Hall v. Lockheed Martin Corporation

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER re: 16 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Lockheed Martin Corporation. The court ORDERS that defendant's motion for summary judgment be, and is hereby, granted, and that all claims and causes of action brought by plaintiff against defendant, be, and are hereby, dismissed with prejudice. (See Order for further details.) (Ordered by Judge John McBryde on 2/6/2014) (mem)

U.S. DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FILED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT~~~~~--~
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEX S
2014
FORT WORTH DIVISION

1!8 -s

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COY'frf

DORTHEA HALL,

By ____~~-----=~

§

Drput~'

§

Plaintiff,

§
§

vs.

§

NO. 4:13-CV-188-A

§

LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION,

§
§

Defendant.

§

MEMORANDUM OPINION
and
ORDER
Came on for consideration the motion for summary judgment
filed in the above-captioned action by defendant, Lockheed Martin
Corporation.

As of the date of the signing of this memorandum

opinion and order, plaintiff, Dorthea Hall 1 , has filed nothing in
response.

Having now considered all of the parties' filings, the

entire summary judgment record, and the applicable legal
authorities, the court concludes that the motion should be
granted.

1

As defendant points out, plaintiff's name seems to have been misspelled in the caption of this
action and throughout her first amended complaint. Documents found in defendant's appendix in support
of its motion indicate that plaintiff's first name is "Doretha," not "Dorthea." However, as summary
judgment is being granted in favor of defendant and this action is being dismissed, the court declines to
investigate the issue any further.

I.

Plaintiff's Claims
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing her original
petition against defendant in the District Court of Tarrant
County, Texas, 153rd Judicial District, as Cause No. 153-26426913.

Defendant removed the action to this court within 30 days of

being served, alleging that this court has federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
under 28 U.S.C.

§

1332.

§

1331 and diversity jurisdiction

Pursuant to the court's order, plaintiff

filed an amended complaint, alleging that defendant was the
administrator of the employee benefit plan of which plaintiff's
husband, Emmett Hall, Jr.

("Mr. Hall"), was a participant and

plaintiff was the beneficiary.

According to the amended

complaint, defendant accepted a fraudulent power of attorney from
Mr. Hall's daughter, Sherry Hall, and failed to pay the plan
funds to plaintiff, in violation of defendant's duties under the
plan and under common law.

Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount

of $60,421.95, attorney's fees, and costs associated with
prosecution of this matter.

2

II.
The Summary Judgment Motion
Defendant argues for summary judgment on the grounds that
all of plaintiff's state law claims are preempted by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").

Defendant also

argues that because there were no funds to disburse to plaintiff
after Mr. Hall's death, it did not breach the terms of the Plan.
Further, defendant argues that it satisfied its fiduciary duties
under the Plan when it honored Mr. Hall's request to revoke
plaintiff's power of attorney and recognize the power of attorney
given to Sherry Hall.
III.
Undisputed Facts 2
Defendant is the plan sponsor and plan administrator for the
Lockheed Martin Corporation's Hourly Employee's Savings Plan Plus
(the "Plan"), which is regulated by ERISA.

Plaintiff's husband,

Mr. Hall, who was employed by defendant, was a Plan participant.
Plaintiff and Mr. Hall were married on August 6, 2002, and
plaintiff was designated Mr. Hall's beneficiary under the Plan.

2

The undisputed facts are taken from defendant's appendix in support of its motion for
summary judgment. Because plaintiff failed to respond to the motion, the court is permitted to accept
defendant's summary judgment evidence as undisputed. Bookman v. Shubzda, 945 F. Supp. 999, 1002
(N.D. Tex. 1996); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Eversley v. MBank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir.
1988).
3

Defendant's Employee Service Center received from Mr. Hall a
Durable Power of Attorney for Financial Management dated
September 6, 2007, appointing plaintiff as Mr. Hall's attorneyin-fact.

