Meraz v. Stephens
Filing
21
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER: The court ORDERS that petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be, and is hereby, denied. The court further ORDERS that a certificate of appealability be, and is hereby, denied, as petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. (Ordered by Judge John McBryde on 6/16/2017) (tln)
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 'fll:XA~
'
J{ '
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT C URT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF T XAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
OSMIN AGRUELLES MERAZ,
JUN I 6217
§
§
Petitioner,
§
§
v.
§
No. 4:15-CV-836-A
§
LORIE DAVIS, Director,
Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Correctional
Institutions Division,
1
§
§
§
§
§
Respondent.
§
MEMORANDUM OPINION
and
ORDER
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C.
§
2254 filed by petitioner, Osmin Agruelles Meraz, a
state prisoner incarcerated in the Correctional Institutions
Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ),
against Lorie Davis, Director of TDCJ, respondent. After having
considered the pleadings, state court records, and relief sought
by petitioner, the court has concluded that the petition should
be denied.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In November 2011 petitioner was indicted in Tarrant County,
1
Effective May 4, 2016, Lorie Davis replaced William Stephens as
director of the Correctional Institutions Division of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Davis is
automatically substituted as the party of record.
Texas, Case No. 1254009D, on two counts of continuous sexual
abuse of two young children, AN and AM. 2 (Adm. R., Clerk's R. 5,
ECF No. 10-7.) The state proceeded to a jury trial on count one.
(Id., Reporter's R., vol. 2, 5, ECF No. 10-9.) The jury found
petitioner guilty and assessed his punishment at life
imprisonment.
(Id., Clerk's R. 53, ECF No. 10-7.) Petitioner
appealed his conviction, but the Fourth Court of Appeals of Texas
affirmed the trial court's judgment, and the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals refused his petition for discretionary review.
(Id., Op. & Docket Sheet, ECF Nos. 10-5 & 10-3, respectively.)
Petitioner also filed two state postconviction habeas
applications challenging his conviction. The first was dismissed
for noncompliance with the state's form requirements and the
second was denied without written order by the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals on the findings of the trial court.
(Id., WR-
82,986-01 State Writ & Action Taken, ECF Nos. 10-19 & 10-15,
respectively; WR-82,986-02 State Writ & Action Taken, ECF Nos.
10-22 & 10-20, respectively.) This federal petition followed.
The state appellate court summarized the factual background
of the case as follows:
2
These are abbreviated versions of the victims' first names
used by the appellate court and are used in this opinion.
2
In August 2011, sisters AN and AM, who were then
seven and ten years old, told their mother that
appellant had been touching them inappropriately. As a
result of the investigation that followed, appellant
was charged with continuous sexual abuse of a young
child or children. The evidence at trial established
that the sisters stayed at their grandmother Carolina's
house while their parents were at work. Carolina lived
in Grand Prairie, Dallas County, Texas, with her longtime boyfriend-appellant-and her teenage daughter,
Stephanie. The sisters consider appellant to be their
grandfather. When the sisters started school, Stephanie
babysat them at Carolina's house during the summer and
on school holidays and breaks. Stephanie was primarily
responsible for caring for the sisters, but appellant
would do so on occasion when his work as a painter was
slow and when the weather prevented him from working.
In May 2010, appellant, Carolina, and Stephanie moved
into a house with Stephanie's older sister in
Arlington, Tarrant County, Texas. During the summers of
2010 and 2011, AM's and AN's mother dropped them off at
the house in Arlington every morning. This arrangement
continued until August 11, 2011, when the sisters made
their outcry to their mother.
Both girls testified at trial. AM testified the
first time appellant touched her was at Carolina's
house (in Dallas County), when she was seven years old.
She testified appellant touched her vagina with his
mouth and with his penis. AM said she had her clothes
on, but they were "pulled down," and appellant's pants
were pulled down. She was on her back on Carolina's
bed, and appellant got on top of her and moved around.
