Bridgeforth v. Stephens

Filing 25

OPINION AND ORDER: For the reasons discussed, the Court DENIES Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and DENIES a certificate of appealability. (Ordered by Senior Judge Terry R Means on 6/20/2016) (tln)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
ISIDORE BRIDGEFORTH,
Petitioner,
v.
LORIE DAVIS, Director,1
Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Correctional
Institutions Division,
Respondent.

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Civil Action No. 4:15-CV-146-Y

OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus
pursuant

to

28

U.S.C.

§

2254

filed

by

petitioner,

Isidore

Bridgeforth, a state prisoner, against Lorie Davis, director of the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division, Respondent.
After having considered the pleadings and relief sought by
Petitioner, the Court has concluded that the petition should be
denied.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In January 2010 Petitioner was indicted in the 29th Judicial
District Court, Palo Pinto County, Texas, Case No. 14276C, for
engaging in organized criminal activity by conspiring to commit the
offense of possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, with

1

Effective May 4, 2016, Lorie Davis replaced William Stephens as director
of the Correctional Institutions Division of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Davis is
automatically substituted as the party of record.

intent to deliver. (Adm. R., Clerk’s R. 1-2, ECF No. 9-6.) On
November 4, 2010, a jury found Petitioner guilty of the offense,
and the trial court assessed his punishment at thirty-five years’
confinement and a $10,000 fine. (Id. at 60-61.) Petitioner appealed
his conviction, but the Eleventh Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed
the trial court’s judgment and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
dismissed his petition for discretionary review as untimely. (Id.,
Mem. Op., ECF No. 9-2.) Petitioner also sought state postconviction
habeas relief to no avail. (Id. Supp. Clerk’s R., Writ 3 & Action
Taken, ECF Nos. 10-8 & 10-1, respectively.2) This federal habeas
petition followed.
The state appellate court set out the facts of the case as
follows:
Texas Ranger Michael Don Stoner worked as a
narcotics agent in Palo Pinto and Parker Counties in the
fall of 2009 for the Criminal Investigation Division of
the Texas Department of Public Safety. While working
undercover on September 11, 2009, he entered Jackie Lynn
Smith’s residence to purchase narcotics. Ranger Stoner
encountered Robert Earl Jefferson Jr. at Smith’s
residence. Ranger Stoner sought to purchase $200 worth of
crack cocaine from Jefferson. Ranger Stoner testified
that, while he and Jefferson were completing the
transaction, Jefferson recognized him as a former
classmate from high school. Ranger Stoner and Jefferson
had a discussion away from the others wherein Ranger
Stoner asked Jefferson not to reveal his identity to the
others. Ranger Stoner also asked Jefferson to contact him
later for the purpose of getting Jefferson to assist
Ranger Stoner in his investigation.

2
These state records are not paginated; thus, the pagination in the ECF
header is used.

2

Jefferson contacted Ranger Stoner on November 13,
2009, to provide information about the distribution of
crack cocaine in the Mineral Wells area. Ranger Stoner
testified that Jefferson provided him with the names of
the individuals involved. Jefferson also identified the
vehicles used in the distribution process, and he
informed Ranger Stoner that the drugs were being obtained
in Fort Worth. Jefferson also told Ranger Stoner the
route that the suspects would take to and from Fort
Worth.
Jefferson subsequently contacted Ranger Stoner on
November 16, 2009, to inform him that Smith, [A]ppellant,
and Brian Dukes would be going that day to purchase
cocaine in Fort Worth. Jefferson further advised Ranger
Stoner that the suspects would be driving a maroon Dodge
pickup. Upon receiving this information, Ranger Stoner
set up surveillance on Smith’s residence in Mineral
Wells. He observed [A]ppellant and Dukes loading Smith
into the Dodge pickup that Jefferson had described.
Ranger Stoner knew [A]ppellant and Smith on sight. Smith
needed their assistance getting into the vehicle because
he was handicapped.
Ranger Stoner and two other undercover narcotics
agents conducted “moving surveillance” on Smith,
[A]ppellant, and Dukes as they first ran some errands in
Mineral Wells. The suspects then exited Mineral Wells on
FM 1195 driving through Millsap to Interstate 20 and then
to Fort Worth. After making several stops in Fort Worth,
the suspects drove to a residence on Harlem Street in
Fort Worth. Ranger Stoner testified that the residence
belonged to Wayne Edward Allen. He observed [A]ppellant
and Dukes meeting with Allen in his front yard.
The agents lost surveillance of Smith, [A]ppellant,
and Dukes afterwards. Based upon information provided by
Jefferson, Ranger Stoner and the agents drove back toward
Mineral Wells on Interstate 20 in an attempt to
reestablish surveillance. Ranger Stoner observed the
Dodge pickup near the Brock exit. Ranger Stoner passed
the suspects in the process of catching up to them. He
observed [A]ppellant driving the pickup. Ranger Stoner
exited Interstate 20 via the Brock exit, and the suspects
did as well. While Ranger Stoner proceeded toward
Millsap, the suspects turned onto Fairview Road. Ranger
Stoner dispatched another agent to follow the suspects.