When Mr. Hall retired on December 1, 2009, he became

eligible to take a distribution from the Plan and also began
receiving monthly payments under the Lockheed Martin Retirement
Plan for Certain Hourly Employees (the "Pension Plan").
On November 1, 2010, the Employee Service Center received
from Mr. Hall a Statutory Durable Power of Attorney dated
September 22, 2010, appointing his daughter, Sherry Hall, as his
attorney-in-fact.

On November 30, 2010, the Employee Service

Center received a letter from Sherry Hall explaining that she had
been asked by Mr. Hall to be appointed power of attorney because
plaintiff had allowed Mr. Hall's life and medical insurance to
lapse and had not been paying any of his medical expenses, even
though she was receiving his Social Security and pension checks.
Sherry Hall also provided documentation showing that Mr. Hall had
been repeatedly evicted from nursing facilities due to nonpayment and that each time, plaintiff would move Mr. Hall to a
different facility with the promise that Medicare/Medicaid would
pay the cost, even though plaintiff knew that Mr. Hall did not
qualify.

Sherry Hall said that she had used her power of

attorney to obtain the remainder of Mr. Hall's savings and
4

provided proof that she had begun paying Mr. Hall's outstanding
medical and nursing home expenses.
The Employee Service Center then received requests from
plaintiff and from Sherry Hall to change the direct deposit
information for Mr. Hall's pension payments.

The Pension Plan

record keeper informed defendant that there could only be one
power of attorney and that Mr. Hall needed to revoke the other
one.

At that point, Robin Villanueva {"Villanueva"), defendant's

Associate General Counsel, began working to determine the valid
power of attorney for Mr. Hall.
On or about December 8, 2010, Villanueva received a call
from Detective M.E. Anderson {"Det. Anderson") of the Fort Worth
Police Department Major Crime Division/Fraud Unit, informing
Villanueva that plaintiff had made a claim against Sherry Hall
for financial fraud regarding Mr. Hall's pension payments.

Det.

Anderson told Villanueva that he had spoken with Mr. Hall, Sherry
Hall, and plaintiff and had visited Mr. Hall at the nursing home
where he was staying.

He indicated that although Mr. Hall was

old and frail, he was not delusional.

Det. Anderson had learned

that plaintiff had been spending Mr. Hall's pension payments on
herself and her daughter and had not been paying the nursing
homes for Mr. Hall's care.

Consequently, Mr. Hall had been

repeatedly evicted from those homes.
5

Further, when Det. Anderson

looked at Sherry Hall's records, he learned that Sherry Hall was
using the funds she received to pay Mr. Hall's nursing home
expenses.

Det. Anderson told Villanueva that he was trying to

convince plaintiff and Sherry Hall to set up a trust for Mr.
Hall's funds and that in the meantime, Mr. Hall's nursing home
expenses would be paid if defendant honored the power of attorney
given to Sherry Hall.

Villaneuva explained that in order to

honor the power of attorney for Sherry Hall, Mr. Hall would need
to revoke the one given to plaintiff.

Det. Anderson said that he

would convey that information to Sherry Hall.
On December 20, 2010, the Employee Service Center received a
document signed by Mr. Hall revoking the power of attorney given
to plaintiff and requesting defendant to recognize the one given
to Sherry Hall.

Based on the revocation of the power of attorney

for plaintiff, the communications from Sherry Hall, and the call
with Det. Anderson, Villanueva made the decision, on December 21,
2010, that defendant should honor only the power of attorney for
Sherry Hall.
On January 14, 2011, defendant received from Sherry Hall the
same letter and documentation that she had sent to the Employee
Service Center on November 30, 2010.

