Grisham v. City of Ft Worth, Texas et al

Filing 65

Memorandum Opinion and Order: Consistent with the foregoing, The court ORDERS that plaintiff, David Grisham, have and recover from City of Fort Worth $65,148.92 as recoverable attorneys' fees and non-taxable expenses incurred on behalf of plaintiff by his attorneys, and that City of Fort Worth, or someone acting on its behalf, can satisfy that payment obligation by providing to Kellum a check or comparable payment item, made payable to plaintiff, Center for Religious Expression, and Scheef & Stone, LLP. (Ordered by Judge John McBryde on 12/16/2016) (hth)

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FORT WORTH DIVISION
DAVID GRISHAM,

vs.

§
§

CITY OF FORT WORTH, TEXAS,
ET AL.,
Defendants.

I

§
§
§
§

Plaintiff,

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CI FRK.!J.S. !liSTRlCTCIH'ilT
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NO. 4:15-CV-324-A

§
§
§
§

MEMORANDUM OPINION
and
ORDER
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed this court's September 3, 2015 denial of the pre-appeal
motions filed in the name of plaintiff, David Grisham, for
attorneys' fees and non-taxable expenses, and remanded the action
to this court for a determination of reasonable attorneys' fees
and expenses incurred by plaintiff pre-appeal and those incurred
by plaintiff in successfully prosecuting his appeal.

Grisham v.

city of Fort Worth, Texas, 837 F. 3d 564 (5th Cir. 2016).

In

addition to addressing those issues in this memorandum opinion,
the court addresses post-remand requests filed in the name of
plaintiff for attorney's time devoted by his attorneys to
activities generated by the remand.

I.

A Listing of the Five Fee and Exoense
Requests Made in the Name of Plaintiff 1
A.

The Initial (August 11, 2015) Fee and Expense Request

On August 11, 2015, following the entry on July 29, 2015, of
the agreed Consent Order and Final Judgment, plaintiff filed his
initial motion for attorneys' fees and non-taxable expenses,
which was accompanied by a supporting memorandum and appendix.
Docs. 38, 39, & 40. 2

He sought a total of $79,074.36 as

attorneys' fees and non-taxable expenses for his district court
legal representation.'

Doc. 38 at 10.

Of the total, $67,050.00

represented attorney time (149.00 hours) of Nathan W. Kellum
("Kellum")

(Doc. 39 at 007); $1,378.87 represented total non-

taxable expenses incurred by Kellum; $10,170.00 represented
attorney time (22.60 hours) of Kellum's local counsel, James A.

1

Each of the motions and requests for payment by City of Fort Worth of attorneys' fees and nontaxable expenses was filed in the name of plaintiff by attorney Nathan W. Kellum ("Kellum"). See,~.
Docs. 38 at 1 and 44 at 1, 7-8. Kellum has declared that he is representing Grisham on a m:g bono basis,
and that there will be no charge to plaintiff for legal services or for the associated cost of litigation. Doc.
39 at 005,, 15. Thus, the request for attorneys' fees more accurately would be described as motions or
requests by Kellum for awards in favor of him and his local counsel against City of Fort Worth of
attorneys' fees. However, because of the nomenclature used by Kellum in his several motions and
requests for recovery of attorneys' fees, the court generally uses in this memorandum opinion and order
the designation of"plaintiff' as the movant or requesting party.
2

The "Doc._" references are to the numbers assigned to the referenced items on the docket in
this Case No. 4: 15-CV -324-A.
3

The billing statement showing the work performed by Kellum is headed with the name "Center
for Religious Expression." Doc. 39 at 009. Apparently Kellum is a sole practitioner who works for, or
does business as, "Center for Religious Expression." ld. at 004,, 10.
2

Pikl ("Pikl"); and $475.49 represented expenses incurred by Pikl.
Doc. 39 at 007-008, 027).
B.

Plaintiff's Pre-Appeal Add-On (August 31, 2015) to His
Request For Attorneys' Fees and Non-Taxable Expenses
city of Fort Worth' filed a response to plaintiff's August

11, 2015 motion, Doc. 42, to which plaintiff replied on August
31, 2015, Doc. 44.

The reply, which was accompanied by an

appendix, sought additional attorneys' fees of $5,040.00 for
Kellum's time (11.20 hours) and additional non-taxable expenses
of $172.66 for Kellum's expenses, for a total add-on of
$5,212.66, increasing the total amount sought by plaintiff from
$79,074.36 to $84,287.02.
c.

Docs. 44 at 7-8 & 45 at 001-004.

Plaintiff's First Post-Remand Add-On (October 5, 2016) to
His Request for Attorneys' Fees and Non-Taxable Expenses
As the Fifth Circuit contemplated in its remand directive he

would do, on October 5, 2016, plaintiff filed a supplemental
motion for attorneys' fees and non-taxable expenses seeking to
recover an additional $35,595.00 as attorneys' fees for Kellum's
time (79.10 hours), an additional $1,029.28 as non-taxable
expenses incurred by Kellum, an additional $1,395.00 for Pikl's
time (2.70 hours), and an additional $83.59 for out-of-pocket
4

The response was filed in the name of City of Fort Worth and "Jeffrey Halstead, sued in his
official capacity as Chief of Police for the Fort Worth Police Department," ("Halstead"). Doc. 42 at I.
Inasmuch as Halstead was sued only in his official capacity, the suit against him is the equivalent of a
suit against City of Fort Worth. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). Therefore, in this
memorandum opinion and order the court is treating City of Fort Worth as the only defendant.
3

expenses incurred by Pikl, for a total add-on of $38,102.87.
Doc. 54 at 01-14.

These October 5, 2016 add-ons increased the

total of attorneys' fees and non-taxable expenses sought by
plaintiff from City of Fort Worth from $84,287.02 to $122,389.89.
Id. at 1-3.
D.

Plaintiff's Second Post-Remand Add-On (November 8, 2016) to
His Request for Recovery from City of Fort Worth of
Attorneys' Fees and Non-Taxable Expenses
In order to inform the parties of certain of the court's

tentative conclusions relative to the award that should be made
to plaintiff for pre-appeal attorneys' fees and non-taxable
expenses and to gain the needed information to comply with the
Fifth Circuit's directive that the fee award to be made by this
court is to include reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred
in successfully prosecuting the appeal, this court issued an
order on October 18, 2016, informing the parties of those
tentative conclusions, directing the parties to respond, and
requesting information to enable the court to comply with the
Fifth Circuit's remand directive.

Doc. 59 at 2-6.

Both parties responded to the October 18 order on
November 8, 2016.

Plaintiff's response was in the form of a

supplemental motion for attorneys' fees, accompanied by an
appendix.

Docs. 60 & 61.

Plaintiff sought to recover an

additional $7,920.00 as attorneys' fees for Kellum's time (17.60
4

hours) and an additional $81.53 as non-taxable expenses incurred
by Kellum, for a total add-on of $8,001.53.

Doc. 60 at 1.

The

November 8, 2016 add-ons increased the total of attorneys' fees
and non-taxable expenses sought by plaintiff from City of Fort
Worth from $122,389.89 to $130,391.42.
E.

