Thomas v. Mills et al
Filing
10
Memorandum Opinion and Order: The court ORDERS that all claims and causes of action asserted in the above-captioned action by plaintiff, Anthony Deshawn Thomas, against defendants, Mills, Peyton, and Hospital, be, and are hereby, dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the authority of 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b). (Ordered by Judge John McBryde on 4/2/2014) (srs)
U.S. OISTRICT COlJRf
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
IN THE UNITED STATES DIST ICT C'i*f~...:;I.::;L:;:;E::..-:D:':::'----r
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISI N
CLERK. u.s. DISTRICT COURT
ANTHONY DESHAWN THOMAS,
Plaintiff,
VS.
DR. JOHN MILLS, M.D. ,
ET AL.,
Defendants.
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By
()eput~
-'
NO. 4:14-CV-009-A
MEMORANDUM OPINION
and
ORDER
Now before the court for consideration is a complaint filed
in the above action by plaintiff, Anthony Deshawn Thomas, naming
as defendants John Mills ("Mills"), M.D., Medical Director, and
D. Peyton ("Peyton"), LVN, both of John Peter Smith HospitalCorrectional Healthcare. 1
Mills and Peyton are sued both in
their individual and official capacities.
Official capacity
suits "generally represent only another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent."
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)
(citation omitted).
Kentucky v.
Thus, the
court is considering the action against Mills and Peyton in their
official capacities as asserting claims against John Peter Smith
1Subsequent to filing his complaint, plaintiff filed a motion titled "Motion to Admit Medical
Records into Evidence." Although the introduction of evidence into the record is premature at this point,
the court is granting the motion and considering the papers attached thereto as exhibits to the complaint.
Hospital ("Hospital"), and is substituting Hospital as a party as
to such claims.
1.
Plaintiff's Complaint
Plaintiff's claims arise from events that occurred while he
was incarcerated at the Tarrant County Jail from February 8,
2013, through July 8, 2013.
The complaint alleged the following:
Plaintiff was incarcerated in the Tarrant County Jail
beginning February 8, 2013, where he remained until his transfer
on July 8, 2013, to a unit of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice.
Upon his arrest and transport to the jail, plaintiff
took with him his continuous positive airway pressure ("CPAP")
machine and mask.
Plaintiff has used the CPAP machine for
fifteen years to treat his obstructive sleep apnea.
For a few
days after his arrest, during the intake process at the jail,
plaintiff did not have possession or use of the machine.
After a few days, the machine was returned to plaintiff.
When he attempted to use it, he realized the mask was broken. 2
Over the course of the five months that plaintiff was
incarcerated at the jail, he made at least ten requests, verbally
2It is unclear exactly what was broken. The complaint alleged that the mask was broken, and that
the mask needed a new strap to hold it in place. The complaint does not allege that anyone at the jail was
responsible for breaking the mask.
2
and in writing, to Mills and Peyton to "obtain a replacement mask
and parts," Compl. at 4-A-2, including making requests for water,
a filter, and a new headband for the CPAP mask.
In response,
Mills and Peyton informed plaintiff that "medical does not
provide supplies" for CPAP machines.
Id. at 4-A-7.
Instead,
plaintiff was directed to have his family members bring the
supplies and place them with his property at the jail.
However,
plaintiff maintained that his family members were not
sufficiently dependable or reliable to bring him supplies, and
that he had no money to purchase the supplies.
Plaintiff asserted claims against Mills, Peyton, and
Hospital for deliberate indifference to his medical needs under
42 U.S.C.
§
1983, and for violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA") and Rehabilitation Act ("RA").
II.
Evaluation of the Complaint Under 28 U.S.C.
§
1915A
As a prisoner seeking redress from government officials,
plaintiff's complaint is subject to preliminary screening under 28
U.S.C.
§
1915A.
Cir. 1998).
See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th
Section 1915A(b) (1) provides for sua sponte dismissal
if the court finds that the complaint is either frivolous or
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
A claim
is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis in either fact or
3
law."
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
A
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
when, assuming that all the allegations in the complaint are true
even if doubtful in fact, such allegations fail to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.
Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
In evaluating whether the complaint states a valid claim for
relief, the court construes the allegations of the complaint
favorably to the pleader.
(1975).
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501
However, the court does not accept conclusory
allegations or unwarranted deductions of fact as true, and a
plaintiff must provide more than labels and conclusions or a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Tuchman v. DSC Commc'ns Corp., 14 F.3d
1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994).
