smith v. Watkins et al
Filing
9
Memorandum Opinion and Order: The court has concluded that the action should be dismissed because it is frivolous and malicious as those terms are used in 2 8 U. S. C. § 1915A (b) ( 1). The court ORDERS that the above-captioned action, and all claims and causes of action that purport to be asserted therein by Weast, be, and are hereby, dismissed. (Ordered by Judge John McBryde on 9/2/2014) (mem)
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JAMES JOSEPH SMITH,
CLERK, U.S. DISI'RiCT CO U!.fT
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Plaintiff,
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RANDY WATKINS, ET AL.,
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Defendants.
NO. 4:14-CV-710-A
MEMORANDUM OPINION
and
ORDER
The above-captioned action was filed in the District Court
of Tarrant County, Texas, 348th Judicial District, on August 1,
2014, by Christopher Robert Weast
James Joseph Smith.
("Weast")
1
,
using the alias
It was removed to this court by notice of
removal filed August 27, 2014, by Angela Saad ("Saad"),
Christopher Curtis ("Curtis"), and Peter Fleury ("Fleury") . 2
The court has concluded that the action should be dismissed
because it is frivolous and malicious as those terms are used in
2 8 U. S . C .
§
1915A (b) ( 1) .
1
As originally prepared in typewritten form, the plaintiff was identified as "Chris Robert" in the
style and by the name "Robert" or "Chris Robert" throughout the body of the pleading. As filed, the
name Chris Robert was marked through in the style and throughout the body and the name Robert was
marked through throughout the body, and by handwritten interlineation "James Joseph Smith" replaced
the name Chris Robert each time it appeared in the pleading and the name "Smith" replaced the name
Robert each time it appeared in the pleading. The pleading is unsigned. Below the line for a signature
on the last page of the pleading the name Chris Robert appears in typewritten form, but has been marked
through and replaced by the handwritten name "James Joseph Smith."
2
The court considers that Saad is the only removing party because she is the only named
defendant. Apparently Curtis and Fleury joined in the notice of removal because Weast, for some
inexplicable reason, arranged for them to be served with process.
--·'
I .
Weast's Criminal Conviction
Weast is a defendant in a criminal case pending before this
court in which he was found guilty by a jury on July 29, 2014, of
two child pornography offenses.
He currently is in federal
custody awaiting sentencing, which is scheduled to be conducted
on November 14, 2014.
II.
Weast's Pleading
A.
Defendants Named by Weast
The defendants named in Weast's pleading are:
Randy Watkins, a detective with the Fort Worth Police
Department who played a role in the investigation that
developed the facts that led to Weast's conviction of the
child pornography offenses, played a role in execution of a
search warrant through which the child pornography in
Weast's possession was found, and testified as a witness at
Weast's criminal trial;
J. Thomson, a detective with the Fort Worth Police
Department who participated in the execution of the search
warrant;
S. Murray, a detective with the Fort Worth Police
Department who participated in the execution of the search
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warrant and who testified as a witness at Weast's criminal
trial;
Simon Gonzalez, the official who, according to the
allegations, issued the search warrant;
D.J. Scott, and M. King, each of whom, according to the
allegations, is a law enforcement officer who participated
in the arrest, by execution of an arrest warrant, of Weast
once he was charged with child pornography offenses;
Aisha Saleem ("Saleem"), an Assistant United States
Attorney, who was the prosecutor in Weast's criminal case;
Jeffrey Cureton, the United States Magistrate Judge who
handled preliminary proceedings in the child pornography
criminal case against Weast, and upon referral from United
States District Judge Terry Means handled other pretrial
matters in the criminal case;
Terry Means, the United States District Judge who
presided over the criminal case against Weast from the time
it was initiated in mid-February 2014 until the case was
transferred to the undersigned on May 22, 2014;
The undersigned, the United States District Judge who
has been presiding over Weast's criminal case since it was
transferred to the undersigned on May 22, 2014;
3
Saad, an Assistant Federal Public Defender in the
Office of the Federal Public Defender for the Northern
District of Texas who has provided representation to Weast
in his criminal case, first as the assigned assistant when
Judge Cureton appointed the Federal Public Defender to
represent Weast, and again when the undersigned reappointed
the Federal Public Defender to represent Weast.
