Teel v. Stephens, Director TDCJ-CID
Filing
17
Opinion and Order denying Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and denying a certificate of appealability. (see order for specifics) (Ordered by Judge Terry R Means on 10/20/2014) (mpw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
WARREN TEEL,
§
§
Petitioner,
§
§
v.
No. 4:13-CV-485-Y
§
§
WILLIAM STEPHENS, Director,
Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Correctional
Institutions Division,
§
§
§
§
§
§
Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
Before
the Court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
state prisoner,
is a
§
petition for writ of habeas corpus
2254 filed by Petitioner, Warren Teel, a
against William Stephens,
director of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,
Respondent.
The
prior
referral
to
the
magistrate
judge
is
withdrawn.
After having considered the pleadings and relief sought by
Petitioner,
the Court has concluded that the petition should be
denied.
I.
Factual and Procedural History
On May 7, 2009, in the 396th Judicial District Court, Tarrant
County, Texas, a jury found Petitioner guilty of aggravated robbery
with a deadly weapon, a furniture leg or post; Petitioner pleaded
true to a habitual-offender notice in the indictment; and the jury
assessed his punishment at 99 years'
confinement and a
$10, 000
fine.
(J. of Conviction by Jury 100, ECF No. 11-9.)
Petitioner
appealed his conviction, but the Second Court of Appeals of Texas
affirmed the trial court's judgment and the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals refused Petitioner's petition for discretionary review.
(Mem. Op., ECF No. 11-5; Thurman v. State, PDR No. 1805-11.)
The state appellate court set forth the relevant facts of the
case as follows:
Teel was charged with committing aggravated robbery
with a deadly weapon after he approached a woman at a gas
station on May 9, 2008; asked her for money; got into her
car; and started beating her with a wooden post. He also
bit her while trying to take her keys. He took her purse
and left.
On July 22, 2008, Dr. Barry Norman conducted a
court-ordered competency examination.
Dr.
Norman
diagnosed Teel with schizoaffective disorder with
psychosis and mixed substance abuse and opined that Teel
was not competent to stand trial.
The trial court
ordered Teel confined to a state hospital until he
regained competence. Several months later, a doctor at
North Texas State Hospital filed with the court a report
stating that Teel was competent to stand trial.
The
trial court entered a judgment of mental competency, and
Teel's attorney filed a notice of intent to raise the
insanity defense.
Before trial, the State objected to Teel's proposed
admission of Dr. Norman's testimony on the basis of
relevance, and Teel made a proffer of Dr. Norman's
testimony. Dr. Norman opined that, as of his examination
of Teel on July 22, 2008, Teel was suffering from
schizoaffective disorder and was responding to auditory
hallucinations, was not oriented as to time and place,
and did not know where he was or what was going on. At
the end of his examination, he concluded Teel was not
competent to stand trial.
On cross-examination by the State, Dr. Norman explained the
difference between a
competency examination and a
sanity
examination, 2 and he stated that he did not perform a sanity
2
examination in this case.
He testified that all of his opinions
pertained to Teel's status as of July 22, 2008-not May 9, 2008-and
that he did not have an opinion as to Teel's sanity as of May 9,
2008. The trial court sustained the State's objection and excluded
Dr. Norman's testimony.
2
Dr.
Norman testified that
a
competency
examination involves determining whether a
defendant has the ability to speak and
interact
with
his
attorney,
to
attend
courtroom proceedings, and to understand what
is going on in a courtroom.
In contrast, a
sanity examination has to do with whether a
defendant was suffering from a debilitating
illness at the time of the alleged offense
such that he could not understand that his
conduct was wrong.
(Mem. Op. 2-3; ECF No. 11-5.)
II.
In one ground,
Issues
Petitioner claims that his 5th, 6th and 14th
Amendment rights were violated and that the trial court abused its
discretion by excluding Dr. Norman's testimony.
1.)
(Pet. 6, ECF No.
According to Petitioner, hesought the assistance of Dr. Norman [' s] testimony so that
he could provide scientific[-]based study regarding
individuals that suffer[] from Teel's mental disease or
defect by providing the jury with a vivid picture of
changes and stages these individuals undergo while not
being treated for this illness and further provide fact
evidence regarding these individual's behavior pattern
and their ability to understand the nature of their
conduct.
Teel's trial counsel timely filed notice of intent
to raise an insanity defense contending that Teel was not
sane at the time he committed the underlying offense.
The elements of the defense are simple. Teel must show
that he was suffering from a severe mental disease or
defect. He must then prove causation: that he was unable
to know that his conduct was "wrong" as a result of that
3
condition.
He
must
prove
preponderance of the evidence.
both
elements
by
a
The procedural requirements is [sic] that once the
trial court have [sic] been made aware of the intent to
raise an insanity defense - by and through motion of
either parties [sic] or on the trial court's own motion
- shall be issued to examine Teel and report back to the
court in thirty (30) days. Teel was not afford[ed] such
examination.
