Walker v. Anderson et al
Filing
14
OPINION AND ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL UNDER 28 USC 1915A(b) AND UNDER 28 USC 1915(e)(2)(B)...the following claims are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 USC 1915A(b)(1) and 28 USC 1915(e)(2)(B)(I) and (ii); all of Plaintiffs' claims in the se claims against Dee Anderson in an official capacity; all of Plaintiffs' claims against Dee Anderson under a respondeat superior or vicarious liability theory; and all of Plaintiffs' claims against Tarrant County Texas, the Tarrant County Jail, and the Tarrant County Sheriff's Deprtment. The court will address the next steps for these Plaintiffs in a separate order issued this same day. (Ordered by Judge Terry R Means on 12/5/2012) (wrb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
STEPHEN WALKER
VS.
DEE ANDERSON, Sheriff,
Tarrant County, Texas, et al.
CHRISTOPHER WILLIAM THOMAS
VS.
DEE ANDERSON, Sheriff,
Tarrant County, Texas, et al.
MATTHEW C. COTTON
VS.
DEE ANDERSON, Sheriff,
Tarrant County, Texas, et al.
CHADWICK BENJAMIN
VS.
DEE ANDERSON, Sheriff,
Tarrant County, Texas, et al.
JAMES EDWARD COOPER
VS.
DEE ANDERSON, Sheriff,
Tarrant County, Texas, et al.
PAUL DAVID JOHNSON
VS.
DEE ANDERSON, Sheriff,
Tarrant County, Texas, et al.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.4:12-CV-362-Y
CIVIL ACTION NO.4:12-CV-364-Y
CIVIL ACTION NO.4:12-CV-365-Y
CIVIL ACTION NO.4:12-CV-478-Y
CIVIL ACTION NO.4:12-CV-485-Y
CIVIL ACTION NO.4:12-CV-486-Y
OPINION and ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§
1915A(B) and UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
These cases are before the Court for review of the pro-se
inmate/plaintiffs’ claims under the screening provisions of 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B). Each case was commenced with the
filing of a complaint that is very similar and includes as an
attachment a photocopy of a document entitled “Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Under the Eight Amendment,” which describes a number of
egregious acts purportedly committed by Officer Joseph Thornhill
against some of the prisoners of the unit or pod, identified as pod
59C (MHMRTC). The Court directed each plaintiff to file a more
definite statement, and each has done so. Although in each of the
cases, the plaintiff alleges facts particular and unique to him
with regard to Officer Thornhill, as to their allegations against
defendants Dee Anderson and the Tarrant County jail, the plaintiffs
have written virtually identical responses to the Court’s questions.1 Thus, the Court has considered and screened the cases
collectively.2
A complaint filed in forma pauperis that lacks an arguable
basis in law should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.3
Under 28
1
Plaintiff Chadwick Benjamin in Benjamin v. Anderson, et al., No.4:12-CV478-Y, included in his more definite statement only very limited allegations with
regard to Dee Anderson and the Tarrant County jail. (Benjamin September 14, 2012
MDS at 3.) The Court’s analysis of the more detailed allegations in the bulk of
the more definite statements, supra at 3-9, will apply equally to the disposition
of Chadwick Benjamin’s claims against Dee Anderson, Tarrant County, the Tarrant
County jail, and the Tarrant County Sheriff’s Department.
2
The Court also has one other case pending before it from a plaintiff
alleging injury out of the same or related events: Andrews v. Anderson, et al.,
No.4:12-CV-359-Y. A separate order will issue regarding the screening and
disposition of claims in that case.
3
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,328 (1989). Section 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
requires dismissal not only when an allegation of poverty is untrue or the action
is frivolous or malicious, but also when “the action . . . fails to state a
2
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court retains broad discretion
in determining at any time whether an in-forma-pauperis claim
should be dismissed.4 Furthermore, as a part of the PLRA, Congress
enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to review a
complaint from a prisoner seeking relief from a governmental entity
or governmental officer or employee as soon as possible after
docketing.5
Consistent with § 1915A is prior case law recognizing
that a district court is not required to await a responsive
pleading to conduct its § 1915 inquiry.6 Rather, § 1915 gives
judges the power to “dismiss a claim based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory.”7
After review of the complaint and more
definite statement under these standards, the Court concludes that
some of the plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed.
Tarrant County and its Departments
In response to the Court’s order for more definite statement,
each of these plaintiffs has recited actions by Officer Thornhill
for which the Court will allow Plaintiffs to obtain service of
process upon Thornhill.
Because many of the complaints listed the
claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(A) and
(B)(West 2006).
4
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(West Supp. 2005); Adepegba v. Hammons, 103
F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 281 (5th
Cir. 1990)(discussing authority to dismiss at any time under prior § 1915(d)).
5
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A(a)(West 2006).
6
See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995).
7
Id., (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).
3
Tarrant
County
jail
as
a
defendant,
the
Court
informed
the
plaintiffs of the fact that an entity must have its own jural
existence to be subject to suit, and then directed the plaintiffs
to either state facts to show the jail had jural existence, or
identify whether they sought to pursue their claims against Tarrant
County, Texas. (Order for MDS ¶¶ 7-8.)
