American Airlines Inc v. Travelport Limited et al

Filing 38

Brief/Memorandum in Support filed by Travelport Limited, Travelport, LP re #37 MOTION to Dismiss Rule 12(b)(6) for Failure to State Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted (Friedman, Walker) .

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,
Plaintiff,
TRAVELPORT LIMITED, a foreign
corporation, and TRAVELPORT, LP, a
Delaware limited partnership, d/b/a
TRAVELPORT;
And
ORBITZ WORLDWIDE, LLC,
a Delaware limited liability company,
d/b/a ORBITZ,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 4:11-cv-00244-Y

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF TRAVELPORT’S
RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
ARGUMENT..................................................................................................................... 4
I.

AA FAILS TO ALLEGE FACTS ESTABLISHING TRAVELPORT’S
DOMINANCE OF THE U.S. GDS MARKET ..................................................... 5

II.

AA FAILS TO ALLEGE FACTS ESTABLISHING A SINGLE-BRAND
MARKET............................................................................................................... 8
1.
2.

The Complaint Does Not Allege Facts Fitting Within the Kodak
Exception ................................................................................................. 10

3.

Bargaining Leverage Allegations Do Not Justify A Single-Brand
Market ...................................................................................................... 12

4.
III.

The Travelport-Only Market Is Implausible.............................................. 8

Parroting Outdated Marketplace Descriptions Cannot Justify a
Single-Brand Monopolization Case in 2011............................................ 14

THE COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER
THE ALLEGED SWITZERLAND, UK, AND BELGIUM MARKETS ........... 15
1.
2.

IV.

Foreign Travel Agency Service Is Not U.S. Import Commerce.............. 15
Foreign Travel Agency Services Do Not Have a Direct and
Substantial U.S. Effect............................................................................. 16

AA’S FAILURE TO ALLEGE FACTS ESTABLISHING
EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT ALSO WARRANTS DISMISSAL ................. 16
1.
2.

The Alleged “Retaliatory” Foreign Pricing Is Irrelevant and
Outside the Scope of U.S. Antitrust Law................................................. 18

3.

The Contractual MFN Allegations Are Time Barred .............................. 20

4.
V.

The Allegations that Travelport Foreclosed Travel Agents or
Software Developers Are Deficient ......................................................... 17

Allegations Regarding “Applications Developers” Do Not State a
Cognizable Antitrust Claim ..................................................................... 22

AA HAS FAILED TO ALLEGE AN ILLEGAL CONSPIRACY...................... 22
1.
2.

VI.

Under Common Control, Travelport and Orbitz Are Incapable of
an Illegal Conspiracy ............................................................................... 22
The Conspiracy Allegations Concerning “Unnamed Industry
Participants” Fail the Twombly Standard................................................. 23

THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT PREEMPTS THE TORTIOUS
INTERFERENCE CLAIMS................................................................................ 24
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Apani Southwest, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Enter., Inc.,
300 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2002) .......................................................................................12
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)...................................................................................................5
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007).............................................................................................4, 5, 23
Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,
140 F.3d 494 (3rd Cir. 1998) .......................................................................................13
Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc.,
417 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969) .........................................................................................6
Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter,
224 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2000) .......................................................................................21
Continental Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Health Insur. of Greater New York,
Inc.,
994 F. Supp. 133 (E.D. N.Y. 1998) .......................................................................11, 13
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,
467 U.S. 752 (1984).....................................................................................................22
Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. Heeremac Vof,
241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001) .......................................................................................16
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs., Inc.,
73 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 1996) .....................................................................................7, 11
Dimmitt Agri Indus., Inc. v. CPC Int’l Inc.,
679 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1982) .........................................................................................6
Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp.,
483 F. Supp. 750 (D. Md. 1980) ....................................................................................7
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc.,
504 U.S. 451 (1992)............................................................................................. passim
Exxon Corp. v. Berwick Bay Real Estate Partners,
748 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1984) .........................................................................................6

-ii-

Flegel v. Christian Hosp., Northeast-Northwest,
4 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 1993) .............................................................................................7
Forsyth v. Humana, Inc.,
114 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1997) .....................................................................................13
Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines,
758 F. Supp. 1399 (D. Col. 1989)................................................................................25
Futurevision Cable Sys. of Wiggins, Inc. v. Multivision Cable TV Corp.,
789 F. Supp. 760 (S.D. Miss. 1992)...............................................................................7
Galileo Int’l v. Ryanair,
No. 01 C 2210, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3317 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2002)......................24
Globespanvirata v. Texas Instruments,
No. 03-2854, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8860 (D. N.J. Mar. 3, 2006)...............................6
Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,
44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995) .........................................................................................24
Imperial Point Colonnades Condominium, Inc. v. Mangurian,
549 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1977) .....................................................................................21
In re Southeastern Milk Antitrust Litig.,
555 F. Supp. 2d 934 (E.D. Tenn. 2008).......................................................................23
Insignia Systems, Inc. v. News Corp.,
No. 04-4213, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42851 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2005) .....................18
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,
466 U.S. 2 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) .............................................................17
Lee v. Life Ins. Co. of North America,
23 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1994)............................................................................................11
Lyn-Lea Travel Corp. v. American Airlines, Inc.,
No. 96-CV-2068-BC, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21119 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 1997).........24
Manassas Travel, Inc. v. Worldspan, L.P.,
Case No. 2:07-CV-701-TC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35217 (D. Utah Apr. 30,
2008) ............................................................................................................................25
North Texas Producers Ass’n v. Young,
308 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1962) .........................................................................................6
Nw. Power Prods., Inc. v. Omark Indus., Inc.
576 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1978) ...........................................................................................7
-iii-

PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,
104 F.3d 811 (6th Cir. 1997) .......................................................................................11
PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc.,
615 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 2010) ............................................................................... passim
Rick-Mik Enters. Inc. v. Equilon Enters., LLC,
532 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2008) ...................................................................................7, 18
Rockbit Indus. U.S.A., Inc. v. Baker Hughes, Inc.,
802 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Tex. 1991) ........................................................................6, 18
Rohlfing v. Manor Care,
172 F.R.D. 330 (N.D. Ill. 1997)...................................................................................11
Rx.com v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc.,
2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 8469 (5th Cir. Apr. 22, 2009) ................................................21
Sabre Inc. v. Northwest Airlines,
Civil Action No. 4:04-CV-612-Y (N.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2005) ..................................2, 14
Tampa Electric. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,
365 U.S. 320 (1961)...............................................................................................17, 18
Turicentro S.A. v. American Airlines, Inc.,
303 F.3d 293 (3rd Cir. 2002) ...........................................................................15, 16, 19
Verizon Communs., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,
540 U.S. 398 (2004).....................................................................................................22
STATUTES
Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) ......................................................4, 24
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a .............................................15
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and
Their Application ¶ 533 (3d ed. 2007)...........................................................................8
Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to
Intellectual Property Law § 21.04 (2002 and 2006 Supp.) ..........................................11

-iv-

INTRODUCTION
American Airlines, Inc.’s (“AA’s”) Complaint is unabashedly an effort to secure a more
favorable position vis-à-vis Travelport Limited and Travelport, LP (“Travelport”) before the
current round of contracts between the parties expires later this year. Compl. at ¶ 12.
Preliminary contract negotiations have stalled, and AA has made good on its threat to file a
lawsuit such as this one if Travelport did not yield on certain commercial terms. This is not a
genuine antitrust action brought by consumers suffering from excessive or artificial price
increases. It is an opportunistic lawsuit brought by a large and powerful company seeking to
enhance its already substantial commercial bargaining leverage.
AA’s power was recently demonstrated when it withdrew ticketing authority for AA
tickets from Orbitz.com late last year after negotiations concerning AA’s direct connect offering
failed. This bullying by AA has caused substantial harm to Orbitz with Orbitz losing more than
half its market capitalization since AA pulled its ticketing authority. AA also demonstrated its
power during the prior round of negotiations with Travelport when AA threatened to withdraw
AA content from the global distribution system (“GDS”) unless Travelport provided AA with
significant discounts. Travelport had no choice but to provide these discounts despite the fact
that GDS burdens have skyrocketed as more consumers search and compare fares using the GDS.
Aside from the disruption in recent negotiations, nothing new or different in the
marketplace gives rise to this antitrust lawsuit. In fact, AA must and does reach far back in time
in an attempt to unearth some marketplace portrayal that might support an antitrust lawsuit. In
doing so, AA relies entirely on outdated descriptions of the marketplace when airlines
themselves owned and operated the GDSs under comprehensive federal regulation.

1

For example, AA’s market definition, on which its entire Complaint rests, comes from a
1996 regulatory filing. Id. at ¶ 37. At that time, leading online travel agencies such as Orbitz
and Priceline did not exist. Nor did Google or Kayak, both of which primarily drive traffic
directly to airline websites and not through the GDSs. Southwest was a small airline that had
just started an online booking site. AA even highlights a federal court decision from the 1980s,
preceding the commercial advent of the Internet, to describe marketplace dynamics in the GDS
industry. Id. at ¶ 88.
If AA’s effort to dress up a commercial dispute in antitrust garb sounds familiar, it is.
Airlines have occasionally sought to secure a negotiating advantage with GDSs by making
monopolization claims. Indeed, in 2004, Northwest Airlines filed a suit making similar
allegations against Sabre, one of Travelport’s competitors. Northwest’s case was transferred to
this District and before Your Honor, where a motion to dismiss was fully briefed with Sabre
pointing out many of the flaws in Northwest’s allegations. 1
Remarkably, it appears that AA’s 2011 Complaint has lifted allegations about the state of
the travel services industry from Northwest’s 2004 Complaint, while passing them off as
reflecting current marketplace conditions. 2 In turn, Northwest’s seven-year-old Complaint relied
on pronouncements from the period of comprehensive federal regulation, going back to 1996 and
even earlier.
In short, the Complaint describes a world that no longer exists. The federal government
long ago deregulated the industry, and not a single one of AA’s cited sources describes the
1

See Sabre Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Civil Action No. 4:04-CV-612-Y (N.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2005) (Dkt. Nos. 65,
82, 105).
2

Compare AA’s Complaint with Northwest’s First Amended Complaint, Sabre Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Civil
Action No. 4:04-CV-612-Y (N.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2005) (Dkt. No. 66, at APP. 009-39) (Appendix to Sabre’s Motion
to Dismiss) (hereafter, “Northwest Compl.”) (attached as TP APX 1).

2

industry post-deregulation. Over half of airline ticket sales in the United States are now made
directly from airlines rather than through a GDS. The largest airline in the United States,
Southwest, primarily built its business through direct distribution and without significant use of
GDSs. What is missing from AA’s Complaint is any reliance on facts portraying these or any
other modern business realities. AA seeks instead to advance costly antitrust litigation without
plausible, specific factual allegations describing how the industry now operates.
Stripped of its antitrust pretext, AA’s real complaint is that the marketplace has not
embraced AA’s unproven and inefficient direct connect technology and that GDSs remain highly
valued by many airlines and travel agencies. GDSs continue to offer proven, cost effective
distribution services for AA and many other airlines, and compete intensely with each other on
price, quality, and content to encourage both airlines and travel agents to continue using their
services. GDSs also vigorously compete with other distribution channels that now account for a
majority of air ticket distribution in the United States. Contrived market definitions cannot mask
these contemporary business realities.
AA’s Complaint should be dismissed in full for failure to allege facts establishing a
plausible market in which Travelport dominates. This failure infects each antitrust claim –
Counts 1-3. AA first tries a GDS-only product market, consisting of GDS services for all U.S.
travel agents. Even this narrowly drawn market, which ignores direct airline distribution, does
not work. Travelport is too small, far smaller than the current GDS leader, Sabre. As alleged,
Travelport’s share of the GDS-only market in the U.S. is just 34%. As a matter of law, that is
not nearly enough to state a claim of monopolization.
Searching for a higher Travelport market share, AA travels outside the United States and
lands in Europe, alleging monopolization of Switzerland, the UK, and Belgium. Id. at ¶ 106.