3

Appellant subsequently failed to negotiate a curve
on Fairview Road, resulting in the pickup striking a
tree. When agents arrived on the scene of the accident,
[A]ppellant and Dukes were standing outside the pickup.
Agents found a crack pipe in a nearby ditch and a rock of
crack cocaine in the bed of the pickup near the area
where appellant was standing. While agents arrested
[A]ppellant for possession, Ranger Stoner spoke with
Dukes away from the others. Dukes told Ranger Stoner that
the group had acquired drugs in Fort Worth. Dukes also
voluntarily removed a package containing crack cocaine
from his sweatpants and gave it to Ranger Stoner. Ranger
Stoner did not arrest Dukes at that time. Agents also did
not
arrest
Smith.
Instead,
ambulance
personnel
transported Smith to the hospital for evaluation.
Dukes came to see Ranger Stoner on November 17,
2009, to be interviewed. Dukes agreed at that time to
inform Ranger Stoner if anyone affiliated with Smith
returned to Fort Worth for more drugs. Dukes called
Ranger Stoner on November 19, 2009, to tell him that a
group planned to return that day to Fort Worth for more
drugs. Ranger Stoner established surveillance on Smith’s
residence at that time. He subsequently observed Billy
Ray Herring loading Smith into a white Dodge pickup.
Ranger Stoner also observed Wilbert Ratliff accompanying
Smith and Herring in the pickup.
Ranger Stoner and other agents followed the
suspects’ vehicle to Fort Worth. They observed the
suspects pulling into a church parking lot near Allen’s
residence. While Herring looked under the hood of the
pickup, Ratliff walked across the street to Allen’s
house. Ranger Stoner testified that Ratliff was observed
meeting with Allen. After Ratliff walked back to the
pickup, the suspects drove back to Mineral Wells with
Ranger Stoner and the agents following them.
As the suspects entered Mineral Wells, Ranger Stoner
requested State Trooper Donnie Wright and Mineral Wells
Police Officer Scott Mitcham to stop them. Trooper Wright
stopped the vehicle for speeding. Trooper Wright
initially spoke with Herring outside the vehicle. Trooper
Wright subsequently removed Ratliff from the vehicle.
Trooper Wright made the decision to arrest Ratliff when
he found a crack pipe on him. As Trooper Wright was
handcuffing Ratliff, Ratliff threw a baggie of crack
cocaine into a nearby ditch. Trooper Wright permitted
4

