Coontz v. Berryhill
Filing
19
Memorandum Opinion and Order...The court accepts the recommendation of the magistrate judge and orders that the decision of the Commissioner that, based on the application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits filed on Apr 4 2014, plaintiff is not disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act, and is hereby, affirmed. (Ordered by Judge John McBryde on 7/11/2018) (wrb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT CO RT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
RHONDA GAIL COONTZ,
CLERK, U.S. DlSTRICT COURT
BY--,,,.---,---Deputy
§
§
Plaintiff,
JUL 1 1 2018
§
§
vs.
§
NO. 4 : 1 7 - CV-- 3 0 2 -A
§
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ACTING
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
§
§
§
§
Defendant.
§
MEMORANDUM OPINION
and
ORDER
Before the court for decision is the complaint of plaintiff,
Rhonda Gail Coontz, seeking judicial review of the final decision
of Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of Social Security
("Commissioner"), denying plaintiff's application for a period of
disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of
the Social Security Act
("the Act").
After having considered the
filings of the parties, the administrative record,
the proposed
findings and conclusions and recommendation of United States
Magistrate Judge Jeffrey L. Cureton, and pertinent legal
authorities, the court has concluded that the decision of
Commissioner should be affirmed.
I.
Background
Plaintiff's application was initially denied on September
12, 2014.
Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative
law judge ("ALJ"), which was held on November 5,
2015.
The ALJ
rendered a decision against plaintiff on January 26, 2016.
Plaintiff's request for review was denied on February 6, 2017.
On April 7, 2017, plaintiff filed her complaint in this.action
complaining of Commissioner's decision.
Consistent with the normal practices of this court,
plaintiff's complaint was referred to the United States
Magistrate Judge for proposed findings and conclusions and a
recommendation, and the parties were ordered to treat the
application as an appeal by plaintiff from Commissioner's ruling.
Each party filed a brief on appeal.
On June 1, 2018, the
magistrate judge issued his proposed findings and conclusions and
his recommendation ("FC&R") that Commissioner's decision be
affirmed, and granted the parties until June 15, 2018,
to file and serve any written objections thereto.
in which
Plaintiff
filed her objections on June 11, 2018, and Commissioner filed a
response on June 18, 2018.
2
II.
Positions Taken bv the Parties, the FC&R,
and Plaintiff's Objection to the FC&R
A.
Plaintiff's Opening Brief
Plaintiff defined in her brief the basic issues to be
resolved as follows:
First Issue:
By not giving substantial or controlling
weight to the opinions of Dr. Caroline Woodland ("Dr. Woodland")
and not considering Dr. Woodland's opinions under the relevant
factors enumerated in 20 C .. F.R.
§
404 .1527 (c) (2) - (6), the ALJ
failed to properly weigh the medical opinion evidence.
And, the
ALJ erroneously determined plaintiff's residual functional
capacity ("RFC") when he •substituted his judgment of the
objective medical evidence for the opinions from a treating
expert who considered the exact same objective evidence," doc. 1
13 at 13
(internal quotation marks omitted), and failed to
identify specific medical facts or non-medical evidence to
support the RFC determination,
Second Issue:
id. at 11-13.
The ALJ improperly evaluated plaintiff's
credibility when he found treatment was effective to control
plaintiff's symptoms, and when he failed to compare plaintiff's
•testimony on her symptoms and resulting limitations, her limited
'The "Doc._" 1·eferences are to the numbers assigned to the referenced items on the docket in
this action, No. 4: 17-CV-302-A.
3
activities of daily living, and her lack of significant or
sustained response to treatment
. against the record before
finding Plaintiff not credible as required by 20 C.F.R.
§
404.1529 and SSR 96-7p."
Third Issue:
Id. at 15.
The ALJ relied on a flawed hypothetical
question posed to the vocational expert in that it did not
include all of plaintiff's limitations or comparable
restrictions.
Specifically, the hypothetical did not incorporate
plaintiff's limited "ability to concentrate over a period of
time, her ability to persist at tasks, or her ability to maintain
a particular pace over the course of a workday or workweek."
Id.
at 16.
B.
Commissioner's Responsive Brief
With respect to plaintiff's first issue, Commissioner
responded that because the ALJ identified first-hand evidence by
plaintiff's other treating and examining
physicians that
contradicted the opinions of Dr. Woodland, the ALJ was not
required to analyze the criteria enumerated in 20 C.F.R.