3

But U.S. courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to decide whether Travelport has illegally
monopolized markets in European nations.
This leaves AA to propose, and depend upon, a market where Travelport is a monopolist
by definition: Travelport services for travel agents who have decided to use Travelport. This
“single brand” market conveniently excludes, for example, travel agents who chose to use one of
Travelport’s competitors. Of course, virtually every company would be a monopolist in markets
defined so as to exclude sales of products by competitors. Given the potential for opportunistic
litigation, however, courts will not allow plaintiffs to plead a single-brand product market except
in the rarest of circumstances. A well developed body of law, including Supreme Court and
Fifth Circuit law, delineates the limited circumstances in which plaintiffs can open the door to
expensive monopolization litigation using an alleged single-brand product market. The alleged
product market consisting of Travelport services for travel agents using Travelport does not fit
this exception.
AA’s inability to allege a plausible market dominated by Travelport compels dismissal of
the antitrust claims, Counts 1-3. Separately and independently, these claims must also be
dismissed because this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the alleged Switzerland, UK,
and Belgium markets, AA has failed to allege facts establishing exclusionary conduct, and AA
has failed to allege an illegal conspiracy. Finally, the state law claims (Counts 4-5) must be
dismissed because they are preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court has stressed the necessity of requiring plausible, non-conclusory
allegations establishing each element of an antitrust complaint. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). “[L]abels and conclusions” do not suffice. Id. at 555. In
evaluating the plausibility of allegations, courts must consider whether the allegations comport
4

with context and common sense realities. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009)
(“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of
Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.”).
Such scrutiny is required at the motion to dismiss stage because antitrust cases are usually
extremely expensive, putting considerable pressure on companies to settle cases with
questionable or dubious merit. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 546. In this case, for example, there is
little doubt that AA would seek extremely costly and far-reaching discovery—perhaps from all
over the globe—about a host of contractual relationships and a course of conduct over a period
of many years.
Applying Twombly, courts are not tolerant of antitrust complaints that contain conclusory
or implausible market definitions. See, e.g., PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc.,
615 F.3d 412, 417-18 (5th Cir. 2010) (granting motion to dismiss without chance to amend for
failure to allege relevant market). Where antitrust claims rest upon implausible or insufficiently
alleged relevant markets, they must be dismissed. See id.
I.

AA Fails to Allege Facts Establishing Travelport’s Dominance of the U.S. GDS
Market
AA alleges a product market consisting of GDS distribution of airfare to U.S. travel

agents. Compl. at ¶ 104. In this alleged product market, direct sales by airlines through their
websites, call centers, and ticket counters, now larger than all travel agency sales in the United
States, do not count. But the Court need not address the plausibility of a travel agency product
market that fails to include all airline direct distribution because, even in the narrower alleged
market, Travelport’s absence of monopoly power is obvious. Travelport’s alleged market share
in this market is only 34%. Id. at ¶ 106 (“Travelport accounted for 34% of all airline bookings

5

made by U.S.-based travel agencies in 2010.”); id. at ¶ 3 (alleging that Travelport has “over
30%”).
As the Fifth Circuit has explained, liability under Sherman Act § 2 is "an impossibility as
a matter of law" when the defendant has a low market share. Dimmitt Agri Indus., Inc. v. CPC
Int’l Inc., 679 F.2d 516, 529 (5th Cir. 1982). Market shares significantly below 50% will not
support liability under Sherman Act § 2. See id. at 528. (Plaintiff “cannot cite us to any case in
which monopolization was found . . . despite undisputed proof of market shares significantly
below 50 percent.”). In fact, "monopolization is rarely found when the defendant’s share of the
relevant market is below 70%.” Exxon Corp. v. Berwick Bay Real Estate Partners, 748 F.2d 937,
940 (5th Cir. 1984). This requirement to establish that the defendant holds monopoly power
applies equally to a claim of conspiracy to monopolize (Count 2). See North Texas Producers
Ass’n v. Young, 308 F.2d 235, 240 (5th Cir. 1962).
The claim that Travelport has achieved an illegal monopoly in the alleged travel agents
market with a 34% U.S. share should be dismissed on the pleadings. The Southern District of
Texas dismissed on the pleadings a monopolization claim based on defendant’s alleged 35%
market share because “as a matter of law, this allegation is insufficient to support a claim of
monopolization in this circuit.” Rockbit Indus. U.S.A., Inc. v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 802 F. Supp.
1544, 1551 (S.D. Tex. 1991); see also Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 206208 (5th Cir. 1969) (dismissing complaint for failure to plead monopoly power);
Globespanvirata v. Texas Instruments, No. 03-2854, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8860 at *11 (D. N.J.
Mar. 3, 2006) (granting motion to dismiss Sherman Act § 2 claim for failure to allege monopoly
share).

6

Likewise, a “market power screen” applies to Sherman Act § 1 rule of reason claims
(Count 3). Leegin, 615 F.3d at 418 n.5 (“‘[S]ubstantial market power is an indispensable
ingredient of every claim under the Rule of Reason.’”) (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq
Digital Techs., Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 761 (7th Cir. 1996)). This screen prevents Section 1 claims
from going forward where, as in this case, the market power allegations are insufficient to raise
genuine concerns about exclusionary conduct.
The allegation that Travelport holds a 34% share of the U.S. travel agents market does
not meet the “market power screen.” See Nw. Power Prods., Inc. v. Omark Indus., Inc. 576 F.2d
83, 90-91 (5th Cir. 1978) (defendant conspicuously lacked market power when it had a 25%
share and competed with at least one larger competitor); Flegel v. Christian Hosp., NortheastNorthwest, 4 F.3d 682, 689 (8th Cir. 1993) (plaintiff must show a “dominant market share” to
satisfy the market power screen) (emphasis added); Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire
Corp., 483 F. Supp. 750, 761 (D. Md. 1980) (defendant did not have requisite market power
when it had 20 to 25% share and there were larger producers). Thus, AA’s claim that Travelport
violated Sherman Act § 1 should also be dismissed on the pleadings for failure to allege market
power. See Leegin, 615 F.3d at 418-19 (to allege a Section 1 claim, “a plaintiff must plausibly
allege the defendant’s market power”); Futurevision Cable Sys. of Wiggins, Inc. v. Multivision
Cable TV Corp., 789 F. Supp. 760, 768-69 (S.D. Miss. 1992) (granting 12(b)(6) dismissal of rule
of reason claim because of failure to allege market share sufficient to establish market power);
Rick-Mik Enters. Inc. v. Equilon Enters., LLC, 532 F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 2008) (granting
12(b)(6) dismissal of rule of reason claim because plaintiff alleged only that defendant was
“number one in the industry”).

