Brooks v. Chandler

Filing 5

Memorandum Opinion and Order. The court ORDERS that the petition of Auntrell Brooks for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 be, and is hereby, dismissed. (see order for specifics) (Ordered by Judge John McBryde on 11/5/2014) (mpw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXA
FORT WORTH DIVISION
AUNTRELL BROOKS,

§
§

Petitioner,

§
§

vs.

§

NO. 4:14-CV-875-A

§

RODNEY CHANDLER, WARDEN,

§
§

Respondent.

§

MEMORANDUM OPINION
and
ORDER
Came on for consideration the petition of Auntrell Brooks
for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

2241.

Rodney

Chandler, Warden at FCI-Fort Worth, is named as respondent.
The court must order a respondent to show cause why a petition
pursuant to

§

2241 should not be granted "unless it appears from

the [petition] that the [petitioner] or person detained is not
entitled thereto."

28 U.S.C.

§

2243.

Having now considered the

petition and the applicable legal authorities, the court
concludes that it appears from the face of the petition that
petitioner is entitled to no relief.
I.

Analysis
A.

Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Much of the petition appears to be a boilerplate form that

devotes several pages to a general discussion of the Second

Chance Act, 18 U.S.C.

§

3624(c), but appears to contain few

factual allegations pertinent to petitioner.

Petitioner asks the

court to order respondent to immediately consider him for
placement in a residential reentry center so.he may be eligible
for the full twelve months' placement allowed by the Second
Chance Act.
A prisoner seeking habeas relief pursuant to

§

2241 must

exhaust all administrative remedies that might provide
appropriate relief.
1994)
1993).

See Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir.

(per curiam); Rourke v. Thompson, 11 F.3d 47, 49 (5th Cir.
The Bureau of Prisons has established a three-tiered

Administrative Remedy Program ("Program") governing formal review
of inmate complaints relating to any aspect of imprisonment.
C.F.R.

§§

542.10 et seq.

28

A prisoner must pursue the procedures

set forth in the Program prior to seeking relief in district
court.

Rourke, 11 F.3d at 49.

These procedures, in turn,

generally require the prisoner first to attempt informal
resolution through a complaint to Bureau of Prisons staff; if not
satisfied with the result, he or she must file a formal written
complaint to the Warden, then pursue an administrative appeal to
the appropriate Bureau of Prisons Regional Director.
§§

28 C.F.R.

542.13-.15. The final appeal is to the Bureau of Prisons's

2

Office of General Counsel, "within 30 calendar days of the date
the Regional Director signed the response."

Id. at 542.15(a).

"Exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are appropriate
where the available administrative remedies either are
unavailable or wholly inappropriate to the relief sought, or
where the attempt to exhaust such remedies would itself be a
patently futile course of action."
(internal citations omitted) .

Fuller, 11 F.3d at 62

Exceptions may be made to the

exhaustion requirement only in "extraordinary circumstances,"
which the petitioner bears the burden to establish.

Id.

Here, petitioner asks that he be excused from exhausting
administrative remedies due to futility.

According to

petitioner, the director of the Bureau of Prisons, Harley Lappin
("Lappin"), "has taken a strong position on the issue [of
allowing prisoners more than six months in a residential reentry
center] and has thus far been unwilling to reconsider."
11.

Pet. at

Petitioner cites no facts to support this statement, and the

cases cited in support predate, and are unrelated to, the Second
Chance Act.
(1969)

See,

~,

McKart v. united States, 395 U.S. 185

(discussion of exhaustion requirement 'in context of appeal

of Selective Service classification); Aron v. LaManna, 4 F. App'x
232 (6th Cir. Feb. 6, 2001)

(requiring exhaustion of

administrative remedies before prisoner brought petition under 28
3

U.S.C.

§

2241 to recover good-time credits); Gutierrez v. United

States, No. 03-CV-1232(FB), 2003 WL 21521759 (E.D.N.Y. July 3,
2003)

(requiring prisoner to exhaust administrative remedies).
Petitioner indicated that his projected'release date is May

22, 2016.

Ample time remains for petitioner to engage in the

administrative remedy process.

Although petitioner obviously

believes the Bureau of Prisons will deny his request, he has
offered no factual basis in the petition to support that belief.
While exhaustion of remedies may take time, "there is no reason
to assume that . . . prison administrators . . . will not act
expeditiously."
(1973).

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494-95

If the Bureau of Prisons has failed.in some way to

correctly evaluate petitioner for placement in a residential
reentry center, it should be afforded the opportunity to rectify
the error.
1991)

See Smith v. Thompson, 937 F.2d 217, 219 (5th Cir.

(agency should be given opportunity to correct its own

error before aggrieved party seeks judicial intervention) .
Petitioner gave no indication in the petition that he has
even attempted to begin the administrative remedy process, and he
has presented nothing, other than speculation, to support his
contention that he should be excused from exhausting those
remedies.

Petitioner has provided nothing to show the type of

extraordinary circumstances needed to justify failure to exhaust
4

administrative remedies, and dismissal is warranted on that
basis.

See Rivkin v. Tamez, 351 F. App'x 876, 877-78 (5th Cir.

2009) 1 (per curiam)

(affirming dismissal of prisoner's

§

2241

petition arguing violation of the Second Chance Act for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies) .
B.

The Petition Fails on the Merits
Even if the court were to excuse petitioner's failure to

exhaust administrative remedies, the petition would still fail on
the merits.
The Second Chance Act of 2007 amended 18 U.S.C.

§

3624(c) to

increase possible placement in a residential reentry center to a
period of no more than twelve months prior to the prisoner's
projected release date.

The amendment also requires the Bureau

of Prisons to assess prisoners for placement on an individual
basis consistent with the five factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
3621(b).

The duration of residential reentry placement

~is

§

a

matter as to which the [Bureau of Prisons] retains discretionary
authority," and

~nothing

in the Second Chance Act or

§

3621(b)

entitles [petitioner] or any other prisoner to guaranteed
placement in a residential reentry center."

1

Creager v. Chapman,

The court recognizes that this unpublished opinion is not binding precedent. Nevertheless, the
court finds its holding instructive in the instant action.

5

No. 4:09-CV-713-A, 2010 WL 1062610, at *3 (N,D. Tex. Mar. 22,
2010)

(alterations in original)

(citing various cases) .

The petition appears to be primarily comprised of lengthy
recitations to program statements issued by the Bureau of Prisons
and other background information pertaining to the Second Chance
Act, and includes broad allegations that the Bureau of Prisons
generally does not properly implement the Second Chance Act.
Absent from the petition, however, are any facts to show how, or
if, such violations have affected petitionerw nor does petitioner
even allege the Bureau of Prisons has failed or refused to
evaluate him for placement in a residential reentry center, or
that he received an assessment with which he is dissatisfied.
Accordingly, the court finds nothing in the petition as would
entitle petitioner to relief.
II.
Order
Therefore,
The court ORDERS that the petition of Auntrell Brooks for
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
hereby, dismissed.
SIGNED November 5, 2014.

6

u.s.c.

§

2241 be, and is