§
404.1527 before declining to give great, substantial, or
controlling weight to the opinions of Dr. Woodland.'
Moreover,
Commissioner stated that even though the ALJ was not required to
'The factors for evaluating medical opinions are: (1) the examining relationship; (2) the
treatment relationship, including the nature, extent, and length oftt·eatment; (3) supportability; (4)
consistency; (5) specialization; (6) other factors. 20 C.F.R. 404. J 527( c )( J )-(6).
4
consider the factors provided in 20 C.F.R.
§
404.1527, he
nevertheless did consider such factors in making his
determination not to give substantial or controlling weight to
Dr. Woodland's opinions.
Finally, Commissioner responded that
the ALJ properly interpreted the medical evidence to determine
plaintiff's capacity for work.
As to the second issue raised by plaintiff, Commissioner
responded that the ALJ sufficiently explained the reason for his
determination that plaintiff's statements concerning the
intensity, persistence, and limited effects of her symptoms were
not entirely credible.
Specifically, the ALJ identified the
process for evaluating a claimant's symptoms, recited the
objective medical evidence and plaintiff's testimony, and then
explained how plaintiff's testimony and subjective complaints
were unsupported by the recited medical evidence.
Finally, in response to plaintiff's third issue,
Commissioner stated that the ALJ "reasonably accounted for any
moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace by
limiting [plaintiff] to detailed, but uninvolved written or oral
instructions,• doc 14 at 13, and that the ALJ properly
disregarded the hypothetical testimony of the vocation expert
that was not supported by the subjective evidence.
5
C.
The FC&R
As to the first issue raised by plaintiff, the magistrate
judge proposed in the FC&R that the ALJ did not err in declining
to give substantial or controlling weight to the opinions of Dr.
Woodland, which were in some instances unsupported by references
to objective evidence, and in other instances controverted by
first-hand medical evidence in the record that was determined by
the ALJ to be more well-founded.
The magistrate judge also
determined that the ALJ appropriately evaluated the medical
evidence by considering the relevant factors enumerated in 20
C.F.R.
§
404.1527(c) and SSRs 96-2p, 96-Sp, 96-6p, and 06-3p.
On
plaintiff's second identified issue, the magistrate judge found
that the ALJ properly evaluated plaintiff's credibility and
reviewed the necessary factors to reach a determination that
plaintiff's statements were not credible to the extent that they
did not align with her medical record.
On plaintiff's final
issue, the magistrate judge concluded that the hypothetical posed
to the vocational expert, which limited plaintiff to
understanding detailed but uninvolved instructions and to
concentrate for extended periods, did not contradict the ALJ's
finding that plaintiff was moderately limited in her ability to
maintain concentration, persistence, or pace.
Moreover, the
magistrate judge determined that the ALJ properly incorporated
6
plaintiff's moderate limitations in maintaining concentration,
persistence, or pace in the RFC and the hypothetical to the
vocational expert when the ALJ limited plaintiff's ability, in
the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert, to understand
detailed but uninvolved instructions and concentrate for extended
periods of time.
Based on these proposed conclusions, the
magistrate judge recommended that Commissioner's decision be
affirmed.
D.
Plaintiff's Objections to the FC&R
Plaintiff's objections to the FC&R for the most part track
the issues raised in plaintiff's opening brief.
Plaintiff again
challenges the amount of weight afforded to the opinions of Dr.
Woodland.
Specifically, plaintiff argues that both the ALJ and
the magistrate judge failed to provide adequate explanations for
rejecting Dr. Woodland's opinions, that the ALJ improperly
considered plaintiff's response to treatment, and that the ALJ
did not weigh Dr. Woodland's opinions using the factors in 20
C.F.R.
§
404.1527(c).
Plaintiff also objects that the magistrate
judge failed to address plaintiff's argument that the ALJ in
substituting his judgement of the objective medical evidence for
the opinions of Dr. Woodland to determine plaintiff's RFC.
Plaintiff also raises for the first time her argument that a
"patient's report of complaints" are relevant.
7
With regard to
her second issue, plaintiff reiterates that it was an error for
the ALJ to consider her "modest response to treatment" and "the
fact that [p]laintiff can engage in some activities of daily
living" as evidence that plaintiff is not disabled.
Doc. 16 at
6.
Plaintiff also reiterates her argument that the ALJ erred in
considering her response to treatment or ability to perform some
activities of daily living as evidence she is not disabled.
