Wooley v. City of Grapevine, Texas et al

Filing 18

Memorandum Opinion and Order Plaintiff's claims dismissed with prejudice under authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) (Ordered by Judge Terry R Means on 12/28/2012) (ult)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
WILLIAM CARL WOOLEY,

§
§
VS.
§ CIVIL ACTION NO.4:12-CV-299-Y
§
§
CITY OF GRAPEVINE, TEXAS, et al.§
OPINION and ORDER OF DISMISSAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(B)(1) and UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii)
This case is before the Court for review of pro-se inmate and
plaintiff William Carl Wooley’s case under the screening provisions
of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B). In addition to his
complaint, and in response to an order of this Court, Wooley has
also filed a more definite statement of his claims.

Wooley’s

complaint alleges that in May 2005, 85 items of property were seized
from his home when officers executed a search warrant. (Compl. ¶ 1.)
Wooley was later convicted in the 297th Judicial District Court,
Tarrant County, Texas, of prohibited sexual conduct, sexual assault
of a child under the age of seventeen, and aggravated assault of a
child under the age of fourteen, for which he received 10, 20, and
life sentences, respectively.1 (More Definite Statement (MDS) at §
1.)

Wooley alleges that outside of seized firearms that were at

some point returned to his brother, the other items of property were
not returned to him and have otherwise been destroyed or not
properly accounted for. (Compl. ¶¶ 2-12.)

Wooley claims the

property he complains of in this suit was not used as evidence, and

1

Wooley’s consolidated challenge to these convictions under 28 U.S.C. §
2254, was denied by order and judgment entered on July 12, 2012, in Wooley v.
Thaler, No.4:11-CV-858-A. The Court takes judicial notice of the records of that
case. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).

was never civilly or criminally forfeited. (Compl. ¶ 1; MDS ¶ 19.)
Wooley seeks relief in the form of a declaratory judgment that his
rights were violated, and he seeks compensatory and punitive
damages. (Compl.¶¶ 30-37.)
A complaint filed in forma pauperis that lacks an arguable
basis in law should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.2

Under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court retains broad discretion
in determining at any time whether an in-forma-pauperis claim should
be dismissed.3 Furthermore, as a part of the PLRA, Congress enacted
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to review a complaint
from a prisoner seeking relief from a governmental entity or
governmental
docketing.4

officer

or

employee

as

soon

as

possible

after

Consistent with § 1915A is prior case law recognizing

that a district court is not required to await a responsive pleading
to conduct its § 1915 inquiry.5 Rather, § 1915 gives judges the
power to “dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory.”6

After review of the pleadings under these standards, the

Court concludes that Wooley’s claims must be dismissed for the
alternative reasons discussed herein.
2

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,328 (1989). Section 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
requires dismissal not only when an allegation of poverty is untrue or the action
is frivolous or malicious, but also when “the action . . . fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(A) and (B)(West 2006).
3

See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(West 2006); Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d
383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir.
1990)(discussing authority to dismiss at any time under prior § 1915(d)).
4

See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A(a)(West 2006).

5

See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995).

6

Id., citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).

2

Defendants
Wooley only named two defendants in this suit, the City of
Grapevine, Texas, and the Grapevine Police Department. With regard
to the Grapevine Police Department, the capacity of an entity to be
sued is determined “by the law of the state where the court is
held.”7 Under Texas law, the key issue is whether the entity has
been granted the capacity “to sue or be sued.”8 This Court and other
federal courts in Texas have consistently held that in order for a
plaintiff to sue a municipal department, the department must have
a separate legal existence.9 After the Court informed Wooley of this
precedent in the order for more definite statement, he responded by
noting that he wished to pursue his claims only against the City of
Grapevine, Texas. Thus, Wooley’s claims against the Grapevine Police
Department must be dismissed.
Although a city is a “person” within the meaning of § 1983, it
may not be held liable “unless action pursuant to official municipal
policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.”10

The Supreme

Court, in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services,

7

FED R. CIV. P. 17(b)(3).

8

Dillon v. Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department, 973 F.Supp. 626, 627
(E.D. Tex. 1997).
9

See generally Darby v. City of Pasadena, 939 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir.
1991)(noting that under Texas law, absent authorization from a municipality to
allow suit against one of its subdivisions as an independent entity, suit cannot
proceed against that department); see also Buckley v. Dallas County, No.
CIV.A.3:97-CV-1649-G, 1999 WL 222380, *2 (N.D.Tex. April 13, 1999) (citations
omitted); Bridges v. Rossi, No. 3:96-CV-0488-X, 1998 WL 241242, at *5 (N.D.Tex.
May 6, 1998).
10

Monell v. New York City Dept.of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691

(1978).