Having now considered the allegations in the complaint, the
court concludes that it should be dismissed in its entirety under
the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§
1915A.
III.
Analysis
A.
Deliberate Indifference Under 42 U.S.C.
§
1983
The "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth
4
Amendment."
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)
(ellipses
in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
The
Supreme Court has determined that deliberate indifference to a
prisoner's serious medical needs may constitute the "unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain" necessary to state an Eighth
Amendment violation.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
However, not every claim by a prisoner that he received
inadequate medical care states an Eighth Amendment violation.
Id. at 104-105.
For a prison official's deliberate indifference to a
prisoner's serious medical needs to rise to the level of a
constitutional violation, a prisoner must establish that the
official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to a
prisoner's health or safety.
837 (1994).
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
"[T]he official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference."
An
Id.
official's "failure to alleviate a significant risk that he
should have perceived but did not" does not constitute an Eighth
Amendment violation.
Id. at 838.
Unsuccessful medical care,
negligent treatment, or medical malpractice do not rise to the
level of a constitutional tort.
339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006).
Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d
Disagreement between a prisoner and
5
his doctor regarding the course of treatment is generally not
actionable.
1995)
Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir.
(per curiam).
"Deliberate indifference is an extremely
high standard to meet."
Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) .
1.
Application of Law to Claims Against Mills and Peyton
The complaint failed to allege sufficient facts against
Mills and Peyton to state a claim for deliberate indifference to
plaintiff's medical needs.
The complaint made clear that Peyton
and Mills did not disregard plaintiff's need for the CPAP
machine.
At most, the complaint alleged that Mills and Peyton
refused to finance replacement parts for plaintiff's personal
equipment.
Absent from the complaint, however, is any allegation
that Mills and Peyton ever refused or denied plaintiff access to,
or use of, his CPAP machine.
As the complaint stated, the CPAP
machine is plaintiff's personal property, which he brought with
him upon his arrest and booking into the Tarrant County Jail. 3
Plaintiff admitted he was repeatedly told he could make
arrangements for family members to provide the replacement parts
for his CPAP machine so he could use the machine in the jail.
31t is also possible, if not likely, that the mask for plaintiffs CPAP machine was not working at
the time of plaintiff s initial arrest and incarceration. Plaintiff alleged that he had the machine with him
when he was arrested and taken to the jail, and that it was returned to him in his cell after just a few days.
No allegation is made in the complaint that anyone at the jail was responsible for the broken mask.
6
That plaintiff believed his family members were not dependable or
were too irresponsible to bring him the needed supplies does not
amount to deliberate indifference by Mills and Peyton.
~,
See,
Cooper v. Hung, 485 F. App'x 680, 684 (5th Cir. 2012)
curiam)
(per
(affirming dismissal of prisoner's complaint of
deliberate indifference to medical needs where prison refused to
provide medical equipment plaintiff used prior to incarceration) .
Nor does the complaint allege facts to show that plaintiff
suffered any physical injury as a result of Mills's and Peyton's
actions.
The complaint alleged only that plaintiff suffered non-
specific pain,4 "mental anguish, fear and depression,"
4-A-7, but no actual harm.
Compl. at
Under the circumstances described in
the complaint, plaintiff cannot establish that Mills and Peyton
were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.
See
Washington v. Thomas, No. 00-20981, 2001 WL 822443 (5th Cir. June
18, 2001)
(per curiam)
(affirming dismissal for failure to state
a claim for relief of prisoner's
§
1983 action alleging
defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by
failing to provide him a CPAP machine) .
2.
Claims Against Hospital
As noted, plaintiff's claims against Peyton and Mills in
4No facts are alleged in the complaint describing plaintiffs pain; however, it is not attributed to
any physical injury.
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their official capacities are claims against Hospital.
A
governmental entity, such as Hospital, can be sUbjected to
monetary damages or injunctive relief only if one of its official
policies caused a person to be deprived of a federally protected
right.
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
Hospital cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat
superior or vicarious liability.
rd.
The Fifth Circuit has been explicit in its definition of an
"official policy" that can lead to liability on the part of a
governmental entity, giving the following explanation in an
opinion issued en banc in response to a motion for rehearing in
Bennett v. City of Slidell:
1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or
decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by
the municipality's lawmaking officers or by an official
to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making
authority; or
2. A persistent, widespread practice of city officials
or employees, which, although not authorized by
officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common
and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly
represents municipal policy. Actual or constructive
knowledge of such custom must be attributable to the
governing body of the municipality or to an official to
whom that body had delegated policy-making authority.
