Leggett v. Latayette-Windom Mailroom Staff
Filing
16
Opinion and Order of Partial Dismissal. Any claims Leggett asserts related to the actions of persons at the Wynne unit are DISMISSED without prejudice. Furthermore, all of Leggett's remaining claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 198 3, except his claim against Lafayette Windom based upon interference with his mail relating to disability benefits from the Veterans Administration, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. (see order for further specifics) (Ordered by Judge Terry R Means on 8/13/2013) (mpw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
PAUL CURTIS LEGGETT
VS.
LAFAYETTE WINDOM, et al.
§
§
§ CIVIL ACTION NO.4:13-CV-155-Y
§
§
OPINION and ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL UNDER
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(B)(1) and UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
This case is before the Court for review of pro-se plaintiff
Paul Curtis Leggett’s case under the screening provisions of 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B).
Leggett, then an inmate at the
Tarrant County jail, filed a form civil-rights complaint seeking
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 He named as defendants Lafayette
Windon, mail-room officer, Tarrant County jail; Officer Clay, law
library officer, Tarrant County jail; and Tarrant County Officers
Opdahl and Pierson. (Compl. Style; § IV(B).)
Leggett to file a more definite statement.
The Court directed
Leggett filed a more
definite statement responsive to the Court’s questions, and then he
filed an addendum to the more definite statement. Thus, the
complaint, more definite statement, and more definite statement
addendum are subject to review. Leggett seeks compensatory damages
and he seeks the return of items of personal property. (Compl. §
VI.)
1
Leggett was subsequently transferred to the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Wynne unit.
A complaint filed in forma pauperis that lacks an arguable
basis in law should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.2
Under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court retains broad discretion
in determining at any time whether an in-forma-pauperis claim should
be dismissed.3 Furthermore, as a part of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the
Court to review a complaint from a prisoner seeking relief from a
governmental entity or governmental officer or employee as soon as
possible after docketing.4
Consistent with § 1915A is prior case
law recognizing that a district court is not required to await a
responsive pleading to conduct its § 1915 inquiry.5 Rather, § 1915
gives judges the power to “dismiss a claim based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory.”6 After review of the complaint and more
definite statements, the court concludes that all of Leggett’s
claims against the defendants listed in the pleadings, except one,
2
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,328 (1989). Section 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
requires dismissal not only when an allegation of poverty is untrue or the action
is frivolous or malicious, but also when “the action . . . fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(A) and
(B)(West 2006).
3
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(West 2006); Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d
383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir.
1990)(discussing authority to dismiss at any time under prior § 1915(d)).
4
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A(a)(West 2006).
5
See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995).
6
Id.(citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).
2
must be dismissed under these provisions.7
In order to assert a claim for damages for violation of federal
constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,8 a plaintiff must set
forth facts in support of the required elements of a § 1983 action:
(1) that he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States; and (2) that the defendants deprived
him of such right while acting under color of law.9 As to defendant
Lafayette Windom, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to satisfy the first
element. As to this defendant, plaintiff Leggett complains of
interference with his legal mail. In order to support a claim for
interference with the right of access to court or a violation of the
First Amendment based on the handling of legal mail,10
a claimant
7
In the more definite statement, Leggett recites additional facts about
events that took place in May and June of 2013 he was housed at the TDCJ--Wynne
unit, unrelated to the Tarrant County dates, events, and defendants in this case.
Any claims related to the actions of persons at the Wynne unit will be dismissed
without prejudice to Leggett’s right to file a separate suit challenging such
events in the district court where he is incarcerated.
8
“Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2012).
9
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)(citing cases); Resident Council
of Allen Parkway Village v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 980
F.2d 1043, 1050 (5th Cir. 1993).
10
See Walker v. Navarro County Jail, 4 F.3d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1993) (legal
mail tampering claim implicates both right of access to courts and right to free
speech); Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 819 (5th Cir. 1993),cert. den’d, 510
U.S. 1123 (1994)(same); see generally Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB,
461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983)(“[T]he right of access to the courts is an aspect of the
First
Amendment
right
to
petition
the
Government
for
redress
of
grievances”)(citation omitted); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 819-20
(1977)(recognizing prisoners constitutional right of access to courts).
3
must do more than allege simply that his legal mail was opened and
inspected outside of his presence.11 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently restated that “[t]he opening
of incoming legal mail outside an inmate’s presence for the purpose
of
inspecting
for
contraband
does
not
violate
a
prisoner’s
constitutional rights.”12
First, Leggett alleges that a mailing he received in March 2011
from a person named Clayte Binyon consulting with him about a
disability claim to the Veterans Administration (VA) was delivered
to him opened and a without a pre-addressed envelope that had been
included. (Compl. § V.)
