Shelton v Tarrant County College District

Filing 19

Memorandum Opinion and Order denying 14 Motion to Dismiss filed by Tarrant County College District. The court further ORDERS that plaintiff's request for an award of attorney's fees be, and is hereby, denied. (see order for specifics) (Ordered by Judge John McBryde on 12/23/2016) (mpw)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEX
FORT WORTH DIVISION
KAREN SHELTON,

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Plaintiff,

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vs.

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NO. 4:16-CV-973-A

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TARRANT COUNTY COLLEGE
DISTRICT,

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Defendant.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Came on for consideration the first amended motion of
defendant, Tarrant County College District, to dismiss
plaintiff's constructive discharge claim. The court, having
considered the motion, the response of plaintiff, Karen Shelton,
the record, the reply, and applicable authorities, finds that the
motion should be denied.
I.

Plaintiff's Claims
Plaintiff is a former employee of defendant who asserts
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 ("Title VII"), for race and gender

discrimination and under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C.

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621-34

("ADEA"), for age discrimination. She

also asserts claims for retaliation under Title VII and the ADEA.
As part of her retaliation claims, plaintiff says that she was
constructively discharged.

II.
Ground of the Motion to Dismiss
Defendant asserts that plaintiff has failed to set forth
sufficient factual allegations to support a claim that she was
constructively discharged.
III.
Applicable Legal Principles
Rule B(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides, in a general way, the applicable standard of pleading.
It requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,"
Fed. R. Civ. P. B(a) (2),

"in order to give the defendant fair

notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,"
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
quotation marks and ellipsis omitted) .

(internal

Although a complaint need

not contain detailed factual allegations, the "showing"
contemplated by Rule 8 requires the plaintiff to do more than
simply allege legal conclusions or recite the elements of a cause
of action.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 & n.3.

Thus, while a court

must accept all of the factual allegations in the complaint as
true, it need not credit bare legal conclusions that are
unsupported by any factual underpinnings.
556 U.S. 662, 679

(2009)

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

("While legal conclusions can provide

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the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.").
Moreover, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12(b) (6), the facts pleaded must allow
the court to infer that the plaintiff's right to relief is
plausible.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

To allege a plausible right

to relief, the facts pleaded must suggest liability; allegations
that are merely consistent with unlawful conduct are
insufficient. Id. In other words, where the facts pleaded do no
more than permit the court to infer the possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has not shown that the pleader is
entitled to relief. Id. at 679.

"Determining whether a complaint

states a plausible claim for relief .

[is] a context-specific

task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense."

Id.
IV.

Analysis
The general rule is that if an employer deliberately makes
the employee's working conditions so intolerable that the
employee is forced into an involuntary resignation, then the
employer is liable as though the employee had been terminated.
Haley v. Alliance Compressor LLC, 391 F.3d 644, 649 (5th Cir.
2004). The employee is said to have been constructively

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discharged. Id. Whether an employee would feel forced to resign
is case and fact-specific, the test being an objective
one-whether a reasonable employee in the plaintiff's shoes would
have felt compelled to resign. Id. at 649-50.
The relief sought in defendant's motion is dismissal of
plaintiff's constructive discharge claims. As plaintiff notes in
her response, she has not asserted a claim as such for
constructive dischargei rather, the constructive discharge
allegation is part of her retaliation claims. In an attempt to
salvage its motion, defendant urges in its reply that the
retaliation claims themselves should be dismissed.

(This

overlooks that the retaliation claims are also based on
allegations of failure to promote and hostile working
environment, which have not been addressed.) The court will not
consider new arguments raised for the first time in a reply
brief. Conceal City, L.L.C. v. Looper Law Enforcement, LLC, 917
F. Supp. 2d 611, 623

(N.D. Tex. 2013). In any event, the court is

satisfied that plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to give
defendant notice of the basis for her allegation that she was
constructively discharged. Whether she will be able to prevail on
the merits is another question.
Plaintiff asks for an award of attorney's fees to compensate
her for having to respond to the motion to dismiss. Although the

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motion could have been better presented, the court is not
persuaded that the motion was frivolous.

v.
Order
The court ORDERS that defendant's motion to dismiss be, and
is hereby, denied.
The court further ORDERS that plaintiff's request for an
award of attorney's fees be, and is hereby, denied.
SIGNED December 23, 2016.

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