Anderson v. General Motors, LLC

Filing 28

Memorandum Opinion and Order...all claims of plaintiff against defendant are dismissed. (Ordered by Judge John McBryde on 11/28/2017) (wrb)

IN

LETOSHA ANDERSON,

§

BY~~~~~~~~~~-

§

Plaintiff,

Deputy

§
§

vs.

§

NO. 4:17-CV-672-A

§

GENERAL MOTORS, LLC,

§
§

Defendant.

§

MEMORANDUM OPINION
and
ORDER
Came on for consideration the motion to dismiss filed in the
above-captioned action by defendant, General Motors, LLC, to
which plaintiff, Letosha Anderson, responded.

Having considered

the motion, the response, the reply, plaintiff's complaint, and
the applicable legal authorities, the court finds that the motion
should be granted.
I.

Plaintiff's Alleged Causes of Action
The following is an abbreviated statement of the allegations
by plaintiff as the basis for her eight alleged causes of action:
Plaintiff is a forty-one-year-old, African American, woman
currently employed by defendant.

In March 2015, she began

working in the defendant's electrical apprenticeship program.
She claimed that during the time she held this position, she
never received the necessary training, classes, or tools to

perform the job, but that "other employees who were over forty
(40) years old, who were not African American, who were not
female who were all given the proper training, classes, and tools
to perform the job."

Doc. 1 1 at 7, , 31 (errors in original).

On January 4, 2016, plaintiff was transferred to work in the
defendant's body shop.

Since then, her male coworkers have,

"together and individually, hazed, bulled [sic], harassed,
insulted, ridiculed, humiliated and disrespected Plaintiff for
being a female, African American over forty-one
Id. 1 at 8, , 35.

(41) years old."'

Additionally, defendant circulated cards,

flyers, and emails within the workplace that all "are offensive
with regard to age, race and sex," id. at 9, , , 41-43, and
defendant retaliated against her for complaining of the offensive
materials,

id.

Plaintiff asserted the following (using plaintiff's
descriptive headings) as causes of action against defendant based
on those alleged facts:
(1) Count One - Age Discrimination, 29 U.S.C.
§ 623 (a) (1), in the Workplace at General Motors LLC, Doc. 1
at 11;

'The "Doc. "references are to the numbers of the items on the docket in this action.
'The specific behavior plaintiff complains of as harassment includes being called "lazy" and
other names, and male coworkers putting "hello kitty" stickers on her toolbox.
2
\,/

(2) Count Two - Race Discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2 (a) (1) & 42 U.S.C. § 1981, in the Workplace at General
Motors, LLC, id. at 15;
(3) Count Three - Sex-Gender Discrimination, 42 U.S.C.
2000e-2 (a) (1) & 42 U.S.C. § 1981, in the Workplace at
General Motors, LLC, id. at 16;
(4) Count Four - Disparate Treatment Employment
Discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, in
the Workplace at General Motors, LLC, id. at 17;
(5) Count Five - Disparate Impact Employment
Discrimination, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a), in the Workplace at
General Motors, LLC, id. at 18;
(6) Count Six - Hostile Work Environment, 42 U.S.C.
2000e & 42 U.S.C. § 1981, in the Workplace at General
Motors, LLC, id. at 19;
§

(7) Count Seven - Retaliation, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) &
42 U.S.C. § 1981, in the Workplace at General Motors, LLC,
id. at 23; and
(8) Count Eight - Defamation, in the Workplace at
General Motors, LLC, id. at 26.
Plaintiff alleged in the first paragraph under each of the
headings for Counts One, Two, Three, Four, Five, Six, and Seven
that the conduct complained of under the heading also violated
Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code •and other similar state
statutes."

Id. at 11,, 58; 15,, 86; 16,, 97; 17,, 115; 18,

, 125; 19, , 136;

&

23, , 158.

Plaintiff requested injunctive relief, recovery of actual
and punitive damages, and for attorneys, expert witness, and
court reporter fees.

Id. at 30-33.

3

II.

Grounds of the Motion
Defendant moved to dismiss each of the claims and causes of
action against it for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.