B.
Nature of Weast's Claims
Weast's alleged complaints against each defendant relate to
that defendant's participation in the investigation, prosecution,
or adjudication of the criminal conduct of which the jury found
Weast guilty on July 29, 2014.
C.
Relief Sought by Weast
As relief, Weast seeks by his pleading an order terminating
his confinement at the federal corrections institution located in
Fort Worth and terminating all proceedings against him; dismissal
of all warrants, petitions, and orders related to him; general
damages of ten million dollars, special damages of one million
dollars, treble damages of seven million dollars, and costs and
all reasonable attorney's fees at trial and in the appellate
courts, together with all costs of investigation and litigation
reasonably incurred by Weast.
4
III.
Section 1915A Screening
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) directs that in a case such as
. as soon as practicable after
this "[t]he court shall review .
docketing[] a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner
seeks redress from a government entity or officer or employee of
a government entity."
Section 1915A(b) provides that "[o]n
dismiss the complaint . . . if
review, the court shall
the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious."
IV.
Weast's Claims are Frivolous
A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in
either law or fact.
1994).
Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 281 (5th Cir.
"A complaint is legally frivolous if it is premised on an
indisputably meritless legal theory."
quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 281-82
(internal
Having conducted the required review,
the court has concluded that all claims and causes of action
Weast purports to assert in his pleading are frivolous.
All claims and causes of action Weast purports to assert
against Judge Means, Judge Cureton, the undersigned, and Saleem
are barred by the doctrine of absolute immunity.
Id. at 284-85;
see also Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 317-18 (5th Cir. 1993).
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All of Weast's purported claims and causes of action are
barred by the principles announced by the Supreme Court in Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 {1994), in which the Supreme Court
explained:
We hold that, in order to recover damages for
allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment,
or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness
would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence
has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus, 28 u.s.c. § 2254. A claim for damages
bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence
that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable
under§ 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks
damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must
consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must
be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that
the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated.
Id. at 486-87. 3
The purported claims and causes of action asserted by Weast
would, if successful, necessarily imply the invalidity of his
3
Heck can be distinguished from Weast's lawsuit because Heck involved a§ 1983 plaintiff.
Here, Weast's purported claims are not under§ 1983 but probably would best be characterized as claims
brought under the authority of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Fifth
Circuit has held that "a federal prisoner's Bivens type action which implicated his conviction should
parallel the analysis used to evaluate state prisoner's § 1983 claims." Stephenson v. Reno, 28 F.3d 26, 27
(5th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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conviction for child pornography offenses.
Therefore, he cannot
proceed in the instant action. 4
v.
Weast's Claims Are Malicious
Not only is the instant action frivolous, but it is
malicious within the meaning of
§
1915A(b} (1).
The filing of
this action by Weast was an intentional, wrongful act done
willfully and intentionally without legal justification or
excuse.
It is but a continuation of a course of conduct of Weast
to obstruct the progress of the criminal case against him by,
among other activities, harassment and attempted intimidation of
everyone involved in the investigation, prosecution, or other
handling of the criminal case.
By way of examples:
Weast twice filed in his criminal case what he
characterized as a counterclaim against Saleem.
This is the second civil action Weast has filed against
the undersigned and Saleem.
The first was filed in the
District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, 96th Judicial
District, on June 10, 2014.
That action was removed by
4
0n the date of the signing of this memorandum opinion and order one of the named defendants,
J. Thomson, filed his eight-page answer to Weast's pleading in which he alleged twelve affirmative
defenses. The court does not mean to suggest by anything said in this memorandum opinion and order
that other defenses are not legally available in response to Weast's purported claims and causes of action.
For the sake of brevity, the court has limited its discussions in this memorandum opinion and order to the
defenses of absolute immunity and Heck, both of which are apparent from the face of Weast's pleading.
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Saleem to this court, when it was randomly assigned to the
undersigned.
The action was dismissed by the court, acting
through the undersigned, on August 12, 2014.
