Agnew v. ABE Factor & Campbell et al

Filing 43

Opinion and Order... For the foregoing reasons, all of Agnews claims against Abe Factor and Brian Eppes, and his claims against all defendants for compensatory monetary damages, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under authority of 28 U.S.C. § 191 5A(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). Agnews claims for monetary damages against Scott Wisch and Sharen Wilson are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). A nd Agnews claims against Officers Barry Moore, J.C. Moran, D. Burden, etc. and the unnamed Mansfield police officers, and alternatively as to Agnews remaining claims, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE to their being asserted again until the Heck v. Humphr ey conditions are met,3 under authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). This dismissal will count as a strike or prior occasion within the meaning 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). (Ordered by Senior Judge Terry R Means on 7/9/2019) (wxc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
NORMAN L. AGNEW,
(TDCJ No. 02172850),
Plaintiff,

§
§
§
§
v.
§
§
ABE FACTOR and CAMPBELL, et al.,§
§
Defendants.
§

CIVIL ACTION NO.4:17-CV-527-Y

OPINION and ORDER OF DISMISSAL
UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A & 1915(e)(2)(B)
This

case

is

before

the

Court

for

review

of

pro-se

inmate/plaintiff Norman L. Agnew’s pleading under the screening
provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B). After review
and consideration of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court determines that
all claims must be dismissed under authority of these provisions.

I.

BACKGROUND/PLEADING
In this suit, after he initially filed several pleadings,

plaintiff

Agnew

attachment
incorporate

re-filed

pages

in

all

of

a

form

accordance
his

civil-rights
with

claims

this

into

complaint

Court’s

one

final

with

order

to

amended

complaint.(Final Am. Compl. (doc.34); Order Resolving Motions and
Order for Plaintiff to File a Final Amended Complaint (doc. 30).)
Thus, the live pleading subject to review is Agnew’s form final
amended civil-rights complaint with attachment pages.(Final Am.
Compl. (Doc. 34).) The final amended complaint names as defendants

attorneys Abe Factor and Brian Eppes; Mansfield police officers
Barry Moore, J.C. Moran, D. Burden, and all Mansfield officers
involved; Sharen Wilson, district attorney, Tarrant County, Texas;
and Scott Wisch, judge, 372nd Judicial District Court, Tarrant
County, Texas.1 (Id. (doc. 34) at 3, 15-25.)
Agnew complains of the actions of Mansfield police officers in
arresting him and recites generally that he was the subject of
racial profiling and was wrongfully arrested. (Id. (doc. 34) at 3.)
Agnew acknowledges that he was initially arrested on an arrestwarrant affidavit for charges of injury to a child and assault on
a family member. (Id. (doc. 34) at 15.) Agnew contends that the
arrest warrant for the injury-to-a-child charge lacked probable
cause, and he alleges the later indictment included insufficient
information. (Id.) He alleges this resulted in his unlawful seizure
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Id. (doc. 34) at 15-16.)
Although Agnew includes challenges to an “enclosed arrest
affidavit,” he did not include that document in the final amended
complaint. Agnew did, however, file a copy of the “Arrest Warrant
Affidavit”

as an exhibit to a prior pleading, and the Court can

1

Although Agnew initially listed Officer C. Stevens, Judge Bakkers, Tarrant
County Assistant District Attorneys Pharra McDonald and Davye J. Esks, and
Tarrant County, Texas, as defendants in the original complaint, he dropped his
claims against these defendants in the final amended complaint. Agnew was
previously informed that once he filed the final amended complaint, the Court
would look only to that document with attachment pages in reviewing his claims.
(Order (doc. 30).) The clerk of Court is directed to note on the docket that
these defendants were removed from the suit by Agnew’s filing of the final
amended complaint.

2

thus review and take judicial notice of that copy previously filed
in this case. (Am. Compl. (Doc. 25) at 5-7.) That document reveals
that the affidavit was prepared by Officer Barry Moore based upon
information provided in a written report by Officer J. C. Moran.
(Id.). In support of a charge brought against Agnew for injury to
a child in violation of Texas Penal Code § 22.04, the document
recites that Agnew threw his eight year old daughter Jaya Agnew
across the floor causing her back to hurt.(Id.) The document also
sets forth facts in support of a separate misdemeanor charge of
assault causing bodily injury/family violence for actions taken by
Agnew against his wife Bridgette Agnew.(Id.) Detective Moore’s
narrative reveals that there was sufficient information to issue a
warrant on each of these charges.(Id. at 7-9.)
In the final amended complaint, Agnew complains of the two
officers’ actions in preparing the affidavit and arrest warrant in
response to contact from Agnew’s wife.(Final Am. Compl (doc. 34) at
17-18.) Agnew contends that he was subjected to violations of his
rights to due process of law, equal protection of law, and his
right to “tell my side of the story” in violation of the First
Amendment.(Id. at 18.) He also alleges that he was subjected to an
illegal custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda v. Arizona,
396 U.S. 868 (1969), and was not afforded meaningful access to
counsel during this investigation stage. (Id. at 19-20.) Agnew
further contends that he was not given adequate notice of the