Herring and Smith to leave, and he transported Ratliff to
the DPS office for Ranger Stoner to interview him.
Ratliff told Ranger Stoner that the drugs that he threw
in the ditch came from Allen.
Ranger Stoner described Allen’s role in the
organization as the supplier of the crack cocaine. Ranger
Stoner testified that Smith served as the connection to
the source and supply. Smith also orchestrated the
transport of crack cocaine from Fort Worth and its
distribution in Mineral Wells. Ranger Stoner described
the roles of [A]ppellant, Ratliff, Dukes, Herring, and
Jefferson
as
assisting
with
the
transport
and
distribution of crack cocaine in Mineral Wells. Ranger
Stoner testified that the maroon Dodge pickup in which
[A]ppellant, Dukes, and Smith traveled on November 16
belonged to Allen and that Allen provided it to Smith to
use in traveling back and forth between Mineral Wells and
Fort Worth.
Jefferson testified that Allen initially delivered
cocaine to Smith at his residence in Mineral Wells and
that he did so often. Jefferson also testified that Allen
provided Smith with the maroon Dodge pickup for the
purpose of transporting the cocaine from Fort Worth to
Mineral Wells. Jefferson stated that he, [A]ppellant,
Dukes, Ratliff, and Herring hung out at Smith's residence
and that the money gleaned from the sale of cocaine went
into Smith’s wallet.
Dukes testified that Smith provided him with a place
to stay and drugs on a daily basis. He admitted to
traveling with Smith and [A]ppellant to Fort Worth on
November 16 to purchase cocaine from Allen. Dukes
testified that Smith accompanied them because it was his
money and he was the one purchasing the cocaine.
Appellant got the money from Smith to purchase the drugs,
and he put the cocaine in Smith’s coat pocket after the
transaction occurred. Dukes removed the drugs from Smith
at Smith’s request after the wreck occurred. Dukes
admitted to possessing the drugs when the officers
arrived at the scene of the wreck.
When Dukes visited with Ranger Stoner the next day,
he told Ranger Stoner about the organization and said
that Smith was the “kingpin.” Dukes testified that
everyone helped Smith because of his handicap. He stated
that the group would go to Fort Worth several times a
5

week to resupply and that he went along on several
occasions. Dukes testified that Smith wanted to make the
trip on November 19, 2009, to replace the drugs that were
lost when Dukes was arrested on November 16, 2009. Dukes
also testified that he had observed Allen coming to
Smith’s residence on several earlier occasions to deliver
cocaine to Smith and that Allen gave the maroon Dodge
pickup to Smith so that Allen would not have to come to
Mineral Wells.
Ratliff testified that he lived with Smith because
he needed a place to stay and Smith needed assistance.
Ratliff stated that Smith compensated him with a place to
stay and later crack cocaine. Ratliff testified that
Smith contacted Herring on November 19 so that they could
use his pickup to travel to Allen’s residence in Fort
Worth. Ratliff testified that Smith accompanied them on
November 19 because “[h]e’s the man that took care of the
business, you know.” Ratliff stated that they called
Allen while en route and that he met Allen at his door
for the transaction. Ratliff also testified that Smith
gave him the money to purchase the drugs.
(Id., Mem. Op. 1-5, ECF No. 9-2.)
II. ISSUES
In two grounds, Petitioner claims (1) that the state courts’
“decision to deny petitioner’s 5th and 14th Amendment claim was an
unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence
presented,” and (2) that the state courts’ “decision to deny
petitioner’s 6th and 14th Amendment claim was an unreasonable
determination of facts in light of the evidence presented.” (Pet.
6, ECF No. 1.) More specifically, Petitioner claims custodial
statements he made to Mineral Wells police officer Scott Mitcham
should have been suppressed because he had not been given his
“Miranda warnings” when he made the statements. (Pet’r’s Mem. 5-8,

6

ECF No. 2.) He also claims his appellate counsel was ineffective by
failing to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel issue
on appeal. (Id. at 8-10.)
III. RULE 5 STATEMENT
Respondent
successiveness

admits
or

the

that

the

statute

of

petition

is

limitations.

not

barred

by

But

Respondent

contends that Petitioner failed to exhaust his second ground for
relief and that the claim is procedurally barred from the Court’s
review. (Resp’t’s Answer 10, ECF No. 18.)
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard for Granting Habeas Corpus Relief
A § 2254 habeas petition is governed by the heightened
standard of review provided for by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under the Act, a writ
of habeas corpus should be granted only if a state court arrives at
a decision that is contrary to or an unreasonable application of
clearly established Supreme Court precedent or that is based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record
before the state court. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100-01
(2011); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). This standard is difficult to
meet but “stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court
relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings.”
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102.
7

Additionally, the statute requires that federal courts give
great deference to a state court’s factual findings. Hill v.
Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000). Section 2254(e)(1)
provides that a determination of a factual issue made by a state
court shall be presumed to be correct. The petitioner has the
burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and
convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399
(2000). Typically, when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denies
relief

in

a

state

habeas-corpus

application

without

written

opinion, as in this case, it is an adjudication on the merits,
which is entitled to the presumption. Singleton v. Johnson, 178
F.3d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 1999); Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 472
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Under these circumstances, a federal court
may assume the state court applied correct standards of federal law
to the facts, unless there is evidence that an incorrect standard
was applied, and infer fact findings consistent with the state
court’s disposition. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 314 (1963)3;
Catalan v. Cockrell, 315 F.3d 491, 493 n.3 (5th Cir. 2002); Valdez
v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 948 n.11 (5th Cir. 2001).

