Lincoln et al v. City of Colleyville Texas et al

Filing 108

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The court ORDERS that the 94 motion for summary judgment of Meeks and Scott be, and is hereby, granted; that Erin take nothing on her claims against Meeks and Scott; and that Erin's claims against Meeks and Scott be, and are hereby, dismissed. The court determines that there is no just reason for delay in, and hereby directs, entry of final judgment as to the dismissal of Erin's claims against Meeks and Scott. (Ordered by Judge John McBryde on 1/17/2017) (tln)

U.S. DISTRiCT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FILED
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEX S
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FORT WORTH DIVISION
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ERIN LINCOLN, INDIVIDUALLY AND
AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
ESTATE OF JOHN LINCOLN, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,

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L...----·'''""''"'" .,.......,, ·······~--·

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CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COt1\T

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BY--------~----------­
~)epllty

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vs.

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CITY OF COLLEYVILLE, TEXAS,
ET AL.,

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Defendants.

NO. 4:15-CV-819-A

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Came on for consideration the motion of defendants Kyle
Meeks

("Meeks") and Sandra Scott {"Scott") for summary judgment.

The court, having considered the motion, the response of
plaintiff Erin Lincoln, individually ("Erin"), the reply, the
summary judgment evidence, the record, and applicable
authorities, finds that the motion should be granted.
I.

Background
The allegations of plaintiffs' first amended complaint are
set forth in the

court~s

memorandum opinion and order of March 4,

2016, Doc. 1 65, and are not repeated here except to point out the
specific allegations made regarding movants. As the court noted
in the March 4 opinion, Erin is asserting that Scott in effect

1

The "Doc.

"reference is to the number of the item on the docket in this action.

arrested her and transported her to the Colleyville police
station and that Meeks interrogated her for five hours at the
police station following the shooting death of her father and
forced her to write out a statement. Doc. 65 at 11-12.
II.
Grounds of the Motion
Meeks and Scott maintain that Erin cannot overcome their
qualified immunity defenses. That is, they contend that Erin
cannot show a Fourth Amendment violation and that the right was
clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.
III.
Applicable Legal Principles
Qualified immunity insulates a government official from
civil damages liability when the official's actions do not
"violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known."
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982).

Harlow v.

For a right to be "clearly

established," the right's contours must be "sufficiently clear
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right."
(1987).

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

Individual liability thus turns on the objective legal

reasonableness of the defendant's actions assessed in light of
clearly established law at the time.

2

Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.

224, 228

(1991); Anderson, 483

u.s.

at 639-40.

In Harlow, the

court explained that a key question is "whether that law was
clearly established at the time an action occurred" because "[i]f
the law at that time was not clearly established, an official
could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal
developments, nor could he fairly be said to 'know' that the law
forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful."

457 U.S.

at 818.
In analyzing whether an individual defendant is entitled to
qualified immunity, the court considers whether plaintiff has
alleged any violation of a clearly established right, and, if so,
whether the individual defendant's conduct was objectively
reasonable.

Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991); Duckett

v. City of Cedar Park, 950 F.2d 272, 276-80 (5th Cir. 1992).

In

so doing, the court should not assume that plaintiff has stated a
claim, i.e., asserted a violation of a constitutional right.
Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232.

Rather, the court must be certain

that, if the facts alleged by plaintiff are true, a violation has
clearly occurred.

Connelly v.

Comptrolle~,

876 F.2d 1209, 1212

(5th Cir. 1989).
In assessing whether the law was clearly established at the
time, the court is to consider all relevant legal authority,

3

whether cited by the parties or not.
510, 512

Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S.

(1994). And, as the Fifth Circuit has noted:

Although a case directly on point is not necessary,
there must be adequate authority at a sufficiently high
level of specificity to put a reasonable official on
notice that his conduct is definitively unlawful . .
Abstract or general statements of legal principle
untethered to analogous or near-analogous facts are not
sufficient to establish a.right 'clearly' in a given
context, rather, the inquiry must focus on whether a
right is clearly established as to the specific facts
of the case.
·
Vincent v. City of Sulphur, 805 F.3d 543, 547 (sth Cir.
2015) (citations omitted).
If public officials of reasonable competence could differ on
the lawfulness of defendant's actions, the defendant is entitled
to qualified immunity.

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341

(1986); Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1273 (5th
Cir. 1992). A mistake in judgment does not cause an officer to
lose his qualified immunity defense.