Id. at 10.

Plaintiff's Third Post-Remand Add-On (November 22, 2016) to
His Request for Recovery from City of Fort Worth of
Attorneys' Fees and Non-Taxable Expenses
On November 22, 2016, plaintiff filed a reply to the

:r·esponse City of Fort Worth was required to make to the
October 18, 2016 order mentioned above.

Docs. 63 & 64. The

reply, in effect, was but another add-on to plaintiff's request
for recovery from City of Fort Worth of attorneys' fees and nontaxable expenses.

This time, plaintiff sought an additional

$1,800.00 from City of Fort Worth for Kellum's time (4.00 hours)
and an additional $286.94 as non-taxable expenses incurred by
Kellum, for a total add-on of $2,086.94, thus increasing from
$130,391.42 to $132,478.36 as the total of attorneys' fees and
non-taxable expenses sought by plaintiff from City of Fort Worth.
Doc. 64 at 01-02.

5

II.

The Court's Findinqs and Conclusions as to a Reasonable
Fee and Non-Taxable Expense Award That Plaintiff
Should Receive from City of Fort Worth
A.

The Attorney Time Upon Which Plaintiff's Claims Are Based Is
Excessive or Otherwise Inappropriate
1.

The Initial Pre-Appeal Claim

The court persists in its conclusion that the attorney time
included in the attorney billing statements for which plaintiff
is seeking reimbursement from City of Fort Worth for pre-appeal
activity is grossly excessive.

The court called this conclusion

to the attention of the parties in the pre-appeal order the court
issued on September 3, 2015, and the post-appeal order the court
issued on October 18, 2016.
a.

Docs. 48 at 10-12 & 59 at 2-5.

Time Claimed for Preparation of Initial Suit
Papers

As reflected by the document attached to this order as
Exhibit "A," the August 5, 2015 billing statement of Center for
Religious Expression (Kellum) showed that Kellum devoted 66.50
hours, starting in early December, 2014, and ending in late April
2015, to preparation of the pleadings by which this action was
initiated in May 2015.

See Doc. 39 at 9-12.

Of that total,

38.90 hours is shown on the billing statement to represent time
Kellum devoted to preparation of the complaint, and the remainder

6

is shown to be time he devoted to preparation of the motion for
preliminary injunction and related papers.
The court made known in its October 18, 2016 order that the
court's tentative conclusion that the total time devoted to
preparation of the initial pleadings should not have been more
than 20 hours.

Doc. 59 at 3.

There is no doubt that Kellum has

significant expertise in preparing for, litigating, and
participating in appeals of litigation involving civil rights
claims of the exact kind asserted by plaintiff in this action.
Docs. 39 at 001-003, 60 at 3-4.

His prior experiences in

handling litigation of the kind is a factor the court has taken
into consideration in reaching the conclusion that the time
Kellum claims he devoted to pre-appeal activity is excessive,
particularly the time he claims he devoted to preparation of the
initial suit papers.

Kellum has prepared exactly the same kind

of suit papers so many times in the past that the preparation of
the initial suit papers in this action would have been simply
routine for Kellum, using the same outline, format,

legal

authorities, and verbiage he repeatedly had used before.
Through the list of cases Kellum previously handled that
were cited in Kellum's declaration in the appendix to the
August 11, 2015 motion (Doc. 39 at 002,

~

6), Kellum provided

sources to which the court could go for an evaluation of the
7

credibility of Kellum's representations to the court concerning
the uniqueness of the initial pleadings he filed in this action.
Similarly helpful information on that subject was provided by
City of Fort Worth in the footnote on page 2 of its November 8,
2016 response. Doc. 62 at 2 n.l.

The initial district court

pleadings in each of those other actions filed by Kellum disclose
that the initial pleadings prepared by Kellum in this action were
but boilerplate-type pleadings. 5

He already had the outline,

format, verbiage, and legal contentions he used here.

Kellum

repeatedly had used them before. If the reader of this memorandum
opinion wishes to explore that matter further, the record
references to the initial pleadings in those other cases are set
forth in a footnote.•
The court is satisfied that an attorney having Kellum's
expertise would have found the preparation of the initial suit
papers in this action to be a purely routine activity.

The

'The cut and paste nature of Kellum's practice is readily apparent in the August II, 2015 motion
for attorney's fees and non-taxable expenses, which refers to "Williams" rather than Grisham in the
second paragraph. Doc. 38 at I.
6

The district court cases, and the pertinent pleadings therein, to which the court was led to by
citations on page 002 of plaintiffs August II, 2015 appendix are: Johnson v. Minneapolis Park and
Recreation Bd. (filed March 30, 2012), Case No. 0:12-CV-00806-MJD-JJG (D. Minn.), at its Doc. I at
1-26; McGlone v. Bell (filed March 29, 2010), Case No.2 10 0029 (M.D. Tenn.), at its Doc. I at 1-16;
and Bays v. City of Fairborn (filed July 19, 20 !0), Case No. 3: I 0-CV -283-TMR (S.D. Ohio), at its Doc. I
at l-25. The two district court cases to which City of Fort Worth called the court's attention in their
November 8, 2016 response are Spears v. Citv of Tucson (filed September 12, 2014), Case No. 4:14-CV2352-TUC-CKJ (D. Ariz.), at its Doc. 1 at 1-15; and Williamson v. City of Foley, Ala. (filed August 26,
2015), Case No. 1: 15-CV-00430-WS-B (S.D. Ala.), at its Doc. I at 1-24.
8

preparation of the complaint itself should not have taken more
than five or six hours once Kellum had the factual information
essential to its preparation.
The initial billing statement and Kellum's demand letter to
City disclose that he had the needed factual information before
he started work on the complaint.

The starting entries on the

billing statement are as follows:

Doc. 39 at 009.

Review materials in
file.

1. 20

1. 20

0.80

0.80

0.50

0.50

Legal research re:
Demand Letter.

1. 30

1. 30

Prepare Demand Letter.

Oct-31-14

ADJUSTED
TIME

Telephone conference
with David Grisham
re: case.

Oct-24-14

ACTUAL
TIME

Review video.

DATE

DESCRIPTION

3.20

3.20

The demand letter that took 3.20 hours to

prepare is found in the appendix to plaintiff's motion for
preliminary injunction.

Doc. 11 at App. 022-026.

As the billing

statement shows, the total time required for Kellum to gather the
needed facts, to locate and understand the pertinent legal
principles, and then to convert them into a legal presentation
was only seven hours.

Doc. 39 at 009.

9

The demand letter itself

shows that by the time Kellum prepared it he had knowledge of the
pertinent facts, he knew and understood the applicable legal
principles, and he was able to, and did, express those legal
principles in that letter.

Doc. 11 at App. 022-026.

He could

have used that letter, with slight amplification, as the basis
for the complaint Kellum now claims took him an additional 38.90
hours, starting on December 8, 2014, going through April 21,
2015, to prepare.
Kellum's claim that he spent that much time preparing the
complaint is simply not credible.

