Caudill v. USA
Filing
19
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER... the motion of Johnathon D. Caudill to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 be, and is hereby, denied... for the reasons discussed herein, the court further ORDERS that a certificate of appealability be, and is hereby, denied, as movant has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See Order for further specifics. (Ordered by Judge John McBryde on 9/1/2014) (krg)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXA
FORT WORTH DIVISION
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.
1
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
By
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
§
§
§
§
§
§
vs.
JOHNATHON D. CAUDILL
Dcpur.v
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NO. 4:14-CV-447-A
(NO. 4:11-CR-144-A)
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Came on to be considered the motion of movant, Johnathon D.
§
2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct
sentence, and a memorandum in support ("Memorandum").
government filed a response.
The
Although the court granted movant's
request for additional time in which to file a reply, he did not
do so.
Having now considered all of the parties' filings, the
entire record of this case, including the record in movant's
criminal case, and the applicable legal authorities, the court
concludes that the motion should be denied.
I.
Background
On November 18, 2011, movant pleaded guilty to one count of
enticement of a child, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§
2422(b).
I
1
MEMORANDUM OPINION
and
ORDER
Caudill, under 28 u.s.c.
!
On
March 2, 2012, the court sentenced movant to a term of
imprisonment of 180 months, to be followed by a lifetime term of
supervised release.
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed.
445 (5th Cir. 2013).
United States v. Caudill, 709 F.3d 444,
Movant filed a petition for writ of
certiorari, which the Supreme Court denied on June 24, 2013.
II.
Grounds of the Motion
Movant raised four claims.
In his first claim, movant
alleged that the court erroneously enhanced his sentence under a
"preponderance of the evidence" standard, rather than under the
correct "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, in violation of his
Sixth Amendment rights.
In his second claim, movant contended
that his due process rights were violated because he received two
conflicting probationary sentences.
Movant's third and fourth claims alleged that his attorney,
William Biggs ("Biggs"), rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel.
The third claim maintained that Biggs was deficient in
the sentencing hearing because he failed to object to the
conflicting terms of probation, while the fourth and final claim
alleged that Biggs was ineffective during the plea bargaining
process and for failing to investigate the facts and law of the
case.
As the factual basis for his first claim, as explained in
2
the Memorandum, movant contended that the court increased his
mandatory minimum sentence using facts found by the judge,
instead of the jury, in violation of Alleyne v. United States,
U.S.
,
133 S. Ct.
2151
(2013).
As the factual basis for his second claim, movant alleged
that the transcript from his sentencing hearing shows that the
court first sentenced him to a five-year term of supervised
release, but then ordered a lifetime term of supervised release.
Movant claimed that this conflict rendered the record ambiguous,
and that the "rule of leniency" favored imposing the five-year,
rather than lifetime, term of supervised release.
In describing the factual basis of his third ground for
relief, movant contended that Biggs was ineffective for failing
to object to the conflicting terms of supervised release.
Had
Biggs done so, movant maintained, the court would likely have
imposed only the five-year, and not the lifetime, term of
supervised release.
As to the fourth and final ground, movant first alleged that
his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary because Biggs
advised movant to plead guilty on the grounds that he had no
defense, he would receive additional charges if he failed to
plead guilty, and he would risk more prison time if he proceeded
3
to trial on the indictment, whereas had Biggs provided competent
advice, movant would not have pleaded guilty but would have
proceeded to trial.
As to the second part of the fourth claim, movant alleged
that Biggs was deficient for failing to bring to the attention of
the Fifth Circuit on appeal a case out of the Seventh Circuit,
Taylor v. United States, 640 F.3d 255 (7th Cir. 2011).
Movant
claimed Taylor paralleled his own case, and could have either
caused the Fifth Circuit to rule in movant's favor, or caused the
Supreme Court to grant his petition for review.
III.
Treatment of
§
2255
After conviction and exhaustion of any right to appeal,
courts are entitled to presume that a defendant stands fairly and
finally convicted.
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164
(1982); United States v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 231-32 (5th Cir.
1991)
(en bane) .
A defendant can challenge his conviction or
sentence after it is presumed final only on issues of
constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude and may not raise an
issue for the first time on collateral review without showing
both "cause" for his procedural default and "actual prejudice"
resulting from the errors.
