Santillana v. Upton
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER ON REMAND: Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is conditionally GRANTED as follows: (1) Petitioner's judgment of conviction and sentence for distribution of methadone resul ting in death, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), entered by the district court for the Western District of Texas is VACATED; (2) The district court for the Western District of Texas shall enter judgment on the offense of distribution o f methadone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and resentence Petitioner within 90 days; (3) Respondent shall deliver Petitioner, who is currently confined at the federal prison camp in Bryan, Texas (FPC-Bryan), to the Western District of Texas for resentencing. (Ordered by Judge Reed C. O'Connor on 6/9/2017) (skg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
TIOFILA SANTILLANA,
Petitioner,
VS.
JODY R. UPTON, Warden,
FMC-Carswell,
Respondent.
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Civil Action No. 4:14-CV-546-O
OPINION AND ORDER ON REMAND
This habeas action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 was filed by petitioner, Tiofila Santillana,
a federal prisoner who was confined in the Federal Medical Center-Carswell (FMC-Carswell) in Fort
Worth, Texas, at the time the petition was filed, against Jody R. Upton, warden of FMC-Carswell,
Respondent. On June 3, 2015, this Court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction on the basis
that Petitioner had failed to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under § 2241 by satisfying the
requirements of the so-called “savings clause” under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). Op. and Order and Final
J., ECF Nos. 12 & 13. On January 16, 2017, the Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of dismissal and
remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration of the jurisdictional issue, having determined that
the Supreme Court decision in Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014), applies retroactively
to cases on collateral review for purposes of a “savings clause” analysis. For the following reasons,
the petition is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner is serving a 240-month term of imprisonment for her 2009 conviction in the United
States District of Texas, Western Division, Case No. 7:08-CR-153(1)-RAJ, for distribution of
methadone resulting in the death of Brandon Moore. Resp’t’s Supp. App. at 1, ECF No. 32-1.
II. DISCUSSION
By this petition, Petitioner challenges the legality of her conviction and enhanced sentence
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) by arguing that Moore’s death did not result from methadone
ingestion as required under Burrage, and instead was the result of a “mixed drug intoxication”–i.e.,
a combination of drugs. Pet. 3-5, ECF No. 1. In Burrage, the Supreme Court interpreted the “death
results” enhancement set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) and held that “at least where use of the
drug distributed by the defendant is not an independently sufficient cause of the victim’s death or
serious bodily injury, a defendant cannot be liable under the penalty enhancement provision of 21
U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C) unless such use is a but-for cause of the death or injury.” Id. at 892 (emphasis
added). Petitioner argued that because the evidence at her trial did not prove that but for the
methadone Moore would not have died, she is actually innocent of her conviction and sentence. Pet.
5, ECF No. 1
Title 28, United States Code § 2255 is the primary means under which a federal prisoner may
collaterally attack the legality of a conviction or sentence. Cox v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr., 911 F.2d
1111, 1113 (5th Cir. 1990). However, a § 2241 petition attacking a federal conviction or sentence
may be considered if the petitioner establishes that the remedy under § 2255 is inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention. Tolliver v. Dobre, 211 F.3d 876, 877 (5th Cir. 2000).
In order to meet this burden, a petitioner must show that (1) his claim is based on a retroactively
applicable Supreme Court decision, (2) his claim was foreclosed by circuit law at the time when the
claim should have been raised in his trial, appeal, or first § 2255 motion, and (3) that retroactively
applicable decision establishes that he may have been convicted of a nonexistent offense. Garland
v. Roy, 615 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2010); Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 904.
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The parties agree, and the Court finds, that these requirements have been met. Accordingly,
this Court has jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claim in the context of a § 2241 habeas petition.
Resp’t’s Supp. Mem. 3, ECF No. 31; Pet’r’s Supp. Mem. 11, ECF No. 33. The parties also agree that
Burrage renders the enhanced-penalty provision under § 841(b)(1)(C) inapplicable to Petitioner.
Resp’t’s Supp. Mem. 3-4, ECF No. 31; Pet’r’s Supp. Mem. 13-14, ECF No. 33. Thus, the only
question that remains is what is the appropriate relief under the circumstances.
The government has provided the following argument:
Burrage does not render Santillana’s conduct non-criminal. The indictment
and the jury instructions specified that Santillana was charged with violating 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) – distribution of a controlled substance (methadone) – and the
enhanced penalty portion of § 841(b)(1)(C) because Brandon Moore’s death “resulted
from” the methadone distributed by Santillana. The court instructed the jury that to
find Santillana guilty, they had to find two things had been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt: first, that Santillana had knowingly or intentionally distributed a
controlled substance to Brandon Moore on or about April 9, 2008, in the Western
District of Texas, and second, that the substance was methadone. The jury was given
separate instructions as to the elements of § 841(a)(1) and the enhanced penalty
under § 841(b)(1)(C). On the verdict form, the jurors first had to find Santillana
guilty of count one of the indictment – distribution of methadone – before they turned
to a special question regarding whether the penalty enhancement for distribution
“resulting in” death applied to Santillana. Accordingly, Burrage should not disturb
Santillana’s underlying conviction for distribution of methadone, in violation of §
841(a)(1).
...
The appropriate relief for Santillana under § 2241 is for this Court to vacate
her sentence under the penalty enhancement provision of § 841(b)(1)(C) and order
Santillana transferred to the Western District of Texas for resentencing on the
underlying § 841(a)(1) conviction. Without the “death or serious bodily injury”
penalty enhancement of § 841(b)(1)(C) in play, Santillana will face a statutory
maximum sentence of not more than 20 years’ imprisonment.
Resp’t’s Supp. Mem. 4-5, ECF No. 31 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
Similarly, Petitioner has provided the following argument:
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Under 28 U.S.C. § 2243, this Court has the authority to “dispose of the matter
as law and justice require.” Here, it is clear that the trial court’s judgment must be
vacated. Ms. Santillana cannot stand convicted of distributing methadone resulting
in death. It is at least hypothetically possible that the Court could order her retried.
But based on discussions with Government Counsel, Petitioner’s attorneys do not
believe that is what the Government wants.
A more flexible alternative would be to order a resentencing under the simple,
or unenhanced version of the offense. After all, the jury found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Ms. Santillana distributed methadone. That would save the Government
the burden of a full retrial, but it would bar the Government from invoking the
“results from” enhancement. Ms. Santillana would not object to an order vacating
her sentence as well as the conviction of the enhanced version of the offense, but
leaving in place a conviction on the “lesser included” simple offense of distribution
of methadone, so long as she would be resentenced without that enhancement.
Pet’r’s’ Supp. Mem. 14, ECF No. 33 (emphasis in original).
The arguments share a common theme, which the parties appear to embrace and the Court
finds persuasive.
III. CONCLUSION
Therefore, Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is
conditionally GRANTED as follows:
(1)
Petitioner’s judgment of conviction and sentence for distribution of
methadone resulting in death, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C),
entered by the district court for the Western District of Texas is VACATED;
(2)
The district court for the Western District of Texas shall enter judgment on
the offense of distribution of methadone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1), and resentence Petitioner within 90 days;
(3)
Respondent shall deliver Petitioner, who is currently confined at the federal
prison camp in Bryan, Texas (FPC-Bryan), to the Western District of Texas
for resentencing.
SO ORDERED on this 9th day of June, 2017.
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Reed O’Connor
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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