Sherry Hall also included a

note explaining that plaintiff had made a claim that Sherry
Hall's power of attorney was fraudulent and that Det. Anderson
6

had investigated the matter and cleared Sherry Hall of the
allegations.
On January 17, 2011, the Employee Service Center sent a
letter to plaintiff informing her that Mr. Hall had revoked the
power of attorney given to her and requested that defendant
recognize the power of attorney given to Sherry Hall.
On or about January 21, 2011, Sherry Hall requested that the
funds in Mr. Hall's Plan account be sent to her.

Because Mr.

Hall was entitled under Article VII(1) of the Plan to withdraw
the money in his account, the Plan issued a check dated February
14, 2011, payable to Emmett Hall, Jr. c/o Sherry Hall, in the
amount of $48,337.56, which represented Mr. Hall's entire account
balance, less the required withholdings.
On April 17, 2011, Mr. Hall passed away, and on April 25,
2011, the Employee Service Center sent plaintiff a letter
providing her a listing of the benefits that had been determined
based on Mr. Hall's reported date of death.

Because no funds

were in Mr. Hall's Plan account upon his death, plaintiff did not
receive any funds as beneficiary of the Plan.

7

IV.

Applicable Summary Judgment Principles
Rule 56{a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that the court shall grant summary judgment on a claim or defense
if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
P. 56{a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
{1986) .

1

Fed. R. Civ.

477 U.S. 242

1

247

The movant bears the initial burden of pointing out to

the court that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett

477 U.S. 317

1

1

323/ 325 {1986).

The movant can discharge this burden by pointing out the absence
of evidence supporting one or more essential elements of the
nonmoving party's claim/ "since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.

11

Id. at 323.

Once the movant has carried its burden under Rule 56{a)/ the
nonmoving party must identify evidence in the record that creates
a genuine dispute as to each of the challenged elements of its
case.

Id. at 324; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 {c)

{"A party

asserting that a fact . . . is genuinely disputed must support
the assertion by
the record .

citing to particular parts of materials in
• II )

•

"Unsubstantiated assertions of an actual

dispute will not suffice."

Thomas v. Price
8

1

975 F.2d 231

1

235

(5th Cir. 1992).

If the evidence identified could not lead a

rational trier of fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party as
to each essential element of the nonmoving party's case, there is
no genuine dispute for trial and summary judgment is appropriate.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
5871 597 (1986) •
The fact that a non-movant has failed to respond to a motion
for summary judgment is not itself a basis for granting the
motioni however, when a movant has made a properly supported
motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must "'go beyond the
pleadings'" and "designate 'specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial.'"
(5th Cir. 1994)

Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537

(quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324)

i

see

also Bookman v. Shubzda, 945 F. Supp. 999, 1002 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
Although the court must draw all inferences in favor of the party
opposing the motion, such party cannot establish a genuine issue
of material fact by resting only on the allegations of the
pleadings.

Hulsey v. Texas, 929 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1991).

"It follows that if a plaintiff fails to respond to a properly
supported summary judgment motion, she cannot meet her burden of
designating specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial."

Bookman, 945 F. Supp. at 1004.

Further, when a non-

movant fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment, the
9

court is permitted to accept the movant's evidence as undisputed.
See Eversly v. Mbank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1988);
Bookman, 945 F. Supp. at 1002.

v.
Analysis
A.

State Law Claims
Defendant argues that the state law claims asserted by

plaintiff are preempted by ERISA.

ERISA preempts "any and all

State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan," subject to certain exceptions not
applicable in this case.

2 9 U.S. c.

§

1144 (a) , (b) .

Further, the

Supreme Court has held that state law claims seeking relief
within the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
1132(a), are completely preempted.

§

Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.

Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 67 (1987); see also Arana v. Ochsner Health
Plan, 338 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2003).

Section 1132, titled

"Civil Enforcement," authorizes "a participant or beneficiary" to
bring a civil action "to recover benefits due to him under the
terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the
plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms
of the plan.

II

29 u.s.c.

§

seeks relief within the scope of
completely preempted.

1132 (a) (1) (B).
§

When a claimant

1132, such claims are

Taylor, 481 U.S. at 66; accord Aetna
10

Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210 (2004).