In this case, on July 22, 2008, Teel was examined by
Dr. Norman, who was chief psychologist at Rusk State
Hospital.
Dr. Norman testified that he had been
qualified as an expert to testify to both competency and
sanity hearings in state courts.
In regards to the
examination he conducted on Teel, he opined that Teel
suffered
from
schizo-affective
disorder
and
was
responding to auditory hallucinations, that he was not
oriented as to time and place, and didn't really know
where he was or what was going on.
Because Dr. Norman testified that he did not conduct
a sanity examination on Teel as to his mental state at
the time of the offense, this is the reason as to why the
trial court excluded Dr. Norman's testimony. This is an
abuse of discretion because Teel was denied his
constitutional right to present a defense and have
favorable witness to testify in his behalf. Dr. Norman
would have provided both through his testimony.
Teel contends that Dr. Norman's testimony would have
been "relevant" evidence and such evidence would have had
a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to determination of the insanity defense at
the time of the offense more probable than it would
without the evidence.
While expert testimony is not
necessary to entitle a defendant to an instruction on the
insanity defense, juries are rarely convinced without it.
Two and a half months after the offense, the trial
court issues an Order for Teel to be examined to
determine whether he was competent to stand trial. Teel
was examined by Dr. Barry Norman on July 22, 2008. Dr.
Norman reported back to the trial court that Teel
suffered
from
"schizoaffective
disorder
and
was
responding to auditory hallucination, that he was not
orient[ed] as to time place, and didn't really know where
4
he was or waht [sic] was going on." Teel was diagnosed
as incompetent to stand trial and was transferred to a
mental health faci8lity. Teel was under treatment at the
time of Dr. Norman's examining him.
After seven (7)
months of extensive treatment, Teel was deemed competent
to stand trial.
It was Teel's intent to present an insanity defense
that he did not understand that his conduct was wrong at
the time of the offense.
Teel needed the favorable
testimony of Dr. Norman to provide the scientific based
studies by both defining his mental deseases [sic] and
defects along with their symptoms and behavior pattern
when treated and untreated.
This fact evidence applied
to similar documented case study by giving the jury a
cohesive understanding and vivid picture of the struggles
Teel suffered because of his mental conditions and
liability for his actions.
After hearing the testimony of Teel's mother
testifying Teel spent 5 years in a mental ward and was on
10-12 different medications to treat his condition
coupled by Teel's testimony that he was not "wrong" to
fight with Ms. Siford, the complainant.
And the fact
that Teel had been admitted three times to the JPS
psychiatric ward for treatment since his release from the
penal system.
The testimony of Dr. Norman would have provided the
scintilla of eveidence [sic] needed to warrant the
insanity at the time of the offense instruction.
The
fact issue would have been left to the jury to believe of
[sic] disbelieve this evidene [sic] .
The jury was not
afford[ed] an opportunity to consider these facts in its
verdict, and might have.
(Pet. 6-6d, ECF No. 1 (citations to the record omitted)
(emphasis
in original) . )
III.
A
§
Legal Standard for Granting Habeas-Corpus Relief
2254
habeas
petition
is
governed
by
the
heightened
standard of review provided for in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA).
28
u.s.c.
5
§
2254.
Under the Act,
a
writ of habeas corpus should be granted only if a
arrives
at
a
decision
that
is
contrary to
state court
or an unreasonable
application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent or that
is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the record before the state court.
Ct. 770, 785 (2011); 28
u.s.c.
§
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.
2254(d) (1)-(2).
This standard is
difficult to meet but "stops short of imposing a complete bar on
federal
court reli tigation of claims already rejected in state
proceedings."
Harrington, 131
Additionally,
the statute requires that federal courts give
great deference to a
Johnson,
s. Ct. at 786.
210 F.3d 481,
state court's
485
(5th Cir.
factual
findings.
Hill
v.
Section 2254 (e) (1)
2000)
provides that a determination of a factual issue made by a state
court
shall
be
presumed
to
be
This
correct.
presumption
of
correctness applies to both explicit findings of fact and those
findings of fact implicit in the state court's mixed-law-and-fact
conclusions.
2001).
Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 948 n.11 (5th Cir.
The applicant has the burden of rebutting the presumption
of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.
2254 (e) (1);
Miller-El
v.
Cockrell,
537
U.S.
See 28 U.S.C. §
322,
340
(2003);
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000).
Finally, when faced with a silent or ambiguous decision by the
state's highest criminal court, such as the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals' decision in this case, the federal habeas court must "look
6
through"
determine
to
the
which
last
clear
state
decision
state
court
decision
to
Johnson, 194 F.3d 641, 651 (5th Cir. 1999).
on
review.
the
matter
to
Jackson
v.
In this case, the last
reasoned opinion was that of the Second Court of Appeals', and so
it is that opinion to which this Court applies AEDPA's standards.
IV.