She testified she saw appellant's private part. AM
testified that this happened on repeated occasions at
Carolina's house, always in the same bedroom. It also
continued to happen after appellant moved to Arlington.
She testified that what appellant did most often was to
put his penis on her vagina. Sometimes he touched her
bottom and breasts with his hand. He told AM he was
checking her breasts to see if they were growing. There
were also times appellant made AM touch his penis and
rub it. She testified he showed her how to grab it and
3
move her hand up and down. The abuse continued
happening whenever she was alone with appellant and
stopped when her sister told their mother.
AN testified she did not remember how old she was
when appellant started touching her, but she was
younger than she was at the time of trial. AN testified
the abuse occurred on the bed in her grandmother's room
at her aunt's house (in Arlington). AN testified she
and appellant both had their clothes on, and he would
put his private part on her private part. One time
appellant made AN put her hand down his pants and touch
his private part and she felt hair. AN also testified
that she was in the room sometimes when appellant would
put his private part on her sister's vagina.
(Id., Op. 2-3, ECF No. 10-5.)
II. ISSUES
In twelve grounds for relief, petitioner claims that he was
denied an interpreter at trial (ground one) and that he received
ineffective assistance of trial counsel (grounds two through
twelve).
(Pet. 6-7, 11-13, ECF No. 1.)
III. RULE 5 STATEMENT
Respondent believes that petitioner has sufficiently
exhausted his state court remedies as to the claims raised and
that the petition is not time-barred.
No. at 11.) 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b),
(Resp't's Answer 5-6, ECF
(d). Nor is the petition subject
to the successive-petition bar.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard for Granting Habeas Corpus Relief
4
A
§
2254 habeas petition is governed by the heightened
standard of review provided for by the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C.
§
2254. Under the
Act, a writ of habeas corpus should be granted only if a state
court arrives at a decision that is contrary to or an
unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court
precedent or that is based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the record before the state court.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100-01 (2011); 28 U.S.C.
2254(d) (1)-(2). This standard is difficult to meet and
§
~stops
short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of
claims already rejected in state proceedings." Harrington, 562
U.S. at 102.
Additionally, the statute requires that federal courts give
great deference to a state court's factual findings. Hill v.
Johnson,
210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000). Section 2254(e) (1)
provides that a determination of a factual issue made by a state
court shall be presumed to be correct. The petitioner has the
burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and
convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C.
2254(e) (1); Miller-El v.
§
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S.
362, 399 (2000). Further, when the Texas Court of Criminal
5
Appeals denies a federal claim in a state habeas-corpus
application without written opinion, a federal court may presume
"that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the
absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to
the contrary" and applied the correct "clearly established
federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States" unless there is evidence that an incorrect standard was
applied, in making its decision. Johnson v. Williams, -
u.s.
133 S. Ct. 1088, 1094 (2013); Harrington, 562 U.S. at 99;
Schaetzle v. Cockrell, 343 F.3d 440, 444 (5th Cir. 2004).
B. Interpreter
Under his first ground, petitioner claims that he does not
understand English and was denied a Spanish interpreter at trial.
(Pet. 6, ECF No. 1.) Petitioner asserts that, although the trial
court sua sponte appointed an interpreter, his trial proceeded
without the interpreter, that "no translation was available
during juror selection and throughout the trial," and that he
"did not understand what was developing as trial commenced,
resulting in lack to confront and to communicate directly with
trial counsel, and listen."
(Id.)
In his state habeas application, Petitioner's claim largely
involved the alleged absence of an interpreter during the voir
6
dire proceeding and his trial counsel's alleged failure to
translate the proceeding for him.
(Adm. R., WR-82,986-02 State
Writ 7-8, ECF No. 10-22.) Petitioner's trial counsel, MarkS.