A plaintiff's

claims fall within the scope of ERISA'S civil enforcement
provision if she,

(1) "at some point in time, could have brought

[her] claim under ERISA

§

502 (a) (1) (B)" and (2) "there is no

other independent legal duty that is implicated by a defendant's
actions."

Davila, 542 u.s. at 210.

Under count one in plaintiff's amended complaint, plaintiff
asserts that defendant breached its contract with plaintiff, or,
alternatively, breached the contract between Mr. Hall and
defendant, by not paying plaintiff the funds of Mr. Hall's Plan
account.

Plaintiff seeks to recover those funds, which she

believes are due to her under the terms of the Plan.

In count

two, plaintiff claims that defendant owed plaintiff a fiduciary
duty under the Plan and that defendant breached that duty by
recognizing Sherry Hall's power of attorney, by failing to
investigate that power of attorney and the revocation of the one
given to plaintiff, and by subsequently failing to pay plaintiff
the Plan benefits.

Plaintiff seeks to have her benefits under

the Plan reinstated and to have defendant enjoined from further
breaches of fiduciary duty.

Count three in plaintiff's amended

complaint is a claim for common law negligence.

Plaintiff

asserts that defendant owed plaintiff a duty of reasonable care
in administrating the benefits under the Plan and that defendant
11

breached that duty by paying the Plan funds to Sherry Hall,
causing plaintiff to be damaged because the funds under the plan
were not available to pay to plaintiff upon Mr. Hall's death.
Clearly, plaintiff's claims under all three counts relate to
Mr. Hall's Plan, which the summary judgment record shows to be an
ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan.

Further, as plaintiff

seeks to "recover benefits due to [her] under the terms of [the]
plan, to enforce [her] rights under the terms of the plan, or to
clarify [her] rights to future benefits under the terms of the
plan," her claims fall within the scope of the civil enforcement
provisions of ERISA.

29 U.S.C.

§

1132 (a) (1) (B).

That is,

plaintiff could have brought her claims under such provision and
she has pointed to no independent legal duty that is implicated
by defendant's actions.

See Davila, 542 u.s. at 210.

Further,

plaintiff asserts in her amended complaint that this action
arises under ERISA.

Therefore, all of plaintiff's state law

claims are completely preempted by ERISA, and defendant is
entitled to summary judgment on those claims.
B.

Denial of Benefits under 29 U.s. c.

§

1132 (a) (1) (B)

Under count one in plaintiff's amended complaint, plaintiff
seeks to recover the funds that were in Mr. Hall's Plan account
because defendant allegedly breached the terms of the Plan by
paying those funds to Sherry Hall instead of to plaintiff upon
12

Mr. Hall's death.

By seeking to recover the benefits she

believes are due to her under the Plan, plaintiff is apparently
invoking 29 U.S.C.

§

1132(a) (1) (B) to challenge defendant's

denial of benefits.
The court is to review an administrator's decision to deny
benefits de novo "[u]nless the terms of the plan give the
administrator 'discretionary authority to determine eligibility
for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.'"

Atkins v.

Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Ret. Plan, 694 F.3d 557, 566
(5th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,

489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)).

"However, if the language of the plan

does grant the plan administrator discretionary authority to
construe the terms of the plan or determine eligibility for
benefits, a plan's eligibility determination must be upheld by a
court unless it is found to be an abuse of discretion."

Id.

(citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 111 (2008)).
The abuse of discretion standard, which in the ERISA context
is synonymous with arbitrary and capricious, "requires only that
substantial evidence supports the plan fiduciary's decision."
Id.

"Substantial evidence is •more than a scintilla, less than a

preponderance, and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'"

Id.

(quoting

Ellis v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston, 394 F.3d 262, 273
13

(5th Cir.2004)).

Therefore, "[a] decision is arbitrary only if

made without a rational connection between the known facts and
the decision or between the found facts and the evidence."