In each of these cases, the
plaintiffs responded by expressly declaring: “plaintiff is naming
Tarrant County jail as a defendant, not Tarrant County, Texas.”
(MDS Answers to Question 8.)
But, even so, the plaintiffs failed
to allege any facts related to the jail having its own jural
existence.
Instead, the plaintiffs recited:
The Tarrant County jail should be liable as a defendant
due to its jural existence, and/or the fact that Plaintiff is housed in the Tarrant County jail and ultimately
restrained of his liberty, without this liberty Plaintiff
is at the mercy of Tarrant County jail and/or its
employees assigned to care for him . . . [and]
The Tarrant County jail along with its employees must be
held liable due to its joint association. The Tarrant
County jail is the basic existence of the other defendants in this particular cause, by failing to enquire
into essential facts that are necessary to make a
professional judgment. (MDS answers to question 7.)
The capacity of an entity to be sued is determined “by the law
of the state where the court is located.”8
Under Texas law, the
key issue is whether the entity has been granted the capacity “to
sue or be sued.”9 This Court and other federal courts in Texas have
8
Fed R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3).
9
Dillon v. Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department, 973 F.Supp. 626, 627
(E.D. Tex. 1997).
4
consistently found that in order for a plaintiff to sue a municipal
department, the department must have a separate legal existence.10
More specifically, courts that have confronted the question of
whether a department of a county itself is an entity subject to
suit have determined that it is not.11 None of these plaintiffs has
set forth facts to show that the Tarrant County jail is a separate
entity subject to suit.12 (MDS at 8.) As such, their claims asserted
only against the Tarrant County jail must be dismissed.13
Dee Anderson
The plaintiffs named Dee Anderson, sheriff, Tarrant County, in
their complaints and in response to the Court’s questions, and
provided extensive and detailed answers in their more definite
statements. First, the Court notes that the plaintiffs allege that
10
See generally Darby v. City of Pasadena, 939 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir.
1991)(noting that under Texas law, absent authorization from a municipality to
allow suit against one of its subdivisions as an independent entity, suit cannot
proceed against that department); see also Buckley v. Dallas County, No.
CIV.A.3:97-CV-1649-G, 1999 WL 222380, *2 (N.D.Tex. April 13, 1999) (citations
omitted); Bridges v. Rossi, No. 3:96-CV-0488-X, 1998 WL 241242, at *5 (N.D.Tex.
May 6, 1998).
11
See Darby, 939 F.2d at 313-14 (holding that city police department lacked
jural existence); see also Busby v. Dallas County Sheriff’s Dept., 2012 WL
5359610, at *3 (N.D.Tex. Sep. 26, 2012)(“Dallas County Sheriff’s Department is
not a separate legal entity having jural authority”), report and rec. adopted,
2012 WL 5359612 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2012); see also Okwilagee v. Dallas County
Jail Nurse Station, et al., No. 3-01-CV-1845-P, 2001 WL 1577435, *2 (N.D.Tex.
Dec. 6, 2001)(finding that neither Dallas County jail nor Dallas County Nurse
Station are separate legal entities subject to suit)(citing Magnett v. Dallas
County Sheriff’s Department, No. 3-96-CV-3191-BD, 1998 WL 51355 at *1 (N.D.Tex.
Jan. 20, 1998)).
12
See Bridges, 1998 WL 241242 at * 5 (plaintiff has burden to show that the
city department has the capacity to be sued).
13
The Court notes that the plaintiffs, in answers to the Court’s questions
regarding Sheriff Dee Anderson, have also referenced the liability of the Tarrant
County Sheriff’s Department. But, the same analysis applies to the Sheriff’s
Department. As it does not have its own jural existence, the Tarrant County
Sheriff’s Department is not subject to suit and must be dismissed.
5
Dee Anderson should be liable in “his official capacity.” (MDS
answers to Questions 5.) A claim against a defendant in an official
capacity is actually a suit against the governmental entity that
employs the defendant.14 In order to prevail in an official-capacity
claim, plaintiffs must show that the government entity is the
moving force behind the violation.15 To do so, plaintiffs
must
identify: (1) a policy (2) of the policy maker (3) that caused (4)
the plaintiff to be subjected to a deprivation of his constitutional rights.16 At the least, the plaintiff must present specific
facts showing a pattern of violations in order to prevail on a
claim against a defendant in his official capacity.17 Here, the
plaintiffs have expressly noted to the Court that they do not
intend to make Tarrant County, Texas, a defendant. Furthermore,
they have not included factual allegations of a policy that caused
the alleged deprivation of their rights or a pattern of incidents
which could be said to amount to a
custom. As such, Plaintiffs'
allegations do not support an official-capacity claim under § 1983.
The Court next notes that a claim of liability for violation
of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, regardless of the particular
constitutional theory, must be based upon personal responsibility.18
14
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985).
15
Id., at 166.
16
Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 169 (5th Cir.1985).
17
See Frare v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1278 (5th Cir.1992).
