Wilson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER... this action is hereby remanded to the state court from which it was removed. See Order for further specifics. (Ordered by Judge John McBryde on 11/7/2013) (krg)
U.S.DISTRfCTCOURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURrt
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEX.P.S'
FORT WORTH DIVISION
RICKEY WILSON,
'
FILED
INOV - 7 2013
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Plaintiff,
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§
vs.
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JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, SUCCESSOR BY
MERGER TO CHASE HOME FINANCE
LLC, ET AL.
§
I
NO. 4:13-CV-877-A
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Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
and
ORDER
The court has not been persuaded that it has subject matter
jurisdiction over the above-captioned action.
Therefore, the
court is ordering the action remanded to the state court from
which it was removed.
I.
Background
Plaintiff, Rickey Wilson, initiated this action on October
29, 2012, by filing his original petition in the District Court
of Tarrant County, Texas, 348th Judicial District, naming as
defendant Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("FHLMC").
Plaintiff on November 9, 2012, filed an amended petition and
motion for temporary restraining order, which added JPMorgan
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Chase Bank, National Association, successor by merger to Chase
Home Finance LLC ("JPMorgan Chase"), as a defendant.
On
September 23, 2013, plaintiff filed a second amended petition,
again naming FHLMC and JPMorgan Chase as defendants. JPMorgan
Chase removed the action on October 28, 2013, alleging that this
court had subject matter jurisdiction by reason of diversity of
citizenship, and that the amount in controversy exceeds the sum
or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, as
contemplated by 28 U.S.C.
§
1332. 1
The allegations in the state court pleadings pertain to
plaintiff's property on Misty Mesa Trail in Mansfield, Tarrant
County, Texas.
Plaintiff claims that he purchased the property
on or about August 28, 2007, by signing a note secured by a deed
of trust, naming GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.
("GreenPoint"), as lender, and Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc.
("MERS"), as a beneficiary.
Although records show
that the assistant secretary of MERS, as nominee for GreenPoint,
signed an assignment of the deed of trust to JPMorgan Chase on
1
JPMorgan Chase indicated in the notice of removal that FHLMC has consented to the removal.
Because the court finds that JPMorgan Chase has failed adequately to establish the amount in
controversy, FHLMC's consent is of no effect.
2
November 21, 2011, plaintiff contends that the assistant
secretary for MERS had no authority to execute such a transfer.
On February 7, 2012, JPMorgan Chase foreclosed on plaintiff's
property, and sold the property to FHLMC.
On or about August 2,
2012, FHLMC received a judgment against plaintiff in County Court
at Law Number One in Tarrant County, Texas, and a writ of
possession issued on or about October 22, 2012.
The general theme of plaintiff's contentions is that no
valid assignment of the note and deed of trust to JPMorgan Chase
ever occurred, so that it had no authority to institute
foreclosure proceedings or sell plaintiff's property at a
foreclosure sale.
Thus, the subsequent purchase of the property
by FHLMC was void.
Plaintiff asserted claims against defendants for: fraudulent
lien instrument, violations of the Texas Debt Collection Act,
violations of section 51.002 of the Texas Property Code, breach
of contract, and wrongful foreclosure.
Plaintiff also sought a
declaration that the substitute trustee's deed was void, and he
sought injunctive relief.
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II.
Basic Principles
The court starts with a statement of basic principles
announced by the Fifth Circuit:
"The removing party bears the burden of showing that federal
subject matter jurisdiction exists and that removal was proper."
Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723
(5th Cir. 2002).
"Moreover, because the effect of removal is to
deprive the state court of an action properly before it, removal
raises significant federalism concerns, which mandate strict
construction of the removal statute." 2
Carpenter v. Wichita
Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 44 F.3d 362, 365-66 (5th Cir. 1995).
Any doubts about whether removal jurisdiction is proper must
therefore be resolved against the exercise of federal
jurisdiction.
Acuna v. Brown & Root Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 339 (5th
Cir. 2000).
2
The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) provides, in pertinent part, that:
[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to
the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place
where such action is pending.
