Martin v. Tarrant County Jail
Filing
9
Memorandum Opinion and Order: The court ORDERS that the above-captioned action wherein plaintiff is Rory Dell Martin and defendant is Tarrant County be, and is hereby, dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the authority of 28 u.s.c. 1915A(b). (Ordered by Judge John McBryde on 6/9/2014) (mem)
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
4
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FILED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXA
FORT WORTH DIVISION
Jfi- 9 2014
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT CO!!!<
By _ _---;;-----
RORY DELL MARTIN,
,_ _ _ _ _ _Depur~'
§
---·-----·--~
§
Plaintiff,
§
§
vs.
§
NO. 4:14-CV-368-A
§
TARRANT COUNTY JAIL,
§
§
Defendant.
§
MEMORANDUM OPINION
and
QRDER
Now before the court for consideration is a complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§
1983 filed in the above action by
plaintiff, Rory Dell Martin, naming Tarrant County Jail as
defendant.
Because Tarrant County Jail is not an entity capable
of being sued, the court is substituting Tarrant County
("County") as a proper defendant.
Having considered the
complaint and applicable legal authorities, the court concludes
that the complaint should be dismissed.
I.
The Complaint
Plaintiff's claims appear to be based on an alleged
violation by staff at Tarrant County Jail of his Eighth Amendment
right to receive necessary medical care.
Plaintiff asserts that
in 2012, he was painting and waxing floors during a jail
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inspection, apparently under the supervision of "Lt. Avaun and
correctional officer Bailey," when plaintiff slipped and injured
his back and neck.
Compl. at 4.
Plaintiff claims the medical
staff did not take x-rays or make an appointment for plaintiff
with a back specialist, but did give him ibuprofen.
Plaintiff
states that he believes County is "responsible" for not placing a
wet floor sign 1 and requests x-rays of his neck and back and any
necessary surgery to relieve the pain.
Compl. at 4.
As to whether plaintiff has exhausted his administrative
remedies, plaintiff answered "YES" to the question on page 3 of
his complaint, "Have you exhausted both steps of the grievance
procedure in this institution?", but also stated, "See Attachment
1."
In the attachments to the complaint, plaintiff explains that
he did not file a step two form because he did not receive a
response to his step one grievance.
Plaintiff states that he
asked Legal Aid of NorthWest Texas for assistance; but it
1
The court notes that to the extent plaintiff is asserting that County is liable for his slip and fall
injuries because of the failure to place a wet floor sign, such contention sounds in negligence and is not
cognizant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Marsh v. Jones, 53 F.3d 707, 712 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Specifically,
Marsh alleged that a leaking or sweating air conditioning unit made the floor wet and that Defendants
failed to warn inmates of the wet floor, and that, as a result of Defendants' conduct, she slipped and
damaged her ring. Because Marsh's claim for damage to her engagement ring is a garden-variety
negligence claim, we hold that it is not actionable under section 1983."); Beasley v. Anderson, 67 Fed.
App'x 242 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ("Beasley's claim regarding a slip and fall sounds in negligence,
which is insufficient to allege a constitutional violation."); Smith v. Dallas Cnty., Tex., 68 F.3d 464 (5th
Cir. 1995) (per curiam) ("The negligent act of an official that causes loss or injury will not state a claim
under § 1983. ").
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declined by letter dated July 6, 2012, because it cannot
represent incarcerated persons.
Plaintiff further explains that
he next wrote the Texas Commission on Jail Standards but was told
by letter dated September 17, 2013, that he had not exhausted the
use of the grievance and appeals procedures at the jail and that
he should file a grievance through the Sheriff's Office.
Plaintiff then filed a step one grievance with Tarrant County
Jail on December 23, 2013.
Plaintiff wrote follow-up letters to
the jail on March 3, 2014, and March 31, 2014, but claims that as
of May 15, 2014, he still had not received a response.
Therefore, plaintiff did not pursue step two of the grievance
process.
He filed the instant complaint with the court on May
22, 2014.
II.
Evaluating the Complaint Under 28 U.S.C.
§
1915A
Plaintiff is incarcerated in the Tarrant County Jail.
As a
prisoner seeking redress from government officials, plaintiff's
complaint is subject to preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C.
§
1915A.
See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir.
1998}.
Section 1915A{b} {1} provides for sua sponte dismissal if
the court finds that the complaint is either frivolous or fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
A claim is
frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis in either fact or law."
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---------------------
u.s.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490
319, 325 (1989).
A complaint fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when, assuming
that all the allegations in the complaint are true even if
doubtful in fact, such allegations fail to "raise a right to
relief above the speculative level."