3

charges to adequately prepare his defense. (Id. at 21.)
Agnew also recites claims of an unlawful arrest procedure,
apparently arising from officers’ detention of him on charges that
he was in violation of a protective order regarding his proximity
to his wife’s house. (Id. at 22.) He alleges the officers did not
have reasonable cause to arrest him, but acknowledges that after
his detention in the Mansfield jail for a few hours, he was charged
with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon in case number
1434387 and with theft of a firearm in case number 1434386. (Id.
at 22-23.) With regard to these two charges, Agnew contends that
the Mansfield police officers would not produce evidence to him and
later destroyed evidence. (Id. at 24.) Agnew claims that his arrest
on these two charges was also not supported by a sufficient arrest
warrant in that probable cause was lacking. (Id. at 24.)
Agnew seeks relief in this civil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
in the form of a finding by this Court that he was wrongfully
convicted and subjected to wrongful enhancements to his charges,
along with monetary damages from his attorneys and from the
officers he alleges violated his constitutional rights. (Id. at 4,
25.)

II.

RELATED CIVIL SUITS
Relevant to the Court’s review of this civil-rights case is

the fact that Agnew also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

4

under

28

U.S.C.

§

2241

in

this

district,

challenging

the

convictions that arose out of the same conduct made the basis of
this civil suit. See Agnew v. Waybourn, No. 4:17-CV-793-Y (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 9, 2018 Order and Judgment). This Court takes judicial
notice of its own records in this habeas-corpus case. See Fed. R.
Evid. 201(b)(2) and (c)(1).
At the time of the entry of judgment in that case, this Court
determined that Agnew’s pre-trial claims brought under § 2241 were
moot because he had by then pleaded guilty to and was convicted of
four felony charges (injury to a child, theft of a firearm,
unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, and bail jumping), and
one misdemeanor charge (assault causing bodily injury to a family
member).(Mot. Dismiss, Agnew v. Waybourn, No. 4:17-CV-793-Y (doc.
8) Exs. at 8, 21, 34, 47, 60). Records before the Court in that
proceeding revealed that on December 11, 2017, Agnew pleaded guilty
to these charges and was sentenced to a fifteen-year term of
confinement for each felony charge, and to one hundred and eighty
days for the misdemeanor charge. (Mot. Dismiss, Agnew v. Waybourn,
No. 4:17-CV-793-Y (doc. 8) Exs. at 8–11, 21–24, 34–37, 47–50,
61–63).
Closer review of the records of Agnew’s convictions in that
case show that they are the exact same charges he complains of in
this civil-rights case. In this regard the Court notes: case number
1429034D is the judgment of conviction for injury to a child
5

causing bodily injury in violation of Penal Code § 22.04(f) for
Agnew’s actions against daughter Jaya Agnew; case number 1433452D
is the judgment of conviction for assault causing bodily injury to
a family member in violation of Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1) for
Agnew’s actions against wife Bridgette Agnew; case number 1434386D
is the judgment of conviction for theft of a firearm in violation
of Penal Code § 31.03(e)(4)(C); case number 1434387D is the
judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a
felon in violation of Penal Code § 46.04(a); and case number
1475324D

is

the

judgment

of

conviction

for

bail

jumping

in

violation of Penal Code § 38.10(f).2(Id.)

III. SCREENING UNDER § 1915A and § 1915(e)(2)(B)
Because Agnew is a prisoner seeking redress from an officer or
employee of a governmental entity, his complaint is subject to
preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Martin v.
Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Because
he is proceeding in forma pauperis, his complaint is also subject
to

screening

under

§

1915(e)(2)(B).

Both

§

1915A(b)

and

§

1915(e)(2)(B) provide for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or
any

portion

thereof,

if

the

Court

finds

it

is

frivolous

or

malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

2

Agnew does not raise any challenge in this case related to the bail-jumping
conviction.