Defendant asserts that plaintiff failed to

exhaust administrative remedies before bringing her ADEA claim,
that her race-related claims should be dismissed as time-barred,
and that all of plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal
because she has failed to set forth sufficient factual
allegations to support them.
Defendant filed with its motion as exhibits 1 through 9
specimens of pleadings counsel for plaintiff previously had filed
in this court or other federal courts.

The exhibits seem to

demonstrate that the allegations made by plaintiff in support of
each count in the instant action are mere boilerplate the
plaintiff's attorney repeatedly has used without regard to the
true facts of the instant action and, perhaps, of the other
actions filed by plaintiff's counsel from which the exhibits were
taken.

Docs. 13-21.
III.

Applicable Pleading Standard
Rule B(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides, in a general way, the applicable standard of pleading.

4

It requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[,]"
Fed. R. Civ. P. B(a) (2),

"in order to give the defendant fair

notice of what the claim[s are] and the grounds upon which [they]
rest[] . "

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

554, 555

(2007) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted) .

Although

a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the
"showing" contemplated by Rule 8 requires the plaintiff to do
more than simply allege legal conclusions or recite the elements
of a cause of action.

Id. at 555.

Thus, while a court must

accept all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true,
it need not credit bare legal conclusions that are unsupported by
any factual underpinnings.
679 (2009)

See Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662,

("While legal conclusions can provide the framework of

a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.")
Moreover, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12 (b) (6), the facts pleaded must allow
the court to infer that the plaintiff's right to relief is
plausible.

Id. at 678.

To allege a plausible right to relief,

the facts pleaded must suggest liability; allegations that are
merely consistent with unlawful conduct are insufficient.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 566-69.

"Determining whether a complaint

states a plausible claim for relief .

5

[is] a context-specific

task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense."

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

While the court generally is not to look beyond the
pleadings in deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774
"it is

(5th Cir. 1999),

. . proper in deciding [such a] motion to take judicial

notice of matters of public record," such a pleading filed by
plaintiff in lawsuits filed in this court or other federal
courts.

Norris v. Hearst Trust, 500 F.3d 454, 461 n.9

2007) (citing Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 n.6

(5th Cir.
(5th Cir.

1994)).

IV.
Analysis
A.

The Exhibits to the Motion
The exhibits to defendant's motion bear out defendant's

contention that the allegations and statements alleged by
plaintiff in support of her causes of action "often match wordfor-word" the same causes of action counsel for plaintiff has
alleged against other defendants in cases before this court and
other federal courts in Texas.

Doc. 12 at 2.

For example,

plaintiff's allegations in support of her Count One cause of
action for alleged age discrimination are virtually identical to
her counsel's alleged actions against Prosero, Inc., d/b/a

6

Spinnaker, in June 2017, Doc. 13 at 011-014, and against Dr.
Pepper Snapple Group, Inc., a/k/a Dr. Pepper Snapple Bottling
Group, in July 2016, id. at 044-047.

Needless to say, it

stretches the imagination to believe that defendant had exactly
the "Underlying Age Discrimination Scheme" employed by Spinnaker
and Dr. Pepper, as counsel for plaintiff has contended in his
boilerplate Count One allegations.

The motion's Exhibits 2-9

show that counsel for plaintiff followed the same pattern as to
the Race Discrimination count that plaintiff alleged as her Count
Two, doc. 14 at 84-85 & 115-16; as to the Sex-Gender
Discrimination claim that plaintiff alleged as her Count Three,
doc. 15 at 153-55 & 182-83; as to the Disparate Treatment
Employment Discrimination claim that plaintiff alleged as her
Count Four, doc. 16 at 218-19 & 252-53; as to the Disparate
Impact Employment Discrimination claim that plaintiff alleged as
her Count Five, doc. 17 at 290-91 & 321-22; as to the Hostile
Work Environment claim that plaintiff alleged as her Count Six,
doc. 18 at 342-43 & 377-78; as to the Mental Abuse feature of
plaintiff's Count Six Hostile Work Environment claim, doc. 19 at
403-04 & 439-40; as to the Retaliation claim that plaintiff
alleged as her Count Seven, doc. 20 at 473-77 & 496-500; and, as
to the Defamation in the Workplace claim that plaintiff alleged
as her Count Eight, doc. 21 at 531-34 & 567-69.