B. Custodial Statements

3
The standards of Townsend v. Sain have been incorporated into 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d). Harris v. Oliver, 645 F.2d 327, 330 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981).

8

Petitioner

claims

his

Fifth

Amendment

protections

were

violated by admission of custodial statements he made to Officer
Mitcham implicating himself and Smith in the conspiracy because he
had not yet been given his Miranda warnings when he made the
statements. (Pet’r’s Mem. 5-8, ECF No. 2.) Petitioner asserts that
Officer Mitcham admitted that he “talked” to Petitioner, which
“means that a two-way conversation took place.” (Pet’r’s Mem. 7,
ECF No. 2.)
At a pretrial hearing, Officer Mitcham testified that on the
night

of

November

11,

2009,

Petitioner

was

“detained

for

paraphernalia” at the Mineral Wells Police Department. (Adm. R.,
Reporter’s R., vol. 4, 37, ECF No. 9-10.) Petitioner requested to
talk

to

the

officer

and

informed

the

officer

that

he

had

information that would lead to the arrest of Jackie Smith. (Id.)
Petitioner told the officer that he usually went with Smith to Fort
Worth to pick up crack cocaine and that they also sometimes took
Brian Dukes with them. (Id. at 38-39.) Petitioner also told the
officer that they would always come through Millsap back into
Mineral Wells and that he would let the officer know the next time
they went. (Id. at 39.) Mitcham acknowledged that he did not give
Petitioner the Miranda warnings before talking to him but stated
that Petitioner’s statements were voluntary and that he did not
subject Petitioner to any questioning to elicit the information.
(Id.) He also testified that he had no intention of questioning

9

Petitioner to elicit incriminating information and was not aware of
any ongoing investigation involving Petitioner, Smith or anybody
else in the case. (Id.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial
court denied Petitioner’s motion to suppress, providing:
Well, you understand, of course, that the evidence
that I have to consider in ruling on a motion to suppress
is that which is adduced at this hearing. And a casual or
a minute inspection of the record at this hearing, there
is not one shred of evidence that was adduced pursuant to
interrogation. Not one word.
In the entire record of this hearing, is there any
evidence that a statement was given pursuant to
interrogation? And when you say, even if it’s true,
that’s what this hearing is all about, is to determine if
both custody and interrogation are getting married
together. And if that’s true, then there are rules to go
by.
And until you have custody and interrogation
together, the cases are too numerous to name that
differentiate between those two.
The classic example, the case where a guy is parked
out in front of the Sheriff’s Department with his foot up
on the bumper of his pickup, and the cops are asking him
all kinds of questions, and he wasn’t even close to being
in custody.
And although it’s clearly interrogation by the
police, there was no custody found. In this case, I will
find that he was in custody. Absolutely. That’s
irrefutable. But there is zero evidence as to any
interrogation, period, not pursuant to a question asked
by you or the State or given by the witness.
And without interrogation, then the parameters of .
. . Miranda don’t apply, and there’s not one shred of
evidence of trickery, even though you chose that word.
There’s not one evidence of coerciveness, even though you
chose that word.
And there has to be evidence of those things for it
to form the basis of this Court making a ruling. So I’ll
10

deny the motion to suppress.
(Adm. R., Reporter’s R., vol. 4, 60-61, ECF No. 9-10.)
Petitioner