6

granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on
an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327. A claim that
falls under the rule announced in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994), “is legally frivolous unless the conviction or sentence at
issue has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or otherwise called
into question.” Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 102 (5th Cir. 1996).
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, plaintiffs
must allege facts sufficient to “raise the right to relief above
the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Mere “labels and
conclusions” nor “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action” suffice to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. Id.

IV. ANALYSIS
(A) Claim Barred by Absolute Immunity
(1) Judicial Immunity
7

With regard to Agnew’s claims against Scott Wisch, judges are
absolutely immune from claims for damages arising out of acts
performed in the exercise of their judicial functions. Mireless v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991)(citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S.
219, 227-229 (1988) and Stump v. Sparkman, 435

U.S. 349, 360

(1978)); see also Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir.
1994). Absolute judicial immunity can be overcome only if the
plaintiff shows that the complained-of actions were nonjudicial in
nature or that the actions were taken in the complete absence of
all jurisdiction. Mireless, 502 U.S. at 11; Boyd, 31 F.3d at 284.
Because any complained-of conduct by Judge Wisch was judicial in
nature and was undertaken pursuant to the jurisdiction provided to
the 372nd Judicial District Court, Judge Wisch is entitled to
absolute immunity from any monetary-damages claims, and such claims
will be dismissed.
(2) Prosecutorial Immunity
Agnew asserts a claim against Tarrant County District Attorney
Sharen Wilson.(Final Am. Compl. (doc. 34) at 3.) Agnew brings a
claim against Wilson for “wrongful enhancement, which I am sending
evidence of, the wrongful enhancement I was done [sic].” But Wilson
is entitled to absolute immunity for any claims for monetary
damages asserted by Agnew. The Supreme Court has consistently held
that acts undertaken by a government prosecutor in the course of
the prosecutors’ role as an advocate for the government are cloaked

8

in absolute immunity. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269-70
(1993); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). The Supreme
Court has further explained that absolute immunity is afforded
based upon whether the prosecutor is acting “in his role as
advocate for the State.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 33. Here, even
assuming Agnew’s allegations against Sharen Wilson are true, she
would have taken such action in her role as a prosecutor on behalf
of the State of Texas. Thus, defendant Wilson is entitled to
absolute

prosecutorial

immunity

from

any

claim

for

monetary

damages, and such claims must be dismissed.

(B) No Color of Law
To assert a claim for violation of federal constitutional
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must set forth facts in
support of both of its elements:(1) the

deprivation of a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2)
the deprivation was imposed by a person acting under color of law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)(citing cases); Resident
Council of Allen Parkway Vill. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
980 F.2d 1043, 1050 (5th Cir.1993). As to Agnew’s allegations
against two different attorneys, Abe Factor and Brian Eppes, Agnew
has failed to satisfy the second element. Agnew has failed to show
that these private attorneys acted under color of law. Because an
attorney, whether private or appointed, owes his only duty to the
9

client and not to the public or the state, his actions are not
chargeable to the state. See Thompson v. Aland, 639 F. Supp. 724,
728 (N.D. Tex.1986) (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,
318 (1981)); see also Pete v. Metcalfe, 8 F.3d 214, 216-17 (5th
Cir. 1993). Furthermore, Agnew has made no allegation that these
attorneys took action on behalf of the government, or that they
took action in concert or conspiracy with a government official to
violate his constitutional rights. Agnew cannot show that his
attorneys

were

acting

under

color

of

law,

so

any

claim

for

violation of his constitutional rights asserted through 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against the attorney defendants must be dismissed.

(C) Limitation Upon Claims for Compensatory Damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(e)
As noted above, as a part of his request for relief from this
Court, Agnew seeks compensatory monetary damages. (Final Am. Compl.
(Doc. 34) at 4.) With the enactment of the PLRA, Congress placed a
restriction on a prisoner’s ability to recover compensatory damages
without a showing of physical injury: “[n]o Federal civil action
may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other
correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered
while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury . . .
.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(e) (West Supp. 2018). This physical-injury
requirement has long been recognized as applying to claims under