3

emphasized that a local government entity cannot be held liable
under § 1983 on a respondeat superior basis:
[T]herefore . . . a local government may not be sued
under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its
employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a
government's policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be
said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury
that the government entity is responsible under § 1983.11
Thus, § 1983 liability attaches “only where the municipality itself
causes the constitutional violation at issue.”12 For a municipality
to be liable under § 1983 there must be: “a policymaker; an official
policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose “moving
force” is the policy or custom.”13

These elements “are necessary

to distinguish individual violations perpetrated by local government
employees from those that can be fairly identified as actions of the
government itself.”14 A plaintiff must initially allege that an
official policy or custom was the “cause in fact of the deprivation
of rights inflicted.”15

The description of a policy or custom and

its relationship to the underlying violation, moreover, cannot be
conclusory; it must contain specific facts.16
11

Id. at 694.

12

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)(emphasis in original).

13

Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)(citing
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694)).
14

Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578.

15

Leffall v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1994); see
also Meadowbrier Home for Children, Inc. V. Gunn, 81 F.3d 521, 533 (5th Cir.
1996)(a plaintiff must allege “the custom or policy served as the moving force
behind the violation”).
16

Fraire v. Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1278 (5th Cir. 1992).

4

The Court asked

Wooley to state any facts showing how any

custom or policy of the City of Grapevine, Texas, related to the
allegations in his complaint.

Wooley answered:

Plaintiff cannot obtain any custom or policy, However,
after the case was disposed of, retained the property and
or destroyed it without first affording any procedural
due process to the plaintiff. Plaintiff counters that the
City has he believes in place some custom, regulation or
practice in regards to the disposition of property held
by them and as to when and or how it disposes of it. That
if they know who the owner is to notify him. (MDS ¶ 8.)
But these statements amount to mere conclusory allegations of the
presence of a policy, and Wooley has not actually pointed to a
policy or custom that was the moving force behind the alleged
withholding of his property. Wooley has not provided factual
allegations of a policy or custom sufficient to state a municipal
liability

claim

against

the

City

of

Grapevine,

Texas.

Thus,

Plaintiff's claims against Grapevine must be dismissed.
Limitations
Furthermore, all of Wooley’s claims must be dismissed as barred

by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court has held that all
§ 1983 actions are governed by the statute of limitations for
personal-injury actions for the state of suit.17 In Texas, the
applicable limitations period is two years.18 Wooley has also

17

See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 273-76 (1985)(state statute of
limitations period for personal-injury actions applies to all claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983).
18

See Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994)(noting that
district courts in Texas must use Texas's general two-year, personal-injury
limitations period); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 16.003(a)(Vernon 2006)
(Texas’s two-year, personal-injury limitations statute).

5

asserted conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, but claims under
that

statute

provision.19

are

also

subject

to

the

two-year

limitations

A district court may dismiss claims sua sponte under

§ 1915 where it is clear from a review of the complaint that the
alleged claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.20
Accrual of a claim under § 1983 is determined by federal law,21
under which a claim generally accrues when a plaintiff knows or has
reason to know of the injury giving rise to the cause of action.22
Plaintiff recites allegations arising from the seizure of his
property in May 2005. Wooley contends that the seized items of
property were not used as evidence in his criminal proceedings, but
even if that time is considered, Wooley’s conviction and direct
appeal process through the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals resolved
when his petitions for discretionary review were dismissed in early
2008.23 Upon review of the allegations in this complaint, the Court
sees no basis to believe that Wooley did not know or have reason to

19

See Helton v. Clements, 832 F.2d 332, 334 (5th Cir.1987)(“Civil rights
actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985
and 1988 are deemed
analogous to Texas tort actions, and therefore, the applicable limitations period
is [two years]”). Although Wooley also alludes to 42 U.S.C. § 1986 as a source
for his claims, this provision has its own statute of limitations which requires
commencement of a suit within one year after the cause of action accrues. 42
U.S.C.A. § 1986 (West 2003). Thus, any claims under § 1986 are time barred for
the reasons stated in the text infra.
20

See Harris v. Hegman, 198 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Moore,
30 F.3d at 620 (citing Gartrell V. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir.1993)).
21

See Harris, 198 F.3d at 157; see also Burrell v. Newsome, 883 F.2d 416,
418 (5th Cir. 1989).
22

(5

th

See Harris, 198 F.3d at 157 (citing Jackson v. Johnson, 950 F.2d 263, 265
Cir. 1992) and Burrell, 883 F.2d at 418).
23

See Wooley v. Thaler, No.4:11-CV-858-A.