Id.

(quoting Holland v. Int'l Paper Co. Ret. Plan, 576 F.3d 240, 246
(5th Cir.2009))

(internal quotation marks omitted).

One of the

factors the court must consider is whether the plan administrator
has a conflict of interest where it "both evaluates claims for
benefits and pays benefits claims."

Truitt v. Unum Life Ins. Co.

of Am., 729 F.3d 497, 508 (5th Cir. 2013)

(quoting Glenn, 554 at

128)

In such circumstances,

(internal quotation marks omitted).

"[t]he conflict of interest ... should prove more important
(perhaps of great importance) where circumstances suggests [sic]
a higher likelihood that it affected the benefits decision,
including, but not limited to, cases where an insurance company
administrator has a history of biased claims administration," but
"less important (perhaps to the vanishing point) where the
administrator has taken active steps to reduce potential bias and
to promote accuracy."
117)

Id. at 508-09 (quoting Glenn, 554 U.S. at

(internal quotation marks ommited).

However, the court's

"review of the administrator's decision need not be particularly
complex or technical; it need only assure that the
administrator's decision fall[s] somewhere on a continuum of
reasonableness--even if on the low end."
14

Atkins, 694 F.3d at 566

(quoting Corry v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston, 499 F.3d
389, 398 (5th Cir.2007))

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The summary judgment record establishes that defendant was
the administrator of the Plan at issue in this case.

Under the

terms of the Plan, defendant was given nthe necessary authority
and sole and absolute discretion to carry out . . . determination
of benefits eligibility and the amount of benefits payable to
Participants and Beneficiaries."

App. 16.

Therefore,

defendant's denial of funds to plaintiff must be upheld unless
the court finds the decision to be an abuse of discretion.

The

court finds no such abuse of discretion here.
Plaintiff, as the beneficiary under the Plan, had been
ndesignated by the Participant to receive any payment from [the
Plan] after the death of a Participant."

App. 10.

Therefore,

under the terms of the Plan, plaintiff was entitled to whatever
funds remained in Mr. Hall's account upon his death.

However,

Mr. Hall, as the participant of the Plan, was entitled under
Article VII(1) of the Plan to withdraw the entire amount of his
account prior to his death, which is what he did, through Sherry
Hall, whom defendant had recognized as Mr. Hall's attorney-infact.

On or about January 21, 2011, Sherry Hall requested that

the money in Mr. Hall's Plan account be sent to her, and a check
dated February 14, 2011, was issued payable to Emmett Hall, Jr.
15

c/o Sherry Hall in the full amount of Mr. Hall's account, less
required withholdings.

Accordingly, when Mr. Hall died on April

17, 2011, there were no funds in Mr. Hall's account to disburse
to plaintiff.
Plaintiff's challenge to defendant's denial of benefits is
based on her contention that defendant breached the terms of the
Plan by failing to disburse funds under the Plan to plaintiff
upon Mr. Hall's death, after allowing Sherry Hall to withdraw the
money in Mr. Hall's account prior to his death.

However,

defendant's decision to deny plaintiff's claim for benefits was
not an abuse of discretion.

Clearly, because Mr. Hall's account

contained no funds at the time of his death, defendant did not
abuse its discretion by disbursing no funds to plaintiff, as the
Plan beneficiary.

Under the terms of the Plan, plaintiff was

entitled to no benefits if there were no funds to be given.
Therefore, even taking into consideration any conflict of
interest that could have existed because defendant was in a
position to both evaluate and pay a claim for benefits, there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding plaintiff's
challenge of defendant's denial of benefits, and defendant is
entitled to summary judgment on that claim. 3

3

The court notes that in the section in defendant's motion regarding count one. of plaintiffs
amended complaint, defendant does not address plaintiffs contention that defendant breached the terms

16

C.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (3)
In its summary judgment motion, defendant construes

plaintiff's claims under counts two and three as claims seeking
appropriate equitable relief for breach of fiduciary duty under
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (3), which the court finds to be a reasonable
approach.

