Clinton Growers et al v. Pilgrims Pride Corporation

Filing 14

Memorandum Opinion and Order: The court ORDERS that the order of the bankruptcy court in the above-captioned bankruptcy case entered February ll, 2011, that each and every one of the Clinton Growers take nothing by their claims against Pilgrim 's Pride Corporation be, and is hereby, affirmed. [see Order for specifics] (Ordered by Judge John McBryde on 12/19/2011) (klm)

Download PDF
U. DI S STRI COURT CT NORTHEkN DI TRI OFTEXAS î S CT FI E D L I THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT OURT N WCRTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS VCRT WORTH DIVISION g g I9 2 l E 0j CVCRX V. PI V STRI COURT CT y bY Deput y IN R E : PILGRIMS PRIDE CORPORATION , Bankruptcy Court Case No . 08-45664-dm111 Debtor . CLINTON GROWERS , ET AL ., App licants, District Court Case VS . No . 4 :11-CV -333-A PILGRIM 'S PR IDE CORPORATION , ET AL ., Appellees . MEMORANDUM OPIN ION and ORDER Before the court for decision is the appeal of a group of persons known as the 'Clinton Growers' from rulings of the ' ' bankruptcy court in the above-captioned bankruptcy case summarily denying their proofs of claim in bankruptcy . The persons referred to herein as the Clinton Growers are listed in the exhibit that is an attachment hereto . The court has concluded that the rulings of the bankruptcy court , as set forth in the document titled 'Final Order on Clinton Growers ' Claims ' entered ' ' in the bankruptcy case on February 11, 2011, R . at 8-15, denying . ' ' ; the Clinton Growers ' claims in bankruptcy against Pilgrim ' Pride s Corporation should be affirmed . The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the debtors, Pilgrim ' Pride Corporation , PSF Distribution Company , PPC s Transportation Company , To-Ricos, Ltd w To-Ricos Distribution , Ltd w Pilgrim 's Pride Corporation of West V irginia, and PPC Marketing, Ltd . ('Debtors'), on two theories--first, that the ' ' bankruptcy court was bound by the law-of-the -case doctrine to rule for Debtors by reason of rulings made by United States District Judge Terry R . Means in Citv of Clinton , Ark . v . Pilqrim ' Pride Corp w 654 F. Supp . 2d 576, 544-45 ( . . Tex . s N D 2009), and, second, even if the law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply , the promissory estoppel theory of recovery urged by Clinton Growers ( their sole remaining theory in support of their bankruptcy claims) is legally unmeritorious under facts estab lished without dispute in the record on which the bankruptcy court acted . Clinton Growers ' contentions on appeal amount to the propositions that the bankruptcy court erred in holding that the law -of-the-case doctrine applies and in applying that doctrine as a basis for denial of their claims , and that the bankruptcy court erred in its conclusion that denial of the claims was justified because the record established as a matter of law that Clinton 2 Growers ' promissory estoppel claims lack legal merit . at 8- l5 . Debtors filed several motions for partial summary judgment, each directed to an aspect of one of the three theories of recovery urged by Clinton Growers in their proofs of claim in bankruptcy . R . at 4009 ( summary of bases for proofs of claim); R . at 9-11 ( final order listing the theories of recovery asserted by Clinton Growers and motions for partial summary judgement filed by Debtors). Clinton Growers admitted the merits of the motions for partial summary judgment as to two of their three theories of recovery ; and , the bankruptcy court granted the motions as to those two theories. R . at 7429, 7432 ( orders granting motions for partial summary judgment as to Clinton Growers ' causes of action based on fraud or deceit , fraudulent inducement, and constructive fraud and their cause of action based on alleged violations of the A rkansas Livestock and Poultry Contract Protection Act) The remaining theory of recovery advanced by Clinton Growers, promissory estoppel, was the subject matter of the bankruptcy court ' ruling from which Clinton Growers have s appealed. R. at 8-15 ( final order); opinion) at 3983-4005 ( memorandum Six of the motions for partial summary judgment were directed to Clinton Growers ' promissory estoppel theory , one ! I focusing on the parol ev idence ru le , another on the statute of frauds, another on merger, another on statute of limitations, another on absence of actionable