Or, if he did spend that much

time preparing it, he was not making proper use of his time.
Apparently Kellum has come to the conclusion after his years of
handling this kind of litigation, which has become a matter of
routine for him, that

§

1988 is intended to provide a form of

economic relief to improve the financial lot of attorneys,
particularly him.
The Supreme Court has made clear that
that as one of its goals.
563

§

1988 does not have

See Burlington v. Dague, 505 u.s. 557,

(1992); Pennsylvania v. Del Valley Citizens' Council, 478

u.s. 546, 565 (1986).

So has the Fifth Circuit. See Leroy v.

City of Houston, 831 F.2d 576, 584-85 (5th Cir. 1987) (commenting
that "[a]n award of attorneys' fees is to be used an incentive
for the private enforcement of constitutional rights, and not as
10

a shill for the imposition of punitive damages). In Perdue v.
Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542

(2010), the Supreme Court quoted with

approval from Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984) that "[a]
reasonable attorney's fee is one that is adequate to attract
competent counsel, but that does not produce windfalls to
attorneys."

559 U.S. at 552.

Kellum appears to be seeking by

his requests for attorney's fees to improve his financial lot by
means of a windfall.
City of Fort Worth agreed in its November 8, 2016 response
to the court's October 18, 2016 tentative conclusions order that
the time Kellum showed he devoted to preparation of the initial
suit papers is unreasonable, but it suggested that the claimed
65.10 hours should be reduced to "a more reasonable thirty
hours."

Doc. 62 at 2.

If City of Fort Worth is willing to

accept 30 hours as an appropriate number for preparation of the
initial pleadings, the court likewise is accepting that number,
even though the court continues to believe that anything more
than 20 hours for that work would be excessive.'

7

A court is permitted to adjust a requested fee award even if the requested amount is unopposed,
because the court is obligated to award only "reasonable attorney's fees." See Curtis v. Bill Hanna Ford,
Inc., 822 F.2d 549, 551 (5'" Cir. 1987); Wright v. Blythe-Nelson, No. 3:99-CV-2522-D, 2004 WL
2870082 at *5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2004); see also Leroy v. City of Houston, 831 F.2d 576, 586 (5'" Cir.
198)(explaining that the burden of proof of reasonableness of the number of hours is on the fee applicant,
and not on the opposing party to prove their unreasonableness, citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
437 (1983)).
Here, City of Fort Wo1th has affirmatively committed to what it considers to be "a more
(continued ... )

11

b.

Time Claimed for Communications Between Kellum and
Local Counsel

Of equal concern is the time devoted to communications
between Kellum and his local counsel for which payment is sought.
The item attached to this order as Exhibit "B" shows that the
attorney time for which Kellum initially sought payment included
14.50 hours of time devoted to communications between Kellum and
his local counsel, Pikl.

With the time Pikl chose to charge for

those communications, another 7.40 hours must be added, making a
total of 22.10 hours of time devoted to communications between
the lawyers.
The court made known in its October 18, 2016 order its
tentative conclusion that a reasonable amount of time devoted to
communications between Kellum and his local counsel to be
included in any fee award for pre-appeal work done in the
district court should not exceed 7 hours.

The court persists in

that belief, taking into account the knowledge Kellum had of the
facts and law related to the litigation and the absence of any
significant need by Kellum to have input from his local counsel
on the day-to-day handling of the litigation.

Seven hours will

'( ... continued)
reasonable thirty hours." Doc. 62 at 2. Therefore, the court's adjustment in the claimed attorney time is
taking into account that concession.

12

be included in the attorney time to be charged against City of
Fort Worth.
c.

"Billing Judgment" as to Initial Pre-Appeal Claim

Noteworthy is that of the total time of 66.50 hours that
Kellum devoted to preparation of the initial suit papers, the
only adjustments he made to evidence exercise of "billing
judgment" were reductions that totaled 1.40 hours.

See attached

Ex. "A" at 2 (the 3rd March 11, 2015 and the April 10, 2015
entries) & 3 (the Total Time Shown for Preparation of Initial
Pleadings) .

And, Kellum made no adjustment as an exercise of

billing judgment in the time shown on the initial billing
statement for communications between him and his local counsel.
See attached Ex. "B" at 8 (TOTALS).
When the court looks at all of the "Actual Time" and
"Adjusted Time" entries on the Center for Religious Expression
statement upon which the initial claim is based, the court notes
that, other than to delete the time related to the unsuccessful
claim plaintiff asserted against a police officer (Doc. 39 at
013-014, 016), the only adjustments for billing judgment
disclosed by the statement were the previously mentioned
adjustments of 1.40 hours, and the following additional
adjustments:

.40 of an hour for April 29, 2015,

for May 27, 2015,

.10 of an hour

.10 of an hour for June 16, 2015, 1.10 hours
13

for July 2, 2015, and 1.10 hours for July 3, 2015.

Thus, the

total of the billing judgment adjustments was 2.8 hours.

Doc. 39

at 011, 012, 015 & 018.
Kellum shows on the August 5, 2015 Center for Religious
Expression time statement that his total time devoted to this
litigation from the beginning in October 2014 through August 4,
2015, was 167.60 hours.

Doc. 39 at 023.

When the court deducts

from that 167.60 hours the 66.50 hours the court has already
discussed as having been shown for preparation of the initial
pleadings and the 14.40 hours that Kellum deducted for time
devoted to plaintiff's unsuccessful claim, the balance of time
Kellum shows as actual time he devoted to this matter during that
time frame is 86.70 hours.

As the court noted in the immediately

preceding paragraph, the total of the adjustments made by Kellum
for exercise of billing judgment as to those 86.70 hours was 2.8
hours, a reduction of 3.23% as a billing adjustment reduction.
Considering the extravagant time entries Kellum made for
preparation of the initial pleadings and communications between
Kellum and his local counsel, the court thinks highly unlikely
that the 3.23% reduction is a sufficient recognition of billing
jUdgment.

The court concludes that a more realistic billing

judgment adjustment for those 86.70 hours would be a reduction of

14

20%.

That is the adjustment the court is making, resulting in a

balance of 69.36 hours rather than 86.70 hours.
d.

The Time Not Claimed by Kellum Related to
Plaintiff's Unsuccessful Cause of Action

The Center for Religious Expression August 5, 2015 billing
statement shows that Kellum deleted from plaintiff's initial. preappeal claim 14.40 hours for time he devoted to the defense of
the unsuccessful claim he asserted on behalf of plaintiff against
a police officer.

Doc. 39 at 013-014, 016. 8

That claim was

dismissed upon the police officer's motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
31.

Docs. 30 &

Because the unsuccessful claim against the police officer

was related to plaintiff's claims against City of Fort Worth, the
court has concluded that the time devoted to the defense of that
claim could have had some benefit to plaintiff, but not enough to
justify an award of attorney's fees for the full 14.40 hours.
The court has concluded that an allowance of seven hours of
attorney time devoted to the defense of that claim would be
generous, and appropriate.

Thus, the court is including seven

hours in the total of the time for which attorney's fees are to
be awarded in response to the initial motion.

8

The "3" notations by each of the time entries related to the unsuccessful claim were to indicate
that the time was not included in the claim for attorney's fees because it was devoted to "[u]nsuccessful
claims." Doc. 39 at 023 (NOTES).