(emphasis added).
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To determine the amount in controversy, the court ordinarily
looks to the plaintiff's state court petition.
at 723.
Manguno, 276 F.3d
If it is not facially apparent from the petition that
the amount in controversy exceeds the required amount, the
removing party must set forth summary judgment-type evidence,
either in the notice of removal or in an affidavit, showing that
the amount in controversy is, more likely than not, greater than
$75,000.
Id.; Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335
(5th Cir. 1995).
The amount in controversy is measured from the
perspective of the plaintiff.
See Garcia v. Koch Oil Co. of
Texas Inc., 351 F.3d 636, 640 n.4 (5th Cir. 2003).
III.
The True Nature of Plaintiff's Claims
The petition by which plaintiff initiated this action in the
state court, along with the amended petitions, do not specify a
dollar amount of recovery sought, nor do the pleadings define in
any way the value of the right sought to be protected or the
extent of the injury sought to be prevented.
Rather, the
allegations of the petition are typical of many state court
petitions that are brought before this court by notices of
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removal in which the plaintiff makes vague, general, and
obviously legally baseless allegations in an attempt to frustrate
the procedures a lender is pursuing, or has pursued, to regain
possession of residential property the plaintiff used as security
for the making of a loan.
As the court has been required to do in other cases of this
kind, the court has undertaken an evaluation of the true nature
of plaintiff's claims.
Having done so, and having considered the
authorities and arguments cited by JPMorgan Chase in the notice
of removal, the court is unpersuaded that the amount in
controversy exceeds the required jurisdictional minimum.
Nothing on the face of plaintiff's state court pleadings
provides sufficient information as to the amount in controversy.
In the notice of removal, JPMorgan Chase contends that plaintiff
seeks to quiet title to the property in his name; because the
property has a fair market value of $179,400, this establishes
the amount in controversy.
The fact that the value of the property mentioned in
plaintiff's pleadings might be more than $75,000.00 does not
establish the amount in controversy.
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Nowhere does plaintiff in
his state court pleadings indicate that the fair market value of
the property represents the amount in damages he is requesting.
Further, a review of plaintiff's pleadings makes clear that
his primary dispute is with the validity of the assignment of the
note and deed of trust from GreenPoint to JPMorgan Chase, and
JPMorgan Chase's authority to appoint a substitute trustee or
conduct a foreclosure sale.
While plaintiff questions whether
JPMorgan Chase had any such authority, nothing in the state court
pleadings gives rise to a legitimate claim to outright title to
the property.
Plaintiff tacitly recognizes that he has no such
claim by praying for relief in the form of an order quieting
title in him "subject to any valid lien(s) ,"and enjoining any
action to interfere with his use and possession of the property
"pending resolution of this case."
at 10.
Notice of Removal, Ex. A-19,
Hence, the court is convinced that there is no legitimate
dispute in this action over ownership to the property, only
plaintiff's efforts to extend the time he can stay on the
property and delay his eviction from the property following the
foreclosure sale.
JPMorgan Chase additionally relies on plaintiff's statement
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in his state court pleadings that he seeks "monetary relief of
$100,000 or less" to establish the amount in controversy.
of Removal at 3.
Notice
This allegation was no doubt included in the
petition pursuant to the recently-revised requirements of Rule
47(c) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
In the court's
view, an allegation that a party is seeking "monetary relief of
$100,000 or less" is not tantamount to a claim that the party is
seeking "at least $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs," as
required to establish diversity jurisdiction.
Thus, JPMorgan
Chase's reliance on this allegation in the pleading is
unavailing.
No information has been provided to the court that would
enable the court to place a value on the interest plaintiff seeks
to protect by this action.
Thus, JPMorgan Chase has not shown by
a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy in
this action exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
Consequently, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
the action, and it should be remanded to the state court from
which it was removed.
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IV.
Order
Therefore,
The court ORDERS that this action be, and is hereby,
remanded to the state court from which it
SIGNED November 7, 2013.
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