7

II.

AA Fails to Allege Facts Establishing a Single-Brand Market
1.

The Travelport-Only Market Is Implausible

AA’s solution to these problems – particularly the inability to allege monopoly power or
substantial market power in an all U.S. travel agency market -- is to contrive what it deems a
“relevant product submarket” in which Travelport’s share is 100%: “Travelport provides 100%
of the bookings for a large number of corporate customers whose travel agents subscribe to one
of Travelport’s GDSs.” Compl. at ¶ 3. This is the “submarket” consisting of Travelport services
to travel agencies using Travelport. Calling this a “submarket” does not excuse AA from market
definition pleading standards. See Leegin, 615 F.3d at 418. Indeed, a leading antitrust treatise
has expressly warned against AA’s tactic of couching “an overly narrow market designation that
exaggerates the defendant’s power” by using the “confus[ing]” submarket nomenclature. Areeda
& Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application ¶ 533
(3d ed. 2007).
With this product submarket, AA can state with confidence that entry is difficult, given
that, by definition, AA’s submarket excludes sales to travel agents that chose Travelport’s
competitors over Travelport. Just as AA omitted airline direct distribution, which constitutes the
majority of U.S. ticket sales, from the “all travel agents” product market, AA omits these sales
from the submarket consisting of just Travelport subscribing travel agencies. Compl. at ¶ 104.
AA also disregarded Sabre and other competing GDSs based on the conclusory allegation that
“other providers of airline booking services do not serve as a competitive check” on Travelport
services for Travelport travel agents. Id. at ¶ 105; see also id. at ¶ 35 (“GDSs are not substitutes
for one another”); id. at ¶ 41 (“Travelport is not subject to competitive discipline from other
providers of booking services to travel agents”). By conveniently ignoring marketplace realities,

8

AA has managed to define a gerrymandered product market in which no one but Travelport ever
has or ever could compete.
Regurgitating antitrust buzz words cannot render AA’s antitrust allegations any more
viable. Of course, every company is a monopolist in a product market comprised exclusively of
its own sales of its own products to its current customers, and which excludes sales to customers
that choose to buy from the company’s competitors. The Court should reject AA’s contrived and
outcome-determinative Travelport-only product market.
AA’s proposed single-brand submarket is flawed for other reasons as well. In particular,
both AA’s “submarket” and the broader market (where Travelport is concededly not a
monopolist) focus on the provision of services to travel agents. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 105 (“The
provision of airline booking services to Travelport subscribers [i.e., travel agents] is a relevant
product submarket.”) (emphasis added). But AA does not allege any harm at all to travel agents;
rather it appears to assert that travel agents are overcompensated by Travelport and other GDSs.
Id. at ¶ 48.
This is internally contradictory. Any allegation that Travelport has monopoly power over
travel agents is contradicted by AA’s allegation that travel agents are able to secure
supracompetitive prices from Travelport. If Travelport really had monopoly power over travel
agents, it would not be forced to pay them too much. Indeed, AA completely fails to support any
claim that Travelport exercises monopoly power over travel agents.
In other portions of the Complaint, AA seems to suggest that Travelport has monopoly
power in a different—but even narrower—market altogether: the market for AA’s access to
travel agents that subscribe to Travelport. Id. at ¶ 8 (“Travelport has ensured that American and
other network airlines that rely on travel agents to distribute tickets are dependent upon

9

Travelport to access the critical group of travel agents that subscribe to Travelport’s GDSs. In
this way, Travelport has obtained and maintained monopoly power over American and other
network airlines.”) (emphasis added). Such allegations would apparently pertain to a different
market, whereby each GDS would have monopoly power over each airline that uses travel agents
to distribute tickets. Thus, there would be an AA-Travelport market, a Delta-Travelport market,
and a US Airways-Travelport market. This even more restrictive single-brand market similarly
fails the Kodak test outlined below.
2.

The Complaint Does Not Allege Facts Fitting Within the Kodak Exception

A well developed body of law governs the limited exception for pleading “single brand”
markets. Antitrust markets are defined based on reasonable interchangeability of products or
services. “In rare circumstances, a single brand of a product or service can constitute a relevant
market for antitrust purposes.” Leegin, 615 F.3d at 418 (affirming dismissal of single-brand
market on pleadings); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
482 (1992) (noting that in exceptional instances a single-brand may constitute a product market).
The limited exception arises where a rivalry exists for the sale of follow-on products (such as
repair parts, service, or supplies) to consumers who may be “locked in” to a particular brand after
initial purchase. Examples may be ink for use in H-P printers or maintenance services for
Whirlpool washers. In these situations, the potential single-brand product market is not based on
the initial products purchased like H-P printers or Whirlpool washers but, rather, the follow-on
products sold to consumers who in some situations could be “locked in” to the single brand or
single manufacturer after the initial purchase.
In these cases, courts have held that the Kodak exception is limited to situations in which
customers were unable to evaluate total life cycle costs at the time of initial purchase (e.g., costs
of the H-P printer and replacement ink) and were exploited by an unexpected change in practice
10

after being locked in to a single brand for the follow-on products. See, e.g, PSI Repair Servs.,
Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 820 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he change in policy in Kodak was
the crucial factor in the Court’s decision.”); see also Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs.,
Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 763 (7th Cir. 1996) (Kodak’s change in policy regarding replacement parts and
services was dispositive); Lee v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 23 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 1994)
(allegation that customers were unaware of “lock in” at time of initial purchase is critical to meet
Kodak exception). 3 The plaintiff asserting a single-brand market within the Kodak exception
must establish that the defendant failed to make adequate disclosures at the time of initial
purchase, thereby preventing consumers from effective comparison shopping. This failure may
leave consumers “locked in” when purchasing follow-on parts, maintenance, or supplies.
AA has not alleged any product market in which there is competition for follow-on
products or services to airlines or travel agents who would face “lock in” following initial
purchase or initial contract. It alleges that the relevant product market is the Travelport GDS, not
any follow-on products or services. Courts reject on the pleadings such single-brand markets
that are outside the Kodak exception. In Leegin, for example, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
dismissal of a single-brand market, emphasizing that the Kodak exception “is limited to
situations in which consumers are ‘locked in’ to a specific brand by the nature of the product.”
615 F.3d at 418; see also Continental Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Health Insur. of Greater
New York, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 133, 141 (E.D. N.Y. 1998) (granting motion on pleadings to
dismiss single-brand health insurer market); Rohlfing v. Manor Care, 172 F.R.D. 330, 346 (N.D.
Ill. 1997) (dismissing single-brand market on pleadings because no alleged facts showing Kodak3

See also Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to
Intellectual Property Law § 21.04 (2002 and 2006 Supp.)( “[i]t should…be clear that Kodak-style ‘lock-in’ occurs
when the primary market decision and the ‘aftermarket’ decision are made at different times.”).