Rosteet, responded to the allegation in an affidavit filed in the
state habeas proceeding as follows:
Applicant asserts in ground one that defense
counsel was ineffective whereby he was denied an
interpreter during voir dire and thereby did not
possess the sufficient present ability to consult with
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational and
factual understanding of the proceeding against him. I
speak Spanish fluently and have represented many
Spanish-speaking and bilingual defendants in criminal
cases during the last 28 years in practice. I request
the services of an interpreter during any contested
hearing or trial where the defendant is unable to
understand the English language. Applicant admits to a
comprehension of the English language. If the record
reflects that no interpreter was provided during voir
dire, it was only because Applicant stated to counsel
that he did not need an interpreter and adequately
understood the English language.
(Id. at 89-90.)
The state habeas judge, who also presided at petitioner's
trial, adopted the state's proposed findings, based primarily on
counsel's affidavit and the state habeas record, and entered
those findings as follows:
2.
Mr. Rosteet speaks Spanish fluently and has
represented many Spanish-speaking criminal
defendants during his twenty-eight-year law
practice.
7
3.
The State Bar of Texas Directory confirms that Mr.
Rosteet provides Spanish language assistance.
4.
Mr. Rosteet does request the services of an
interpreter for trials when his client is unable
to understand the English language.
5.
Mr. Rosteet did not request the service of an
interpreter because he did not feel one was
necessary.
6.
There is nothing to suggest that Mr. Rosteet or
his staff were incapable of assisting any Englishlanguage deficiencies which the applicant might
have in understanding the legal process.
7.
The applicant has filed an extensive and detailed
writ application and supporting memorandum.
8.
The applicant's verification does not indicate
that he was assisted in preparing this application
and supporting memorandum.
9.
There is nothing from the writ record to suggest
that the applicant does not adequately understand
the English language.
10.
The applicant has not established that the
appointment of an interpreter was required to
assist him in his defense.
(Id. at 78-79 (record citations omitted).)
Based on her findings, her recollection of the trial
proceedings, and state law, the state habeas judge entered the
following legal conclusions in recommending denial of habeas
relief:
1.
The appointment of an interpreter is required when
the trial court becomes aware that the defendant
8
does not understand English.
2.
The fact that a defendant may be more fluent in
another language does not require the appointment
of an interpreter.
3.
A defendant who does not request an interpreter
waives the right to complain on appeal, unless the
record otherwise demonstrates the defendant's lack
of understanding of the proceedings.
4.
When defense counsel is capable of interpreting
for the defendant, the trial court does no err by
failing to appoint an interpreter.
5.
The writ record does not establish that the
applicant was unable to adequately understand the
English language or that Mr. Rosteet was unable to
assist the applicant.
6.
The applicant was not improperly denied the
services of an interpreter.
(Id. at 79 (citations omitted).)
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in turn, denied relief
based on the trial court's findings. Petitioner has not presented
clear and convincing evidence in rebuttal. Thus, relying on the
presumptive correctness of the state courts' factual findings,
the state courts' adjudication of the claim is not contrary to or
an unreasonable application of federal law as established by the
Supreme Court.
The Sixth Amendment ensures the right to be meaningfully
present at one's own trial, to assist in one's own defense, to
9
effective assistance of counsel, and to confront the government's
witnesses. U.S. CaNST. amend. VI. The due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits trying a criminal defendant who
lacks capacity to understand the proceedings or to assist in the
preparation of his defense. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,
171 (1975). This prohibition refers not only to those who are
incompetent, but also to those who are hampered by their
inability to communicate in the English language. United States
v. Martinez,
U.S. 994
616 F.2d 185, 188 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450
(1981)
(the use of courtroom interpreters involves a
balancing of the defendant's constitutional rights to
confrontation and due process against the public's interest in
the economical administration of criminal law). Therefore,
assuming that petitioner's claim implicates certain federal
constitutional rights, petitioner has not established that he was
incapable of understanding and communicating in the English
language or that counsel, fluent in both English and Spanish, was
unable to adequately communicate with petitioner in the Spanish
language. Nor did petitioner at any time during the proceedings
bring to the court's attention that he needed the aid of an
interpreter, although an interpreter was available in the
courtroom.