7

While boilerplate pleading language is often used as to
commonly-expressed legal principles, the court is highly
suspicious of factual allegations that are alleged to be in
common in unrelated lawsuits involving unrelated defendants.

The

use by plaintiff, through her attorney, of factual allegations
that are almost copies of factual allegations made in other
complaints filed in this court and other federal courts

bear on

the plausibility of the claims asserted by plaintiff in this
action.
The court has concluded that plaintiff has failed to plead
facts that would cause the court to conclude that any of her
claims are plausible under the standards established by the
Supreme Court in Twombly & Igbal.

Other reasons why defendant's

motion has merit as to the counts alleged by plaintiff in her
complaint are set forth below.
B.

The Count One Age Discrimination Claim
Defendant seeks dismissal of plaintiff's ADEA claim for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies, or, in the
alternative, because she has failed to adequately plead her
claim.

Plaintiff stated in her complaint that prior to

initiating the above-captioned action, she timely filed with the
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
two written charges of discrimination.

8

The first,

filed on

June 11, 2016, asserted sex discrimination, hostile work
environment, disparate impact discrimination, and retaliation.'
Her second, filed on June 13, 2017, alleged age and race
discrimination.•
While it appears that plaintiff filed the June 13, 2017
charge of discrimination with the EEOC and received a
corresponding right to sue notification, the court has noted that
the facts recited in the charge do not support an age
discrimination claim.

In it plaintiff states:

In March 2015, I moved to Dallas, TX to participate in
the electrical apprenticeship. However, since I started
the program in March 2015, I have not received the
proper training, classes, or tools to perform the job.
Since I started the program, there have been other
employees (Black and white/ over and under 40) who have
elected to participate in the apprenticeship program.
They were all given proper training, classes, and
tools.
Doc. 25 at App. 4.

This is the only EEOC charge in which

plaintiff has complained of discrimination under the ADEA.

It

suggests that the discrimination claim is based on early-2015
conduct.

ADEA protection is limited only to individuals over the

age of forty.

29 U.S.C.

§

63l(a).

From the face of the charge

'Defendant also claimed to have knowledge or record of two other charges of discrimination filed
with the EEOC on September 10, 2010, and March 25, 2014. Neither of these charges were mentioned in
plaintiff's complaint, nor do they seem to be central to any of her claims.
4

Defendant, in its motion to dismiss, claims to have no knowledge or notice of such charge.
Plaintiff responded by attaching such document, and the accompanying right to sue letter, to her
response.

9

of discrimination, it appears that this allegedly discriminatory
behavior recited by plaintiff was before plaintiff turned forty
years old. 5
Even if the court were satisfied that plaintiff had
exhausted

the administrative remedies available to her, she

still has not pleaded any facts that would suggest an age
discrimination claim.

Rather, plaintiff devotes three pages of

her complaint to conclusory allegations that defendant employed a
systematic scheme designed to disfavor older employees, none of
her allegations rise above the level of pure speculation, nor do
they suggest that any of the complained-of behavior actually
affected plaintiff or resulted in any discriminatory conduct
directed at her.'

The court is not bound to accept as true

labels and conclusions stated by plaintiff. Igbal, 556 U.S. at
679.

Simply parroting the language of ADEA does not suffice

under Rule 8.

Thus, plaintiff's claims of age discrimination,

and all age-related claims, are to be dismissed.

5

In her June 11, 2016 charge of discrimination, plaintiff showed her date of birth to be November
13, 2017. See Doc. 25 at App. 3.
6

For instance, the complaint alleges that the overall goal of this scheme was apparently to
terminate senior employees and replace them with younger employees. Doc. 1 at 12. Plaintiff, however,
was never terminated by defendant. Another example is plaintiff's allegation that as a result of
defendant's discriminatory conduct, plaintiff"suffered and will continue to suffer pecuniary losses,
including , , , lost wages and other benefits .... " Id. at 14. But the record is completely devoid of any
factual information that, iftaken as true, would indicate that such is the case.