11

type lock in); Apani Southwest, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Enter., Inc., 300 F.3d 620, 633 (5th Cir. 2002)
(affirming 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to plead plausible market when plaintiff defined market
around sales to a single customer). This Court should do the same.
AA does not allege that Travelport failed to disclose its key business practices at the time
of an initial contract, resulting in unfair consumer lock in. Nor does AA allege some unexpected
shift in business practice during the life of the contract. These allegations are essential for the
Kodak exception and their absence compels dismissal of this Complaint dependent on a singlebrand market.
3.

Bargaining Leverage Allegations Do Not Justify A Single-Brand Market

Instead of facts needed to meet the Kodak exception, the Complaint is filled with run-ofthe-mill commercial bargaining power allegations. The allegations that underlie the Travelportonly single-brand market are (1) that Travelport provides access to “a large number” or “critical
group” of Travelport agents, Compl. at ¶¶ 1, 3, 35; (2) that AA and other airlines must distribute
through Travelport to avoid losing a “significant” number of ticket sales, id. at ¶ 35-36; and (3)
as a result, AA and other airlines have “little ability” to drop Travelport or “no choice” except to
distribute through Travelport. Id. at ¶¶ 35, 105. Stripped to its core, the Complaint states that
Travelport is a valuable distributor and that losing Travelport as a distributor may cause a
supplier to lose significant business. This in turn gives Travelport some degree of bargaining
leverage.
Travelport concedes that its distribution services are valuable and does not question why
AA and many other airlines use Travelport to distribute tickets. But it is commonplace in our
economy for manufacturers or suppliers to depend upon valued distributors to reach key
customers. Take supermarkets as distributors. The makers of Cheerios, Corn Flakes, or Lucky
Charms could say that each supermarket chain provides access to “a large number” or “critical
12

group” of customers, that each cereal brand participates in each supermarket chain so as to avoid
losing “significant” sales, and that the cereal markers have “little ability” to stop distributing
through the supermarket chain. This in turn gives the supermarket some degree of leverage
when negotiating terms of sale with the cereal maker. Nike or Adidas might say the same things
about the leading sporting good retailers. However, these commonplace bargaining power
conditions would not support a Kroger product market or Dick’s Sporting Goods product market.
Not surprisingly, courts have rejected single-brand markets based on commonplace
bargaining power conditions. For example, hospitals and pharmacy chains have alleged that
each health insurer (such as Blue Cross, Aetna, or Cigna) provides exclusive access to a unique
and critical group of patients, that the hospital or pharmacy needs to participate in the health
insurer’s network to avoid losing significant business, and the health insurer has enormous
negotiating leverage as a result. None of these arguments has sustained a market limited to the
services of a single health insurer.
Thus, a retail pharmacy chain could not sustain a single-brand health insurer market
(giving the health insurer “100% of this market regardless”) despite alleging that the health
insurer had “leverage acquired by virtue of its ability to provide . . . access to thousands of
potential pharmacy customers,” that the insurer’s “subscribers constituted a significant portion of
[the pharmacy chain’s] customer base,” and that “participating pharmacies do not drop out of
the . . . network.” Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 510, 514
(3rd Cir. 1998). This does not “fall within Kodak’s concept of lock in.” Id. at 515; see also
Continental Orthopedic, 994 F. Supp. at 141 (rejecting single-brand health insurer market);
Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1476 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We reject the plaintiffs' attempt

13

to limit the relevant market to acute care hospitals used by Humana insureds” where there is no
failure to disclose under the Kodak exception).
AA’s allegations support only the conclusion that this is a commercial dispute between
two large companies with varying degrees of bargaining leverage. AA’s assertions should not be
confused with factual allegations sufficient to show that the defendant maintains a monopolistic
market share (i.e., well over 50%) in a relevant product market that is defined by product
characteristics and consumer demand in the industry.
4.

Parroting Outdated Marketplace Descriptions Cannot Justify a Single-Brand
Monopolization Case in 2011

To justify a single-brand market, AA relies on anemic allegations of simple bargaining
leverage, coupled with quotes from regulatory filings that predate the deregulation of the GDS
industry. AA even quotes a district court decision from the 1980s. Compl. at ¶ 88.
Remarkably, it also appears that AA has attempted to pass off as evidence of current
market conditions allegations it lifted from a Northwest Airlines Complaint filed in 2004. For
example, AA’s allegations about how travel agents are the “dominant channel for selling airline
tickets,” appear to be pulled from observations made nearly a decade ago – an extremely long
period in the context of a dynamic high technology business. 4 The outdated materials quoted
throughout the Complaint are business generations away from the current environment where
more than half of U.S. ticket sales are made directly by airlines.

4

Compare, e.g., AA Compl. ¶ 35 with Northwest Compl. ¶ 21 (“Travel agents continue to be the dominant channel
for distribution of air transportation services, and travel agents continue to rely almost entirely on a single GDS.”);
AA Compl. ¶ 33 with Northwest Compl. ¶ 19 (“Those payments are tied to productivity commitments by travel
agencies, i.e., commitments to use the GDS service for a specified volume of bookings, coupled with financial
penalties or disincentives if those commitments are not reached.”); AA Compl. ¶ 36 with Northwest Compl. ¶ 20
(“In theory, an airline could exert countervailing leverage against GDSs, like defendants, by withholding its
participation in a particular GDS since, over time, the GDS’s services would become less valuable to consumers and
thus to travel agents.”).

14

III.