prom ises on which Clinton Growers could justifiably rely, and the final on barred by contract . R . at 10 . The bankruptcy court 's memorandum opinion says that the bankruptcy court was granting its relief based on the merger motion . R . at 3983 n .1, 4005 . Because of the bankruptcy court 's granting of the merger motion , the bankruptcy court concluded that the remaining motions were moot . R . at 4005 . In the final order , the bankruptcy court granted the merger motion , but none of the others . Id . However, the explanation the bankruptcy court gave in its memorandum op inion as why Arkansas law compelled a rejection of Clinton Growers' promissory estoppel theory seems to say that the bankruptcy court has accepted Debtors ' arguments that the promissory estoppel theory is not viable by reason of the contract bar urged by one of the motions as well as the merger bar urged by the motion the bankruptcy court expressly granted . Undoubtedly conscious of the ability of this court to affirm the bankruptcy court 's ruling on any ground supported by the record , Clinton Growers assign in their brief as issues to be resolved on the appeal each of the theories urged by Debtors in the bankruptcy court as to why Clinton Growers cannot 4 successfully assert promissory estoppel . Br . of Appellants at 1 . Appellees responded in kind , agreeing that Clinton Growers l statement of the issues was accurate, Br . of Appellees at 1, and by providing responsive argument as to each of those issues . In this memorandum opinion the court expresses its conclusion that promissory estoppel is not a v iable theory of recovery for two reasons--because it is barred by reason of the existence of a contract between the parties dealing with the same subject matters of the statements upon which the estoppel theory is based and because the merger language in the contracts prohibits reliance on the extra-contractual statements Clinton Growers urge in support of their promissory estoppel theory . While the court finds persuasive the arguments and authorities presented by Debtors in support of their other reasons why promissory estoppel cannot successfully be asserted , the court chooses to limit its discussion to the merger and barred -bycontract issues . The bankruptcy court and Debtors make persuasive arguments in support of the bankruptcy court ' law-of-the -case ruling , but s the court has reservations as to whether that doctrine is applicable . Consequently , the court chooses not to base the court' affirmance of the bankruptcy court ' judgment on 1aw of s s the case . For the reasons given below , the court has no 5 misgivings about the bankruptcy court ' denial of Clinton s Growers ' claims on the ground that the record establishes as a matter of law that Clinton Growers ' promissory estoppel theory is without merit . The bankruptcy court 's December 15 , 2010, memorandum opinion correctly and adequately described in a1l material respects the procedural history and undisputed factual background . R . at 3983-88. The contract , which is titled 'Pilgrim 's Pride ' Corporation Broiler Production Agreement ,' between each of the ' Clinton Growers and Pilgrim ' Pride Corporation has essentially s the same terms and provisions as the other contracts . The terms and provisions that have potential relevance to the v iability of Clinton Growers ' promissory estoppel claims are as follows : 1. Under the heading 'Engagement of the Independent ' Grower,'l the contract provides that ' sluch agreement is to ' 'l continue unless terminated in accordance with the prov isions . . contained' i the agree l n ment. R. at 2045, ! A. . 2. Under the heading 'Term , the contract provides ' that : The term of this Agreement shall commence on the date of execution of this Agreement , continue on a flock to flock basis , and shall terminate upon completion of the engagement ( subject to s) l Clnt Gr e s a e ca l d ' nde nde Gr e s'i t c r t ' rhe i on ow r r le ' pe nt ow r ' n he ontac . I 6 the right of the Company to terminate this Agreement upon written notice to the Independent Grower in the event the Independent Grower does not timely perform its objections hereunder as provided in this Agreement. Id., ! C. 3. Under the heading 'Termination ,' the contract ' ' provides : Either the Independent Grower or the Company shall have the right to terminate this Agreement and its Exhibits without any need for cause provided