also

raised

this

claim

in

his

state

habeas

application, and, based on the record, the habeas court found—
After having reviewed the pleading and instruments on
file in Cause 14276C-A, The State of Texas vs. Isidore
Krishna Bridgeforth, the application on file in this
cause, the Court is of the opinion and does hereby find
that there are no controverted, previously unresolved
facts material to the legality of the Applicant’s
confinement.
(Id., Supp. Clerk’s R., Writ WR-80,643-01, 3, ECF No. 10-7.) In turn
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied the application without
written order on the trial court’s findings. Petitioner asserts the
state courts’ decision was an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented during the hearing.
As noted above, under these circumstances, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals’ denial constitutes an adjudication on the merits,
which is entitled to the presumption of correctness. Further, this
Court may assume the state courts applied correct standards of
federal law to the facts, absent evidence that an incorrect standard
was applied, and infer fact findings consistent with the state
courts’ disposition of the issue. Implicit in the state courts’
decision to deny Petitioner’s motion to suppress is the implied
finding that Petitioner initiated the conversation with Officer
Mitcham, that there was no interrogation by Officer Mitcham, and
that Petitioner voluntarily made the statements to the officer.

11

Miranda only requires that a recital of the warnings be given before
custodial interrogation and does not reach a situation such as this
where the statement is made voluntarily and not in response to any
question by a police officer. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). “Custodial interrogation is “questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody.”
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. “Interrogation . . . reflect[s] a measure
of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.”
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980). Petitioner asked
to meet with Officer Mitcham and voluntarily made the incriminating
statements to him. Petitioner fails to cite any facts or argument
showing

the

encounter

with

Officer

Mitcham

was

a

custodial

interrogation and thus Miranda warnings were required. Therefore,
contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the state courts’ adjudication
of the matter was reasonable in light of the evidence and comports
with Supreme Court precedent on the issue.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
Petitioner claims his appellate counsel, Cora Moore, was
ineffective by failing to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel issue on appeal. (Pet. 6, ECF No. 1.) Respondent asserts
this claim is unexhausted and procedurally barred. (Resp’t’s Answer
21-24.)
Applicants seeking habeas-corpus relief under § 2254 are
required to exhaust all claims in state court before requesting
12

federal collateral relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Fisher v. Texas,
169 F.3d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 1999). The exhaustion requirement is
satisfied when the substance of the federal habeas claim has been
fairly presented to the highest court of the state on direct appeal
or in state post-conviction proceedings. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526
U.S. 838, 842-48 (1999); Fisher, 169 F.3d at 302; Carter v. Estelle,
677 F.2d 427, 443 (5th Cir. 1982). The exhaustion requirement is
“not satisfied if the petitioner presents new legal theories or
factual claims in his federal habeas petition.” Reed v. Stephens,
739 F.3d 753, 780 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Anderson v. Johnson, 338
F.3d 382, 386 (5th Cir. 2003)).
In Texas, the highest state court for criminal matters is the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Richardson v. Procunier, 762 F.2d
429, 431-32 (5th Cir. 1985). Therefore, a Texas prisoner may
typically satisfy the exhaustion requirement by presenting both the
factual and legal substance of a claim to the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals in either a petition for discretionary review or,
as in this case, a state habeas post-conviction proceeding. TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 (West 2015); Depuy v. Butler, 837 F.2d
699, 702 (5th Cir. 1988).
Petitioner

raised

six

ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-

counsel claims in his state habeas application, none of which
sufficiently correspond to the instant claim. (Adm. R., Supp.
Clerk’s R. Writ 23-26, 35, 42, ECF No. 10-8.) Thus, the claim raised

13

for the first time in this federal petition is unexhausted for
purposes

§

2254(b)(1)(A).

Under

the

Texas

abuse-of-the-writ

doctrine, however, Petitioner cannot now return to state court for
purposes of exhausting the claim. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07,
§ 4(a)-(c). The abuse-of-the-writ doctrine represents an adequate
state procedural bar to federal habeas review. Nobles v. Johnson,
127 F.3d 409, 423 (5th Cir. 1997). Therefore, a showing of cause and
prejudice or a miscarriage of justice being absent here, the claim
is unexhausted and procedurally barred from this Court’s review.
Smith v. Johnson, 216 F.3d 521, 523-24 (5th Cir. 2000).
For

the

reasons

discussed,

the

Court

DENIES

Petitioner’s

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254
and DENIES a certificate of appealability.
SIGNED June 20, 2016.

____________________________
TERRY R. MEANS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

14