Leggett contends that the envelope was
removed and never given to him, and he complains that this caused
a two-year delay in the submission and processing of a claim to the
VA. (More Definite Statement (MDS) at ¶ 2A.) Although Leggett
recites that the Texas Veteran’s Commission has informed him that
his claim is “back on track,” he complains that the “amount of time
between 03/30/2011 and 03/14/2013 was a period of uncertainty as to
whether the claim was valid due to the interrupted required
11
See Walker, 4 F.3d at 413 (allegation that incoming mail was opened and
read, but not censored, did not state a constitutional violation); Brewer, 3 F.3d
at 824(noting that allegations that mail was opened and inspected outside
inmate’s presence [and in violation of prison regulation], without additional
allegation that such practice affected the inmate’s ability to prepare or
transmit a document, or allegation that the mail had been “censored,” did not
state a cognizable constitutional claim)(citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S.
401, 410 (1989) and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987)).
12
Clemons v. Monroe, 423 Fed. Appx. 362, 364 (5th Cir.)(citing Brewer, 3
F.3d at 825), cert. den’d, 132 S.Ct. 764 (2011).
4
procedures as indicated in the instructions by Clayte Binyon.” (MDS
¶ 2(A).) In the addendum to the more definite statement, Leggett
writes
that
the
withholding
of
the
envelope
“disrupted
the
application process for disability to the VA . . . [and] caused
unconstitutional delay of entitled benefits due to Plaintiff at a
rate of $2700.00 dollars a month over a period of about two years.”
(July 31, 2013 MDS Addendum.)
The Court will allow Leggett to
obtain service of process of defendant Windom on this claim.
In the second incident of claimed interference with his mail,
Leggett alleges that a four-page letter he delivered to the American
Civil liberties Union (ACLU) was returned to him because he
delivered it to an outdated address provided to him by the Tarrant
County Law library. (MDS ¶ 2(B). He contends that when the envelope
was returned to him, it appeared to have been tampered with. (MDS
¶ 2(B)).
Leggett also alleges the mailing contained information
relevant to his claim of self-defense for his criminal trial. (MDS
¶ 2(B)).
But this allegation fails to state a violation of Leggett’s
rights. First, Leggett acknowledges that he kept a copy of the
papers he placed in the envelope sent to the ACLU, thus he remained
free to re-mail the papers to the ACLU at the proper address. Also,
Leggett has not claimed that the ACLU was his legal defense counsel,
and it is not likely that such a mailing would have had any bearing
on his case if he did not choose to send it to his defense lawyer.
5
Thus, the Court determines that Leggett has not stated a violation
of his rights as to this second allegation against defendant Windom.
Leggett next alleges that his right of access to court was
violated by the actions of law library officer Clay. Although the
Supreme Court, in Bounds v. Smith,13 recognized a fundamental
constitutional right of access to the courts, it later clarified the
scope of a prisoner's right of access to the courts and found that
a prisoner must allege an actual injury to support a claim for a
violation of such right:
Because Bounds did not create an abstract, freestanding
right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate
cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by
establishing that his prison's law library or legal
assistance program is sub-par in some theoretical sense
. . . [t]he inmate therefore must go one step further
and demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the
library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts
to pursue a legal claim.14
Thus, in order to state a claim of a right to relief on the alleged
facts, Leggett must set forth that the complained-of action hindered
his efforts to pursue a legal claim.15
Leggett alleges that he was denied the right to use a copy
13
430 U.S. at 828.
14
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996).
15
See Chriceol v. Phillips, 169 F.3d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1999)(inmate
alleging denial of access to courts must demonstrate actual injury)((citing Ruiz
v. United States, 160 F.3d 273,275 (5th Cir. 1998)(holding that without proof of
actual injury a prisoner cannot prevail on an access-to-the-courts claim)); see
also McDonald v. Steward, 132 F.3d 225, 230-31 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that such
a plaintiff must show prejudice to his position as a litigant)(citations
omitted).