10

the Eighth Amendment. See Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 665-66
(5th Cir. 2001); Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir.
1999); Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193-94 (5th Cir. 1997).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held
that § 1997e(e) applied to claims under the First Amendment as
well, noting “it is the nature of the relief sought, and not the
underlying substantive violation, that controls: Section 1997e(e)
applies to all federal civil actions in which a prisoner alleges a
constitutional violation, making compensatory damages for mental or
emotional injuries non-recoverable, absent physical injury.” Geiger
v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 375 (5th Cir. 2005). More recently, the
Fifth Circuit rejected an inmate’s claim that § 1997e(e) does not
apply to a Fourth Amendment claim arising from a strip search,
emphasizing that in Geiger the court noted that “1997e(e) applies
to all federal civil actions,” and noting that “[r]egardless of
[Plaintiff’s] invocation of the Fourth Amendment, his failure to
allege

any

physical

injury

precludes

his

recovery

of

any

compensatory damages for emotional or mental injuries suffered.”
Hutchins v. McDaniels, 512 F.3d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 2007) (emphasis
in original). Another district court has applied the language of
Geiger to hold that an inmate’s claims for compensatory damages for
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, without showing physical
injury, are barred by § 1997e(e). See Rogers v. Newman, No.5:04-CV193-DCB-JCS, 2006 WL 1520298, at *1 (S.D. Miss. April 7, 2006).
11

A review of the allegations in Agnew’s final amended complaint
shows that he has not asserted any claim of physical injury.
Applying the above referenced holdings to the instant case, no
matter the substantive constitutional violations asserted by Agnew,
his

failure

to

allege

physical

injury

bars

any

claims

for

compensatory monetary damages.

(D)

Application of Heck v. Humphrey
With regard to the claims against the unnamed Mansfield police

officers, and as to named Mansfield Officers Moore, Moran and
Burden, and as an alternative ground for dismissal of the claims
against the defendants already dismissed, the Court considers
application of the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994). In the Heck case, the Supreme Court held that when a
successful

civil-rights

action

would

necessarily

imply

the

invalidity of a plaintiff’s conviction or sentence, the claim must
be dismissed unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the conviction
or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to
make such a determination, or called into question by a federal
court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Id.

at

486-87.

termination

of

A

plaintiff

his

does

available

so

by

state,

achieving
or

“favorable

federal

habeas,

opportunities to challenge the underlying conviction or sentence.”

12

Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 (2004) (per curiam). “[T]he
Heck determination depends on the nature of the offense and of the
claim.” Arnold v. Slaughter, 100 F. App’x. 321, 323 (5th Cir. 2004)
(citation omitted). Although the Heck opinion involved a bar to
claims for monetary damages, a dismissal of a claim for injunctive
and/or declaratory relief may also be made pursuant to Heck. See
Reger v. Walker, 312 F. App’x. 624, 625 (5th Cir. 2009)(noting that
claims, “whether for damages, declaratory judgment, or injunctive
relief” are not cognizable in a § 1983 action because they imply
the invalidity of conviction); see also Clarke v. Stadler, 154 F.3d
186, 190-91 (5th Cir. 1998)(en banc)(holding that a claim for
prospective injunctive relief that would imply the invalidity of a
prisoner's conviction may be dismissed without prejudice subject to
the rule of Heck v. Humphrey).
Agnew claims in this federal civil suit that the officers
violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment by arresting him
without probable cause; he also claims violations of due process of
law by several defendants; he claims that evidence was withheld or
destroyed; he claims that his right to equal protection under law
was violated by racial profiling; he claims his rights under the
First Amendment were violated when he was detained against his
will; he claims that his rights under Miranda v. Arizona were
violated; and relatedly, he claims denial of access to counsel
during his arrest and investigation. (Final Am. Compl. (doc. 34) at

13

15-25.) A favorable ruling on such claims in this Court would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions in the state
criminal cases. See e.g., Conlan v. King, 682 F. App’x 345, 345–46
(5th Cir. 2017)(claims of false arrest, forced self-incrimination,
and illegal seizure of evidence barred by Heck); Goldston v. City
of Monroe, 621 F. App’x 274, 278 (5th Cir. 2015)(concluding that
claim that arrest warrant lacked probable cause was barred by Heck
because any showing of a lack of probable cause is in essence a
collateral attack on the conviction); Legate v. Garcia, 582 F.
App’x 287, 288 (5th Cir. 2014)(“[A]ny claim that Legate was wrongly
convicted
necessarily

based

on

imply

due[-]process

that

his

violations

conviction

is

at

trial

would

invalid”)(citations

omitted)); Villegas v. Galloway, 458 F. App’x 334, 337 (5th Cir.
2012)(civil-rights

claims

such

as

ineffective

assistance

of

counsel, use of perjured testimony and fabricated evidence, and
suppression of favorable evidence, barred by Heck); Shaw v. Harris,
116

F.

App’x

499,

500

(5th

Cir.

