Bell v. Wilson et al
Filing
6
OPINION and ORDER OF DISMISSAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(B)(1) and UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii): Under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii), all of Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE to their being asserted again until the Heck v. Humphrey conditions are met. [Emailed Order to Betty Parker, ED/TX.] (Ordered by Judge Terry R Means on 10/17/2011) (klm) .
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
GROVER CLEVELAND BELL JR.,
(TDCJ No. 00393259)
VS.
ETHA WILSON, Parole Officer,
Texas Board of Pardons
and Paroles, et al.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL ACTION NO.4:11-CV-143-Y
OPINION and ORDER OF DISMISSAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(B)(1) and UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii)
(With special instructions to the clerk of Court)
This case is before the Court for review of pro-se inmate and
plaintiff Grover Cleveland Bell Jr.’s case under the screening
provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B).
Bell, now an
inmate at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s (“TDCJ”) Ellis
unit, filed a form civil-rights complaint seeking relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.1 He names as defendants Etha Wilson, parole officer,
and Ken Neil, parole supervisor, both for the Texas Board of Pardons
and Paroles. (Compl. Style; § IV(B).) Bell alleges that on July 30,
2010, Officer Wilson denied him the right to “life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness” by denying him release to parole to his own
residence. (Compl. § V.) He also contends that on January 14, 2011,
Officer Wilson and Ken Neil concurred to deny his parole plan for
release. (Compl. § V.)
Bell seeks the right to obtain his “life,
liberty, and pursuit of happiness,” and he seeks $ 50,000 in
1
When this suit was filed Bell was incarcerated in the TDCJ Baten ISF unit.
Although Bell has provided a street address in Arlington, Texas as his address
of record, the TDCJ online inmate information service indicates that inmate
Grover Cleveland Bell (TDCJ# 00393259) is incarcerated at the Ellis unit. Thus,
the clerk of Court is also directed to send a copy of this order and accompanying
judgment to Grover Cleveland Bell Jr., TDCJ #00393259, Ellis Unit, 1697 FM 980,
Huntsville, TX, 77343, and note on the docket that his was done.
compensatory and punitive damages.” (Compl. § VI.)
A complaint filed in forma pauperis that lacks an arguable
basis in law should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.2
Under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court retains broad discretion
in determining at any time whether an in-forma-pauperis claim should
be dismissed.3 Furthermore, as a part of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the
Court to review a complaint from a prisoner seeking relief from a
governmental entity or governmental officer or employee as soon as
possible after docketing.4
Consistent with § 1915A is prior case
law recognizing that a district court is not required to await a
responsive pleading to conduct its § 1915 inquiry.5 Rather, § 1915
gives judges the power to “dismiss a claim based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory.”6
The Court concludes that Bell’s claims are not cognizable under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks from this Court injunctive-type
relief
and
monetary
damages
from
the
determination
by
Texas
2
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,328 (1989). Section 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
requires dismissal not only when an allegation of poverty is untrue or the action
is frivolous or malicious, but also when “the action . . . fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(A) and
(B)(West 2006).
3
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(West 2006); Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d
383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir.
1990)(discussing authority to dismiss at any time under prior § 1915(d)).
4
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A(a)(West 2006).
5
See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995).
6
Id., citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
2
officials to deny him release on parole. In Heck v. Humphrey,7 the
Supreme Court held that a claim that, in effect, attacks the
constitutionality of a conviction or imprisonment is not cognizable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and does not accrue until that conviction or
sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus.”8 Although the Heck opinion involved a
bar to claims for monetary damages, a dismissal of a claim for
injunctive relief may also be made pursuant to Heck.9
Plaintiff’s request to have this Court review the decisions to
deny him release on parole, if successful, necessarily would imply
the invalidity of his present incarceration. Thus, such claims are
not cognizable under § 1983 unless Plaintiff has satisfied the
conditions set by Heck. With regard to challenges brought under §
1983 to parole proceedings, the Supreme Court clarified that,
although challenges only to the procedures used to determine parole
eligibility may go forward in a civil suit, if the claims “seek to
invalidate
the
duration
of
[an
inmate’s]
confinement–-either
7
512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).
8
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; see also Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 94 (5th
Cir. 1995).
9
See Clarke v. Stadler, 154 F.3d 186, 190-91 (5th Cir. 1998)(en banc)
(holding that a claim for prospective injunctive relief that would imply the
invalidity of a prisoner’s conviction may be dismissed without prejudice subject
to the rule of Heck v. Humphrey), cert. den’d, 525 U.S. 1151 (1999).
3
directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or
indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies
the unlawfulness of the State’s custody”10--the prisoner must pursue
such claim through habeas corpus or similar remedies. As Bell seeks
to be released from confinement on parole, the Heck rule bars his
claims for damages and injunctive relief. Plaintiff remains in
custody and has not shown that the complained-of imprisonment has
been invalidated by a state or federal court.11 As a result,
Plaintiff's claims are not cognizable under § 1983, and must be
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).12
Therefore, under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii), all of Plaintiff’s claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE to their being
asserted again until the Heck v. Humphrey conditions are met.13
SIGNED October 17, 2011.
____________________________
TERRY R. MEANS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
10
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 80-81 (2005).
11
See McGrew v. Texas Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 47 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.
12
See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487-88; McGrew, 47 F.3d at 161.
13
See Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996).
1995).
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?