort Worth.
(Compl. At 2; More Definite Statement (“MDS”) at ¶ 4.) He names Dr.
Capps under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics (“Bivens”)1 for violation of his rights under the Fifth
and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution, and he alleges claims
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).(Compl. at 5; MDS at ¶¶
1
403 U.S. 388, 297 (1971). Bivens, of course, is the counterpart to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and extends the protections afforded under § 1983 to parties
injured by federal actors. See Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856, 863 n. 10(5th Cir.
1999) (“A Bivens action is analogous to an action under § 1983--the only
difference being that § 1983 applies to constitutional violations by state,
rather than federal officials”), overruled on other grounds, Castellano v.
Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 948-49 & n. 36 (5th Cir. 2003), cert den’d, 543 U.S.
(2004).
1-8.) Wooderts seeks $100,000 in damages for violation of his
constitutional rights, hardship on his family, and the emotional
stress he alleges he sustained due to the fact “that upon arrival
at FCI--Fort Worth, I was forced to sleep out in the hallway for two
months.” (Compl. at 19; MDS at ¶ 11.)
A complaint filed in forma pauperis that lacks an arguable
basis in law should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.2
Under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court retains broad discretion
in determining at any time whether an in-forma-pauperis claim should
be dismissed.3 Furthermore, as a part of the PLRA, Congress enacted
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to review a complaint
from a prisoner seeking relief from a governmental entity or
governmental
docketing.4
officer
or
employee
as
soon
as
possible
after
Consistent with § 1915A is prior case law recognizing
that a district court is not required to await a responsive pleading
to conduct its § 1915 inquiry.5 Rather, § 1915 gives judges the
power to “dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory.”6 After review of the complaint and more definite statement
2
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,328 (1989). Section 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
requires dismissal not only when an allegation of poverty is untrue or the action
is frivolous or malicious, but also when “the action . . . fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(A) and
(B)(West 2006).
3
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(West 2006); Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d
383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir.
1990)(discussing authority to dismiss at any time under prior § 1915(d)).
4
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A(a)(West 2006).
5
See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995).
6
Id., citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
2
under these standards, the Court concludes that Wooderts’s claims
must be dismissed.
As a part of the PLRA, Congress placed a restriction on a
prisoner’s ability to recover compensatory damages without a showing
of physical injury: “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a
prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility,
for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a
prior showing of physical injury.”7 Wooderts alleges violations of
his
rights
under
the
Eighth
and
Fifth
Amendments
to
the
Constitution. Although long recognized as applying to claims under
the Eighth Amendment,8 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that § 1997e(e) applied to claims under the First
Amendment as well, noting “it is the nature of the relief sought,
and not the underlying substantive violation, that controls:
Section 1997e(e) applies to all federal civil actions in which a
prisoner alleges a constitutional violation, making compensatory
damages for mental or emotional injuries non-recoverable, absent
physical injury.”9
More recently, the Fifth Circuit rejected an inmate’s claim
that § 1997e(e) does not apply to a Fourth Amendment claim,
emphasizing that in Geiger the court noted that “1997e(e) applies
to all federal civil actions,” and noting that “[r]egardless of
7
42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(e)(West 2003).
8
See Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 665-66 (5th Cir. 2001); Harper v.
Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999).
9
Geiger v. Jones, 404 F.3d 371, 375 (5th Cir. 2005).
3
[Plaintiff’s] invocation of the Fourth Amendment, his failure to
allege
any
physical
injury
precludes
his
recovery
of
any
compensatory damages for emotional or mental injuries suffered.”10
Applying
these
holdings
to
the
instant
case,
no
matter
the
substantive constitutional violations asserted by Wooderts against
Dr. Capps, a failure to allege physical injury bars his Bivens
claims for compensatory damages.11
Section 1997e(e) also applies to Wooderts’s claims for monetary
damages under the FTCA. The Fifth Circuit held that an inmate’s FTCA
monetary damage claims, lacking allegation of a physical injury,
were barred by § 1997e(e).12
Another court has expressly rejected
an inmate’s argument that § 1997e(e) does not apply to claims filed
under the FTCA, explaining “the plain language of the statute makes
no distinction between different types of civil actions filed by
inmates.”13
The FTCA waives the United States’s sovereign immunity from
tort
suits.14
Because
the
FTCA
provides
such
a
waiver,
the
limitations and conditions upon which the government consents to be
10
Hutchins v. McDaniels, 512 F.3d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 2007)(emphasis in
original).
11
Section 1997e(e) does not preclude claims for nominal or punitive damages
(Hutchins, 512 F.3d at 198) or for injunctive or declaratory relief (Harper, 174
F.3d at 719). Wooderts, however, does not seek any other forms of relief.
12
Stephens v. Yusuff, 95 Fed. Appx. 78, 2004 WL 838724,at *1 (5th Cir.
2004).
13
Taylor v. United States, 2006 WL 2350165, at *3 (W.D. Va. 2006)(citing
Stephens, 2004 WL 838724, at *1 (5th Cir. 2004).
14
McGuire v. Turnbo, 137 F.3d 321, 324 (5th Cir. 1998)(citing 28 U.S.C.A §
2674).
4
sued must be construed strictly in favor of the United States.15 One
of those conditions is that the FTCA prohibits an inmate from filing
suit against the United States for emotional injury absent a showing
of physical injury:
No person convicted of a felony who is incarcerated while
awaiting sentencing or while serving a sentence may bring
a civil action against the United States or an agency,
officer, or employee of the Government, for mental or
emotional injury suffered while in custody without a
prior showing of physical injury.16
In response to the Court’s question in the Order for More
Definite Statement concerning upon what basis he sought $100,000 in
monetary damages, Wooderts’s answered: “This is based upon the
violation of my constitutional rights and hardship on my family.
Additionally, it is based upon emotional stress due to the fact that
upon arrival at FCI--Fort Worth, I was forced to sleep out in the
hallway for two (2) months.” (MDS ¶ 11.)
Also, in answer to the
Court’s specific question regarding whether Wooderts alleged any
physical injury as a result of the allegations of the complaint, he
answered: “I have suffered emotional distress and continue to do so.
I complained to Nurse Friday at FCI--Fort Worth, whom got me moved
into a room from the hallway.” (MDS ¶ 12.) Wooderts has thus not
stated any physical injury as a result of the alleged actions in
this
complaint.
Wooderts’s
right
to
recovery
of
monetary
compensatory damages for emotional distress is barred under 42
15
(5
th
Atorie Air, Inc., v. Federal Aviation Administration, 942 F.2d 954, 957
Cir. 1991)(citing Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160 (1981)).
16
28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b)(2)(West 2006).
5
U.S.C. § 1997e(e) and under the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(2), and
as he seeks only monetary damages in his complaint and more definite
statement, all claims must be dismissed.
Therefore,
all
of
Plaintiff’s
claims
are
DISMISSED
WITH
PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 1915A(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).
SIGNED September 26, 2011.
____________________________
TERRY R. MEANS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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