10

C.

The Counts Two and Three Race and Gender Discrimination
Claims
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under

Title VII, plaintiff is required to establish that she:
member of a protected class;
position;

(2)

(1) is a

is qualified for a particular

(3) suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) was

replaced by a person not within her protected class.
Honeywell,

Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 281

(5th Cir. 2004).

Pegram v.
To survive a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, plaintiff need
not actually prove each of these elements.

Rather, she simply

must allege sufficient facts to suggest a plausible right to
relief on the claim.

Stone v. La. Dep't of Revenue, 590 F. App'x

332, 339 (5th Cir. 2014).
Plaintiff has not satisfied that burden.

Specifically,

plaintiff has alleged no facts to indicate that she suffered an
adverse employment action, or that she was replaced by someone
outside of her protected class, which here, refers to her race or
gender.

Adverse employment actions, in the context of a

discrimination claim, include "ultimate employment decisions such
as hiring, firing, demoting, promoting, granting leave, and
compensating."

Thompson v. City of Waco, Texas, 764 F.3d 500,

503 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Actions

not affecting job duties, compensation, or benefits usually do
not constitute adverse employment actions, but may in the case of
11

a transfer or reassignment that results in an objectively worse
or less desirable job.

Id.

Although plaintiff stated that she

was transferred to a different division in her workplace, doc. 1
at 7, , 34, she never alleged such transfer constituted an
adverse employment action.

Rather, her complaint seems to be

that she was never given the tools to be successful at her former
position, doc. 1 at 7, , , 32-33,

and that her coworkers treated

her in an undesirable manner, doc. 1 at 8, , , 36-37.

Without

more, these statements are insufficient to support her
discrimination claim.
In her response to defendant's motion, plaintiff voluntarily
waived her claim of sex discrimination under section 1981.
24 at 13.

Accordingly, that claim is to be dismissed.

Doc.

Thus, all

of plaintiff's race and gender discrimination claims are to be
dismissed.
D.

The Count Four Disparate Treatment Employment Discrimination
Claim
To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiff must, when making

a claim of disparate treatment discrimination, allege facts that
would establish the following:
class;

(1) her membership in a protected

(2) that she was qualified for a particular position;

(3)

that she was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4)
that other similarly situated employees outside the protected
class were treated more favorably.
12

See Abarca v. Metro Transit

Auth., 404 F.3d 938, 941 (5th Cir. 2005).

Though plaintiff

stated in her complaint that "[p]laintiff has established her
prima f acie case of disparate treatment employment
discrimination[,]" doc. 1 at 17,

~

119, such is not the case.

Plaintiff has alleged no facts to indicate she has any plausible
right to relief on her disparate treatment claims.

She never

claimed that she was qualified for any particular position, and
she never alleged, in more than a conclusory way, that she was
subject to an adverse employment action or treated less favorably
than individuals outside of her protected class.

Thus,

plaintiff's disparate treatment claims are to be dismissed.
E.

The Count Five Disparate Impact Employment Discrimination
Claim
A claim of disparate impact is one that establishes a

violation of Title VII without a showing of discriminatory
intent.

To establish such a claim, plaintiff must show that

defendant implemented a facially neutral employment practice or
policy that caused a significant disparate impact on employees in
a particular protected class, and then pinpoint the specific
factor or factors in defendant's decision-making process
responsible for causing such statistical disparate impact.
42 U.S.C.

§

2000e-2 (k) (1) (A) (i)- (ii);

Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-57

(1989).

Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Although plaintiff in her

complaint pointed to multiple alleged discriminatory practices
13

engaged in by defendant, she did so in such a conclusory way
that, even if taken as true, cannot support a disparate impact
claim.

For instance, she stated:

Defendant continually utilizes a policy of using age,
race, sex, results of performance reviews, progressive
discipline, imaged leader training, career path,
coaching for success, discrimination, among others to
make employment decisions. Defendant inquires, about
employees' age, race, sex, training progress,
discipline, participation and completion on a regular
bases.
Such policies, while facially neutral, have a
disproportionate and disparate impact on employees
whose race is African American, whose gender is female
and who are over forty (40) years old.
Doc. 1 at 19, , 113.