The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over the Alleged Switzerland, UK,
and Belgium Markets
AA’s quest for an antitrust market where Travelport has a monopolistic share has

spanned the globe. It appears that AA tracked Travelport’s alleged share by country around the
world and selected three relatively high share countries as geographic markets for an antitrust
lawsuit. The highest is Switzerland, as “Travelport accounted for 55% of all bookings made in
Switzerland.” Id. at ¶ 106. Thus, AA is apparently asking this Court to determine whether
Travelport has monopolized markets, including single-brand markets, in individual European
nations.
Under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (“FTAIA”), a plaintiff relying on
foreign conduct must allege facts showing that (1) the foreign conduct amounts to U.S. “import
commerce” or (2) the foreign conduct has “a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable”
effect on U.S. consumers. 15 U.S.C. § 6a. Neither condition is present here.
1.

Foreign Travel Agency Service Is Not U.S. Import Commerce

The subject matter jurisdiction of U.S. antitrust law may extend to foreign conduct that
constitutes import commerce. For example, U.S. antitrust law may cover a price fixing
agreement formed in Germany between two German manufacturers to raise the price of goods
those firms import into the United States. That concerns “import commerce” even though the
conduct occurred abroad.
In the seminal industry case, AA itself successfully argued that the business of foreign
travel agencies is not import commerce under the FTAIA. See Turicentro S.A. v. American
Airlines, Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 303 (3rd Cir. 2002). The court ruled that U.S. airlines do not
“import” foreign travel agency services for purpose of selling tickets in the United States. Id.
The court also rejected the argument that a foreign travel agency’s use of a GDS based in the

15

United States and the agency’s receipt of commissions paid by a U.S. GDS transforms these
services into import commerce. Id. at 304.
2.

Foreign Travel Agency Services Do Not Have a Direct and Substantial U.S.
Effect

Alternatively, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that a defendant’s foreign “conduct
has ‘a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable’ anticompetitive effect on U.S. commerce,
and that the conduct ‘gives rise’ to a Sherman Act claim.” Id. at 304 (quoting FTAIA); Den
Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. Heeremac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 427 (5th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff failed
to show that effect on U.S. commerce in any way “gives rise” to its antitrust claim). The
“geographic effect of the defendants’ [foreign] conduct” must be on the competitive process
within the United States and it must be direct and substantial. Turicentro, 303 F.3d at 304.
AA’s Complaint does not allege that Travelport’s conduct in Switzerland, the UK, or
Belgium has a direct and substantial anticompetitive effect within the United States. Rather, AA
does just the opposite: It alleges effects in separate and distinct parts of Europe. There is no
alleged world market based on the idea that pricing in one country has direct effects in others.
The allegation that Travelport has monopolized markets in Europe is far outside the subject
matter jurisdiction of the United States antitrust laws.
IV.

AA’s Failure to Allege Facts Establishing Exclusionary Conduct Also Warrants
Dismissal
Another essential element of a monopolization claim under Sherman Act § 2 (Counts 1

and 2) is exclusionary conduct that has produced or is maintaining the illegal monopoly.
Likewise, a rule of reason claim under Sherman Act § 1 (Count 3) requires proof that the
defendant enjoying substantial market power engaged in exclusionary or anticompetitive acts.

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1.

The Allegations that Travelport Foreclosed Travel Agents or Software
Developers Are Deficient

Even if a 34% share of the alleged U.S. GDS market somehow amounted to monopoly or
market power, AA still needs to allege facts establishing that the suppliers or customers
foreclosed constitutes a “substantial share of the relevant market.” Tampa Electric. Co. v.
Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1961); see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 45 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Exclusive dealing is an unreasonable
restraint of trade only when a significant fraction of buyers or sellers are frozen out of a market
by the exclusive deal.”).
AA alleges that Travelport, acting as a monopolist, used multi-year contracts to foreclose
access to travel agencies. Compl. at ¶¶ 53-58. It also alleges that Travelport foreclosed access to
software developers. Id. at ¶¶ 64-76. Tampa Electric’s “substantial share” requirement is
intended to ensure that any foreclosure by a company with monopoly power is in fact likely to
have the effect of handcuffing competitors, thereby harming consumers. Control over an
insubstantial portion of the supplier or customer base does not establish an antitrust violation.
How much of the alleged travel agency market do Travelport’s multi-year contracts cover?
According to AA, it reaches “a large number of corporate customers,” agencies representing “a
significant number of ticket sales,” or agencies representing “a discrete, but critical, group of
travelers.” Id. at ¶¶ 1, 3, 35-36. We are left to guess whether this “large number” is 5% or 95%
of the relevant travel agents market. As to the software developers Travelport supposedly walled
off from AA, the Complaint alleges virtually nothing. Id. at ¶¶ 31, 64, 66, 73-76. As far as the
Complaint reads, this could be 5 of 5, 5 of 50, or 1 of 100 software developers. Id. There are
simply no facts alleged that would allow any assessment of the impact on competition.

17

This is a Complaint in which the alleged monopolist, maintaining either a 34% market
share or a fixed 100% share, allegedly exercised its monopoly power by blocking access to
customers (travel agents) and unrelated third-parties (software developers) whose relative size
and competitive significance is anybody’s guess. AA’s failure to plead any facts showing
foreclosure of a substantial share of the travel agents or software developers as required by
Tampa Electric is grounds for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. See, e.g., Rick-Mik, 532 F.3d at 972
(“The complaint alleges nothing about, for example, what percentage of gasoline franchises are
[defendant’s]. There are no factual allegations regarding the amount of power or control that
[defendant] has over prospective franchises.”); Rockbit, 802 F. Supp. at 1550 (granting 12(b)(6)
motion because plaintiff “failed to allege any facts which would indicate the degree of commerce
that may have been foreclosed”); Insignia Systems, Inc. v. News Corp., No. 04-4213, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 42851, at *10-11 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2005) (“[A]bsent some indication of the
percentage of the local, regional, or national markets that the . . . outlets allegedly under
exclusive contract constitute, it is impossible to evaluate the percentage of the market with
which . . . competitors are prevented from doing business”).
2.