(Id., Reporter's R., vol. 2 at 2, 11-12 & 20, vol. 3
10
at 2, 7 & vel. 4 at 16, ECF Nos. 10-9, 10-10 & 10-11.)
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Under grounds two through twelve, petitioner claims he
received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. A criminal
defendant has a constitutional right to the effective assistance
of counsel at trial. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, XIV; Evitts v. Lucey,
469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985); Strickland v. washington, 466 U.S. 668,
688
(1984) . To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a
petitioner must show (1) that counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that but for
counsel's deficient performance the result of the proceeding
would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. In
applying this test, a court must indulge a strong presumption
that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Id. at 668, 688-89. Judicial scrutiny of
counsel's performance must be highly deferential and every effort
must be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight.
Id. at 689.
The Supreme Court emphasized in Harrington v. Richter the
manner in which a federal court is to consider an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim raised in a habeas petition subject
to AEDPA's strictures:
11
The pivotal question is whether the state court's
application of the Strickland standard was
unreasonable. This is different from asking whether
defense counsel's performance fell below Strickland's
standard. Were that the inquiry, the analysis would be
no different than if, for example, this Court were
adjudicating a Strickland claim on direct review of a
criminal conviction in a United States district court.
Under AEDPA, though, it is a necessary premise that the
two questions are different. For purposes of §
2254(d) (1), "an unreasonable application of federal law
is different from an incorrect application of federal
law." A state court must be granted a deference and
latitude that are not in operation when the case
involves review under the Strickland standard itself.
562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Williams, 529
u.s.
at 410). Accordingly,
it is necessary only to determine whether the state courts'
rejection of petitioner's ineffective assistance claims was
contrary to or an objectively unreasonable application of
Strickland. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-99 (2002)
i
Kittelson
v. Dretke, 426 F.3d 306, 315-17 (5th Cir. 2005) i Schaetzle v.
Cockrell, 343 F.3d 440, 443 (5th Cir. 2003).
Petitioner asserts trial counsel was ineffective by~
failing to adequately prepare for triali
failing to conduct proper voir dire during jury
selectioni
failing to challenge unqualified jurorsi
failing to object to the prosecution's commitment
questions during voir direi
failing to develop a viable defense strategyi
12
failing to file a motion for new trial;
failing to "invoke protection" under Batson;
failing to object to extraneous offense evidence
during the punishment phase;
failing to properly object to extraneous offenses
from another county under Texas Rule of Evidence
403;
failing to "raise provisions for proper outcry
witness under T.C.C.P. art. 38.072 and hearsay
objections"; and
failing "to suppress petitioner's inculpatory
claim by the state."
(Pet.6-7, 11-13, ECF No. 1.)
To the extent raised in petitioner's state habeas
application, counsel denied the allegations and discussed them in
his affidavit as follows:
Applicant states in ground two that counsel was
ineffective by not obtaining the services of an
investigator and child psychologist, and failing to
file motions for discovery and production of "witness
list, warrants and waivers, as well as law enforcement
and investigation records." Contrary to Applicant's
allegation, pursuant to the Open File Policy of the
Office of the Criminal District Attorney of Tarrant
County, defense counsel was provided with full
discovery, including offense reports, arrest reports,
written statements, and video interviews and outcry
statements of the children who testified at trial. As a
Court would not compel the children who are the victims
of sexual assault to be interrogated by a child
psychologist to determine the veracity of their
statements, there was no evidentiary basis for a child
psychologist to testify about the "margin of error" of
13
the allegations of sexual assault brought by the
children against Applicant. Furthermore, "margin of
error" is a statistical measurement inadmissible as
reputation or opinion evidence. Applicant additionally
states in ground two that no extraneous motion in
limine was filed. The State did provide counsel
extraneous offense notice listing 23 extraneous
offenses and the Court included a limiting instruction
in the jury charge regarding same, thus preserving
Applicant's rights. Contrary to Applicant's assertion
that counsel only once visited Applicant, counsel
visited with Applicant at the jail and during at least
six pretrial court appearances, fully informing
Applicant of the State's allegations and evidence
against him as well conferring with and counseling
Applicant regarding his version of the facts.