These statements alone are too factually

bare to allow the court to inf er that her right to relief is
plausible.

Further, the allegation that defendant's policies

disparately impacted people in her Title VII protected class is
insufficient, as she has provided no factual information to
support that claim.

In fact, she has not pointed to a single

person, besides herself, who allegedly was affected by such
policies.

Thus, plaintiff's disparate impact discrimination

claims are to be dismissed.
F.

The Count Six Hostile Work Environment Claim
A hostile work environment exists "when the workplace is

permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult
that is sufficiently severe or persuasive to alter the conditions
of [one's] employment and create an abusive working environment."

14

Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n, 586 F.3d 321, 328 (5th Cir.
2000) .

Whether such behavior is "hostile" depends on "the

frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it
is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance.•
625

Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615,

(5th Cir. 2009). See also Alaniz v. Zamora-Quezada, 591 F.3d

761, 771 (5th Cir. 2009) (explaining that "simple teasing, offhand
comments, and isolated incidents• are not actionable).
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
plaintiff must plead facts that permit the court to reasonably
infer that any alleged harassment was severe enough to alter the
conditions of her employment and create an abusive work
environment.

Stone, 590 F. App'x at 340-341.

Plaintiff here alleges that defendant created a hostile work
environment by allowing "bullying, harassment,

intimidation,

ridicule, insults, rumors and innuendoes [sic][,]" doc. 1 at 20,
~

141, to exist in the workplace, taking no steps to reduce,

eliminate, or prevent such behavior, and failing to take any
remedial action against any employees of plaintiff who engaged in
same, id. at 20,

~

145.

However, the only non-conclusory,

factual information provided by plaintiff to support such
allegation is that "Steve Sanzone, Jim Robinson, Ron Reese, Brad

15

Smith, Victor Trevino, Tiwan Outlaw, Ken Lewis, Doug Carr and
others, together and individually, consistently harassed
Plaintiff, called Plaintiff 'lazy' among other names, placed
'hello kitty' stickers on her toolbox

"

Id. at 8, , 36.

Even taken as true, such facts do not demonstrate that plaintiff
faced harassment "sufficiently severe or persuasive to alter the
conditions of
environment."

[her] employment and create an abusive working
Stone, 590 F. App'x at 341.

Plaintiff includes as part of her Count Six allegations a
section devoted to alleged mental abuse.
, , 146-57.

Doc. 1 at 21-22,

That claim must be dismissed because there was no

tort cause of action under Title VII for "mental abuse."
Thus, plaintiff's hostile work environment claims are to be
dismissed.
G.

The Count Seven Retaliation Claim
To state a claim for retaliation in violation of Title VII,

plaintiff must allege that:
activity;

(2)

( 1) she engaged in a protected

she was subject to an adverse employment action;

and (3) some causal connection between the protected activity and
the adverse action.

Stone, 590 F. App'x

at 341.

See also Foley

v. Univ. of Houston Sys., 355 F.3d 333, 339 (5th Cir. 2003).
"Notably, the standard for establishing an adverse employment
action in the retaliation context differs from the standard in

16

the discrimination context."

Stone, 590 Fed. App'x at 341

(quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53,
66-68

(2006)).

In such context, an adverse employment action is

a materially adverse action, beyond "petty slights, minor
annoyances, and simply lack of good manners[,]" which is, based
on the particular circumstances of the case, likely to dissuade a
reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.

Id.

(quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co,

548 U.S. at 668)

Plaintiff alleged that defendant retaliated against her for
"having participated in an EEOC proceeding and for having opposed
conduct which she had a good faith belief was unlawful and/or
discriminatory."

Doc. 1 at 25

~

167 (errors in original).

She

then alleged that the retaliatory conduct included, among other
things, uttering unproductive remarks, undermining her, creating
events in the workplace that caused her stress, blatantly
discriminating against her, depriving her of her legal rights,
and employing a systematic scheme designed to provide better
opportunities to "non-African American, non-female, non-over
forty (40) year old individuals .