In Hunter, the Supreme

Court explained:
The qualified immunity standard "gives ample room for
mistaken judgments" by protecting "all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."
Malley, [475 U.S.] at 343. .
This accommodation for
reasonable error exists because "officials should not err
always on the side of caution" because they fear being sued.

502 U.S. at 229. Further,

"an allegation df malice is not

sufficient to defeat immunity if the defendant acted in an
objectively reasonable manner."

Malley, 475 U.S. at 341.
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When a defendant relies on qualified immunity, the burden is
on the plaintiff to negate the defense. Kovacic v. Villarreal,
628 F.3d 209, 211 (5th Cir. 2010)

i

Foster v. City of Lake

Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 428 (5th Cir. 1994). The test is demanding,
Vincent, 805 F.3d at 547, and the hurdle significant. Brown v.
Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 2001). Qualified immunity is
not to be denied unless existing precedent places the
constitutionality of the defendant's conduct beyond debate.
Vincent, 805 F.3d at 547.

IV.
Analysis
The basis for Erin's claims against Meeks and Scott is that
she was involuntarily detained for hours following the shooting
death of her father by tactical officers. The summary judgment
evidence, however, does not support that contention. 2 Erin says
that she was never asked what she wanted to do. But, she never
says that she told Meeks or Scott that she wished to leave the
car or the room where she was being questioned. She makes only
the conclusory allegation that "without her consent" she was
transported to the police station and taken to a room and
interviewed. Doc. 105 at 2. "I did not wish to, or consent to, be

2

Meeks and Scott assume for purposes of their motion that Erin was being detained, but the issue
of whether they violated Erin's constitutional rights turns on whether the detention was lawful.
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involuntarily restrained, detained and interrogated until the
early morning hours of the next day." Id. Meeks testified that it
never crossed his mind that Erin was being involuntarily
detained. Doc. 105 at 25. Erin did not ask any questions or argue
or say she did not want to go to the police station. Doc. 105 at
32. As a police officer, he does not expect people to comply with
what he tells them. Id. Rather, he expects people to protest if
they do not like what he tells them is going to happen. Doc. 105
at 41. Scott testified that Erin never said anything to her. Doc.
105 at 53, 62. It never occurred to Scott that Erin might be
being held involuntarily. Doc. 105 at 63. Scott believed Erin to
be a cooperating witness. Doc. 105 at 66. Neither Meeks nor Scott
saw Erin until long after the shooting and after she had been
placed in a police car. Doc. 96 at 26, 30. Scott transported Erin
to the police station. Doc. 96·at 26-27. Meeks and another
officer interviewed Erin at the police station for approximately
one hour and 43 minutes, which includes time Erin spent writing a
statement. Doc. 96 at 31. At no time did Erin protest or say she
wanted to leave or give any indication that she did not want to
cooperate. Id.i Doc. 96 at 33i Doc. 105 at 75.
Officers arriving late to a scene take it as they find it.
That is, they are entitled to assume that proper procedures have
been followed and they are not required to second guess what has
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earlier transpired. White v. Pauly, No. 16-67, 2017 WL 69170, at
*5

(U.S. Jan. 9, 2017) .. Thus, Meeks and Scott were entitled to

believe that there was probable cause to detain Erin or, as it
appeared to them, that she was a cooperating witness.
Investigative detention can be continued when based on consent.
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212

(1979). Erin has not

pointed to any summary judgment evidence to support the
contention that she was unlawfully detained. Nor has she cited
any authority to establish that every reasonable officer would
have known that she was being unlawfully detained.

(The closest

she comes is an Alaska case decided more than two years after the
events giving rise to Erin's claims. Estate of Tasi v.
Municipality of Anchorage, No. 3:13-CV-00234-SLG, 2016 WL 370694
(D. Alaska Jan. 28, 2016) . 3 ) Accordingly, Meeks and Scott are
entitled to qualified immunity.

v.
Order
The court ORDERS that the motion for summary judgment of
Meeks and Scott be, and is hereby, granted; that Erin take
nothing on her claims against Meeks and Scott; and that Erin's
claims against Meeks and Scott be, and are hereby, dismissed.

3

The court need not discuss other reasons that Tasi is not instructive in this case.
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The court determines that there is no just reason for delay
in, and hereby directs, entry of final judgment as to the
dismissal of Erin's claims against Meeks and Scott.
SIGNED January 17, 2017.

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