550
u.s.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
544, 555 (2007).
In evaluating whether the complaint states a valid claim for
relief, the court construes the allegations of the complaint
favorably to the pleader.
(1975).
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501
However, the court does not accept conclusory
allegations or unwarranted deductions of fact as true, and a
plaintiff must provide more than labels and conclusions or a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Tuchman v. DSC Commc'ns Corp., 14 F.3d
1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994).
Having now considered plaintiff's claims against County, the
court concludes that they should be dismissed under the
provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§
1915A.
III.
Analysis
A.
Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C.
1997e(a), provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with
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§
respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or
any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,
prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted."
Generally, "[f]ailure
to exhaust is an affirmative defense, and 'inmates are not
required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their
complaints."'
2010)
Hicks v. Lingle, 370 Fed. App'x 497, 498 (5th Cir.
(per curiam), cert. denied,
821 (2010),
U.S.
, 131 S. Ct.
(quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 US. 199, 216 (2007)).
"Dismissal may be appropriate, however, when, on its face the
complaint establishes the inmate's failure to exhaust."
Id.
(citing Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir.2007)).
Here, plaintiff admits that he did not pursue the second
step of the Tarrant County Jail grievance process.
Plaintiff
filed his step one grievance on December 23, 2013, but as of May
15, 2014, he had received no response.
Plaintiff is deemed to
have exhausted the first step of the two-step grievance procedure
after the sixty-day response period has elapsed.
See id.
Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292, 295 (5th Cir.1998)
on other grounds)).
(citing
(overruled
The sixty-day response period for Tarrant
County Jail to respond to plaintiff's first step grievance
expired February 21, 2014; therefore, plaintiff exhausted step
one of the grievance procedure before filing the instant
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complaint.
However, the lack of a response to plaintiff's step one
grievance does not excuse his failure to pursue step two of the
procedure.
While it is true that
~an
inmate has exhausted
administrative remedies when he follows each step of the prison
grievance process without ever having received a response from
the prison," id. at 499 (citing Underwood, 151 F.3d at 295)
(emphasis added), plaintiff here concedes that he has failed to
comply with the second step.
Therefore, it is clear from the
face of plaintiff's complaint that he has not exhausted his
administrative remedies and, thus, has failed to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.
See Carbe, 492 F.3d at 328
(citing Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 920-21)
(~[A]
court can dismiss a
case prior to service on defendants for failure to state a claim,
predicated on failure to exhaust, if the complaint itself makes
clear that the prisoner failed to exhaust."); Hicks, 370 Fed.
App'x at 498 (citing Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358
(5th Cir.2001))
(affirming dismissal of prisoner's
§
1983
complaint where the prisoner failed to file a step two grievance
after he received no response to his step one grievance, and
holding that
~failure
to pursue his grievance remedy to
conclusion constitutes a failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies.").
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B.
Failure to State a Claim for Municipal Liability
Plaintiff's claims against County should also be dismissed
because plaintiff has failed to state a claim against County for
municipal liability under§ 1983.
It is well-settled that local
government entities such as County cannot be held liable for the
acts of their employees solely on a theory of respondeat
superior.
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692
(1978).
Liability may be imposed against a local government entity
under § 1983 only "if the governmental body itself 'subjects' a
person to a deprivation of rights or 'causes' a person 'to be
subjected' to such deprivation."
Connick v. Thompson,
, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011)
692).
U.S.
(quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at
To hold County liable under § 1983 requires that plaintiff
"initially allege that an official policy or custom 'was a cause
in fact of the deprivation of rights inflicted.'"
Spiller v.
City of Texas City, Police Dept., 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir.
1997)
(quoting Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521,
525 (5th Cir.1994)).
An "[o]fficial municipal policy includes
the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its
policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and
widespread as to practically have the force of law."
131 S. Ct. at 1359.
Connick,
Therefore, liability against local
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government defendants pursuant to
§
1983 requires proof of "a
policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of
constitutional rights whose 'moving force' is the policy or
custom."
Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th
Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff's complaint against County under
§
1983 fails
because plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to state
a claim for municipal liability.
Nothing in the complaint
alleges that an official policy or custom was a cause in fact of
any deprivation of rights, nor has plaintiff identified any
responsible policymaking officials.
Therefore, plaintiff has
failed to state a claim for municipal liability against County,
and his complaint should be dismissed.
Therefore,
The court ORDERS that the above-captioned action wherein
plaintiff is Rory Dell Martin and defendant is Tarrant County be,
and is hereby, dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the authority
of 28
u.s.c. 1915A(b) .
.-....
SIGNED
June~' 2014.
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