7

"7

Doc. 1 at 23-24,

Plaintiff in suppmt of her retaliation claim also referenced the allegations quoted in footnote 9
above. Doc. 1 at 23 ~ 161. As previously explained, such conclusory allegations are insufficient to
support any claim.

17

, 164.

But these allegations alone are insufficient to support a

claim of retaliation.

The behavior is too minor to constitute an

adverse employment action.

See Stone, 590 Fed. App'x at 341.

And to the extent that any of the alleged conduct could be
thought severe enough to support a claim for retaliation, the
allegations by plaintiff are wholly conclusory and unsupported by
factual information.
Further, though plaintiff's assertion that filing an EEOC
complaint is a protected activity is true,

Walker, 214 F.3d at

629, she still has the burden of pleading that some causal
connection exists between her filing such charge and the
allegedly retaliatory behavior, Stone, 590 F. App'x

at 341.

Plaintiff has not pleaded such a connection, other than to say,
"[d]efendant

. subjected Plaintiff to retaliation . . . for

her filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and/or .
because she opposed discrimination and retaliation .
Doc. 1 at 25,

, 167.

"

For the forgoing reasons, plaintiff's

retaliation claims are to be dismissed.
H.

The Count Eight Defamation Claim
To state a defamation claim under Texas law, plaintiff must

allege that defendant "(1) published a statement;
defamatory concerning the plaintiff;
actual malice,

(2) that was

(3) while acting with either

if the plaintiff was a public official or public

18

figure, or negligence, if the plaintiff was a private individual,
regarding the truth of the statement."

WFAA-TV, Inc. v.

McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998)
Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 593

(Tex. 2015).

are not actionable as defamation.
561, 579 (Tex. 2002).

See also In re
Statements of opinion

Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d

Whether a statement is an actionable

assertion of fact or merely a protected expression of opinion is
to be determined by the court as a matter of law.

Carr v.

Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 570 (Tex, 1989).
Here, plaintiff has failed to state any facts informing the
defendant of the grounds of her defamation claim.

Plaintiff

alleges defendant made defamatory statements, through written and
oral

com~unication,

about her job performance and her ability to

perform as a team player, and divulged information related to a
private issue.

Doc. 1 at 26-28, ,, 182-187.

Such statements are

too vague and broad to qualify as defamatory, and instead
constitute, to the extent they might be true, the opinion of
defendant or its employees.
Even more, plaintiff fails to identify the specific
defamatory statements she alleges defendant made or to squarely
identify the speaker of the alleged defamatory statement, other
than to point the finger, generally, at "management, supervisors,
preceptors & others".

Doc. 1 at 26-29.

19

Plaintiff's mere recital

of the elements of a defamation claim supported only by her
conclusory allegations simply does not survive the dismissal
stage.

See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678.

Thus, plaintiff's defamation

claim is to be dismissed.
I.

The 42 U.S.C.

§

1981 and Texas Labor Code Claims

For the reasons already given, the court has concluded that
whatever claims plaintiff purports to be making under

§

1981 or

the Texas Labor Code have not been sufficiently pleaded, and are
to be dismissed.

* * * * *
Plaintiff made just at the end of her response to the motion
to dismiss a contingent request to file an amended complaint.
That request is not in compliance with the Local Civil Rules of
this court.

Plaintiff did not comply with Local Civil Rule LR

5.1, which requires that "[a)ny [)document must clearly identify
each included .

motion

in its title."

Moreover, if

leave is sought to amend a pleading, the Local Civil Rules
require that the movant attach a copy of the proposed amended
pleading as an exhibit to the motion, and submit with the motion
the original and a copy of the proposed pleading.

LR 5.1.

Apparently plaintiff was not serious enough about filing an
amended complaint to go to the trouble to comply with the Local
Civil Rules.

Furthermore, she has done nothing to demonstrate

20

that the filing by her of an amended complaint would be
productive.

v.
Order
Based on the foregoing,
The court ORDERS that all claims of plaintiff against
defendant be, and are hereby, dismissed.
SIGNED November 28, 2017.

21