15

e.

Remaining Time to be Included for Work Claimed to
Have Been Done by Pikl in the First Pre-Appeal
Motion

Included in the initial August 11, 2015 fee claim was
$10,170 for work said to have been done by Pikl.

& 027.

Doc. 39 at 008

The total represented 22.60 hours shown on the Scheef &

Stone, LLP, billing statement.

Id. at 027.

Of those hours, 7.40

already have been dealt with in the preceding section having to
do with Time Claimed for Communications Between Kellum and Local
Counsel.

Supra at 12-13.

The court does not consider appropriate to include in the
fee charges to be paid by City of Fort Worth the 3.70 hours Pikl
devoted to receipt and review of the complaint and other suit
documents and related matters.

Kellum did not need to call upon

Pikl for assistance in those matters.

The same is true as to the

1.60 hours devoted by Pikl on June 24, 2015, to receipt and
review of dismissal of the unsuccessful claim and related
activities.

When the 7.40, 3.70, and 1.60 items are deleted,

10.20 hours remain.

There is no indication in the initial claim

documents that Pikl exercised billing judgment as to those hours.
Rather, his only claim to billing judgment was that he reduced
his total fee by $2,610, representing the time he devoted to the
unsuccessful claim by plaintiff against the police officer.
39 at 026.

Doc.

The court is satisfied that there is no reason why
16

the local counsel should have devoted any time to that activitY.
Thus, the end result is that there has been no billing judgment
adjustment as to the 10.20 hours.

The court concludes that an

appropriate billing judgment reduction as to those hours would be
20%, resulting in a reduction of 2.04 hours, leaving a balance of
8.16 hours to be included in the total attorney time to be
recognized as reasonable time devoted to attorney work done on
this case up to the date of the filing of the initial pre-appeal
claim.
f.

Interim Conclusion as to Attorney Time to be
Honored as Reasonable as to the Initial Claim

Summingup what the court has found to be a reasonable
amount of time to be included in a fee award in favor of
plaintiff against City of Fort Worth for the work done through
the filing of the initial, August 11, 2015 fee request, the court
concludes that the total is 121.52 hours.

It consists of thirty

hours for time devoted by Kellum to preparation of the initial
suit papers, seven hours for communications between Kellum and
his local counsel, 69.36 hours after the billing adjustment
reduction of the 86.70 hours of Kellum's time that is discussed
in section I.A.1.c. above, seven hours of Kellum's time devoted
to plaintiff's unsuccessful claim against the police officer, and

17

8.16 hours of local counsel's time, as calculated in section
I.A.1.e. above.
2.

The Pre-Appeal Add-On (August 31, 2015)

On August 19, 2015, City of Fort Worth filed a four and onefourth page response to plaintiff's initial August 11, 2015
motion for attorney's fees.

Doc. 42.

On August 31, 2015,

plaintiff, through Kellum, filed an eight-page reply, accompanied
by an addendum.

By the reply, an additional $5,040 in attorney's

fees was sought from plaintiff based on 11.20 hours of Kellum's
time.

Doc. 44 at 8 & Doc. 45 at 003-004.

The court accepts that

additional attorney's fees should be awarded for the reply, but
has concluded that the 11.20 hours of time involved in the claim
is excessive.
The August 27, 2015 Supplemental Time Statement of Center
for Religious Expression showing the time and any adjustments
that were made for billing judgment shows that there was no
adjustment for billing judgment.

Doc. 45 at 003-004.

This time

statement again shows communications between Kellum and his local
counsel, and that significant time was devoted to research
related to the reply and preparation of the reply.

The court is

satisfied from its study of papers filed by Kellum in other cases
he has handled that he, again, was dealing with routine matters
he often had encountered before.

Therefore, the court has
18

concluded that a billing judgment adjustment should be made, and
that a 20% reduction in the 11.20 hours would be appropriate.
Thus, the court concludes that plaintiff should recover an
additional amount for 8.96 hours of attorney time devoted to
preparation and filing of the reply.
3.

The First Post-Remand Add-On (October 5, 2016)

By the supplemental motion for attorney's fees Kellum, in
the name of plaintiff, filed on October 5, 2016, plaintiff added
to the claim for attorney's fees attorney time devoted by
plaintiff's counsel to district court activity prior to the
filing of the notice of appeal on September 28, 2015 (6.30
hours), Doc. 54 at 04-05, time devoted to appellate activity
(89.50 hours), id. at 005-08, and time devoted to activities for
approximately ten days after the Fifth Circuit issued its
September 19, 2016 opinion (1.70 hours), id. at 08.

The

September 30, 2016 Third Time Statement of Center for Religious
Expression shows that the actual time for work shown on it is
97.50 hours and that the adjusted time is 78.70 hours.
09.

Id~

at

The adjustments, as indicated in the "NOTES" column on each

19

page are for clerical (2.10 hours), excessive (12.10 hours), and
travel

(4.60 hours) . 9

The court accepts the 78.70 hours as a

reasonable amount of attorney time for the activities described
in the Third Time Statement.
The statement of local counsel's firm that accompanied the
October 5, 2016 Supplemental Motion shows that Pikl devoted
another 3.10 hours to the case.
time entries).

Id. at 13

(the 8/5/15-5/31/16

The court concludes that only .70 of an hour of

(the 8/5/15 and 9/24/15 entries) of those 3.10 hours should be
considered reasonable attorney time.

The court cannot think of a

good reason why the local counsel should have done the other
things for which he showed time charges.
Adding the 78.70 hours the court has concluded is a
reasonable amount of Kellum's attorney time related to the First
Post-Remand Add-On to the .70 of an hour of local counsel's time,
the court concludes that a total of 79.40 hours should be
recognized as a reasonable amount of attorney time for the
activities described in the October 5, 2016 supplemental motion
and its appendix.

9

0f interest, only .60 of an hour was deleted as excessive as to the initial time statement filed
August II, 2015 (Doc. 3 8 at 0 II), and only 1.40 hours was designated as clerical (Id. at 0 II, 0 12, &
0 15), only 1.40 hours of which pertains to time claimed for preparation of the initial pleadings.

20

4.

The Second Post-Remand Add-On (November 8, 2016)

On October 18, 2016, following issuance by the Fifth Circuit
of its mandate remanding this action to this court, the court
issued an order expressing its tentative conclusions relative to
excessiveness of attorney time claimed by plaintiff for district
court activity and excessiveness of the per hour rate used in the
attorney fee claims.

Doc. 59 at 2-5.

The court afforded

the

parties an opportunity to respond to the court's tentative
conclusions relative to hours and rates, and requested plaintiff
to provide in an appendix accompanying its response copies of all
briefs or other filings made by any party in this action with the
Fifth Circuit in connection with plaintiff's appeal. Id. at 5-6.
Plaintiff, through Kellum, responded by the filing on November 8,
2016, of a document titled "Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's
Supplemental Motion for Attorney's Fees," Doc. 60, which was
accompanied by a supporting appendix, Doc. 61, that contained the
briefs filed by the parties in the appeal to the Fifth Circuit
and declarations of Kellum and his local counsel concerning
attorneys'

fees and expenses related to the add-on attorney's

claim made in plaintiff's November 8 filings.