The understanding of the court is that Weast has filed
grievances with the State Bar of Texas against Saad, Curtis,
and Fleury, which were promptly dismissed.
The papers in Weast's criminal case disclose that Weast
has aggressively sought to disrupt his criminal proceedings.
The court adopts by reference the order signed July 15,
2014, in Weast's criminal case as a demonstration of the
extent to which Weast has engaged in disruptive, harassing,
and intimidating behavior in an effort to derail his
criminal prosecution.
Order (Doc. 125).
Case No. 4:14-CR-023-A, July 15, 2014
The court also adopts by reference as
further demonstrating the intent and goal of Weast in his
ongoing legal actions against those involved in his criminal
case the order the court signed July 23, 2014.
Id., July
23, 2014 Order (Doc. 161).
As the July 15 and July 23, 2014 orders in Weast's criminal
case disclose, a part of Weast's disruptive conduct has been the
repeated filings by Weast in his criminal case under various
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names 5 of handwritten documents that cannot have had any possible
goal other than to disrupt the criminal proceeding and harass or
intimidate those involved.
The July 15 and July 23, 2014 orders
provide a general description of Weast's filings through July 22,
2014.
Since that date, Weast has made twenty-six more filings of
a similar nature in his criminal case.
For the reasons stated above, the court is dismissing the
above-captioned action in its entirety.
VI.
Recusal Would Not Be Appropriate
A final matter to consider is the request in the notice of
removal that the clerk's office assign the removed case to Judge
O'Connor inasmuch as the undersigned, Judge Means, and Judge
Cureton are named as defendants.
The clerk of court quite
properly did not abide by that request, but, instead, complied
with the court's routine case assignment procedures by making a
random assignment that caused the case to end up on the
undersigned's docket.
The undersigned has considered whether there is any reason
why the undersigned should recuse in this action.
5
In reaching
Names Weast has used in his handwritten filings in his criminal case are "Christopher Robert
Weast," "Chris Weast," "Chris Robert," "James Joseph Smith," "James Joseph," "James," and, most
recently, "James Ali."
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the decision not to recuse, the undersigned is mindful of the
principle that "[t]here is as much obligation for a judge not to
recuse when there is no occasion for him to do so as there is for
him to do so when there is."
985, 994 (lOth Cir. 1993)
United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Also, the undersigned is giving effect to the principles
that:
"absolute immunity is properly viewed as immunity from
suit rather than a mere defense to liability,"
Boyd, 31 F.3d at
284 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted); "immunity
[is] a threshold question, to be resolved as early in the
proceedings as possible"; and "the essence of absolute immunity
is its possessor's entitlement not to have to answer for his
conduct in a civil damage action," id.
(internal quotation marks
omitted) .
In Graves, the Fifth Circuit held that "[a] claim is based
upon an indisputably meritless legal theory if the defendants are
immune from suit."
1 F.3d at 317.
Thus, as a matter of law, the
undersigned should not be a defendant in this lawsuit, and the
decision of the undersigned not to recuse cannot have any legal
bearing on the undersigned's potential liability inasmuch as it
is indisputable that there is no potential that the undersigned
has any liability.
The ruling of the court as to the other
defendants has not been influenced by the fact that the
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undersigned is named as a defendant.
If the undersigned were to
recuse, as a matter of law the rulings of the replacement judge
would have to be the same as the undersigned's.
If the undersigned were to recuse,
judicial resources would
be wasted by the reassignment of this action to another judge.
This undoubtedly would serve as something of a reward to Weast
for his inappropriate litigation conduct.
The Fifth Circuit has
made clear that a judge is not disqualified because a litigant
sues the judge.
See Matter of Hipp, Inc., 5 F.3d 109, 116 {5th
Cir. 1993); see also Olsen v. Wainwright, 565 F.2d 906, 907 {5th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Grismore, 564 F.2d 929, 933 {5th
Cir. 1977)
{stating that "[a]
judge is not disqualified merely
because a litigant sues or threatens to sue him").
VII.
ORDER
Consistent with the foregoing,
The court ORDERS that the above-captioned action, and all
claims and causes of action that purport to be asserted therein
by Weast, be, and are hereby, dismissed.
SIGNED September 2, 2014.
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