Chauhan v. Jones

Filing 16

Memorandum Opinion and Order: The court ORDERS that petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be, and is hereby, denied. The court further ORDERS that a certificate of appealability be, and is hereby, denied, as petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. (Ordered by Judge John McBryde on 12/8/2017) (edm)

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U.S. DISTRICT C-OURT
NORTHERN DISTR!CT OF TEXAS

FILED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT C ORT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TE AS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
VILRAM S. CHAUHAN, a.k.a.
VIKRAM S. CHAUHAN,
Petitioner,

v.
DALLAS JONES, Warden,
FCC-Beaumont-Medium, and
KEN PAXTON, Attorney General,
the State of Texas,
Respondents.

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CLERK, U.S. DISTRJl J

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No. 4:16-CV-525-A

MEMORANDUM OPINION
and
ORDER
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by petitioner, Vilram S. Chauhan, a.k.a.
Vikram S. Chauhan, a former federal prisoner now incarcerated in
the Correctional Institutions Division of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice (TDCJ), against Dallas Jones, warden of FCCBeaumont-Medium, and Ken Paxton, Attorney General of the State of
Texas, respondents.

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After having considered the pleadings, state

court records, and relief sought by petitioner, the court has
concluded that the petition should be denied.
I. Procedural History
Petitioner is serving two concurrent 20-year sentences for
his convictions in Tarrant County, Texas, Case Nos. 1248464D and

1
When petitioner filed this petition he was in federal custody subject
to an outstanding detainer arising from criminal charges in Tarrant County,
Texas. He has since been transferred to state custody.

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1248466D, for aggravated robbery. The state appellate court set
forth the relevant background facts of the case as follows:
On September 8, 2011, [petitioner] was indicted on
two counts of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon
committed on July 7, 2011. On November 14, 2011, while
out on bond, [petitioner] robbed a bank. He was
convicted of the bank robbery in federal district court
and sentenced to sixty-six months' confinement in
federal prison.
On February 7, 2013, [petitioner] received notice
that Tarrant County had lodged a detainer on him for
the two aggravated robbery charges. Between July 1,
2013, and December 27, 2013, [petitioner] filed five
pro se motions seeking dismissal of the charges. The
State claimed that all five motions were defective and
inadequate to invoke the IADA. On March 20, 2014,
[petitioner] was transferred from federal prison to the
Tarrant County jail.
A jury trial was held on [petitioner]'s aggravated
robbery cases in June 2014. The jury found [petitioner]
guilty of both counts and assessed punishment at twenty
years' confinement on each count. The trial court
sentenced [petitioner] accordingly and ordered the
sentences to run concurrently. [Petitioner] filed a
motion for new trial arguing that he was tried in
violation of the IADA. The trial court denied the
motion .
(Mem. Op. 2, doc. 4.)
Petitioner appealed the denial of his motion for new trial,
but the Second District Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed his
convictions and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused his
petitions for discretionary review.

(Id. at 7; Electronic Record,

doc. 15-34.) Petitioner did not file a postconviction application
for habeas relief in the state courts.

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II. Issues

In two grounds, petitioner claims(1)

the state trial court erred by not trying him
within the 180-day speedy-trial provision of the
Interstate Agreement of Detainers Act (IADA); and

(2)

his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to
urge his motions for dismissal of the state
charges pursuant to the IADA.

(Pet. 6, doc. 1.)
III. Rule 5 Statement

Respondent agrees that the petition is timely filed and that
petitioner has sufficiently exhausted his state-court remedies as
to his claims.

(Resp't's Answer 4, doc. 9.)
IV. Discussion

A. Legal Standard for Granting Habeas Corpus Relief

A

§

2254 habeas petition is governed by the heightened

standard of review provided for by the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C.

§

2254. Under the

Act, a writ of habeas corpus should be granted only if a state
court arrives at a decision that is contrary to or an
unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court
precedent or that is based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the record before the state court. 28
U.S.C.

§

2254(d) (1)-(2); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100-

01 (2011). This standard is difficult to meet and "stops short of
imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims

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already rejected in state proceedings." Harrington,

562 U.S. at

102.
Additionally, the statute requires that federal courts give
great deference to a state court's factual findings.
Johnson,

Hill v.

210 F. 3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000). Section 2254 (e) (1)

provides that a determination of a factual issue made by a state
court shall be presumed to be correct. 'The petitioner has the
burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and
convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C.
Cockrell,
362, 399

537 U.S. 322, 340

2254 (e) (1); Miller-El v.