18
See Murphy v. Kellar, 950 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1992); Jacquez v.
Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1986); Wanger v. Bonner, 621 F.2d 675, 679
(5th Cir. 1980); Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205, 1208 (5th Cir. 1979).
6
Plaintiffs claim, in part, that Anderson “is responsible for
liability because he is the sheriff of assigning officers to
housing facilities within the Tarrant County jail,”[and] “Officer
Thornhill worked 3pm-11pm Monday - Friday at which time Sheriff Dee
Anderson was the Sheriff of Tarrant County jail,” [and] “Anderson
is responsible because from February through April 2012, I suffered
physical harm at the hands of Officer Thornhill many times over .
. . [and because Anderson] is the supervisor of Officer Thornhill
which makes him liable for ‘wanton infliction of pain’ inflicted on
me.”
(MDS answers to question 5.) As to these particular allega-
tions, Plaintiffs appear to have named Anderson purely because of
his supervisory capacity as the top administrator of the Tarrant
County jail.
But, § 1983 does not authorize supervisory liability
based only on respondeat superior or any theory of vicarious
liability.19
Thus,
the
Court
allegations by Plaintiffs
concludes
that
these
particular
against Dee Anderson must be dismissed.
Next, the plaintiffs allege the following:
Sheriff Dee Anderson was the Sheriff of Tarrant County
jail. Since Officer Thornhill was not qualified or
trained to work with mentally ill or mentally retarded
inmates in his official capacity Sheriff Dee Anderson .
. . should be held liable. Sheriff Anderson should have
provided an officer to Pod 59C, a special housing unit
for mentally ill and mentally retarded inmates who are
obligated to take psychiatric medication on a daily
basis, with some type of special training or special
19
See Alton v. Texas A&M Univ., 168 F.3d 196, 200 (5th Cir. 1999)(“Only the
direct acts of omissions of government officials, not the acts of subordinates,
will give rise to individual liability under § 1983”); Thompkins v. Belt, 828
F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir.1987)(“Under section 1983, supervisory officials are not
liable for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious
liability”)(citations omitted).
7
classes that deal with primarily mentally ill and or
mentally disabled inmates. (MDS answers to Questions 5.)
Sheriff Dee Anderson was personally involved because
after being informed of the violations through the
grievance procedure step 1 and step 2 and did not do
anything to act on these unconstitutional acts [sic]. He
was grossly negligent in supervising Officer Thornhill
who committed wrongful acts, by allowing him to continue
to work here until he ultimately resigned on his own.
Sheriff Dee Anderson created a policy which unconstitutional practices occurred by not properly training
Officer Thornhill to work in a special needs housing
areas for mentally ill and mentally retarded. (MDS
answers to Question 6.)
As noted above, Sheriff Anderson is responsible under § 1983
only for his own actions and omissions.20 Although he may not have
otherwise directly been involved in the alleged conduct by Officer
Thornhill, Anderson may be personally liable if he “(1) failed to
train or supervise the officers involved; (2) there is a causal
connection between the alleged failure to supervise or train and
the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s rights; and (3) the
failure to train or supervise constituted deliberate indifference
to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”21
To state a claim of
deliberate indifference in this context, generally requires “a
showing ‘of more than a single instance of the lack of training or
supervision causing a violation of constitutional rights.’”22 The
20
Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010).
21
Estate of Henson v. Callahan, 440 Fed. Appx. 352,
2011)(citing Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., TX. 245 F.3d 447,
2001)(citations omitted)).
22
Burge v.
plaintiff [must]
from training or
likely to result
356
459
(5th
(5th
Cir.
Cir.
St. Tammany Parish, 336 F.3d 363, 370 (5th cir. 2003)(“[A]
demonstrate ‘at least a pattern of similar violations” arising
supervision “that is so clearly inadequate as to be ‘obviously
in a constitutional violation’”)(quoting Thompson, 245 F.3d at
8
plaintiffs recite several different actions taken by Thornhill
against them that allegedly occurred over the course of a threemonth period between February 2012 and April 2012.
They accompany
these allegations with an allegation that Anderson was aware of
Thornhill’s conduct as the result of the repeated filing of
grievances, but still continued to allow Thornhill to work in Pod
59C. Plaintiffs’ claim that Anderson was made aware of Thornhill ’s
repeated conduct and allowed him to remain in the MHMR Pod, and the
allegation that Thornhill’s conduct was the result of Anderson’s
inadequate training or supervision, combine to support a plausible
personal-liability claim against Anderson at this stage of the
proceedings.
Order
Therefore, the following claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 1915A(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
(B)(I) and (ii):
all of Plaintiffs’ claims in these cases against
Dee Anderson in an official capacity; all of Plaintiffs’ claims
against Dee Anderson under a respondeat superior or vicarious
liability theory; and all of Plaintiffs’ claims against Tarrant
County, Texas, the Tarrant County jail, and the Tarrant County
459)).
9
Sheriff’s Department.23
SIGNED December 5, 2012.
____________________________
TERRY R. MEANS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
23
The Court will address the next steps for these Plaintiffs in a separate
order issued this same day.
10
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