6
machine on two occasions to photocopy a letter he received from his
son, the substance of which would have helped prove his innocence
in his criminal case. (MDS ¶ 4(A) and (B). He also alleges that on
another date, when he was involved in an active search of the
Lexis/Nexis database within the Tarrant County law library, his
access was terminated just as he was about to discover information
relevant to his criminal case. (MDS ¶ 4(C).)
incidents,
Leggett
was
represented
by
At the time of both
counsel,
and
Leggett
acknowledges he was able to meet with and discuss the issues raised
in the letter with his counsel.16(MDS ¶ 4(B)). Furthermore, if there
was material accessible in a legal database helpful to his defense,
his attorney would have been able to gather such information.
Because Leggett was then represented by counsel, and counsel was
able to review the substance of the letter and able to conduct any
research on his behalf, Leggett has not stated a viable claim that
he sustained harm sufficient to support a claim of violation of his
right of access to court.17
Plaintiff Leggett next asserts claims against Officer Opdahl
and Pierson for allegedly failing to properly maintain and return
to him a pair of swim trunks, a watch, and two aluminum design rings
16
Although Leggett includes a sentence in his more definite statement
related to the representation of him by attorney Ray Hall Jr., Leggett has not
named Hall as a defendant or sought to assert claims against Hall in this case.
17
See Caraballo v. Fed. Bureau of
2005)(holding that because plaintiff
constitutional right of access to the
and therefore failed to state a claim
Prisons, 124 Fed. Appx. 284, 285 (5th Cir.
had court-appointed counsel, he had no
law library to help prepare his defense,
upon which relief may be granted).
7
that were taken from him at the time of his arrest. (Compl. § V; MDS
¶ 7(A-D). Leggett has not recited the constitutional basis for his
claims, but it appears that he is complaining of a loss of property
without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution provides that no State shall “deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”18 Under the
Parrat/Hudson
doctrine, a random and unauthorized intentional
deprivation of property does not give rise to a violation of the Due
Process Clause if the state provides an adequate post-deprivation
remedy.19
Thus,
in
challenging
a
random
intentional
property
deprivation,20 the claimant must either take advantage of the
available
remedies
or
prove
that
the
available
remedies
are
inadequate.21 Texas law allows recovery of monetary damages for loss
18
U.S. CONST.
amend.
XIV § 1.
19
See Myers v. Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1996)(discussing the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) and Hudson
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1983), as dictating that a state actor’s random and
unauthorized deprivation of property does not result in a violation of procedural
due process if the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy, and
explaining “the doctrine protects the state from liability for failing to provide
a predeprivation process in situations where it cannot anticipate the random and
unauthorized actions of its officers.”)
20
To the extent that Leggett claims the loss of his property was only the
result of negligence, such allegation also does not state a cause of action under
§ 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); see also Davidson v.
Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986)(noting where negligence is involved in causing
a deprivation of property, no procedure for compensation is constitutionally
required).
21
Hudson, 468 U.S. at 534-35; Myers, 97 F.3d at 94.
8
of use of property during its period of detention.22 Because Texas
provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for the loss of the
personal-property items, Leggett’s claim concerning the taking of
his personal property does not rise to a violation of the Due
Process Clause.23 Thus, Leggett’s allegation concerning the loss of
his personal property does not amount to a violation of a constitutional right, and such claim should be dismissed.24
Therefore, any claims Leggett asserts related to the actions
of persons at the Wynne unit are DISMISSED without prejudice to
Leggett’s right to file a separate lawsuit challenging such events
in the district court where he is incarcerated.
Furthermore, all of Leggett’s remaining claims for relief under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, except his claim against Lafayette Windom based
upon interference with his mail relating to disability benefits from
the Veterans Administration,25 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and, alternatively, under 28 U.S.C. §§
22
See Murphy v. Collins, 26 F.3d 541, 543 (5th Cir. 1994)(In Texas, the tort
of conversion fulfills this requirement); see also Beam v. Voss, 568 S.W.2d 413,
420-21 (Tex.Civ.App.–San Antonio 1978, no writ)(conversion is the unauthorized
and unlawful assumption and exercise of dominion and control over the personal
property of another, to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with the owner’s
rights).
23
See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 536 (noting that even where a prisoner's property
was intentionally destroyed, such destruction did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment since the Commonwealth of Virginia provided the prisoner with an
adequate post-deprivation remedy.)
24
Such dismissal is, of course, without prejudice to Leggett’s right to
assert any state law tort claims arising out of the same facts in state court.
25
Leggett will be allowed to complete summonses for service upon defendant
Windom through a separate order issued this same day.
9
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).
SIGNED August 13, 2013.
____________________________
TERRY R. MEANS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
10
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