Actions of officers or employees of a municipality do
not render the municipality liable under § 1983 unless
they execute official policy as above defined.
735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1984)
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(per curiam) .
It is unclear under which definition of "official policy"
plaintiff is attempting to impose liability on Hospital.
The
only reference in the complaint to any "policy" is the following
notation Peyton wrote in response to one of plaintiff's
grievances: "Medical does not provide supplies (filter, mask,
headband) for CPAP machines.
Your family may bring these
supplies to you & place in Property."
Compl., Ex. B-2.
Although plaintiff referred to this statement as Hospital's
"policy," there is no indication that this statement reflects
anything other than Peyton's own response to plaintiff's
grievance.
No facts are alleged to support a conclusion that
Peyton and Mills acted pursuant to an official policy under
either of the definitions of that term set forth in Spiller:
nothing is alleged to indicate that Peyton's response represents
a "policy statement, . . . regulation, or decision that is
officially adopted and promulgated" by Hospital's policYmakers,
nor do any facts show that Peyton's response represents a
"persistent, widespread practice" that is "so common and well
settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents"
Hospital policy, or that any part of Hospital's governing body
had either actual or constructive knowledge of the purported
policy.
See Spiller, 735 F.2d at 862.
Nor does the complaint
allege the existence of a policYmaker, a requirement to establish
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Hospital's liability under
§
1983.
Piotrowski v. City of
Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001).
In short, nothing is
alleged in the complaint as would support a finding of liability
against Hospital under
§
1983.
To sum up the court's conclusions concerning plaintiff's
claim pursuant to
§
1983, plaintiff has failed to allege any
facts as would show the defendants refused to treat him, ignored
his complaints, or intentionally treated him incorrectly.
None
of the complaint's allegations meets the "high standard" required
to show defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's
medical needs.
Therefore, plaintiff has failed to allege a
violation of his constitutional rights as required to state a
claim under
§
1983, and that claim is dismissed as to all
defendants.
B.
ADA and RA Claims 5
Title II of the ADA provides that "no qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity."
42 U.S.C.
§
5The Fifth Circuit has held that, inasmuch as the rights and remedies under the ADA and the RA
are the same, case law interpreting one statute can be applied to interpreting the other. Pace v. Bogalusa
City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 287-88 (5th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the court is combining its analysis of
plaintiffs claims under the ADA and RA.
10
12132.
Similarly, the RA prohibits discrimination against
individuals with disabilities in institutions receiving federal
funds.
29 U.S.C.
§
794(a).
As an initial matter, plaintiff may
not assert an ADA or RA claim against Mills and Peyton in their
individual capacities.
Only the pUblic entity is amenable to
suit under either statute.
Nottingham v. Richardson, 499 F.
App'x 368, 376 n.6 (5th Cir. 2012).
Hence, the court is
considering the ADA and RA claims only against Hospital.
To state a claim for relief under Title II of the ADA
requires plaintiff to allege that:
disability;
(1) he has a qualified
(2) the pUblic entity has denied him the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities for which it is
responsible, or it has otherwise discriminated against him; and,
(3) the discrimination is "by reason of" his disability.
King, 642 F.3d 492, 499 (5th Cir. 2011)
Hale v.
(per curiam) .
For purposes of evaluating the complaint under
§
1915A, the
court will assume that plaintiff's sleep apnea is a "qualified
disability."
Nevertheless, plaintiff still has failed to state a
claim for relief under the ADA or RA.
The basis of these claims is that Hospital failed or refused
to provide plaintiff a replacement mask and filter for his CPAP
machine.
Plaintiff does not allege that Hospital refused to
provide the mask because of his disability.
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Rather,he contends
he was repeatedly told his family could bring the mask to him at
the jail.
No allegation is made that Hospital attempted to
obstruct or prevent plaintiff's family members from doing so.
Nor does plaintiff allege that he was denied access to the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities provided by
Hospital, or that Hospital took any actions against him, because
of his disability.
Under these circumstances, plaintiff has
failed to state a claim for relief under the ADA or RA.
v. Thaler, 470 F. App'x 411, 418 (5th Cir. 2012)
See Hay
(per curiam) .
IV.
Order
Therefore,
The court ORDERS that all claims and causes of action
asserted in the above-captioned action by plaintiff, Anthony
Deshawn Thomas, against defendants, Mills, peyton, and Hospital,
be, and are hereby, dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the
authority of 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b).
SIGNED April
t2.., 2014.
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