Boyd v. City of River Oaks, Texas et al

Filing 53

Memorandum Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part 47 Motion to Dismiss filed by J.C.W. Electronics, Inc: The court ORDERS that JCW's motion to dismiss be, and is hereby, granted, and all of plaintiffs' claims and c auses of action against JCW be, and are hereby, dismissed with prejudice. The court determines that there is no just reason for delayin, and hereby directs, entry of final judgment as to such dismissals. The court further ORDERS that JCW's moti on for more definite statement be, and is hereby, denied as moot. The court further ORDERS that the caption of this action be amended by removing J.C.W. Electronics Inc. from the title, so that from this point forward, the title shall read: "Michael Boyd, et al., Plaintiffs, v. City of River Oaks, Texas, Defendant." (Ordered by Judge John McBryde on 5/7/2014) (mdf)

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li.S. mSTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRI T COUR.T
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TE S
FORT WORTH DIVISION

r

FILED
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MAY - 7 2014.
1

MICHAEL BOYD, ET AL.,

CLER~

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u.s. DISTRICT COCfn

By _ _--=-

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Plaintiffs,

.

Depuf."

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§

VS.

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CITY OF RIVER OAKS, TEXAS,
ET AL.,

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No. 4:13-CV-443-A
(Consolidated with
No. 4:13-CV-Sll-A)

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Defendants.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION
and
ORDER
Came on for consideration the motion to dismiss pursuant to
Rules 8, 9, and 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and alternative motion for more definite statement, filed in the
above action by defendant J.C.W. Electronics Inc.

("JCW").

Having considered the motion, plaintiffs,l response, the
Consolidated Amended Complaint, and the applicable legal
authorities, the court concludes that the motion to dismiss
should be granted, and the motion for more definite statement
should be denied as moot.

IPlaintiffs are Michael Boyd, individually and as heir of Christine Sexton, deceased; Sarah-Raspberry
Epiphany Fanner, by and through her next friend, Troy Fanner; Thomas Sexton, individually and as heir
of Christine Sexton; Judy Ernst, individually and as heir of Christine Sexton; and the Estate of Christine
Sexton, by and through Thomas Sexton.

I
i

I.

Background
Two groups of plaintiffs initiated separate actions against
the various defendants.

The parties moved to consolidate the

cases, which the court granted on July 17, 2013, and ordered the
parties to file a consolidated amended complaint that combined
all claims and causes of action by all plaintiffs against all
defendants.
Complaint.

Plaintiffs then filed their Consolidated Amended
The factual background of this action, as alleged in

the Consolidated Amended Complaint, is set forth in the
memorandum opinion and order signed January 16, 2014, and the
court adopts by reference in this memorandum opinion and order
the factual allegations described on pages 2-6 of the January 16,
2014 memorandum opinion and order.
II.

Grounds of JCW's Motion and Plaintiffs' Response
Against JCW, the Consolidated Amended Complaint alleged
claims and causes of action for negligence, breach of implied
warranty, breach of express warranties, strict liability, and
misrepresentation.

The essence of JCW's motion is that

plaintiffs have failed to allege any factual allegations to
support any of the causes of action against it.

Instead, JCW

contends that all of the causes of action against it assert legal
2

conclusions, as opposed to facts.
In their response, plaintiffs state simply that they "stand
on their pleadings," which they contend meet the requirements of
the applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
III.
Applicable Legal Principles
Rule 8(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides, in a general way, the applicable standard of pleading.
It requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,"
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2), "in order to give the defendant fair
notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
quotation marks and ellipsis omitted).

(internal

Although a complaint need

not contain detailed factual allegations, the "showing"
contemplated by Rule 8 requires the plaintiff to do more than
simply allege legal conclusions or recite the elements of a cause
of action.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 & n.3.

Thus, while a court

must accept all of the factual allegations in the complaint as
true, it need not credit bare legal conclusions that are
unsupported by any factual underpinnings.
556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

("While legal conclusions can provide

the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
3

allegations.