6

know of the events giving rise to his claims by 2008. As Wooley did
not file suit until May 2012, his claims recited here are too late:
the applicable two-year statute of limitations already had expired
prior to the time Wooley filed suit. As all claims are barred by the
applicable statutes of limitations they must be dismissed.
Substantive Claims
Wooley claims that the prolonged detention of his property was
in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment. “The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment confers both substantive
and procedural rights.”24

Although Wooley has not indicated that

he intends to bring a substantive-due-process claim, even if he has,
where, as here, an amendment to the Constitution protects an
individual against specific government misconduct, “that Amendment,
not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must
be the guide for analyzing [those] claims.”25

Here, Wooley has

alleged a substantive violation of his rights under the Fourth
Amendment. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures and provides that “no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be
seized.”26

Wooley claims that officers “executed a search warrant

based upon evidence obtained from his residence at 1901 Saddle

24

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994)(plurality opinion).

25

Id., at 273 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).

26

U.S. CONST. amend IV.

7

Ridge, Grapevine, Texas from a private person to wit David Wooley
[and] that this evidence was unlawfully and unconstitutionally
seized . . ..” (Compl. ¶ 1.)

But Wooley states no specific facts

beyond this conclusory allegation. Wooley’s complaint fails to state
a claim under the Fourth Amendment.27
Wooley’s

procedural

due-process

claim

also

fails.

The

Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that no State
shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.”28

Under the Parrat/Hudson doctrine, a random and

unauthorized intentional deprivation of property does not give rise
to a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process
Clause if the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy.29
Thus, in challenging a random intentional property deprivation,30
27

The Court notes that in Wooley’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, he
claimed a violation of his rights because evidence was stolen from his residence
and used against him. If the seizure complained of here actually resulted in the
taking of evidence used against Wooley in his criminal proceedings, his claims
for relief under § 1983 would be barred by the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey. See
512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994)(holding that a § 1983 claim that effectively attacks the
constitutionality of a conviction or imprisonment is not cognizable under § 1983
and does not accrue until that conviction or sentence has been “reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal
court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”)
28

U.S. CONST.

amend.

XIV § 1.

29

See Myers v. Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1996)(discussing the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) and Hudson
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1983), as dictating that a state actor’s random and
unauthorized deprivation of property does not result in a violation of procedural
due process if the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy, and
explaining “the doctrine protects the state from liability for failing to provide
a predeprivation process in situations where it cannot anticipate the random and
unauthorized actions of its officers.”)
30

Any claim that the loss of property was only the result of negligence
also does not state a cause of action under § 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327, 328 (1986); see also Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347
(1986)(noting where negligence is involved in causing a deprivation of property,

8

the claimant must either take advantage of the available remedies
or prove that the available remedies are inadequate.31 Texas law
allows recovery of monetary damages for loss of use of property
during its period of detention.32 Because Texas provides an adequate
post-deprivation remedy, Wooley’s claim concerning the taking of his
personal property does not rise to a violation of the Due Process
Clause.33 Thus, Wooley’s allegation concerning the loss of his
personal property does not amount to a violation of a constitutional
right, and such claim should be dismissed.34
Wooley also alleges a violation of his right to equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits
the states from denying persons within their jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.35

An equal-protection violation may occur

when the government treats someone differently than another who is
similarly situated.36 When the Court asked Wooley to explain this

no procedure for compensation is constitutionally required).
31

Hudson, 468 U.S. at 534-35; Myers, 97 F.3d at 94.

32

See Murphy v. Collins, 26 F.3d 541, 543 (5th Cir. 1994)(In Texas, the tort
of conversion fulfills this requirement); see also Beam v. Voss, 568 S.W.2d 413,
420-21 (Tex.Civ.App.–San Antonio 1978, no writ)(conversion is the unauthorized
and unlawful assumption and exercise of dominion and control over the personal
property of another, to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with the owner’s
rights).
33

See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 536 (noting that even where a prisoner's property
was intentionally destroyed, such destruction did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment since the Commonwealth of Virginia provided the prisoner with an
adequate post-deprivation remedy.)
34

Such dismissal is, of course, without prejudice to Wooley’s right to
assert any state-law tort claims arising out of the same facts in state court.
35

U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.

36

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).

9

claim, he recited: “Plaintiff states the prolonged detention of his
property after final disposition of the underlying criminal charges
were disposed of the defendant should have allowed him to obtain
them.” (MDS ¶ 9.) This non-sensical statement does not state a
violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Wooley’s claims for relief under the equal protection provision of
the Fourteenth Amendment is dismissed.
For all of these reasons, all of Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE under authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).
SIGNED December 28, 2012.

____________________________
TERRY R. MEANS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

10