Johnson v. Mansfield Jail et al

Filing 7

Memorandum Opinion and Order: The court ORDERS that plaintiff's claims in the above-captioned action against City of Mansfield, City of Fort Worth, and Tarrant County be, and are hereby, dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the authority of 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b). The court further ORDERS that by February 19, 2016, plaintiff inform the court by written filing whether he intends to pursue claims against any individuals based on the facts he alleges in his complaint and providing all information he has that will identify such individuals and state what each of them did to cause harm to plaintiff. (Ordered by Judge John McBryde on 2/2/2016) (ewd)

WILLIAM D. JOHNSON,

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Plaintiff,

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§

vs.

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NO. 4:16-CV-079-A

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MANSFIELD JAIL, ET AL.,

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Defendants.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Came on for consideration the complaint filed by William D.
Johnson naming Mansfield Jail/Law Enforcement Center, Tarrant
County Sheriff's Department, Tarrant County Fort Worth Police
Department

[sic], Tarrant County Jail, and Tarrant County as

defendants.

Plaintiff's Claims
Briefly, plaintiff is complaining that when he was arrested
and placed in the Tarrant County Jail, he was not allowed to
bring his walker or cane. He says he cannot walk without them.
Plaintiff was transferred to the Mansfield Jail, where he told
jailers he could not walk without assistance. The jailers told
plaintiff that there was nothing wrong with him and pushed into a
cell. Plaintiff fell and broke his hip. A jailer again told him
there was nothing wrong with him and grabbed plaintiff's leg and
started twisting, telling plaintiff to get up. At that point,

another jailer said to stop because plaintiff was hurt. Plaintiff
was taken to Mansfield Methodist Hospital where he had surgery
and stayed three weeks. Plaintiff describes the relief he seeks
as getting his "medical taken care of" and certain unidentified
officers to be brought to justice.

Doc. 1 1 at 5.

II.

Evaluation of the Complaint Under 28 U.S.C.

§

1915A

As a prisoner seeking redress from governmental entities,
plaintiff's complaint is subject to preliminary screening under
28 U.S.C.

§

1915A.

(5th Cir. 1998).

See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80
Section 1915A(b) (1) provides for sua sponte

dismissal if the court finds that the complaint is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.

A claim is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis in

either fact or law.•
(1989).

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325

A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted when, assuming that all the allegations in the
complaint are true even if doubtful in fact, such allegations
fail to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
In evaluating whether the complaint states a valid claim for
relief, the court construes the allegations of the complaint

'The "Doc." reference is to the number of the item on the court's docket in this action.
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favorably to the pleader.
(1975).

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501

However, the court does not accept conclusory

allegations or unwarranted deductions of fact as true, and a
plaintiff must provide more than labels and conclusions or a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Tuchman v. DSC Commc'ns Corp., 14 F.3d
1061, 1067 (5th cir. 1994).
Having now considered the allegations in the complaint, the
court concludes that it should be dismissed under the provisions
of 28 U.S.C.

§

1915A.
III.

Analysis
Plaintiff names five defendants. Four of them are not
governmental units capable of being sued. Darby v. Pasadena
Police Dep't,

939 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 1991).

The proper

defendant instead of Mansfield Jail/Law Enforcement Center is the
City of Mansfield; the proper defendant instead of Tarrant County
Fort Worth Police Department is the City of Fort Worth; and the
proper defendant instead of Tarrant County Sheriff's Department
and Tarrant County Jail would be Tarrant County. Rogers v. Nueces
County Jail, No. C-07-410, 2007 WL 4367814,

*4

(S.D. Tex. Dec.

13, 2007). The court is considering for purposes of evaluation of
the complaint that the proper parties had been named.

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A governmental entity, such as a city or county, can be
subjected to monetary damages or injunctive relief only if one of
its official policies caused a person to be deprived of a
federally protected right.
U.S. 658, 694

Monell v. Dep•t of Soc. Servs., 436

(1978). A governmental entity cannot be held liable

under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.
Id.

Instead, liability may be imposed against a local government

entity under

§

1983 only "if the governmental body itself

subjects a person to a deprivation of rights or causes a person
to be subjected to such deprivation."

Connick v. Thompson, 563

U.S. 51, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011)

(quoting Monell, 436 U.S.

at 692)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

county liable under

§

To hold a city or

1983 thus requires plaintiff to "initially

allege that an official policy or custom was a cause in fact of
the deprivation of rights inflicted." Spiller v. City of Texas
City, Police Dept., 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997)

(internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, liability
against local government defendants pursuant to

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1983 requires

proof of a policymaker, an official policy, and a violation of
constitutional rights whose "moving force" is the policy or
custom.

Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th

Cir. 2001).

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The Fifth Circuit has been explicit in its definition of an
•official policy• that can lead to liability on the part of a
governmental entity, giving the following explanation in an
opinion issued en bane in response to a motion for rehearing in
Bennett v. City of Slidell:
1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or
decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by
the municipality's lawmaking officers or by an official
to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making
authority; or
2. A persistent, widespread practice of city officials
or employees, which, although not authorized by
officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common
and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly
represents municipal policy. Actual or constructive
knowledge of such custom must be attributable to the
governing body of the municipality or to an official to
whom that body had delegated policy-making authority.
Actions of officers or employees of a municipality do
not render the municipality liable under § 1983 unless
they execute official policy as above defined.
735 F.2d 861, 862

(5th Cir. 1984)

(per curiam).

In this case, plaintiff has not alleged any facts to support
a claim against any of the named defendants. The only basis for
liability based on the allegations made would be respondeat
superior, which, as stated, is not sufficient.' It occurs to the
court, however, that plaintiff may have intended to include as

2

Any potential criminal liability of individual jailers is a matter that should be addressed to state
authorities. In any event, the individual jailers are not named as defendants in this action.
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defendants the individuals he says mistreated him. Accordingly,
the court will give plaintiff an opportunity to do so.
IV.
Order
The court ORDERS that plaintiff's claims in the abovecaptioned action against City of Mansfield, City of Fort Worth,
and Tarrant County be, and are hereby, dismissed with prejudice
pursuant to the authority of 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b).
The court further ORDERS that by February 19, 2016,
plaintiff inform the court by written filing whether he intends
to pursue claims against any individuals based on the facts he
alleges in his complaint and providing all information he has
that will identify such individuals and state what each of them
did to cause harm to plaintiff.
SIGNED February 2, 2016.

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