§

(2003); Williams v.

Taylor,

529 U.S.

(2000).

B. Petitioner's Grounds

Petitioner claims that he was not brought to trial by the
state trial court within the 180-day time limit prescribed by the
IADA despite his motions for a final disposition of the
indictments and that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing
to urge his motions for dismissal pursuant to the IADA.

(Pet. 6,

doc. 1; Supp. Clerk's Rs., vol. 1, 4-53, docs. 15-24 & 15-26.)
A prisoner's right to a speedy trial is protected by the
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the IADA.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 51.14

(West

2006) . The IADA enables one state to gain custody of a prisoner
incarcerated in another jurisdiction in order to prosecute him on
criminal charges. See Birdwell v. Skeen, 983 F.2d 1332, 1335-36

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(5th Cir. 1993). The process is initiated when the state places a
detainer on a prisoner. Id. at 1336. The prisoner may then
request a speedy disposition of the charges under Article III of
the IACA accompanied by a certificate as specified in the IAOA.

Id. at 1336. The state seeking custody is required to bring the
prisoner to trial within 180 days after a proper request is
received. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 51.14, Article III(a)
(West 2006) . If the trial does not commence within that time, the
charges are dismissed with prejudice and the detainer becomes
invalid.

Id. art. V(c).

The state courts determined that petitioner's motions for
disposition of his criminal indictments in Cause Nos. 12484640
and 12484660 failed to meet the statutory requirements necessary
to invoke the IAOA.

(Mem. Op. at 4, doc. 15-4.) Specifically, the

state appellate court addressed the issues as follows:
The IADA

The IAOA is a congressionally-sanctioned compact
between the federal government and the states. See
Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 148, 121 S. Ct. 2079,
2082 (2001) (citing 18 U.S.C. app. § 2). It creates
uniform and cooperative procedures to be used for
lodging and executing a detainer when one state seeks
to obtain temporary custody of and prosecute a prisoner
in another state or federal facility. Id. Texas adopted
the IAOA in code of criminal procedure article 51.14.
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.14 (West 2006);
State v. Votta, 299 S.W.3d 130, 134-35 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009).
When an IADA-party state has an untried
indictment, information, or complaint against the
prisoner, it files a detainer with the institution in
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the state that is holding the prisoner. Votta, 299
S.W.3d at 135. The prison is required to promptly
inform the prisoner that a detainer has been filed
against him and that he has the right to request final
disposition of the charges. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
art. 51.14 art. III(c); Votta, 299 S.W.3d at 135. The
prisoner, in order to invoke the IADA, "shall have
cause[] to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and
the appropriate court of the prosecuting office's
jurisdiction written notice of the place of his
imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to
be made of the indictment, information, or complaint."
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 51.14, art. III(a). The
prisoner's written request must also be accompanied by
a certificate of the appropriate official
having custody of the prisoner, stating the
term of commitment under which the prisoner
is being held, the time already served, the
time remaining to be served on the sentence,
the amount of good time earned, the time of
parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any
decision of the state parole agency relating
to the prisoner.

Id.
"The prisoner bears the burden of demonstrating
compliance with the procedural requirements of article
III." Walker v. State, 201 S.W.3d 841, 846 (Tex.
App.-Waco 2006, pet. ref'd) (citations omitted). Once
the prisoner meets the requirements under Article
III(a), then the prisoner must be brought to trial in
the receiving state within 180 days from the date on
which the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court
receives the written request for a final disposition,
unless a continuance is granted under the IADA. Id.;
Votta, 299 S.W.3d at 135. If the prisoner is not
brought to trial within 180 days, the trial court must
dismiss the indictment with prejudice. Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 51.14, art. III(d); Votta, 299 S.W.3d
at 135.
[Petitioner]'s Motions

In [petitioner]'s first point, he argues that he
was tried in violation of article III of the IADA. As
discussed above, [petitioner] must properly request a