that written notice is given after a flock is settled and before a new flock is p laced . Written notice from the Independent Grower should be given to the Live Production Manager or Broiler Manager . Written notice shall be given from the Company to the Independent Grower . Termination during a flock shall be in accordance with the other terms of this Agreement . Should such termination occur , the Company agrees to pay the Independent Grower for a11 serv ices performed until termination of this Agreement , and the Independent Grower agrees to perform all obligations until termination of this Agreement . Once notice has been given by either party to terminate , the Company will not deliver new chicks, nor will the Independent Grower accept neW chicks . Except for cause or economic necessity , Company will not terminate this Agreement without first requiring Independent Grower to follow the 'Cost Improvement Program ' as described in Exhibit ' ' B. Id., ! D. 4. Under the subheading 'Prior Agreements/Entire ' Agreement ,' the contract prov ides : ' This agreement supersedes , voids and nullifies any and a1l previous Broiler Production 7 Agreements and a11 other prev ious agreements governing the relationship between Independent Grower and Company . The Independent Grower and Company hereby release and extinguish all claims that they may have against each other under any previous Broiler Production Agreement and al1 other prev ious agreements governing the relationship between Independent Grower and Company . This Agreement , and any Exhibits hereto , constitute the entire agreement between the parties, and those documents supersede al1 oral statements and other communications made before the execution of those documents . Independent Grower acknowledges that in entering into this Agreement, he/she has not relied upon any statements that are not contained in this document, and/or the Exhibits hereto. R. at 2047-48, ! H.9). 5. Under the subheading ' ' Modification Except in No Writing ,' the contract provides : ' The parties agree that this Agreement and the Exhibits hereto may not be modified except in writing signed by b0th the Company and Independent Grower . Id., ! H.l2). 6. Under the subheading 'Exclusion of Incidental, ' Consequential , and Certain Other Damages,' the contract ' provides : TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW , NEITHER THE COMPANY NOR INDEPENDENT GROWER SHALL BE LIABLE TO ONE ANOTHER FOR ANY SPECIAL , INCIDENTAL , INDIRECT , CONSEOUENTIAL , EXEMPLARY OR NON COMPENSATORY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER ARISING OUT OF OR IN ANY WAY RELATING TO THIS AGREEMENT AND/OR ITS 8 EXHIBITS , AND/OR THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PARTIES UNDER THIS AGREEMENT AND/OR ITS EXHIBITS. - Id ., H.13). 7. Under the subheading 'Choice of Law and Venue ,' ' 1 the agreement prov ides that the 'substantive laws of the ' State in which the farm is located shall govern the inter pretati of this Agreement . . . .' I ., ! H . . on ' d 17) Clinton Growers maintain that , notwithstanding the provisions of their respective contracts with Pilgrim ' Pride s Corporation , each of them should recover from Debtors based on a statement or statements made to the grower by one or more employees of Pilgrim ' Pride Corporation ( of its predecessor) s or such as , or similar to , that the grower ' ' would receive chickens as long as he met the company 's requirement ' and that they were 'here for the long haul .' Each of the Clinton Growers maintains ' that he took such statement or statements to mean that the grower ' contract with Pilgrim ' Pride Corporation would continue s s in ef fect for at least a suff icient length of time to enable the grower to recoup through income from the contract the cost of making the necessary preparations for performance under the contract . All farm s of the Clinton Growers were located in the State of Arkansas . The 1aw of Arkansas appears to be quite clear that 9 Promissory estoppel applies only when the elements of a contract cannot be shown . See Skallerup v . City of Hot Sprinqs, 309 S. . 196, 201 ( W 3d Ark . 2009). Another holding of the Supreme Court of A rkansas that illustrates the extent to which Arkansas law allows the ex istence of a contract to insu late the contracting parties from extra -contractual claims is Lowell Perkins Aqencv, Inc . v . Jacobs, 469 S. . 89 ( W 2d Ark . 