The Alleged “Retaliatory” Foreign Pricing Is Irrelevant and Outside the
Scope of U.S. Antitrust Law

AA alleges a series of commercial disputes between it and Orbitz Worldwide, LLC
(“Orbitz”), Travelport, and third-party Sabre Inc. (“Sabre”) without connecting them to any
viable antitrust theory. Many of these allegations have nothing to do with Travelport at all. The
ones that do involve “retaliatory” actions allegedly taken by Travelport occur “outside the United
States.” Compl. ¶ 85.
One of the main exclusionary acts highlighted in the Complaint is foreign pricing:
“Travelport doubled American’s booking fees for reservations made outside the United States,

18

and subsequently intentionally misrepresented American’s fares in a manner that made them
appear more expensive than they actually were to consumers outside the United States.” Compl.
at ¶ 10 (emphasis added). Over and over again the Complaint points to this price increase “to
consumers outside the United States.” Id. at ¶ 42 (“doubling the booking fees for tickets sales
made outside the United States”); id. at ¶ 85 (“doubling the booking fees charged American for
bookings made by travel agents outside the United States”); id. at ¶¶ 86-87 (Travelport added a
“premium to American’s fares” in response to American’s “recovery fee . . . for Travelport
subscribers who booked American flights from outside the United States”); id. at ¶ 111
(“Travelport was able to double American’s booking fees in certain regions”); id. at ¶ 226
(“Doubling the fees . . . made through Travelport’s GDS”).
AA’s foreign pricing allegations not only fall outside the subject matter jurisdiction of
U.S. antitrust law, but they also conflict with AA’s market definition allegations. See Turicentro,
303 F.3d at 303. AA has not alleged a world market where pricing decisions in one country
necessarily have a ripple effect in others. Rather it has alleged distinct national markets based on
local conditions. Id. at ¶ 106 (“Because most travelers purchase airline tickets from travel agents
located where they work or reside, the provision of airline booking services in one country is not
a substitute for the provision of such services in another country.”). Raising the price outside the
United States cannot equate to price increases or anticompetitive effects on consumers in the U.S.
market, particularly where the price competition as alleged occurs in distinct national markets.
AA’s heavy reliance on contradictory, foreign pricing allegations underscores the
absence from its Complaint of any factual allegation of increased prices in the United States.
Foreign pricing allegations provide no support for the claim that Travelport has monopolized the
United States market.

19

The Complaint’s only allegation of a GDS price increase in the United States concerns
not Travelport but a third-party who, according to the Complaint, is not even a competitor. Id. at
¶¶ 35, 41, 105. AA alleges that in January 2011, Sabre made a decision to raise its prices in the
United States. Id. at ¶ 91. How does Sabre’s U.S. price increase relate to Travelport? There are
no allegations of any meeting or discussion – let alone an agreement – between Travelport and
Sabre to raise Sabre’s U.S. prices. AA makes no allegations that Travelport responded to
Sabre’s U.S. price increase by raising its own prices in the United States. As AA has enjoyed
very significant price cuts under the contracts at issue in this case, it is unable to and has not
alleged any U.S. price increases by Travelport.
3.

The Contractual MFN Allegations Are Time Barred

In its contract with AA, Travelport seeks assurance that it is getting the most current,
accurate, and complete airfare content available. That assurance is critical to Travelport’s
competitiveness because travel agencies depend on full and transparent content to comparison
shop and obtain the best price for travelers. To achieve this business objective, Travelport’s
contract with AA contains a “content parity” or, as AA calls it, a “most-favored nation” (“MFN”)
clause. Id. at ¶¶ 45-46.
AA’s Complaint identifies the Travelport contract, quotes the content parity clause, and
alleges that this clause improperly restricts AA’s ability to offer a la carte content. Id. at ¶¶ 4647. AA challenges the content parity clause in its contract with Travelport as exclusionary,
quoting old regulatory filings referring to these types of contract clauses. Id. at ¶¶ 51-52. Not
only are such clauses ultimately pro-competitive, but they are beyond the applicable statute of
limitations. The AA-Travelport contract containing the content parity clause was executed in

20

2006. (See TP APX 2 at 35). 5 AA has sat on its hands since 2006 and now seeks treble damages
incurred by AA as a result of the content parity clause that it negotiated at arm’s length and that
resulted in it receiving deep price discounts. This violates the four-year statute of limitations
governing Sherman Act claims.
Under the “continuing conspiracy” exception to the four-year time bar, a plaintiff relying
on an outdated event must show fresh, specific, and identifiable anticompetitive acts occurring
within the limitations period. For example, the Fifth Circuit in Rx.com dismissed an antitrust
claim as time barred when the refusal to deal occurred more than four years ago and the plaintiff
failed to show that “[d]efendants reiterated their refusals.” Rx.com v. Medco Health Solutions,
Inc., 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 8469, at *8-9 (5th Cir. Apr. 22, 2009); see also Imperial Point
Colonnades Condominium, Inc. v. Mangurian, 549 F.2d 1029, 1035 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[A] cause
of action will not lie for damages that occur within the four years preceding suit, if those
damages result solely from acts committed by the defendant outside the four-year period.”). To
the extent AA thought this contract term gave rise to an antitrust violation in 2006, it failed to
allege such a claim in a timely manner.
Having experienced an unsuccessful commercial negotiation thus far in 2011, AA seems
willing to dig through its files in an effort to come up with anything that might possibly advance
an antitrust lawsuit. However, AA’s MFN allegations are not based on any new fact or event
that happened within the limitations period. All AA is saying is that the contract clause it agreed
to in 2006 is anticompetitive and has been since AA signed the contract in 2006. AA has not
alleged a continuing conspiracy with any fresh, new, or different acts.

5

This Court may take judicial notice of contracts referenced in the Complaint. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000).

21

4.

Allegations Regarding “Applications Developers” Do Not State a Cognizable
Antitrust Claim

AA expresses outrage that Travelport has restricted access to its proprietary applications
programming interfaces to “authorized” applications developers, Compl. at ¶¶ 64-76, as if any
company in Travelport’s position would just open its gates to every outside software developer
regardless of concerns about quality control, system burdens, or free-riding. AA’s attempt to
characterize this activity as an antitrust violation defies both the law and common sense. It is
well established that a private company has the right to choose with whom it does business and
has no duty to aid competitors. Verizon Communs., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,
540 U.S. 398, 408, 411 (2004). Devoid of any plausible allegation that Travelport lacks a valid
business justification for exercising control over its proprietary technology, AA’s Complaint fails
to state a claim for an unlawful refusal to deal. See id. at 409-10.
Accordingly, all of AA’s antitrust claims (Counts 1-3) should be dismissed for their
failure to allege any exclusionary conduct sufficient to give rise to antitrust liability.
V.