II)

Moreover, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, the facts pleaded must allow the court to infer
that the plaintiff's right to relief is plausible.

Id.

To

allege a plausible right to relief, the facts pleaded must
suggest liability; allegations that are merely consistent with
unlawful conduct are insufficient.
550 U.S. at 557).

Id. at 678 (citing Twombly,

"Determining whether a complaint states a

plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense."

Id. at 679.
IV.

Application of Law to Facts
A.

All Claims Against JCW are Dismissed
In its motion, JCW first argues generally that plaintiffs

have failed to allege any factual allegations against it that
meet the requirements of Iqbal and Twombly.

JCW then outlines

the elements of each specific cause of action asserted against it
and argues that plaintiffs have failed to allege facts to support
any of those elements.

The court could discuss in detail each of

these claims and causes of action and the specific grounds for
dismissal argued by JCW in its motion.

However, the court finds

that dismissal is warranted as to each cause of action for
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essentially the same reason:

no facts are alleged in the

Consolidated Amended Complaint as would support any such claims
or causes of action against JCW.
After being identified on pages 2 and 3 of the Consolidated
Amended Complaint as a defendant in this action, JCW is not
mentioned again until page 8, where plaintiffs allege that the
"telephone in question was owned and operated by Defendants JCW
as part of a joint venture with" defendant City of River Oaks,
Texas.

Consolo Am. Compl. at 8.

Not a single fact is pleaded in

the Consolidated Amended Complaint that describes any action or
failure to act by JCW that could support any of the causes of
action against it.

Instead, under each of the headings

identifying the claims and causes of action against JCW,
plaintiffs have offered nothing more than bare legal conclusions.
While well-pleaded facts of a complaint are to be accepted as
true, legal conclusions are not "entitled to the assumption of
truth."

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citation omitted).

However,

legal conclusions, and a "formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action," are all that the Consolidated Amended
Complaint directs at JCW.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

The court

finds that plaintiffs have failed to allege anything as to JCW
that would raise a right to relief up to, much less above, the
speculative level.

See Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555.
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B.

Request to Replead
In their response to JCW's motion to dismiss, plaintiffs

asks that they be permitted to replead.

Rule LR 10.1(a) of the

Local Civil Rules of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas requires that each motion must n(a)
contain on its face a title clearly identifying each included
pleading, motion, or other paper; .

"The response to JCW's

motion to dismiss does not indicate on its face that it includes
a motion or request to replead.

Plaintiffs also did not inform

the court of the additional facts they could plead to correct the
deficiencies in the Consolidated Amended Complaint, and they did
not attach to the response a proposed amended Consolidated
Amended Complaint.
In the July 17, 2013 consolidation order, the court ordered
plaintiffs to file an amended complaint.

In response, the two

sets of plaintiffs each filed a separate amended complaint.

The

court then ordered the parties to file a single, consolidated
amended complaint.

Plaintiffs have thus had multiple

opportunities to amend their pleadings, and even had the benefit
of prior motions to dismiss filed by other defendants to alert
them to potential problems with their pleadings.

Presumably by

this point plaintiffs have pleaded their best case.

The court

can see nothing to be gained by giving plaintiffs yet another
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bite at the apple.

Under these circumstances, the court is not

permitting plaintiffs to replead.

Sullivan v. Leor Energy, LLC,

600 F.3d 542, 551 (5th Cir. 2010).
V.
Order
Therefore,
The court ORDERS that JCW's motion to dismiss be, and is
hereby, granted, and all of plaintiffs' claims and causes of
action against JCW be, and are hereby, dismissed with prejudice.
The court determines that there is no just reason for delay
in, and hereby directs, entry of final jUdgment as to such
dismissals.
The court further ORDERS that JCW's motion for more definite
statement be, and is hereby, denied as moot.
The court further ORDERS that the caption of this action be
amended by removing J.C.W. Electronics Inc. from the title, so
that from this point forward, the title shall read: "Michael
Boyd, et al., Plaintiffs, v. City of River Oaks, Texas,
Defendant."
SIGNED May 6, 2014.

Judge