Lincoln et al v. City of Colleyville Texas et al

Filing 74

Memorandum Opinion and Order granting 67 MOTION and Brief to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, and in the Alternative, Request for Rule 7(a) Reply to Immune Defense. The court ORDERS that movants' motion to dismiss be, and is her eby, granted, and that plaintiffs' claims against Lewis and Stites be, and are hereby, dismissed. The court determines that there is no just reason for delay in, and hereby directs, entry of final judgment as to the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims against defendants Lewis and Stites. (Ordered by Judge John McBryde on 4/8/2016) (tln)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COU~'I'~ ;~; ,,
NORTHERN DISTRICT Of TEXA&·-·-····~-~· ...:..'.: •·'
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FORT WORTH DIVI~ION
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ERIN LINCOLN, INDIVIDUALLY AND
AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
ESTATE OF JOHN LINCOLN, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,

CITY OF COLLEYVILLE, TEXAS,
ET AL.
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Defendants.

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C!

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vs.

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NO. 4:15-CV-819-A

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Came on for consideration the motion of defendants Sergeant
Leah Lewis ("Lewis") and Officer Tim Stites ("Stites") to dismiss
and, in the alternative, for Rule 7(a) reply to immunity defense.
The court, having considered the motion, the response of
plaintiff Erin Lincoln ("Erin"), the record, and applicable
authorities, finds that the motion to dismiss should be granted.
I.

Background
The allegations of plaintiffs' first amended complaint are
set forth in the court's memorandum opinion and order of March 4,
2016, and are not repeated here except to point out the specific
allegations made regarding movants. Aside from mentioning that
movants can be served through the Southlake Police Department,

Doc. 1 37 at ,,13-14, plaintiffs do not mention them again until
,57. There, they simply allege that Stites, Lewis and another
officer participated in detaining Erin in the back of a patrol
car. No details are provided. Plaintiffs only say that movants
would have intercepted Erin had she attempted to leave. Again in
,

they simply state that movants prevented Erin from leaving

60,

the back of the patrol car. In ,

61, they say that the conduct of

movants was objectively unreasonable.
II.
Grounds of the Motion
Movants maintain that plaintiffs have not pleaded
sufficiently to state a claim against them and have not, in any
event, pleaded sufficiently to overcome their right to qualified
immunity. They urge that the claims against them should be
dismissed. In the alternative, they request a Rule 7(a) reply to
their immunity defense.
III.
Applicable Legal Principles
The applicable legal principles are set forth in the court's
March 4 memorandum opinion and order.

1

The "Doc." reference is to the number of the item on the court's docket in this action.
2

IV.
Analysis
Plaintiffs/ complaint does not allege any facts regarding
the arrival of movants on the scene or their role in the events
giving rise to this action/ other than to say that movants
participated in detaining Erin in the back of a police car. As
noted in the court 1 s earlier opinion/ Erin sat in the car for
approximately two hours. Doc. 37 at

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29-30. Plaintiffs allege

that Erin suffered from a severe anxiety disorder and that she
was extremely distraught. Id.

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29. There is no allegation that

Erin or her family had any contact with movantsr physical or
verbal. In sumr plaintiffs have alleged little more than bare
legal conclusions. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly/ 550 U.S. 544

& n.3

1

555

(2007). The facts pleaded do no more than permit the court

to infer the possibility of misconduct and that is not enough to
allow plaintiffs to go forward with their claims. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal/ 556

u.s.

662

1

678-79

(2009).

Even if plaintiffs/ pleading was sufficient under Rule
8(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure/ they have not
overcome the qualified immunity defense asserted by movants.
Mullenix v. Lunar 136 S. Ct. 305
475 U.S. 335

1

1

308

(2015); Malley v. Briggs/

341 (1986). Plaintiffs have not cited any authority

to establish that every reasonable officer would have known that

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he could not detain a witness for a period of approximately two
hours while an investigation was underway. This is especially
true given Erin's mental status-suffering severe anxiety disorder
and being emotionally distraught,

fragile, and in distress--as

alleged by plaintiffs. Although one court has stated that a
ninety minute detention of a witness is ordinarily too long, see
Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139 (lOth Cir. 2006),
plaintiffs have not shown that the alleged two hour detention by
Stites and Lewis was clearly unreasonable and that every officer
would have known so. Unlike Officers Scott, Meeks, and Barnes,
movants here are alleged to have played only a minor role during
a limited period of time. In fact,

from plaintiffs' pleading, it

is not clear why the Southlake officers were even present at the
scene.

v.
Order
The court ORDERS that movants' motion to dismiss be, and is
hereby, granted, and that plaintiffs' claims against Lewis and
Stites be, and are hereby, dismissed.

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The court determines that there is no just reason for delay
in, and hereby directs, entry of final judgment as to the
dismissal of plaintiffs' claims against defendants Lewis and
Stites.
SIGNED April 8, 2016.

District Judge

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