Applicant complains of alleged errors made during
voir dire in grounds three, four, five and eight. Said
grounds were not raised on appeal. Nevertheless, I
maintain that I performed an effective voir dire
examination and execution of peremptory strikes to best
obtain a fair and impartial jury based upon trial
strategy and without alienating the jury against
Applicant.
Applicant asserts in ground six that he was denied
an opportunity to testify during the guilty phase of
the trial, and then forced to testify during the
punishment phase where he was defenseless against the
State's unfair line of confusing questions designed to
incriminate Applicant." I categorically deny this
assertion. All of my clients always make the final
decision whether to testify or not to testify at trial,
without any promises, threats, force, or coercion.
Applicant asserts in ground seven that he was
prohibited from filing a motion for new trial. This
assertion is not supported by the record, as Applicant
was appointed and received the services of appellate
counsel, which would include the filing of a motion for
new trial.
14
Applicant asserts in ground nine that counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the extraneous
offense testimony of Nina Fernandez (a prior sexual
assault of child younger than 14 years of age) , because
it was "uncorroborated or documented." Texas law
provides that said testimony is admissible, and the
jury determines the weight of said evidence and whether
it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that said
extraneous offense occurred.
Applicant asserts in ground ten that counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the jurisdiction
of the Court regarding an element of one of the
continuous sexual assaults occurring in Dallas County.
This issue was raised on appeal and overruled, holding
that the Tarrant County Trial Court did have
jurisdiction under the law in effect at the time of
trial.
Applicant asserts in ground eleven that counsel
was ineffective by failing to object to multiple outcry
witnesses presented by the State and thus, constituted
"bolstering" and prevented Applicant from receiving a
fair and impartial trial. Under Article 38.072, Code of
Criminal Procedure, a claim of bolstering is not a
basis for excluding an outcry statement. Furthermore,
Texas law does provide for multiple outcry witnesses,
and it is admissible hearsay in trials of sexual
assault of children.
Applicant asserts in ground twelve that counsel
was ineffective for failing to suppress his
"confession" of guilt made in letters written to his
wife from jail, as well as the translations read to the
jury by an interpreter. Applicant's wife is not an
agent of law enforcement, and thus, said "confession"
is admissible against Applicant as a statement against
interest and was properly admitted into evidence.
At all times I provided effective, experienced and
reliable legal advice and counsel to Mr. Meraz.
(Adm. R., WR-82,986-02 State Writ 90-92, ECF No. 10-22 (citation
15
omitted).)
The state habeas judge adopted the state's proposed findings
of fact, too numerous to list here, and made additional findings
consistent with counsel's affidavit and the documentary record,
and applying the Strickland standard, found that counsel had
provided petitioner with adequate representation guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment.
(Id. at 81-83, 107-08.) The judge also found
that the following evidence undercut any likelihood that the
outcome of the case would have been different with other counsel
or if counsel had represented petitioner in another manner:
a.
Stephanie Meraz routinely babysat her nieces.
b.
The applicant (the long-time boyfriend of Carolina
Meraz - Step[hanie's mother) would sometimes help
out watching the girls.
c.
One day, Stephanie noticed the girls touching each
other inappropriately, and contacted their
parents.
d.
Both AN and AM told their mother that the
applicant had been touching them and making them
touch him.
e.
The applicant pulled down AM's clothes and touched
her female sexual with his penis and his mouth.
f.
The applicant touched AM's bottom and breasts with
his hand, kissed her on the mouth, and had her rub
his penis with her hand.
g.
AN testified that the applicant touched her
16
bottom, female sexual organ, and breasts with his
penis through clothing and that once he had her
touch his penis and she could feel hair.
h.
AN sometimes saw the applicant abusing AM.
I.
