Segundo v. Davis, Director TDCJ-CID
Filing
104
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO VACATE, ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT: The motion to vacate, alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) (doc. 100 ) is DENIED. (see order for specifics) (Ordered by Senior Judge Terry R Means on 10/4/2018) (tln)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
JUAN RAMON MEZA SEGUNDO,
Petitioner,
V.
LORIE DAVIS, Director,
Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Correctional
Institutions Division,
Respondent.
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No. 4:10-CV-970-Y
(Death Penalty Case)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING MOTION TO VACATE, ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT
Petitioner Juan Ramon Meza Segundo, a Texas death-row inmate
set for execution on October 10, 2018, has filed a motion to vacate,
alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (Motion, doc. 100). Respondent Lorie Davis has filed her
response in opposition (Response, doc. 102), and Segundo has made
his reply (Reply doc. 103). Because the prior order properly included
alternative findings, the motion is denied.
I.
On September 28, 2018, Segundo filed the Rule 59(e) motion,
arguing that this Court improperly included an alternate finding on
the merits of his prior motion purportedly filed under Rule 60(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside the prior
judgment denying habeas relief.
Segundo argues that because this
Court construed his motion as a successive petition that requires
authorization from the court of appeals, the portion of the order
that included an alternate finding on the merits of his motion was
improper and should be removed.
(Mot. at 1-2.)
Respondent presents several examples where the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and district courts in that
circuit have used and approved of the use of such alternate findings.
(Resp. at 2 (citing Preyor v. Davis, 704 F. App’x 331, 339–44 (5th
Cir. 2017), In re Edwards, 865 F.3d 197, 208–09 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 909 (2017), In re Paredes, 587 F. App’x 805,
811–12, 826 (5th Cir. 2014), and In re Jasper, 559 F. App’x 366,
371–72 (5th Cir. 2014)).) She also argues that the court of appeals
has rejected this same argument in Edwards.
(Resp. at 2-3.)
Respondent further notes that the nature of the motion filed in this
Court allows it to make such an alternate finding regarding whether
such relief is warranted.
(Resp. at 4.)
Finally, Respondent
distinguishes the cases relied upon by Segundo.
Segundo
replies
that
the
jurisdictional
(Resp. at 4-5.)
requirement
is
“inflexible and without exception” and that Respondent misconstrues
the jurisdictional principles. (Reply at 1-2 (quoting Steel Company
v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998)).)
Segundo argues that this also applies to alternate findings. (Mot.
at 2-3 (citing United States v. Texas Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 286
(5th Cir. 1999)).)
II.
In Steel Co., the Supreme Court drew a distinction between
constitutional jurisdiction and statutory jurisdiction of the federal
2
courts.
See id., 523 U.S. at 97 (“The latter question is an issue
of statutory standing.
It has nothing to do with whether there is
case or controversy under Article III.”)
“Article III, § 2, of the
Constitution extends the ‘judicial Power’ of the United States only
to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’”
Id. at 102.
The irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains
three requirements. First and foremost, there must be
alleged (and ultimately proved) an injury in fact—a harm
suffered by the plaintiff that is concrete and actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there
must be causation—a fairly traceable connection between
the plaintiff’s injury and the complained-of conduct of
the defendant. And third, there must be redressability—a
likelihood that the requested relief will redress the
alleged injury. This triad of injury in fact, causation,
and redressability constitutes the core of Article III’s
case-or-controversy requirement, and the party invoking
federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing its
existence.
Id., 523 U.S. at 102–04 (quotation marks, footnotes and internal
citations omitted).
No party contends, and this Court did not find, that there is
no case or controversy under Article III.
Instead, this Court
construed the limitation of § 2244 to require that the motion in
question be filed in a different federal court. This Court expressly
concluded that the issue of whether the successive habeas petition
may be authorized was within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals
and transferred this case there rather than dismissing it under
prevailing Fifth Circuit precedent, something that could not be done
for any matter beyond the Article III jurisdiction of federal courts.
This Court rejects Segundo’s assertion that it had no constitutional
3
jurisdiction once it construed his motion as an impermissible
successive petition and was without power even to transfer it to the
court of appeals.
This Court agrees with the analysis of this issue by the Fifth
Circuit in In re Edwards, No. 17–10066, Order (5th Cir. Jan. 26, 2017)
(unpublished). As in Edwards, Segundo has “consistently maintained
that his Rule 60(b) motion was not barred as a second or successive
petition,” and requests a stay of his execution on the basis of his
entitlement to Rule 60(b) relief.
Slip op. at 3.
There is no
material difference in the instant case.
The Court does not read Segundo’s motion as conceding that this
Court does not have jurisdiction to enter findings regarding whether
relief is warranted under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
It seems inconsistent for him to argue that this Court
has jurisdiction over his motion while also arguing that it does not
have jurisdiction to include the alternate findings to dispose of
his motion.
Indeed, the alternate findings would only become
operative if the court of appeals finds that this Court does have
jurisdiction, in which case there would be no “hypothetical”
jurisdictional question.
To grant Segundo’s latest motion would
create unnecessary problems in the event he successfully overturns
this Court’s conclusion that his motion is an impermissible successive
habeas petition.
In that event, the court of appeals would have no
alternate findings to consider in determining whether Rule 60(b)
4
relief is warranted in time to resolve the issue before the scheduled
execution.
This also appears to be the problem that the court of
appeals in Edwards sought to avoid.
Segundo argues that the opinion in Edwards is contradicted by
Leal Garcia v. Quarterman, 573 F.3d 214, 216 (5th Cir. 2009), in which
the court of appeals rejected the use of hypothetical jurisdiction
in a habeas proceeding.
able.
(Reply at 4-5.)
That case is distinguish-
Unlike Edwards, the court in Leal Garcia was not construing
a Rule 60(b) motion as a successive habeas petition and there was
no request to stay an execution. Instead, the petitioner had filed
his second application for federal habeas relief promptly after fully
litigating a subsequent state habeas application on the issue.
Further, the state conceded that the district court erred in making
the alternate findings.
See id. at 216 n.4.
Neither party before
this Court makes any such concession.
*
*
*
The motion to vacate, alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule
59(e) (doc. 100) is DENIED.
SIGNED October 4, 2018.
____________________________
TERRY R. MEANS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
TRM/rs
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