Shaid, 937 F.2d at 232.
4
Section 2255
does not offer recourse to all who suffer trial errors, but is
reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and other
narrow injuries that could not have been raised on direct appeal
but, if condoned, would result in a complete miscarriage of
justice.
United States v. Capua, 656 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir.
Unit A Sept. 21, 1981).
IV.
None of the Grounds Has Merit
A.
First Ground for Relief
Movant's reliance on Alleyne in support of his first ground
for relief is unavailing.
Alleyne held that factors that
increase the statutory minimum must be proven to a jury.
Ct. at 2163.
133 S.
The "statutory minimum" is the minimum term of
incarceration imposed by the statute of conviction.
In movant's
case, the statute requires a term of imprisonment of "not less
than 10 years."
18 U.S.C.
§
2422(b).
In contrast, the
Sentencing Guidelines provide for an applicable range of
punishment, taking into account factors other than the offense of
conviction.
See,
~'
18 U.S.C.
§
3553; 28 U.S.C.
§
994.
Importantly, Alleyne "did not imply that the traditional
fact-finding on relevant conduct, to the extent it increases the
discretionary sentencing range for a district judge under the
5
[Sentencing] Guidelines, must now be made by jurors."
United
States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2014).
Here, movant's plea agreement and factual resume both
plainly indicate that the statutory minimum sentence was ten
years, with a maximum term of life imprisonment.
The court
further explained this at movant's rearraignment hearing, and
movant indicated he understood.
Rearraignment Tr. at 21-22.
At
movant's sentencing hearing, the court discussed the guideline
range applicable to movant.
The undersigned then sentenced
movant in the middle of the guideline range after using the
court's discretion to consider all the relevant factors.
Sentencing Tr. at 12-14.
Use of the court's discretion under the
sentencing guidelines did not trigger application of Alleyne to
movant's case.
Hinojosa, 749 F.3d at 413.
The first ground for
relief is denied.
B.
Second Ground for Relief
Where an ambiguity exists between the court's oral
pronouncement and a written judgment, the oral judgment prevails.
United State v. Kindrick, 576 F.2d 675, 676-77 (5th Cir. 1978).
Where, as alleged here, a conflict is purported to exist between
two oral sentencing statements, "the district court's intention
controls."
Id.
The sentencing judge's intent is determined
6
"both by what he said from the bench and by the terms of the
order he signed, or from his total acts."
States, 434 F.2d 11, 20 (5th Cir. 1970)
Scott v. United
(per curiam).
During the sentencing hearing, the court stated on the
record that the supervised release range was five years to life.
Movant relied on the following statement of the court during that
hearing to argue that the court intended to impose a five-year
term of supervised release:
I think a sentence of about midway in the advisory
guideline range would adequately and appropriately
address the--that, combined with a term of supervised
release of five years, and a special assessment of $100
would adequately and appropriately address the factors
the Court should consider under 18 United States Code
Section 3553(a), and that would be a sentence of 180
months imprisonment.
Sentencing Tr. at 13.
However, in pronouncing the judgment, the
court then "order[ed] that the defendant serve a term of
supervised release of life, for the remainder of his life, once
he gets out of prison."
Id. at 14.
The written judgment
subsequently reflected the lifetime term of supervised release.
As noted, when a conflict is present in the oral
pronouncement of a sentence, it is the sentencing court's
intention that controls.
During movant's sentencing hearing, the
undersigned expressed concern over the seriousness of movant's
7
conduct that formed the basis of his conviction in this action.
Id. at 13.
Consistent with that concern, at all times it was the
undersigned's intent to impose the maximum lifetime term of
supervised release upon movant's discharge from prison, and that
intent was reflected in the oral order and written judgment.
Accordingly, movant is entitled to no relief on his second
ground.
C.
Legal Standards Applicable to Claims of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel
Movant's third and fourth grounds for relief allege that
Biggs rendered ineffective assistance.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
movant must establish that counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.
466 u.s. 668, 688 (1984).
Strickland v. Washington,
To prevail on such a claim, movant
must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that
movant was prejudiced by counsel's errors.
Id. at 687.