On her final point, plaintiff again challenges the
hypothetical posed to the vocational expert, which included
mental limitations in plaintiff's ability to understand and carry
out detailed but uninvolved instructions and concentrating for
extended periods of time, did not adequately account for
plaintiff's moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or
pace.
III.
Analysis
A.
Basic Principles
A guiding principle is that judicial review of a decision of
Commissioner of nondisability is limited to two inquiries:
(1)
whether Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole and (2) whether Commissioner
applied the proper legal standards.
8
See Anthony v. Sullivan, 954
F.2d 289, 292
(5th Cir. 1992).
Substantial evidence is more than
a scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a
conclusion.•
Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995);
Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 514 U.S. 1120 (1995).
There will not be a finding of "no
substantial evidence" unless "there is a conspicuous absence of
credible choices.•
1988)
Harrell v. Brown, 862 F .. 2d 471, 475
(5th Cir.
(per curiam).
The determination of whether there is substantial evidence
to support the fact findings of the Commissioner does not involve
reweighing the evidence, or trying the issues de novo.
67 F.3d at 555.
The court cannot substitute its own judgment for
that of the Commissioner.
Cir. 1987)
Ripley,
Neal v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 528, 530 (5th
(per curiam); Chaparro v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1008, 1010
(5th Cir. 1987)
(5th Cir. 1986).
(per curiam); Milam v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 1284, 1286
The Commissioner, not the court, has the duty
to weigh the evidence, resolve material conflicts in the
evidence, and make credibility choices.
F.2d 243, 247
(5th Cir. 1991)
F.2d 479, 482
(5th Cir. 1985).
Carrier v. Sullivan, 944
(per curiam); Carry v. Heckler,
The court's role is to
"scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine whether
substantial evidence supports• the Commissioner's findings.
9
750
Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1992)
Ransom v. Heckler, 715 F.2d 989,
curiam)).
992
(5th Cir. 1983)
(citing
(per
If supported by substantial evidence, the
Commissioner's findings are deemed conclusive, and the court must
accept them.
Ct. 1420, 1422
See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390,
(1971).
91 S.
"The role of the courts in this
quintessentially administrative process is extremely narrow and
the Commissioner's decision is entitled to great deference."
Leggett v. Chater,
67 F.3d 558, 564
(5th Cir. 1995); Lewis v.
Weinberger, 515 F.2d 584, 586 (5th Cir. 1975).
B.
The Decision of the Commissioner is to be Affirmed
1.
Plaintiff's Claim that the ALJ Failed to Properly Weigh
the Medical Opinion Evidence and Failed to Properly
Determine Plaintiff's Residual Functional Capacity
Having reviewed the record in this action, the court is
satisfied that the ALJ properly weighed the medical opinions of
Dr. Woodland.
As a general rule, an ALJ is to accord great
weight to the opinions of a claimant's treating physician.
Leggett,
67 F.3d at 566; Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 237.
See
If the
treating physician's opinions are "well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and
[are] not inconsistent with .
other substantial
evidence,~
the treating physician's opinions should be given controlling
weight.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (2); Martinez v. Chater,
10
64 F.3d
172, 176 (5th Cir. 1995).
However, an ALJ may discredit such an
opinion if the ALJ shows good cause for doing so.
Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 455-56
(5th Cir. 2000).
Newton v.
Good cause in this
context may include disregarding statements that are brief or
conclusory, unsupported by acceptable diagnostic techniques, or
otherwise unsupported by the medical evidence.
Leggett,
67 F.3d
at 566; Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 237.
In this case, the ALJ properly evaluated the medical
evidence before determining to disregard the medical opinions of
Dr. Woodland.
The ALJ explained that the opinions of Dr.
Woodland were afforded less than substantial or controlling
weight because such opinions were "based primarily on the
claimant's subjective allegations and .
. not supported by Dr.
Woodland's objective findings or those of any other medical
source.•
Doc. 1 at 19.
Such explanations provide good cause for
the ALJ to give less than substantial or controlling weight to
the opinions of Dr. Woodland.
Moreover, even though the ALJ was
not required, for the reasons stated above, to consider the
factors set forth in 20 C.F.R.
§
404.1527, his decision
nonetheless demonstrates that he did consider each of the
relevant factors as part of his review of Dr. Woodland's
opinions.
For these reasons, the court concludes that the ALJ
did not err in assigning less than substantial or controlling
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weight to the opinions of Dr. Woodland.