Also included in

the appendix were documents on which Kellum relied in support of
his claim that the $450 per hour rate sought by him and his local
counsel was appropriate.
21

City of Fort Worth filed on November 8, 2016, a responsive
document in which it concurred in the court's assessment that the
amount of time devoted by Kellum to district court activities was
excessive, and that the per hour rate the attorneys are seeking
to charge against City of Fort Worth is significantly higher than
rates that would be charged in the Fort Worth/Tarrant County
area.

Doc. 62.

City of Fort Worth attached to its response a

2015 Hourly Fact Sheet published by the State Bar of Texas,
Department of Research & Analysis, showing per hour rates charged
in this and other areas of the State of Texas by attorneys with
different years of practice experience, broken down by
specialties and types of litigation.

Id. at Ex. A.

By the November 8, 2016 filing, Kellum, in the name of
plaintiff, seeks to add $7,920 of attorney's fees to the claim
against city of Fort Worth.

Doc. 60 at 1.

The Fourth

Supplemental Time Statement dated November 4, 2016, of Center for
Religious Expression shows that the total time Kellum claims he
devoted to this case between September 30, 2016 and November 3,
2016, was 26.90 hours, and that he has adjusted the time down to
17.60 hours, for which he is seeking payment from City of Fort
Worth.

The adjustment consists of a reduction of 8.20 hours for

excessiveness and a reduction of 1.10 hours as clerical, for a
total downward adjustment of 9.30 hours, resulting in the 17.60
22

hours claimed as attorney's fees.

Doc. 61 at Appx. 013-014.

All

of the time shown on the statement, except for the .70 of an hour
devoted to preparation of the appendix, pertains to work done by
Kellum to make known his disagreement with the tentative
conclusions expressed by the court in the October 18, 2016 order.
Put another way, all of the time, except for the .70 of an hour,
was devoted to activities by Kellum to convince the court to
award attorney's fees against city of Fort Worth that were based
on excessive hours and an excessive per hour rate.

The court has

concluded that City of Fort Worth should not be required to pay
for that time.

Therefore, the court is including only .70 of an

hour of the time shown on the November 4, 2016 Fourth
Supplemental Time Statement as attorney time for which City of
Fort Worth is to pay.
5.

The Third Post-Remand Add-On (November 22, 2016)

The third post-remand add-on by Kellum, in the name of
plaintiff, to the attorney's fees sought from City of Fort worth,
which was filed November 22, 2016, sought an additional $1,800 in
attorney's fees from City of Fort Worth for Kellum's time,
represented by the Fifth Supplemental Time Statement of Center
for Religious Expression, to be four hours of work done between
November 8, 2016 and November 11, 2016.
App. 3.

Docs. 63 at 7 & 64 at

No adjustment was made in that time for billing
23

judgment.

Essentially all of that time, as reflected by the

documents filed by plaintiff on November 22, 2016, was devoted to
work calculated to persuade the court to award the attorneys'
fees against City of Fort Worth based on excessive hours and
excessive per hour rates.

The court concludes that none of those

hours should be charged against City of Fort Worth.
6.

The Total of the Attorney Time the Court Finds to Have
Been Reasonable to Have Been Devoted by Counsel for the
Plaintiff to District Court and Fifth Circuit
Activities Related to This Case

Consistent with the findings and conclusions of the court
expressed in the preceding parts of this section II.A., the court
concludes that 210.58 hours is the most that the attorneys,

in

the name of plaintiff, should recover from City of Fort Worth as
reasonable attorney time devoted to district court and Fifth
Circuit attorney activities related to this case, starting in
October 2014 and going through this date, and that an award of
attorneys' fees against City of Fort Worth based on any attorney
time beyond that would be excessive and unreasonable."

10

The 210.58 hours represents the 121.52 hours of attorney time the comt is honoring as
reasonable as to the initial claim for attorneys' fees, supra at 17; 8.96 hours of attorney time claimed by
the August 31, 2015 pre-appeal add-on, supra at 19; 79.40 hours, representing attorney time the court has
accepted as reasonable sought by the October 5, 2016 post-remand add-on (78.70 hours claimed by
Kellum and .70 of an hour claimed by Pikl), supra at 20; and .70 of an hour of the time included in the
November 8, 2016 post-remand add-on, supra at 21-23.

24

B.

The Per Hour Rates Claimed by Plaintiff Are Excessive
The court finds that plaintiff's claim that he should

recover from City of Fort Worth attorneys' fees based on a $450
per hour rate is no more credible than his claim that Kellum
should recover from City of Fort Worth attorney's fees for 65.10
hours for preparation of the initial suit papers.

The work

Kellum did in this action was purely routine for him.

In fact,

it appears from the papers Kellum has filed in other actions,
supra at 8 n.6, to be more routine than the kind of legal work
attorneys do in representing insurance companies regularly in
insurance litigation or representing lenders regularly in the
type of litigation that has been popular for the past several
years over whether a foreclosure should be allowed or was
properly conducted.

The State Bar of Texas Study provided by

City of Fort Worth, Doc. 62, Ex. A, bears out this court's
experience that lawyers in the Fort Worth area handling routine
litigation normally charge their clients a per hour rate of less
than $300, id. at 11-12.
In the order the court issued on October 18, 2016, the court
expressed the tentative conclusion that the per hour rate for
each of the attorneys who have submitted billings with the
August 11, 2016 motion to recover attorneys' fees and expenses
should not exceed $300.

Doc. 59 at 4-5.
25

Three Hundred Dollars

per hour is more than attorneys in Fort Worth/Tarrant County are
charging for most kinds of litigation.

Doc. 62, Ex. A at 11-12.

The "per hour" rate Kellum and the attorneys who filed
affidavits in support of Kellum appears, from what has been
presented to the court, to be a rate that has no basis in
reality.

According to Kellum's filings, he does not charge his

clients for the work he does.

Doc. 39 at 005, , , 15-19, 21.

The

$450 per hour rate is not what he would charge a client, but is
what he hopes a court will approve for his services.
, 22.

Id. at 006,

Apparently the attorneys who have filed declarations in

support of a $450 per hour fee are in somewhat the same position.
Id. at

~

23.

Thus, the "prevailing market" Kellum seeks to make

controlling is not a market of what clients have paid, or will
pay, but, rather, is a market of what attorneys in his position
contend in their fee claims is a reasonable per hour rate.

The

fact that from time to time they convince a court to make an
award based on that or a similar rate, id., is not controlling.
A proper per hour rate to be charged against City of Fort Worth
is the customary rate charged for comparable work by an attorney
of comparable experience in the Fort Worth area.
A factor Kellum urges the court to consider in determining
the reasonableness of the fee charges is the contingent nature of

26

the attorney work.

Doc. 40 at 7

§

F.

In Burlington, the Supreme

Court had the following to say on that subject:
[E]nhancement for the contingency risk posed by each
case would encourage meritorious claims to be brought,
but only at the social cost of indiscriminately
encouraging nonmeritorious claims to be brought as
well.
We think that an unlikely objective of the
•reasonable fees" provisions.
505

u.s.

at 563.