Discussion
In rejecting Petitioner's claim and relying solely on Texas
Rule
of Evidence
4 01 and Texas
case
law,
the Second Court of
Appeals addressed Petitioner's claim as follows:
In his sole issue, Teel complains that the trial
court abused its discretion by excluding Dr. Norman's
testimony because it was relevant, was probative, and
would have assisted the jury in determining an ultimate
issue
of
fact,
i.e.,
whether
Teel
was
insane.
Specifically, he argues that Dr. Norman's testimony would
have "provided a 'small nudge' in proving or disproving
a fact of consequence to the trial" and that by excluding
Dr. Norman's testimony, the trial court violated Teel's
due process right to present his defense.
A.
Standard of Review
We may not disturb a trial court's evidentiary
ruling absent an abuse of discretion. In other words, as
long as the trial court's decision was within the zone of
reasonable disagreement and was correct under any theory
of law applicable to the case, it must be upheld. This
is so because "trial courts . . . are usually in the best
position to make the call on whether certain evidence
should be admitted or excluded."
[Under Texas Rule of Evidence 401,] "[r]elevant
evidence" means "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence."
" [E] xpert testimony that does not directly rebut the
culpable mental state usually may be excluded at the
7
guilt stage.
The test for determining insanity is
whether, at the time of the conduct charged, as a result
of mental disease or defect, the defendant did not know
his conduct was wrong.
In this context, "wrong" means
"illegal."
B.
Analysis
Teel refers us to Fisher-Riza v. State, arguing that
his due process rights were violated when he was
prohibited from presenting Dr. Norman's testimony.
We note first that Fisher-Riza is inapposite, as the
court addressed expert testimony about past mental
illness and held that testimony about a defendant's
mental health five years prior to the instant offense was
not too remote. Here, Dr. Norman did not testify about
Teel's past mental health during the proffer, and he
specifically testified that he was unaware of Teel' s
mental health status on the date of the incident at
issue.
Further, he stated that he did not conduct a
sanity examination at the time he evaluated Teel's
competency to stand trial and that he had no opinion
about Teel's state of mind-sanity or mens rea-on the date
Teel committed the instant offense. Rather, he testified
about Teel's lack of mental competence to stand trial
over a month after the commission of the offense. Under
the circumstances here, we cannot say that the trial
court abused its discretion by excluding Dr. Norman's
testimony during the guilt-innocence phase of trial.
(Mem. Op. 3-6, ECF No. 11-5 (footnotes omitted).)
A criminal defendant has the right to a fundamentally fair
trial and to present a defense.
Crane
v.
Kentucky,
Mississippi,
476
410 U.S.
u.s. 14, 19 (1967).
U.S.
284,
294
U.S. CONST., amends. V, VI, XIV;
683,
690-91
(1973);
(1986);
Washington v.
Chambers
v.
Texas,
388
However, a federal habeas court's review of
state-court evidentiary rulings "is limited to determining whether
a trial judge's error is so extreme that it constituted a denial of
fundamental fairness."
Jackson v. Johnson, 194 F. 3d 641, 656 (5th
8
Cir.
1999).
Relief
will
be
warranted only when
the
excluded
evidence "is a crucial, critical, highly significant factor in the
context of the entire trial."
Johnson v.
Puckett, 176 F.3d 809,
821 (5th Cir. 1999).
Under Texas law,
"[t]here is a general presumption of sanity
and the defendant bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance
of the evidence, his insanity at the time of the conduct charged."
Martinez v. State,
867 S.W.2d 30, 33
must demonstrate that
(Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
"as a result of severe mental disease or
defect," he did not know his conduct was wrong.
§
8.01
(West
He
2011).
Dr.
Norman
did not
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
perform an
insanity
examination and had no opinion as to petitioner's sanity at the
time of the offense.
(Reporter's R., vol. 4, 15, ECF No. 11-11.)
Therefore, any testimony regarding Petitioner's mental illness in
an effort to support an inference that his condition rendered him
unable to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of his actions at
the
time
he
irrelevant.
2008) .
committed
the
offense
was
properly
excluded
United States v. Eff, 524 F.3d 712, 717-18
as
(5th Cir.
The fact that Petitioner was deemed incompetent to stand
trial as a result of the competency examination would not have been
helpful to the
jury in deciding whether he was
committed the offense.
expert witness,
examination,
Dr.
insane when he
Further, Petitioner's own court-appointed
Kelly Goodness,
who did perform an insanity
apparently expressed the opinion that there was no
9
basis for an insanity defense.
(Reporter's R., vol. 3, 10, ECF No.
11-10 & vol. 5, 13, ECF No. 11-12.)
V.
Based on
the
Conclusion
record before
the
Court,
the
state
courts'
rejection of Petitioner's claims is not contrary to, or involve an
unreasonable
precedent
application of,
nor
was
the
clearly established Supreme Court
decision
based
on
an
unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
state court.
For
the
reasons
discussed,
the
Court
DENIES
Petitioner's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§
2254
and DENIES a certificate of appealability.
SIGNED October 20, 2014.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
10
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