See Newton, 209 F.3d at
453.
2.
Plaintiff's Claim that the ALJ Failed to Properly
Evaluate Plaintiff's Credibility
Plaintiff's second objection focuses on the ALJ's alleged
failure to properly evaluate plaintiff's credibility.
Credibility determinations of an ALJ are entitled to deference.
See Carrier, 944 F.2d at 247.
In particular, an ALJ's
determination "of the credibility of subjective complaints is
entitled to judicial deference if supported by substantial record
evidence."
Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1024
1990); Chambliss v. Massanari, 269 F.3d 520, 522
(5th Cir.
(5th Cir. 2001)
The ALJ evaluated the credibility of plaintiff's statements
regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her
symptoms by, among other things, reviewing the factors enumerated
in SSR 96-7p. 3
Based on an evaluation of these factors,
the ALJ
determined that plaintiff's "medically determinable impairments
could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms[, but
that plaintiff's]
statements concerning the intensity,
3
The factors the ALJ must consider in addition to the objective medical evidence when assessing
the credibility of a claimant's statements are: (1) the claimant's daily activities; (2) the location, duration,
frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; (3) factors that precipitate and aggravate the
symptoms; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication taken to alleviate pain
or other symptoms; (5) treatment, other than medication, received for relief of pain or other symptoms;
(6) any measures other than treatment that the claimant uses or has used to relieve pain or other
symptoms; and (7) other factors that bear on the claimant's functional limitations and restrictions due to
pain or other symptoms.
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persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not
entirely credible.•
Doc. 9 at 18.
The magistrate judge
discussed and identified in his recommendation each of the points
made by the ALJ regarding the relevant factors.
Although
plaintiff objected to the magistrate's findings on the issue of
the ALJ's assessment of her credibility, she did not actually
challenge the magistrate judge's assessment of the ALJ's
application of the relevant factors.
Instead, she argued that
her modest response to treatment and the fact that she is capable
of what she refers to as "hardly significant activities,• for
instance doing laundry, driving, and grocery shopping, do not
contradict a finding of disability.
Doc. 16 at 6.
Because the
ALJ properly considered plaintiff's credibility and there is
sufficient evidence in the record to support that credibility
determination, the court finds that the ALJ did not err.
Chambliss, 269 F.3d at 522; Villa,
3.
895 F.2d at 1024.
Plaintiff's Claim that the ALJ Relied on a Flawed
Hypothetical Question to the Vocational Expert
Plaintiff's final objection to the findings, conclusions,
and recommendation of the magistrate judge focused on the
hypothetical posed to the vocational expert, arguing that the
hypothetical failed to account for plaintiff's moderate
limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace.
Rather than
challenging the actual merits of the findings and recommendations
13
of the magistrate judge, she presented again the same cases and
arguments offered in her opening brief, and provided additional
authority from other circuits.
The ALJ in this case found moderate limitation in
plaintiff's ability to maintain concentration, persistence, or
pace, and severe mental impairments of depression and anxiety.
The ALJ then incorporated plaintiff's moderate limitations into
the RFC and in the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert by
limiting plaintiff to, among other things, a job that involves
understanding "detailed but uninvolved" written or oral
instructions and concentrating for extended periods of time.
The
court concludes that such a hypothetical adequately accounted for
an incorporated plaintiff's limitations in her ability to
maintain concentration, persistence, or pace.
See Bordelon v.
Astrue, 281 F. App'x 418, 419 (5th Cir. 2008); Williams v.
Colvin, No. 4:14-CV-114-BJ, 2015 WL 1288348, at *6 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 20, 2015);
Westover v. Astrue, No. 4:11-CV816-Y, 2012 WL
6553102, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Nov.16, 2012).
Finally, plaintiff attempted to cast doubt on the
hypothetical posed by the ALJ by questioning her ability to
perform the job of poultry eviscerator.
Because the job of a
poultry eviscerator was not identified by the vocational expert
or the ALJ, plaintiff's ability to perform that job is not
14
relevant to this action.
Thus, the court finds that the ALJ did
not err.
IV.
Order
Therefore,
The court accepts the recommendation of the magistrate judge
and ORDERS that the decision of the Commissioner that, based on
the application for a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits filed on April 4, 2014, plaintiff is not
disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security
Act, be,
and is hereby, affirmed.
SIGNED July 11, 2018.
District
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