In Perdue, the Supreme Court made mention of an important
factor to be considered, when it said that:
In many cases, attorney's fees awarded under § 1988 are
not paid by the individuals responsible for the
constitutional or statutory violations on which the
judgment is based.
Instead, the fees are paid in
effect by state and local taxpayers, and because state
and local governments have limited budgets, money that
is used to pay attorney's fees is money that cannot be
used for programs that provide vital public services.
559 U.S. at 559.

In support of the quoted language, the Court

cited Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 448 (2009), where the Court
noted that •a federal-court decree has the effect of dictating
state or local budget priorities."
In Perdue, the Court said that •a 'reasonable' fee is a fee
that is sufficient to induce a capable attorney to undertake the
representation of a meritorious civil rights case."
552.

559 U.S. at.

The court is satisfied, and finds and concludes, that there

are capable attorneys in the Fort Worth area that would have
undertaken representation of a plaintiff in this civil rights
27

case at a per hour rate of $300, and that such a rate is a
reasonable one for the kind of representation the attorneys have
provided plaintiff, both at the district court level and at the
Fifth Circuit level.

Therefore, that is the rate the court is

using in determining the attorneys' fee award to be made in favor
of plaintiff against City of Fort Worth in this case.

Plaintiff

has not persuaded the court that a per hour rate greater than
$300 should be used to determine the fee award to be made here.
C.

Total of the Attorneys' Fees to be Awarded Against City of
Fort Worth
Based on the court's determination that the award of

attorneys' fees against City of Fort Worth should be based on
210.58 hours of attorney time, and that the per hour rate should
be $300, the court finds, and concludes, that the attorney fee
award to be made to plaintiff against City of Fort Worth should
be $63,174.00.
D.

Non-Taxable Expenses Claimed by Plaintiff
The document attached to this order as Exhibit "C" is a

listing and itemization of all the non-taxable expenses plaintiff
has included in his initial August 11, 2015 claim and in each of
his subsequent add-ons that he is asking the court to order City
of Fort Worth to pay.

28

There are items shown on the initial, August 11, 2015,
statement of Center for Religious Expression that the court
finds, and concludes, should not be charged against City of Fort
Worth.

The court is referring to the April 27, 2015 $50 payment

for Certificate of Good Standing, the May 1, 2015 Pro Hac Vice
Fee of $25, and the Travel expenses shown for June 19, 2015, and
July 2-3, 2015, in the total amount of $1246.50.

Kellum chose to

handle plaintiff's suit in Fort Worth from his base of operation
in Tennessee, and chose to do so when he was not a member of the
Bar of this court.

The court is satisfied that a local attorney

who is a member of this court's Bar could have represented
plaintiff as well as Kellum did.

If plaintiff had retained a

local attorney directly, or if Kellum had referred him to one,
those expenses would not have occurred.

The court considers them

not to be reasonable and necessary expenses that should be
charged against City of Fort Worth for the legal representation
plaintiff received from Kellum.

The court is denying recovery of

the $286.94 expense amount shown on the third post-remand add-on
for the same reason that attorney time shown on that add-on was
denied.

Supra at 23-24.

The court has concerns about some of the other expense items
shown on Exhibit c, such as postage and computer research.
Normally the court would consider items of that kind to be part
29

of attorney overhead, not to be charged separately to a defendant
in a fee-shifting ruling.

However, those items are so

insignificant in amount that the court is not devoting further
attention to them.

After deducting the total of the items

mentioned above that the court is not allowing as part of the
recovery against City of Fort Worth, the balance of expenses
claimed by plaintiff is $1,974.92.
E.

Total Attorneys' Fees and Expenses Being Awarded Plaintiff
Against City of Fort Worth
The total of the attorney fee and expense award to be made

against City of Fort Worth for the benefit of plaintiff's
attorneys is $65,148.92.
III.
Order
Consistent with the foregoing,
The court ORDERS that plaintiff, David Grisham, have and
recover from City of Fort Worth $65,148.92 as recoverable
attorneys' fees and non-taxable expenses incurred on behalf of
plaintiff by his attorneys, and that City of Fort Worth, or
someone acting on its behalf, can satisfy that payment obligation
by providing to Kellum a check or comparable payment item, made

30

payable to plaintiff, Center for Religious Expression, and Scheef

SIGNED December 16, 2016.

District Ju

31

Time Shown on August 5, 2015 Billing
of Center for Religious Expression
for Preparation of Initial Pleadings
(Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Filed in May 2015)

Dates
of Work

Description
of Work

Actual
Time

Adiusted
Time

Dec-08-14

Review materials to
analyze for lawsuit
and determine issues.

2.20

2.20

Dec-15-14

Prepare outline of
complaint.

5.20

5.20

Jan-28-15

Prepare Complaint.

2.50

2.50

Feb-11-15

Prepare Complaint.

3.20

3.20

Feb-12-15

Prepare Complaint.

8.50

8.50

Feb-16-15

Prepare Complaint.

5.10

5.10

Feb-17-15

Prepare Complaint.

1.10

1.10

Feb-18-15

Prepare Complaint.

2.30

2.30

Feb-25-15

Prepare Complaint.

0.90

0.90

Feb-26-15

Prepare Motion for
Preliminary Injunction.

0.80

0.80

Prepare Memorandum in
Support of Motion for
Preliminary Injunction.

3.30

3.30

Feb-27-15

Prepare Memorandum in
Support of Motion for
Preliminary Injunction.

3.50

3.50

Mar-02-15

Prepare Memorandum in
Support of Motion for
Preliminary Injunction.

5.90

5.90

1

Exhibit "A" to Memorandum
Opinion and Order dated
December J,.6, 2016 in
Case No. 4:15-CV-324-A
Page 1 of 3

Mar-03-15

Prepare Memorandum in
Support of Motion for
Preliminary Injunction.

2.10

2.10

Mar-09-15

Prepare Complaint.

2.40

2.40

Mar-11-15

Prepare Memorandum in
Support of Motion for
Preliminary Injunction.

2.50

2.50

Prepare Affidavit of
David Grisham.

1.50

1. 50

Prepare Motion for
Preliminary Injunction.

0.80

0.20

Mar-12-15

Prepare Affidavit of
Misty Hodges.

1. 70

1.70

Mar-26-15

Edit Complaint.

0.50

0.50

Mar-26-15

Prepare Exhibits for
Motion for Preliminary
Injunction.

0.80

0.80

Mar-27-15

Prepare Affidavit of
David Grisham.

2.60

2.60

Mar-30-15

Supplement Complaint.

2.10

2.10

Mar-30-15

Supplement Memorandum
in Support of Motion
for Preliminary
Injunction.

0.70

0.70

Mar-31-15

Supplement and Edit
Pleadings.

1. 90

1.90

Apr-10-15

Prepare Appendix for
Motion for Preliminary
Injunction.

.80

0.00

Apr-21-15

Edit complaint.

0.70

0.70

2

Exhibit "A" to Memorandum
Opinion and Order dated
December 16, 2016 in
Case No. 4:15-CV-324-A
Page 2 of 3

Apr-21-15

Edit complaint.

