Gonzalez v. Neal et al

Filing 18

OPINION and ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(B) and UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)... all of Plaintiffs claims in this case, except Plaintiffs claims against defendant Neal related to the seizure and loss of his truck/personal property, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE to their being asserted again until the Heck v. Humphrey conditions are met, under authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2)(B)(i) and (ii). (Ordered by Senior Judge Terry R Means on 11/16/2016) (wxc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
JULIAN GONZALEZ,
V.
SHANE NEAL, State Trooper,
Texas Department of
Public Safety

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§
§
§
§
§
§

CIVIL ACTION 4:15-CV-021-Y

OPINION and ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§
1915A(B) and UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
This case is before the Court for review of pro-se inmate and
plaintiff Julian Gonzalez’s pleadings under the screening provisions
of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B). Gonzalez, an inmate at the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Gib Lewis Unit, initially
filed a handwritten complaint, and later in response to Court
orders, a form civil-rights complaint and a more definite statement.
Gonzalez does not challenge anything about his present confinement.
Instead, Gonzalez raises several challenges to the actions of Texas
Department of Public Safety Officer Shane Neal arising from an April
2013

traffic

stop,

and

Gonzalez’s

subsequent

arrest

and

his

resulting conviction.1 (Compl. (doc. 1); Supplemental Compl. (doc.
9); More Definite Statement (MDS) (doc. 15)).
The claims arise from events that took place on April 17, 2013.
Gonzalez alleges Officer Neal stopped and detained him for a failure
to wear a seat belt, and then asked Gonzalez to empty his pockets,
at which time “the drugs fell out of my pants,” resulting in
1

Although Plaintiff initially named the Texas Department of Public Safety
as a defendant, he subsequently moved to dismiss such defendant, and the Texas
Department of Public Safety was dismissed by order and Rule 54(b) judgment
entered September 4, 2015.

Gonzalez’s arrest. (Compl. (doc. 1) at 2.) Although Plaintiff
acknowledges he was indicted and convicted in “cause number SR 12512
in the 355th Judicial District Court of Hood County, Texas,” he does
not list the charge, conviction, and sentence.(MDS, doc. 15, at 3.)
But Gonzalez pleaded guilty and was convicted in cause number
CR12512 in the 355th Judicial District Court, Hood County, Texas on
February 14, 2014, of manufacture or delivery of a controlled
substance in penalty group 1--more than 4 grams but less than 200
grams--and sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment.2
In this case, Gonzalez contends that Officer Neal violated his
rights under the Fourth Amendment by detaining and seizing him
without probable cause. (MDS (doc. 15, at 1.) Gonzalez also contends
that his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection of law and
due process of law were violated because he believes he was stopped
and detained beyond the time necessary to review a seat-belt
violation only because he was a “Mexican.” (MDS (doc. 15) at 1.)
Gonzalez also alleges his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were
violated due to the alleged illegal search and seizure of drugs, the
officer’s improper questioning of him, and the use of illegally
seized evidence to convict him. (Compl. (doc. 1), at 4.) Gonzalez
also complains of and alleges that his right to due process of law
was violated when his truck and items of personal property were

2

The Court takes judicial notice of the public information obtained from
the records of the Hood County District Clerk regarding Case No. 12512. See
https://txhoododyprod.tylerhost.net/PublicAcesss/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=24988;
see also Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2) and (c)(1).

2

seized and never returned. (MDS (doc. 15) at 1,7.) Gonzalez seeks
compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory and
injunctive relief. (Compl. (doc. 1) at 5.)
A complaint filed in forma pauperis that lacks an arguable
basis in law should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B),
a district court retains broad discretion in determining at any time
whether an in-forma-pauperis claim should be dismissed.

See 28

U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2) (West 2006); see Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d
383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996). Section 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) requires
dismissal not only when an allegation of poverty is untrue or the
action is frivolous or malicious, but also when “the action . .

.

fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(A) and (B) (West 2006). Furthermore, as a
part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Congress enacted
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to review a complaint
from a prisoner seeking relief from a governmental entity or
governmental

officer

or

employee

as

soon

as

possible

after

docketing. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A(a)(West 2006). Consistent with
§ 1915A is prior case law recognizing that a district court is not
required to await a responsive pleading to conduct its § 1915
inquiry. See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995).
Rather, § 1915 gives judges the power to “dismiss a claim based on
an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. (citing Neitzke, 490
3

U.S. at 327.) After review of Gonzalez’s pleadings under these
standards, the Court concludes that all of Plaintiff’s claims must
be dismissed except those related to the seizure of property.
With regard to Plaintiff’s claims related to the lawfulness of
his detention, search, seizure of drugs, and use of drugs as
evidence to convict him, the Court concludes that such claims are
not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is seeking relief
from this Court against Texas State Trooper Neal over actions
related to the validity of his arrest and his conviction in state
court.

Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), the

Supreme Court determined that a plaintiff who has been convicted of
a crime cannot recover damages for an alleged violation of his
constitutional rights if that violation arose from the same facts
attendant to the charge for which he was convicted, unless he proves
“‘that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. Although the Heck opinion involved a bar
to

claims

for

monetary

damages,

a

dismissal

of

a

claim

for

injunctive and/or declaratory relief may also be made pursuant to
Heck. See Reger v. Walker, 312 F. App’x. 624, 625 (5th Cir.
2009)(noting

that

claims,

“whether

for

damages,

declaratory

judgment, or injunctive relief” are not cognizable in a § 1983
4

action because they imply the invalidity of conviction); see also
Clarke v. Stadler, 154 F.3d 186, 190-91 (5th Cir. 1998)(en banc)
(holding that a claim for prospective injunctive relief that would
imply the invalidity of a prisoner’s conviction may be dismissed
without prejudice subject to the rule of Heck v. Humphrey).
Gonzalez asserts several distinct claims based upon the alleged
violation of different constitutional rights. But all of his claims
under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments relating to
whether defendant Neal had probable cause, selectively detained him,
illegally searched him and seized evidence, and related that
evidence as a basis to convict him, must be dismissed. All of these
claims arise from and are based upon fact allegations interrelated
to the drug-possession charge for which Gonzalez was convicted. In
this regard, Gonzalez acknowledges that his appointed criminal
counsel filed a motion to suppress during the state criminal
proceedings, and that the motion was denied. (MDS (doc. 15) at 4-5.)
Because

all

successful,

of

such

would

claims

necessarily

by

Gonzalez

undermine

in
the

this

action,

validity

of

if
his

controlled-substance conviction, and because he has not shown that
the conviction has been reversed or set aside, his claims for
damages and declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
are not cognizable under Heck v. Humphrey, and must be dismissed.
See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487-88; see generally Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d
90, 94 (5th Cir. 1995) (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims
5

challenging search and seizure barred by Heck); Dailey v. Middleton,
et al., No. 6:13-CV-485, 2013 WL 5353035, at *1-2 (E.D. Tex. Sep.
245, 2013) (Plaintiff’s claim that he was subjected to a violation
of his right to equal protection barred by Heck); Huynh and Nyuyen
v. City of Houston, Texas, et al., No. H-10-1303, 2011 WL 6250792,
at #6 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2011) (“Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim for
selective application of law based upon either their race, national
origin, or religion, in violation of their equal protection rights,
would necessarily impugn their conviction on the citation . . . and
thus is barred by the ‘favorable termination rule’ announced by the
Supreme Court in Heck v. Humphrey”)(internal citation and footnote
omitted).
Plaintiff also has a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment that
defendant

Neal

improperly

seized

his

truck

and

his

personal

property. It is unclear from the instant pleadings whether the truck
was the subject of a forfeiture proceeding to which Plaintiff was
a party, and whether the seizure of Plaintiff’s truck and other
personal

property

would

be

the

subject

to

the

Parrat/Hudson

doctrine.3 Thus, at this time, Plaintiff Gonzalez’s remaining claim
3

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that no State shall
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. Under the Parrat/Hudson doctrine, a random and
unauthorized intentional deprivation of property does not give rise to a
violation of the Due Process Clause if the state provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy.See Myers v. Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91, 94 (5th Cir.
1996)(discussing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527
(1981) and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1983), as dictating that a state
actor’s random and unauthorized deprivation of property does not result in a
violation of procedural due process if the state provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy, and explaining “the doctrine protects the state from

6

against defendant Neal for the seizure of his truck and personal
property remains pending before the Court.4
Therefore, all of Plaintiff’s claims in this case, except
Plaintiff’s claims against defendant Neal related to the seizure and
loss of his truck/personal property, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
to their being asserted again until the Heck v. Humphrey conditions
are met, under authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e) (2)(B)(i) and (ii).5
SIGNED November 16, 2016.

____________________________
TERRY R. MEANS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

liability for failing to provide a predeprivation process in situations where it
cannot anticipate the random and unauthorized actions of its officers.”) But in
several cases arising from § 1983 challenges to seizure of property, courts have
held the claim was not necessarily barred by such doctrine. See generally
Alexander v. Ieyoub, 62 F.3d 709, 712-13 (5th Cir. 1995) (challenge to seizure
of automobile not barred by Parrat/Hudson doctrine); Lacy v. Thaler, No. 1240792, 2012 WL 59142561, at *1 (5th Cir. Nov. 16, 2012); Eaves v. Texas, 427 F.
App’x 378, 379-80 (5th Cir. 2011).
4

By separate order, the Court will allow Plaintiff to obtain service of
process of this lone remaining claim against defendant Neal.
5

See Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996).

7