AN and AM repeated the details of their sexual
abuse by the applicant to the sexual assault nurse
examiner.
j.
The applicant wrote letters to Carolina Meraz in
which he admitted his guilt.
k.
N.F. (Carolina Meraz' niece) testified how the
applicant sexually abused her from the age of
eight or nine to the age of twenty-one.
1.
N.F. testified that the applicant had sexual
intercourse with her, made her perform oral sex,
and ejaculated on her breasts.
(Id. at 83-84
(record references omitted).)
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in turn, denied relief
based on the trial court's findings. Petitioner has not presented
clear and convincing evidence in rebuttal. Thus, relying on the
presumptive correctness of the state courts' factual findings,
and having independently reviewed petitioner's claims in
conjunction with the state court records, the state courts'
adjudication of the claims is not contrary to or an unreasonable
application of Strickland. Petitioner's claims are largely
conclusory, with no legal and/or evidentiary basis, refuted by
the record, involve state evidentiary rulings or other matters of
17
state law, involve strategic and tactical decisions made by
counsel, or would have required counsel to make frivolous
objections, all of which generally do not entitle a state
Petitioner to federal habeas relief. See, e.g., Strickland, 460
U.S. at 689 (holding strategic decisions by counsel are virtually
unchallengeable and generally do not provide a basis for
postconviction relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of
counsel); Johnson v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2002)
(concluding that counsel is not required to make futile motions
or frivolous objections); Green v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 1029, 1037,
1042 (5th Cir. 1998)
("[m]ere conclusory allegations in support
of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are insufficient
to raise a constitutional issue" and "counsel is not required to
file frivolous motions or make frivolous objections"); Teague v.
Scott, 60 F.3d 1167, 1172 (5th Cir. 1995)
(an "attorney's actions
during voir dire are considered to be a matter of trial
strategy"); United States v. Green, 882 F.2d 999, 1003 (5th Cir.
1989)
(providing "[a] defendant who alleges a failure to
investigate on the part of his counsel must allege with
specificity what the investigation would have revealed and how it
would have altered the outcome of the trial"). A petitioner
shoulders a heavy burden to refute the premise that "an
18
attorney's actions are strongly presumed to have fallen within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Messer v.
Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080, 1090 (11th Cir. 1985). Petitioner presents
no evidentiary, factual, or legal basis in this federal habeas
action that could lead the court to conclude that the state
courts unreasonably applied the standards set forth in Strickland
based on the evidence presented in state court. 28 U.S.C.
§
2254 (d) .
Overall, counsel had access to the state's evidence through
the district attorney's open-file policy, and petitioner fails to
point to any evidence known to counsel that would have led a
reasonable attorney to investigate further or that would have
warranted additional preparation. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,
527 (2003). Counsel conducted an adequate voir dire, and jurors
were struck by agreement (two for cause and seventeen by
peremptory strike), alleviating any Batson objection. Nor does
petitioner demonstrate that an unequivolcally-biased juror served
on the jury or that the jury pool was tainted or otherwise
contaminated in the state's favor by the state's questions or
juror comments. Virgil v. Dretke, 446 F.3d 598, 613
(5th Cir.
2006) . Counsel advised petitioner of the allegations and evidence
against him. Petitioner voluntarily chose not to testify during
19
the guilt/innocence phase and to testify during the punishment
phase. Counsel made appropriate objections or decisions not to
object regarding admissibility of the evidence, cross-examined
all but one witness, and made closing arguments in both phases of
the trial. And, appellate counsel was appointed to represent
petitioner on the same day his trial was concluded, relieving
trial counsel of any further representation.
(Adm. R., Clerk's R.
63, ECF No. 10-7.)
For the reasons discussed herein,
The court ORDERS that petitioner's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28
u.s.c.
§
2254 be, and is hereby,
denied. The court further ORDERS that a certificate of
appealability be, and is hereby, denied, as petitioner has not
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.
SIGNED June
/
~
, 2017.
STATES
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