1971). In Lowell, the Arkansas Supreme Court made clear that A rkansas 'law ' never accommodates a party with an implied contract when he has made a specific one on the same subject matterz' id. at 93, ' citing to authorities to the effect that the doctrine of unjust enrichment or recovery in quasi-contract applies only to situations where there is no legal contract and that , generally , where there is an express contract , the law will not imply a quasi or constructive contract , id . at 92-93 . The Arkansas Supreme Court quoted w ith approval from 17 C . .S. Contracts 5 6, J p. 574, that ' a) quasi-contractual principle of unjust '( enrichment does not apply to an agreement deliberately entered into by the parties , however harsh the prov isions of such contract may seem in the light of subsequent happenings .' Id . at ' 92 . See also Farmer ' Cooo . A ss ' v . Garrison , 454 S . . s n W 2d 644, 647-48 ( Ark . 1970). 10 The decisions of intermediate appellate courts of Arkansas seem uniformly to apply the rule announced by the Arkansas Supreme Court that promissory estoppel may be a basis for recovery only when formal contractual elements do not exist . See Moore v . Keith Smith Co ., Inc w No . CA 08-884 , 2009 A rk . App . LEXIS 283, at *13 ( . App . May 6, 2009) U' Ark promissory estoppel is not to be used as a vehicle to engraft a promise on a contract that differs from the written terms of the contract .' ; Tavlor v . s George, 212 S. . 17, 25 ( W 3d Ark. App . 2005) Ul promissory estoppel may be a basis for recovery only when formal contractual elements do not exist.'); MDH Builders, Inc . v . Nabholz Constr . Corp ., 17 ' - - S. .3d 97, 101 ( W Ark . App . 2000) ( holding that there was no need to explore whether the plaintiff proved entitlement to relief on an extra-contractual theory inasmuch as the trial court correctly found that a contract existed between the p laintiff and defendant). see also Glenn Mech . v, S . Ark . Req ' 278 S . . l, W 3d 583, 587 ( Ark. App . 2008). In Heatinq & Air Specialists , Inc . v . Jones , 180 F .3d 923 ( 8th Cir . 1999), the Eighth Circuit provided the following explanation as to the status of Arkansas law on the subject under discussion : Arkansas courts have permitted parties to assert the doctrine of promissory estoppel as an alternative to breach of contract in the absence of consideration or 11 as a means of overcoming a statute of frauds defense . The courts of Arkansas thus have applied the doctrine in order to overcome deficiencies in the formation of an enforceable contract , but have not applied it in order to determine the Darties ' riqhts under a contract that is otherwise enforceable . Their failure to do so reflects the widely accepted principle that Dromissory estopoe l is applicable only in the absence of an otherw ise enforceable contract . - -- - - - 18O F . at 934 ( 3d citations omitted, emphasis added) . A recent United States District Court decision interpreting Arkansas law noted that : As repeatedly stated by the Arkansas Supreme Court , the law never accommodates a party w ith an imp lied contract when he has made a specific E one) on the same subject matter . The Arkansas Supreme Court has also held that promissory estoppel may be a basis for recovery only when formal contractual elements do not exist . Billinqslev v . Weverhaeuser Co ., No . 4 :09-cV -04040 , 2010 U .S . Dist . LEXIS 95254 , at *13 ( . . Ark . Aug . 24 , 2010) ( W D quotation marks & citations omitted), adopted by 2010 U . . Dist . LEXIS S ( . . Ark . Sept . 10, 2010) . W D While the court is not giving law -of -the -case effect to the rulings of Judge Means in Citv of Clinton , the court finds that the first reason given by Judge Means for rejecting the promissory estoppel theory advanced by the poultry growers in that case is persuasive and equally applicab le to the prom issory estoppel theory advanced by Clinton Growers in support of their 12 claims in bankruptcy in this same bankruptcy case in which Judge Means made his Citv of Clinton ruling . The 1aw of Arkansas on the effect of the merger doctrine is that it prevents reliance by a contracting party on extracontractual statements or representations . In Farm Bureau Insurance Co . v . Runninq M Farms, the A rkansas Supreme Court explained : ( Tlhis court has said that ul wlhen two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a writing to which they have b0th assented as the complete and accurate integration of that contract , ev idence , whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent understandings and negotiations will not be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the writing . ' U . . Rubber v . Northern , 236 Ark . 