0.30

0.30

Apr-21-15

Edit Memorandum in
Support of Motion for
Preliminary Injunction.

0.60

0.60

66.50

65.10

Total Time Shown for Preparation of
Initial Pleadings

3

Exhibit "A" to Memorandum
Opinion and Order dated
December 16, 2016 in
Case No. 4:15-CV-324-A
Page 3 of 3

TIME RELATED TO COMMUNICATIONS WITH CO-COUNSEL

1.

August 5, 2015 Billing of Center for Religious Expression

Dates
of Work

Description
of Work

Actual
Time

Adiusted
Time

Apr-14-15

Telephone conference
with co-counsel Jim
Pikl re: case.

0 '20

0. 20

Apr-21-15

Email co-counsel re:
pleadings.

0. 20

0. 20

Review email from
co-counsel re:
pleadings.

0.10

0.10

Email co-counsel re:
edits to pleadings.

0. 40

0. 40

Review email from
co-counsel re: status
and theory.

0.10

0.10

Email to co-counsel
re: status and theory.

0.20

0. 20

Review email from
co-counsel re: status.

0.10

0.10

Email to co-counsel
re: status.

0.10

0.10

Review email from
co-counsel re: answer.

0.10

0.10

Email to co-counsel
re: answer.

0.10

0.10

Call to co-counsel
re: status.

0.10

0.10

May-05-15

May-28-15

May-29-15

1

Exhibit "B" to Memorandum
Opinion and Order dated
December 16, 2016 in
Case No. 4:15-CV-324-A
Page 1 of 9

Email to co-counsel
re: status.

0.10

0.10

Review email from
co-counsel re: status.

0.10

0.10

Email to co-counsel
re: status.

0.10

0.10

Telephone conference
with co-counsel re:
status.

0.20

0.20

Review email from
co-counsel re:
Response.

0.10

0.10

Email co-counsel re:
Response to Motion for
Preliminary Injunction.

0.10

0.10

Email to co-counsel
re: consent judgment
and status.

0.20

0.20

Review email from
co-counsel re: status.

0.10

0.10

Email co-counsel re:
status.

0.10

0.10

June-08-15

Review email from
co-counsel re: status.

0.10

0.10

June-09-15

Email to co-counsel
re: consent order.

0.10

0.10

Review email from
co-counsel re: status.

0.10

0.10

Email to co-counsel
re: status.

0.10

0.10

Review email from
co-counsel re: status.

0.10

0.10

June-01-15

June-02-15

June-10-15

2

Exhibit "B" to Memorandum
Opinion and Order dated
December 16, 2016 in
Case No. 4:15-CV-324-A
Page 2 of 9

Email to co-counsel
re: status.

0.10

0.10

Email to co-counsel
re: status.

0.10

0.10

Review email from
co-counsel re: status.

0.10

0.10

Email to co-counsel
re: status.

0.10

0.10

Email to co-counsel
re: status.

0. 20

0.20

Email to co-counsel
Re: Motion for
Preliminary Injunction
response.

0.10

0.10

Review email from
co-counsel re: Motion
for Preliminary
Injunction Response.

0.10

0.10

June-16-15

Email to co-counsel
re: exhibits.

0. 20

0.20

June-17-15

Email to co-counsel
re: Reply.

0.20

0.20

June-18-15

Review email from
co-counsel re:
settlement conference.

0.10

0.10

Email to co-counsel
re: settlement
conference.

0.10

0.10

0.10
Review email from
co-counsel re: strategy.

0.10

0.20

0. 20

June-11-15

June-12-15

June-19-15

Email to co-counsel
re: strategy.

3

Exhibit "B" to Memorandum
Opinion and Order dated
December 16, 2016 in
Case No. 4:15-CV-324-A
Page 3 of 9

Email co-counsel
re: Reply and
conversion.

0.30

0.30

Review email from
co-counsel re:
conversion.

0.10

0.10

Email to co-counsel
re: conversion.

0.10

0.10

June-22-15

Email to co-counsel
re: status.

0. 20

0.20

June-23-15

Email to co-counsel
re: status.

0.20

0.20

Review email from
co-counsel re:
paperwork.

0.10

0.10

Email to co-counsel
re: paperwork.

0.10

0.10

Review email from
co-counsel re: status.

0.10

0.10

Email co-counsel
re: status.

0.20

0. 20

Review email from
co-counsel re: status.

0.10

0.10

Email co-counsel
re: status.

0.10

0.10

Review email from
co-counsel re: status
conference.

0.10

0.10

Email co-counsel
re: status conference.

0.10

0.10

June-24-15

June-25-15

June-29-15

4

Exhibit "B" to Memorandum
Opinion and Order dated
December 16, 2016 in
Case No. 4:15-CV-324-A
Page 4 of 9

Jul-02-15

2.50
Meet with co-counsel
re: settlement
conference and strategy.

2.50

Meet with co-counsel
re: strategy.

0. 20

0.20

Jul-03-15

0.30
Email to co-counsel
re: fees and settlement.

0.30

Jul-07-15

Review email from
co-counsel re:
settlement.

0.10

0.10

Email to co-counsel
re: settlement.

0.10

0.10

Review email from
co-counsel re status.

0.10

0.10

Email co-counsel
re: status.

0.10

0.10

Review email from
co-counsel re status.

0.10

0.10

Email co-counsel
re: joint status
report.

0.10

0.10

Email to co-counsel
re: status of report.

0.20

0.20

Review email from
co-counsel re: status.

0.10

0.10

Email co-counsel
re: status.

0.10

0.10

Review email from
co-counsel re: joint
status report.

0.10

0.10

Jul-08-15

Jul-13-15

Jul-14-15

5

Exhibit "B" to Memorandum
Opinion and Order dated
December 16, 2016 in
Case No. 4:15-CV-324-A
Page 5 of 9

Jul-15-15

Review email from
co-counsel re:
joint status report.

0.10

Email co-counsel re:
joint status report.

0.10

0.10

Jul-17-15

Email to co-counsel
re: status.

0.10

0.10

Jul-24-15

Email co-counsel
re: status.

0.10

0.10

Jul-27-15

Review email from
co-counsel re: status
of settlement.

0.10

0.10

Email co-counsel
re: strategy for
settlement.

0. 20

0.20

Review email from
co-counsel re: status.

0.10

0.10

Telephone conference
with co-counsel re:
status.

0.10

0.10

Telephone conference
with co-counsel re:
settlement.

0.10

0.10

Review email from
co-counsel re:
settlement.

0.10

0.10

Review email from
co-counsel re:
conference.

0.10

0.10

Email co-counsel
re: conference and
numbers for call.

0. 20

0.20

Jul-28-15

6

Exhibit "B" to Memorandum
Opinion and Order dated
December 16, 2016 in
Case No. 4:15-CV-324-A
Page 6 of 9

Review email from
co-counsel re: order.

0.10

0.10

Email co-counsel
re: order.

0.10

0.10

Prepare letter to
co-counsel re: order.

0. 20

0.20

Review email from
co-counsel re: phone
conference.

0.10

0.10

Review email from
co-counsel re: fee
petition.