A plan participant or beneficiary may bring suit for

breach of fiduciary duty under§ 1132(a) (3) to obtain appropriate
equitable relief to address violations of ERISA.

See Varity

Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 507-15 (1996); McCall v. Burlington
N./Santa Fe Co., 237 F.3d 506, 510 (5th Cir. 2000).

Section

1104(a) {1) (B) of ERISA requires a plan fiduciary to discharge its
duties "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct
of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims."
U.S.C. § 1104(a).

29

Defendant argues that its actions in regards

to Mr. Hall's Plan met this standard.

The court agrees.

The summary judgment record reveals that defendant received
from Mr. Hall two powers of attorney: one naming plaintiff and a
later one naming Sherry Hall.

In the amended complaint,

of the plan by permitting Sherry Hall to withdraw Mr. Hall's funds prior to his death. However, the court
finds that such action, which occurred well before Mr. Hall's death and plaintiffs claim for benefits, is
outside the scope of review of defendant's decision to deny payment of benefits to plaintiff. Defendant's
handling of the competing powers of attorney is examined in full detail below.

17

plaintiff alleges, without elaboration, that the power of
attorney for Sherry Hall was "obviously fraudulent" and that
defendant did not investigate whether Mr. Hall was competent to
revoke plaintiff's power of attorney and appoint Sherry Hall in
her stead.

Am. Compl. at 4.

However, despite plaintiff's

contention, when defendant became aware of the two powers of
attorney, it did begin an investigation.

After the power of

attorney for Sherry Hall had been received by defendant, Sherry
Hall sent documentation to defendant showing that plaintiff had
not been paying Mr. Hall's medical or nursing home expenses and
that Mr. Hall had consequently been evicted from multiple homes.
The letters from the nursing homes indicated that plaintiff had
moved Mr. Hall from nursing home to nursing home, promising that
Medicare or Medicaid would pay his bills, but then failing to
follow through with the qualification process or to pay any of
his expenses.

Sherry Hall, however, provided proof that since

her appointment as Mr. Hall's attorney-in-fact, she had used his
savings and pension payments to pay his outstanding medical and
nursing home bills.

Further, Villanueva was contacted by Det.

Anderson of the Fort Worth Police Department, who confirmed that
his investigation had revealed that plaintiff had been spending
Mr. Hall's pension payments on herself and her daughter, rather
than on Mr. Hall's care, leading to Mr. Hall being repeatedly
18

evicted from nursing homes.

Det. Anderson also indicated that he

had visited Mr. Hall and that although he was old and frail, he
was not delusional.

Further, a review of the power of attorney

given to Sherry Hall shows that although Mr. Hall's signature is
not confined to the signature lines, it was properly notarized by
a notary public.

Therefore, after completing her investigation,

Villanueva, on behalf of defendant, recognized the revocation of
the power of attorney for plaintiff and honored the power of
attorney for Sherry Hall.
The court finds that the summary judgment evidence
establishes that under the circumstances, defendant used "the
care, skill, prudence, and diligence" that "a prudent man" would
have used "acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
matters."

29 U.S.C.

§

1104(a).

Plaintiff has failed to produce

or identify any evidence in the record to contradict any of
defendant's evidence, and has failed to produce or point to any
evidence whatsoever that could raise a material issue of fact
sufficient to withstand summary judgment.

Therefore, defendant

is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claims under 29

u.s.c.

§

1132 (a) (3).

19

VI.

Order
Therefore,
The court ORDERS that defendant's motion for summary
judgment be, and is hereby, granted, and that all claims and
causes of action brought by plaintiff against defendant, be, and
are hereby, dismissed with prejudice.
SIGNED February~~ 2014.

~

20

flo

McBRYDE
ited States