381, 384 , ' S 366 S . . 186, 188 (1963)7 see also Ultracuts Ltd. v . W 2d Wal-Mart Stores, Inc ., 343 Ark . 224 , 232, 33 S .W .3d 128, 134 ( 2000) ( holding that nE ilt is a general proposition of the common law that in the absence of fraud , accident or mistake, a written contract merges , and thereby extinguishes , al1 prior and contemporaneous negotiations, understandings and verbal agreements on the same subject.') z 237 S. . 32, 37 ( W 3d Ark. 2006). See also Haqans v . Haines, 984 S. . 4l, 44 ( W 2d Ark. App . 1998); Stevens V . Ark . Power & Liqht Co ., l24 S. . 972, 973, 975 ( W 2d Ark. 1939). No plausible argument can be made that the statements on which Clinton Growers rely in support of their promissory estoppel theory are not directly dealt with in their broiler production contracts. The subjects of those statements are 13 express elements of the contracts . The contracts could not have been more specific and complete on the subjects of the terms of the contract and circumstances that would cause the contracts to term inate . Nor could they have been any more specific and complete in their provisions that the written documents constituted the entire agreement between the parties , and that they superseded a1l oral statements and other communications made before the execution of the contracts . The contracts dealt directly with the possibility that someone would claim a verbal modification after the contract was entered into by prov iding in each contract that it was not subject to modification except in writing signed by b0th parties . The contracts went so far as to prov ide that the kinds of damages Clinton Growers are asserting against Debtors would not be recoverable . The Arkansas courts could not have made it any plainer that a promissory estoppel claim under the circumstances existing here would not be viable under Arkansas law . Aside from significant attention devoted by Clinton Growers in their briefs to their contention that the bankruptcy court erred in giving effect to the law -of-the-case doctrine in its denial of their claims in bankruptcy , the main thrust of ' heir t appellate arguments is that the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court in Tvson Foods v . Davis, 66 S. .3d 568 ( . 2002), is W Ark 14 controlling , and that the rulings in Tyson establish that, at the least, the record on which the bankruptcy court acted presented issues of fact that caused the bankruptcy court 's summary rulings against Clinton Growers to be in error . Br . of Appellants at 12- 19, 21-24 , 31-33 7 Reply Br . at 8-18 . The bankruptcy court did not overlook Tvson ; rather , it devoted four pages of the opinion to exp lanations of why Tv son is inapplicable to the legal issues related to the promissory estoppel theory advanced by Clinton Growers . R . at 3997-4000. The court concurs with the bankruptcy court 's analysis of Tvson , and agrees that none of the Tvson holdings are inconsistent with , or impair , any of the rulings made by Judge Means in Citv of Clinton or by the bankruptcy court here as to why the promissory estoppel theories urged by the growers in City of Clinton and the instant action is not legally viable . If, as Clinton Growers seem to contend , the Arkansas Supreme Court in Tvson changed the rule that promissory e/toppel applies Only when the elements of a contract cannot be shown , that court would not have said , as it did seven years after Tvson , in Skallerup that : To the extent that Skallerup argues that estoppel applies to the contract obligations asserted , he is in error . Promissory estoppel applies when the elements of a contract cannot be shown . Skallerup argues that contracts exist in the present case making promissory 15 estoppel inapplicable . We hold that there is no relief available under either equitable estoppel or promissory estoppel . Skallerup, 309 S. . at 201 ( W 3d citation omitted). The court has given full consideration to all arguments and authorities advanced by Clinton Growers in support of their equitable estoppel theory , and finds none of them persuasive . Therefore , The court ORDERS that the order of the bankruptcy court in the above-captioned bankruptcy case entered February ll, 2011, that each and every one of the Clinton Growers take nothing by their claims against Pilgrim ' Pride Corporation be, and is s hereby , affirmed . SIGNED December 19, 2011 . A vz * z' z z ZA N MCBRYDE United States Di / 16 rict Judge 1 N. o ooeNm rwrae Ipofolm j roN.a oci f I 1 BI E hn Ib I I e l 3: 85 I 2 Rlk & De i Ar ol c bbe n d l 3: :4 1 3. 