2004)(inmate’s

claims

that

defendants violated her right to due process by concealing or
tampering with evidence, prosecuted her based on false evidence and
presented false evidence challenged validity of conviction and thus
were barred by Heck); Taylor v. Stadler, 193 F.3d 518, 1999 WL
707855, at *1 (5th Cir. 1999)(affirming dismissal of complaint
challenging a state-court conviction and including challenge to the
validity of the indictment as barred by Heck)(unpublished); Roberts

14

v. Jack, No. 3:14-CV-826-FKB, 2016 WL 4136490, at *2 (S.D. Miss.
Aug.

3,

2016)(claim

related

to

Miranda

warnings

barred

by

Heck)(citation omitted); Johnson v. Merchant, No. 4:08-CV-028, 2009
WL 4592488, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 1, 2009)(holding that claim that
arrest was retaliation for exercise of First Amendment right barred
by Heck); Evans v. Mendoza, No.4:05-CV-759-Y, 2006 WL 3438627, at
*2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2006)(Means,J.)(claims challenging unlawful
seizure of evidence later used in prosecution of plaintiff not
cognizable under
4473(RJD)(LB),

Heck);

2012

WL

Azor v. City of New York, No.08-CV1117256

at

*3

(E.D.

N.Y.

Mar.

30,

2012)(finding Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim based
upon racial profiling barred under Heck).
Agnew has not shown that his convictions have been reversed or
set aside in any of the manners listed in Heck. As noted above, a
review of the state-court records provided in Agnew’s prior suit
seeking relief under § 2241, as well as that suit itself, reveals
that

Agnew

pleaded

guilty

to

and

was

convicted

on

the

four

charges——injury to a child causing bodily injury (case 1429034D),
assault causing bodily injury to a family member(case 1433452D),
theft of a firearm (case 1434386D), and unlawful possession of a
firearm

by

a

felon

(case

1434387D)——to

which

he

raises

constitutional challenges in this case.(Mot. Dismiss, Agnew v.
Waybourn, No. 4:17-CV-793-Y (doc. 8) Exs. at 8, 21, 34, 47, 60).
Review of additional records shows that Agnew has not yet

15

obtained any relief from any of these convictions in the manner
required by Heck. Although he filed direct appeals to the Court of
Appeals of Texas, Second District, those appeals are still pending,
and the court of appeals issued a notice to the parties regarding
lack of jurisdiction. See http://search.txcourts.gov/Case.aspx?cn=
02-19-132-CR,

133-CR,

134-CR,

and

135-CR&coa=coa02.

Likewise,

although Agnew recently filed a state application for writ of
habeas corpus, that application was denied without written order on
April

3,

2019.

Ex

parte

Agnew,

No.

WR-89,622-01.

See

http://search.txcourts.gov/Case.aspx?cn=WR-89,622-01&coa=coscca.
And although Agnew has filed another petition for writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging these same convictions in
this district, that § 2254 petition remains pending, and Agnew has
not obtained relief. See Agnew v. Davis, No.4:18-CV-604-O (N.D.
Texas)(docs. 1 and 12.)
As Agnew has not shown that the four convictions to which he
asserts constitutional challenges in this proceeding have been
invalidated under Heck, his claims under § 1983, whether they be
for monetary damages, injunctive relief, or for declaratory relief,
are not cognizable at this time and must be dismissed. See Heck,
512 U.S. at 487-88; see also Reger, 312 F. App’x. at 625. The
claims are “legally frivolous” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §
1915 and should be dismissed “with prejudice to their being
asserted again until the Heck conditions are met.” Johnson v.

16

McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996).

V.

CONCLUSION and ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, all of Agnew’s claims against Abe

Factor and Brian Eppes, and his claims against all defendants for
compensatory monetary damages, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under
authority

of

28

U.S.C.

§

1915A(b)(1)

and

28

U.S.C.

§

1915

(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). Agnew’s claims for monetary damages against
Scott Wisch and Sharen Wilson are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under
authority

of

28

U.S.C.

§

1915A(b)(2)

and

28

U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). And Agnew’s claims against Officers Barry
Moore, J.C. Moran, D. Burden, etc. and the unnamed Mansfield police
officers, and alternatively as to Agnew’s remaining claims, are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE to their being asserted again until the
Heck v. Humphrey conditions are met,3 under authority of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).
This dismissal will count as a “strike” or “prior occasion”
within the meaning 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
SIGNED July 9, 2019.
____________________________
TERRY R. MEANS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

See Johnson, 101 F.3d at 424.
17