AA Has Failed to Allege an Illegal Conspiracy
For the reasons stated above, the conspiracy to monopolize claim (Count 2) should be

dismissed for failure to allege a plausible market. The Court may dismiss this claim for the
independent reason that AA has not alleged an illegal agreement or conspiracy.
1.

Under Common Control, Travelport and Orbitz Are Incapable of an Illegal
Conspiracy

The conspiracy alleged here is implausible because it is, in essence, a conspiracy of one.
Travelport and Orbitz are controlled by the same majority owner, The Blackstone Group. Since
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,
777 (1984), plaintiffs have been unable to plead this type of a bath tub conspiracy. See

22

Defendant Orbitz Worldwide LLC’s Brief in Support of its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint.
2.

The Conspiracy Allegations Concerning “Unnamed Industry Participants”
Fail the Twombly Standard

AA charges Travelport with entering into an illegal conspiracy, in violation of federal
antitrust law, with “unnamed industry participants.” Compl. at ¶ 116. It may be that AA cannot
identify “unnamed industry participants” because this is the rankest form of speculation and
innuendo lacking any grounding in fact. Alternatively, AA may know the identity of the
“unnamed industry participants” and the terms or elements of the alleged illegal conspiracy but
has withheld those facts for some tactical reason. Either way, AA cannot force Travelport to
incur huge legal fees and lost management time to defend an antitrust case on this flimsy
conspiracy theory.
The conclusory allegation that Travelport entered into a conspiracy with “unnamed
industry participants” causing massive consumer harm throughout the United States and Europe
is not enough. The dismissed complaint in Twombly “furnishe[d] no clue as to which of the four
ILECs (much less which of their employees) supposedly agreed, or when and where the illicit
agreement took place.” 550 U.S. at 563 n. 8. The lower courts have interpreted the Twombly
decision as requiring plaintiffs charging conspiracy to assert the “when and where” facts. See,
e.g., In re Southeastern Milk Antitrust Litig., 555 F. Supp. 2d 934, 942 (E.D. Tenn. 2008) (“To
allege an agreement between antitrust-conspirators, the complaint must allege facts such as a
specific time, place, or person involved in the alleged conspiracies to give a defendant seeking to
respond to allegations of a conspiracy an idea of where to begin.”). The Court should demand
more than a bare-bones allegation where even the identity of the conspirators is a mystery.

23

VI.

The Airline Deregulation Act Preempts the Tortious Interference Claims
AA alleges that Travelport tortiously interfered with AA’s existing or prospective

contractual relations to provide airfare distribution services to travel agencies (Counts 4 and 5).
Compl. at ¶¶ 124-26, 132-34. Travelport’s interference with AA’ own air distribution services
allegedly violates the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and creates tort liability under Texas
law. Id. at ¶ 126(d).
The Airline Deregulation Act preempts state law claims “related to a price, route, or
service of an air carrier.” 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). Interpreting this federal law, the Fifth
Circuit drew a distinction between claims for physical injury from claims relating to “the
business of transportation as well as the schedules” or “the economic factors that go into the
provision of the . . . passenger’s fare, including flight frequency and timing.’” Hodges v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Civil Aviation Board). In the Fifth
Circuit case, Mrs. Hodges suffered injury when a fellow passenger opened an overhead
compartment and dislodged a case of rum. Id. at 335. The Airline Deregulation Act did not
preempt her negligence claim for physical injury. Id. at 338.
Applying Hodges, this Court held that the Airline Deregulation Act preempts state law
claims relating to GDS services: “Here, plaintiff’s complaints arising out of the SABRE CRS are
clearly based on the defendants’ reservation practices and therefore have a connection with
defendants’ ‘services.’” Lyn-Lea Travel Corp. v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 96-CV-2068-BC,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21119 at *21 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 1997), aff'd, 139 F.3d 899 (5th Cir.
1998), vacated on other grounds, 283 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2002). Other courts have ruled that the
Airline Deregulation Act preempts claims under state law relating to GDS or airfare booking
services. See Galileo Int’l v. Ryanair, No. 01 C 2210, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3317 at *14 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 21, 2002) (finding that GDS services are “services” under the Act and thus claim under
24

state law for overcharges for bookings is preempted); Manassas Travel, Inc. v. Worldspan, L.P.,
Case No. 2:07-CV-701-TC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35217 at *6 (D. Utah Apr. 30, 2008)
(applying ADA preemption to claims against GDS); Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines,
758 F. Supp. 1399, 1402 (D. Col. 1989) (claim under state unfair competition law that airline
improperly marketed GDS services is preempted).
AA’s claim that a GDS interfered with an airline’s own airfare distribution is “related to a
price, route, or service of an air carrier” and thus falls well within the Airline Deregulation Act’s
preemption clause. Both tortious interference counts (Counts 4-5) must be dismissed.

Dated: May 25, 2011

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Walker C. Friedman
Walker C. Friedman
Michael L. Weiner
[e-mail]
DECHERT LLP
1095 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-6797
212.698.3608
212.698.3599(Fax)
Mike Cowie
[e-mail]
Craig Falls
[e-mail]
DECHERT LLP
1775 I Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20006-2401
202.261.3300
202.261.3333 (Fax)
Walker C. Friedman
State Bar No. 07472500
[e-mail]
Christian D. Tucker
State Bar No. 00795690
[e-mail]

25

FRIEDMAN, SUDER & COOKE, P.C.
Tindall Square Warehouse No. 1
604 East 4th Street, Suite 200
Fort Worth, Texas 76102
817.334.0400
817.334.0401 (Fax)
John T. Schriver
[e-mail]
Paul E. Chronis
[e-mail]
DUANE MORRIS LLP
Suite 3700
190 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603-3433
312.499.6700
312.499.6701 (Fax)
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
TRAVELPORT LIMITED and
TRAVELPORT, LP

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of May, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing
document with the clerk of the court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, Fort
Worth Division, using the electronic case filing system of the court. The electronic case filing
system sent a “Notice of Electronic Filing” to the attorneys of record who have consented in
writing to accept this Notice as service of this document by electronic means.

/s/ Walker C. Friedman
Walker C. Friedman

26