4. Lll Bas lan s l Bobbv D.Beaver s 1 4801 480: 5 Mlon & FaI Bi o s l t t h er 6. Ph li Bl hle ls acks r 7. Anla J Tavl f a An,aJ Br hear t or * t es s B Geor e Br t q ens 9. Her K Br s man ent ID Kennet Br t d/ a Br s Fe% LLLC h ens b/ ent 11 a i S.& Ha od Br wn an e rl o 12 J M Br e own . l I 1 I i I l 4 2 01 4:11 51 77 4 01 : 7949 2962 40 5 0 401 4 , 1 13 Pe Br ant v I 38% ' 1 4 Shar K Bwanl on l 38% I l ; 1 1 6 17. 1 B 1 9. I 3877 4915 40> 2 Lnd J cot e n 9 l a hr 21 Edmu d Cu nio . n n n ham l I l 48 2 0 34 92 39 88 22 Dl & James cu ana 23. Phl1 A. Des v l I alo I I 3869 4010 2 Ton J Des to 4 av 25. Bar a J Dio bar xn I l 57 15 39 98 26 27 28 29 39 ' Manln s car r Nealchi db/ chl Far sm / a sm ms aaml L. & Jana A cofman e f W a ne col u*/ w AndJ Ranch. 1c e a n , I . Dam s & Sar Dl dba Dams Di Far ah xon xon m Br J & Robi Dunlp ad n a Car ln Dunl w an cNaresW . Dunl l a a J. Dunl e a , I 4007 4002 3990 3902 3937 31 NelDun l n 32. Bur D.Duv l l al I l 57 14 3983 I 3 IJ l D Du al 8 er vl t 73 98 1 35 i 7944 l ' : 3 lAn a N F uln r 6 oel a Ke 3 1GaveFa k e 7 l uln r 3 !Ran w Fldly 8 dy ne ' 36 82 37 89 i I ; 40 21 1 i 36 87 4092 ! 3 lpau ?? Du al 4 l . vl l Roöne .Edwar us . . ! 42 cnrto e K Fov 3 DarelKhFb, tr 9 ro r il s ' 1 i ' 41 Mi chaelB Gadberk r 42 Gi bson Fami Parner zl z Gi Fami'Padner p l t shi kl bsc l shl 42 aer N G ol w den *d lLl Gol nca aen l l ! ! , 2 31 9 3946 4000 3892 3895 E bit Me an xhi t o mor :um Upni i on and O r si der gned Decem ber 19, 2Q11,i Case No.4: CV- A n 11- 333- ( Page 1of3) I ' i I 1 I 45. 'w ll D & Ger dl Hacman lam l al ne ' 4 ' l m Se Hanman 5. . l tve -- . Wia .. . . 47. lJoe & Manln Hawknsdba J L M Hawxns'Far 1 l l m nc . . . ' 4986 4795 . . . 3872 46. Ra d Ha es nv 49. Aln Ho lema a ez n 5 0. T1 t Ho cut m0h ne t 1 I l 3 68 8 51 79 39 81 - - -- . - 51. 52 53 M 55 56 57. 56 Ma s. Hul e Fr i L I am anke nor Ronni L Jones e sc tw and Deana L Jones ot a n 'ol oh n J s ' n L shane Kasoer J E.Keet oe on Eul La l na 59. 69 61 62 63. 64 65 James& car Mal t ol l t e charesA. Maon l le DalonT.Mal l one M aronw a ne M arl l ln St e C Masl l ev noil Benn 'Mocl er ar ErcQ . Mccl e: i ar k 66 l $ 67 6% 1 I l 2 ù i ! ! l # l ! l - 4793 3980 4933 3897 403 7 3920 3934 3994 3874 I 39 91 1 1 l 3933 3878 389D 4013 3996 Mat a E Mc ar n r n cl e l 4 405 Mi chaelB. McNabb Jl m B M 'er& Charene M M ler m l l k 1 l 3947 4Q19 69 7 0 a mesMlerJ a l r l Ma R Mie lr l I 3 3 87 4795 ' 71 l i Ma E & CharesE. M ier l 1 72. Lor u & shawnaMler et l l 1 3876 Sher an D. Mls m la l Dors Peueh i I 4 4 79 I 73 74 I l i ! ! ' ! 75 Ga R Pulim l a t 77 76 J em G Rame er w llm D Rob s n la l ero l l 79 80 401 6 Kvl R Prœ e l 76 4932 Jos Rx er h s RaIh%' Ruf Jr f 3919 3883 l I l 39 80 4 797 l 3996 3951 k e1 Sa Si . ' mmv ms r 8 T a lL sl 2 rvs ms t 83 PaulL & L d J sn lo l a . lce n n t i 1 I 491 5 57 $6 32 97 1 M IBe l nL. clt v Somnlr naml & e a es 1 40 09 6 IFr kE Souh : 5 an tar ' i 4O1F 3 41 9 ) 8 IDaeD Stac e 7 l r nr E 3 9 93 I . 3671 l l i ' 49M 3 9 88 402 0 3 -1 . BB . 8i IDouc & cara soenc l e 85 ' i ' Rx erJ Staton ' rt s 8 IRo Sulv 9 v l an l 9: lstv Ir f d ' e e af or 91 IJ l A Tr cwar ul e l c d S' J P A F ( -- .! !v . . :9 - - - 1 1 i 1 4 Ex l tt Me a du Up ni à bi o mor n m i on and O r si der gned Decem ber19, 2011,i Case No.4: CV- A n 11- 333- ( Page2 of3) I l 93 J nchrt walc er lv l e s a 94. Mie L. Wal c k le a 95 J h A wesev on l 96. Thomass . whl c lo k l 97 BIl E. & char qe T.vi I l o ït chman 98 Anneqe & Benn N ll lams 99 Davl K. w ii s u lam 100 Gr e lamsd/ ' Davi L e lar eo l b/ a d l ns l 1Q1. Te ,w lamsd/ l O li sBr Far l l b. a l am cs m 1D2 Lawr ence F. e lams i 1D3 shii w ib re lams 1> . Ll S W oot nda en 105 RounevN w zl la l 1O6 paulzt mmer man 42 03 1 1 ' 32 95 3 7 99 3% 8 t 1 t 440 5 I l l 5178 4: 26 3999 3286 3921 3891 3875 3*70 38:3 . i 2r .. é bti ke a m öpii xàii o mor ndu nol and O r si der gned Decem ber19, 2011,i Case No.4: CV- J n 11- 333-( ( PaQe3Of3)

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.


Why Is My Information Online?