Prejudice requires movant to show there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceedings would have been different.
Id. at 694.
In the context of a guilty plea, prejudice requires movant to
show there is a reasonable probability that, but for his
8
attorney's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty but would
have gone to trial.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
While both prongs of the Strickland test must be met to
demonstrate ineffective assistance, both need not be considered
if movant makes an insufficient showing as to one.
Id. at 687,
697.
Judicial scrutiny of this type of claim must be highly
deferential; movant must overcome a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.
Id. at 689.
The court must make "every
effort . . . to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct,
and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the
time."
Id.
Counsel should be "strongly presumed to have
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions
in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment."
Id. at
690.
Here, movant is entitled to no relief based on the alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel because he has failed to meet
the standard set forth by Strickland.
1.
Third Ground for Relief
This claim, based on Biggs's failure to object to the
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conflicting terms of supervised release during sentencing, is
meritless.
Biggs stated during the sentencing hearing that he
anticipated the court would impose a lifetime term of supervised
release.
Sentencing Tr. at 9-10.
Had Biggs objected, the
undersigned would have clarified his intention to impose a
lifetime term.
Movant cannot show he was prejudiced by any
failure to object.
2.
Fourth Ground for Relief
Movant's contention that his guilty plea was unknowing and
involuntary also fails.
Movant maintained that he was coerced
into a guilty plea because Biggs told movant he "had no defense,"
failing to plead guilty would result in additional charges, and
he risked "more time in prison" if he proceeded to trial.
at 11.
Mem.
Movant cannot establish that he was prejudiced by any of
the foregoing because he cannot show that, absent these purported
errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.
The evidence of movant's guilt was overwhelming.
Movant
apparently agreed, because the presentence report reflected that
movant notified the government of his intent to plead guilty.
Movant also received a reduction in his sentencing guidelines as
a result of his guilty plea.
As part of the plea agreement, the
government agreed not to bring additional charges against movant,
10
and none were brought.
Had movant proceeded to trial and been
found guilty--an outcome likely in light of the evidence against
him--the court would have determined movant's sentence.
Not only
would the court have retained the same concerns about movant's
conduct that resulted in a sentence in the middle of the
guideline range, but movant would have lost his reduction for
acceptance of responsibility.
Summed up, movant has failed to
show that he would have obtained a more favorable outcome had he
not pleaded guilty and proceeded to trial.
Nor can movant prevail on his claim that Biggs failed to
rely on Taylor as an affirmative defense at trial or on appeal.
Attached to the Memorandum are a series of letters exchanged
between movant and Biggs or other attorneys in the office of the
Federal Public Defender, wherein movant urged Biggs to use Taylor
in his appeal to the Fifth Circuit, and Biggs's responses.
The
responsive letters make clear that Biggs considered Taylor and
determined that the case was of no benefit to movant.
Counsel is
not required to make every argument urged by the defendant on
appeal, and nothing in the motion or the record of this case
could lead to a conclusion that movant would have prevailed on
this issue had Biggs raised it on appeal.
See United States v.
Reinhart, 357 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 2004).
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Mere disagreement
with counsel's appellate strategy does not constitute ineffective
assistance.
Additionally, as explained in the letters from Biggs, Taylor
is distinguishable from the facts of movant's case.
Not only did
Taylor involve interpretation of Indiana law, rather than Texas
law here, but the decision turned, in part, on the fact that the
defendant "neither made nor, so far as appears, attempted or
intended physical contact with the victim."
640 F.3d at 260.
Here, movant admitted in his factual resume that he "inten[ded]
to have sexual intercourse and deviate sexual intercourse with
the minor children."
Factual Resume at 3.
Hence, Taylor would
have been of no assistance even if Biggs had urged its
consideration to the Fifth Circuit.
v.
Order
Therefore,
The court ORDERS that the motion of Johnathon D. Caudill to
vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§
2255 be, and is hereby, denied.
Pursuant to Rule 22(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Rule ll(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255
Proceedings for the United States District Courts, and 28 U.S.C.
12
§
2253(c) (2), for the reasons discussed herein, the court further
ORDERS that a certificate of appealability be, and is hereby,
denied, as movant has not made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.
SIGNED September
_j__,
2014.
District
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J
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