0.10

0.10

Email co-counsel re:
fee petition.

0.10

0.10

Email to co-counsel
re: conference with
judge re: settlement.

0.20

0. 20

Review email from
co-counsel re:
settlement offer.

0.10

0.10

Review email from
co-counsel re: status.

0.10

0.10

Email to co-counsel
re: status and
objections to time
statement.

0.10

0.10

Review email from
co-counsel re:
settlement.

0.10

0.10

Email co-counsel re:
settlement.

0.10

0.10

7

Exhibit "B" to Memorandum
opinion and Order dated
December 16, 2016 in
case No. 4:15-CV-324-A
Page 7 of 9

Telephone conference
with co-counsel re:
conference and status.

0.10

0.10

Telephone conference
with co-counsel re:
conference with judge.

0.10

0.10

Review email from
co-counsel re: revised
order.

0.10

0.10

Email to co-counsel
re: effect of revised
order.

0.10

0.10

J·ul- 3 o-15

Email to co-counsel
re: fee petition.

0.20

0.20

Aug-04-15

Email to co-counsel
re: fee petition.

0.20

0.20

14.50

14.50

Jul-29-15

TOTALS
2.

August 5, 2015 Billing of Scheef & Stone, LLP

Dates
pf Work

Description
of Work

Time Shown
on Billing

6/9/15

Emails with counsel
regarding replies
and responses to
Motion to Dismiss.

1. 60

6/10/15

Emails regarding
proposed reply brief.

0.80

6/11/15

Emails with counsel
regarding proposed
orders.

0.80

6/12/15

Emails regarding
response to Motion to
Dismiss.

0.60

8

Exhibit "B" to Memorandum
Opinion and Order dated
December 16, 2016 in
Case No. 4:15-CV-324-A
Page 8 of 9

6/18/15

Emails regarding status
conference and reply
brief.

6/19/15

Emails regarding
setting-up status
conference (1.0);
Emails regarding reply
brief ( . 8) .
Emails with Mr. Kellum
regarding status.

7/22/15

TOTAL

1.50

1. 80

0.30

7.40

•

9

Exhibit "B" to Memorandum
Opinion and Order ~ated
December 16, 2016 ln
case No. 4:15-CV-324-A
Page 9 of 9

List of Expenses Claimed in Initial Motion
and in Each of the Add-Ons

1.

The Initial (August 11, 2015) Claim
a.

Apr-27-15
May-01-15
May-30-15

The August 5, 2015 Time Statement of
Center for Religious Expression
Certificate of Good Standing
Pro Hac Vice Fee
Shipping - FedEx - Certificate of GS
Shipping - FedEx - Signature pages
Shipping - FedEx - MPI

June-19-15
July-02-·15

July-03-15

Shipping
Travel Travel Travel Travel Travel Travel Travel Travel -

36.38

- FedEx - Certificate of GS
American Airlines - Airfare
Parking
Starbucks - Meal
The Cheesecake Factory - Meal
Embassy Suites - Lodging
National Car Rental - Car Rental
Shell - Gas
DFW Airport - Meal

Total Disbursements
b.

05/04/2015
05/05/2015
05/05/2015
05/06/2015
05/06/2015

$50.00
25.00
26.55
38.96

30.48
774.18
12.00
5.46
31.00
202.27
123.49
13.00
10.10
$1378.87

The "Detail Transactions File List" of
Scheef & Stone, LLP
Postage
Courier service (670) Special Delivery
Service, Inc.
Photocopies
Courier service (670) Special Delivery
Service, Inc.
Photocopies

1

$19.44
82.66
3.20
105.13
63.00

Exhibit "C" to Memorandum
opinion and Order dated
December 16, 2016 in
Case No. 4:15-CV-324-A
Page 1 of 3

05/11/2015
05/12/2015
05/12/2015

Computerized legal research (1013)
Thomson Reuters - West
Photocopies
Postage

$475.49

Total for Expenses
2.

199.26
1.40
1.40.

The Pre-Appeal (August 31, 2015) Add-On
The August 27, 2015 Supp. Time Statement of
Center for Religious Expression

Aug-6-15
Aug-7-15
Aug··7-15
Aug-10-15

Shipping - FedEx Shipping - FedEx Shipping - FedEx Shipping - FedEx Estimated Shipping

Pikl Declaration
Weber Declaration
Mateer Declaration
Motion Attorney's Fees
- FedEx - MAF Reply

$172.66

Total Disbursements
3.

$15.04
28.16
60.31
39.15
30.00

The First Post-Remand (October 5, 2016) Add-On
a.

Nov-03-15
Feb-06-16
Mar-31-16

Jun-01-·16

Jul-01-16

The September 30, 2016 Third Time Statemen~
of Center for Religious Expression
Shipping - FedEx - Notice of Appeal
Shipping - FedEx - Appellate Brief
Shipping - Reply Brief
Shipping - Reply Brief
Copy expenses
Westlaw expenses
Travel - Agent Fee
Travel - Airfare - Delta
Travel - Seat Assignment
Travel - Seat Assignment
Travel - Seat Assignment
Travel - Seat Assignment
Travel - Shuttle - Execucar
Travel - Meal - ACME Oyster House
Travel - Meal - Master Concessionaire
Travel - f'lleal - ccs Coffeehouse
Travel - Parking - Memphis
Travel - Meal - The Grove
Travel - Lodging - Hilton New Orleans
Travel - Meal - Mothers
2

$18.97
39.05
14.42
15.57
32.85
14.78
35.00
450.70
15.00
15.00
15.00
15.00
57.00
22.42
8.49
7.48
12.00
9.44
200.62
24.92

Exhibit "C" to Memorandum
Opinion and Order dated
December 16, 2016 in
Case No. 4:15-CV-324-A
Page 2 of 3

Travel - Meal - Starbucks
$1029.28

Total Disbursements
b.

The "Detail Transactions File List• of
Scheef & Stone, LLP

02/25/2016

4.

Courier Service (670) Special
Delivery Service, Inc.
Computerized legal research

$83.39
0. 20

Total for Expenses

07/29/2015

$83.59

The Second Post-Remand (November 8, 2016) Add-On
The November 4, 2016 Fourth Supplemental Time
Statement of Center for Religious Expression

Oct-04-16
Nov-04-16

Shipping - FedEx - Supplemental Motion
for Attorney's Fees.
Shipping - FedEx - Memorandum in Support
of Supplemental Motion for Attorney's Fees

50.00
$81.53

Total Disbursements
5.

$31.53

The Third Post-Remand (November 22, 2016) Add-On
The November 18, 2016 Fifth Supplemental Time
Statement of Center for Religious Expression

Nov-18-16

Shipping - FedEx - Reply in Support of
Supplemental Motion for Attorney's fees.
Westlaw Expenses
Copy Expenses
Total Disbursements

Total Expenses Claimed:

3

$30.00
67.94
189.00
$286.94

$1378.87
475.49
172.66
1029.28
83.59
81.53
286.94
$3508.36
Exhibit "C" to Memorandum
Opinion and Order dated
December 16, 2016 in
Case No. 4:15-CV-324-A
Page 3 of 3