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final and speedy disposition under the IADA for the
act's requirements to apply. We must therefore
determine whether [petitioner]'s motions meet the
statutory requirements necessary to invoke the IADA.
Under the IADA, [petitioner] is first required to
request a final disposition of his indictments before
he requests dismissal of the indictments. Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. art. 51.14, art. III(a). [Petitioner]'s
third motion is the only motion that uses the term
"final disposition." But [petitioner]'s third motion,
despite the title including a "request for disposition
of indictments," does not actually request a final
disposition of the indictments. The motion states,
"[petitioner] is now imprisoned in the Federal
Correctional Institution .
., and pursuant to the
detainer lodged against [him]
., that a request
for final disposition shall be made to the above
referenced .
. causes against [him] . " [Emphasis
added.] [Petitioner] goes on to claim that the 180-day
period in which the State was required to bring him to
trial had already passed, that he had filed a "Motion
to Dismiss for violations of the Speedy Trial Act," and
that "[w]hen the Petitioner's right to a speedy trial
has been violated, dismissal is 'the only possible
remedy.'" [Citations omitted.] The prayer of
[petitioner]'s third motion likewise only requested the
dismissal of his indictments. [Petitioner]' s third
motion therefore did not request a "final disposition"
of the indictments as required by the IADA, but a
dismissal based on the State's alleged failure to
comply with the IADA deadline. See Votta, 299 S.W.3d at
137 ("Appellee's motion to dismiss the charges was not
proper notice to the district court of his request for
disposition."). Absent a proper request for a final
disposition, the IADA time period had not begun to run,
and dismissal was not mandated. See id.
Furthermore, none of [petitioner]'s filings were
accompanied by the statutorily required certification
from the prison warden of the prison in which he was
serving his federal sentence. A request for dismissal
of the indictments must include the required
documentation to sufficiently invoke the IADA. See
State v. Chesnut, 424 S.W.3d 213, 218 (Tex. App.Texarkana 2014, no pet.) (holding that a prisoner
complies with his obligations under the IADA when he
mails a "proper request for final disposition along

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with all the required document a ti on") (emphasis added) ;
Lara v. State, 909 S.W.2d 615, 617-18 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1995, pet ref'd) (holding that appellant's proper
request for disposition alone, unaccompanied by a
certificate from the official having custody of him,
was insufficient to invoke the IADA) . Even viewing all
five of [petitioner]'s prose filings together, the
motions are still inadequate to invoke the IADA.
Because [petitioner]'s motions did not invoke the IADA,
the 180-day period did not start, and [petitioner] was
not tried in violation of the IADA. We overrule
[petitioner]'s first point.
Ineffective assistance of counsel

In his second point, [petitioner] argues that his
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not
moving to dismiss the underlying charges for the
alleged violation of the IADA. [Petitioner]'s second
point of error is based solely on the first point of
error, and he acknowledged in oral argument that if the
first point of error is overruled, then no grounds
exist to support the second point of error. Because we
have overruled [petitioner]'s first point, we overrule
[petitioner]'s second point.
(Mem. Op. 2-6, doc. 15-4.)
In turn, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused
petitioner's petitions for discretionary review raising the
claims.
The state courts' adjudication of the claims comports with
federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court on
the issues. When a habeas petitioner alleges a violation of the
IADA, he must show that the alleged violation is a "fundamental
defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of
justice." Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 348

(1994). "The defect

must be an exceptional circumstance of a type which causes

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prejudice to the defendant." Lara v. Johnson, 141 F.3d 239, 24243 (5th Cir. 1998), modified on reh'g, 149 F.3d 1226 (5th Cir.
1998). Petitioner has failed to show how the alleged IADA
violation rises to the level of a fundamental defect which would
require dismissal. He makes no showing that his ability to get a
fair trial was affected or credible assertions of prejudice as a
result of any failure of the state to abide by the IADA. Nor does
he establish that he is actually innocent of the charges for
which he was convicted. Further, absent clear and convincing
evidence in rebuttal, this court must defer to the factual
findings of the state appellate court. Applying the appropriate
deference, petitioner's motions did not comply with the
procedural requirements of the IADA because his motions were not
accompanied by the requisite certificate regarding his federal
prison term.
Finally, petitioner's trial counsel testified at the new
trial hearing that he did not urge petitioner's motions because,
in his opinion, the motions were frivolous as they did not comply
with the requirements of the IADA.

(Supp. Reporter's R., Mot. for

New Trial, vol. 2, 72-79, doc. 15-17.) Counsel is not required to
raise frivolous motions.

Johnson v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 1029, 1037

(5th Cir. 2002).
For the reasons discussed herein,
The court ORDERS that petitioner's petition for a writ of

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habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

2254 be, and is hereby,

denied. The court further ORDERS that a certificate of
appealability be, and is hereby, denied, as petitioner has not
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.
SIGNED

Decembert)/_,,_~~-'

2017.

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