University Baptist Church v. Lexington Ins Co

Filing 61

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER: The court ORDERS that the 43 motion of Lexington be, and is hereby, granted, and that Church's claims be, and are hereby, dismissed. (Ordered by Senior Judge John McBryde on 10/11/2018) (bdb)

US DISTRICT COURT
NORTIIBRN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FILED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUR
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXA
FORT WORTH DIVISION
UNIVERSITY BAPTIST CHURCH
OF FORT WORTH,

OCT 1 1 2018

§

CLERK, U.S. DlSTRlCT COURT

§

BY--..,,,-----

Deputy

§

Plaintiff,

§
§

vs.

§

NO. 4:17-CV-962-A

§

LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.

§
§
§

MEMORANDUM OPINION
and
ORDER
Came on for consideration in the above-captioned action the
motion for summary judgment filed by defendant, Lexington
Insurance Company ("Lexington"). The court, having considered the
motion, the response of plaintiff, University Baptist Church of
Fort Worth ("Church"), Lexington's reply, the entire record, and
the applicable legal authorities, finds that the motion should be
granted.
I.

Background
The operative pleading is Plaintiff's Amended Complaint
("Complaint")

filed February 8, 2018. Doc. 19. 1

Church's claims

arise out of a dispute between Church and Lexington related to
hail and windstorm damage to Church's church buildings.

When the

'The "Doc._" references are to the number assigned to the referenced items on the docket in this
Case No. 4: J7-CV-962-A.

Complaint was filed,

there was a second defendant, York Risk

Services Group,

("York"), the independent adjusting firm

Inc.

that worked with Church and its roofing contractor in defining
the needed repairs.

York filed a motion to dismiss for failure

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Its motion

was granted, and a final judgment dismissing Church's claims
against York was issued May 16, 2018.

See Docs. 31 & 32.

The

factual recitations contained in the Complaint, doc. 19 at 2-7,
, , 5-37, are summarized in an abbreviated form under the heading
"Plaintiff's Amended Complaint" on pages 2-6 of the Amended
Memorandum Opinion and Order explaining the court's reasons for
dismissing Church's claims against York, doc. 32 at 2-6.

For

convenience, the court adopts, and here incorporates by
reference, that summarization inasmuch as the allegations were
the factual bases of Church's claims against Lexington as well as
those against York.
As that summarization makes apparent, Lexington was the
insurance company that issued the insurance policy that provided
insurance coverage for the hail and windstorm damage Church's
church buildings suffered on March 17, 2016.

Church's claims

against Lexington are not, except in a minor respect, based on
any contention that Lexington did not satisfy the obligations
imposed on it by the insurance policy it issued to Church, but,

2

instead, with that one exception, are exclusively extracontractual claims.
The only exception is the allegation in paragraph 35, on
pages 6-7 of the Complaint, that Lexington was responsible for
use of Verea 2 tile in the re-roofing of Church's church buildings
instead of the Ludowici tile that was on the buildings when the
roof was damaged.

Doc. 19 at 6-7,

~

35.

Church alleged that

Verea is of lesser quality than Ludowici, and is not as durable
as Ludowici, and that by causing the Verea tile to be used,
Lexington breached the provision of the policy that required it
to pay "the cost to repair, replace and rebuild the property with
material of like kind and quality."

Id.

Church has rather lengthy allegations in the Complaint under
the heading "Breach of Contract-Lexington," but the summary
judgment record, including the briefs filed by the parties, make
clear that those allegations actually are related to Church's
extra-contractual claims and do not describe a claim of breach of
contract by Lexington.
The summary judgment record discloses that the events that
led to Church's extra-contractual claims were set in motion by
the making of a gross underestimate by Jeff Eubank Roofing Co.,

2

In some of the summary judgment paperwork, the alternative tile is sometimes referred to as

"Verea" and so1neti1ncs as "Versa." 1'he court uses in this 1ne1norandu1n opinion whichever na1ne was

used in the particular document the court is discussing or from which it quotes.
3

Inc.

("Eubank") , the roofing contractor selected and hired by

Church, of the cost of labor and material that would be required
to do the extra work during the roof repair needed to satisfy law
and ordinance requirements. 3
court will return.
of that kind.

This is a subject to which the

The policy had a limit of $250,000 for work

Doc. 45 at App. 013, 015.

Were it not for the

Ordinance or Law Amendatory Endorsement in the insurance policy,
the insurance policy would not have provided any benefits to
Church for increased costs attributable to enforcement of any
ordinance or law regulating the construction, use or repair of
the property.

Id. at App. 052,

§

4.b.

The parties are in agreement, and the record establishes,
id. at App. 288, that Lexington paid Church the policy limit of
$250,000 for the code upgrade work, and that, except for the
Verea vs. Ludowici issue, Lexington complied with all of its
policy obligations.

Lexington paid Church a total of $852,149.52

for repair of church buildings in satisfaction of its insurance
policy payment obligations as to those buildings.
006,

~

Id. at App.

11.

"'Code upgrade" and "law and ordinance" are used interchangeably by the parties in this
litigation, and the court will do the same. Law and ordinance is the term used for code compliance work
in Lexington's Commercial Line Policy, doc. 45 at App. 036-37, while code upgrade is the term used to
refer to the same thing in most of the communications between the pmties that do not reference the
specific language of the policy.
4

Church is using the events that followed Eubank's
underestimate of the cost of doing the code upgrade work as
predicates for its extra-contractual claims.

By doing so, Church

attempts to shift the significant extra cost resulting from that
underestimate from the Church and/or Eubank to Lexington.
II.
Lexington's Summary Judgment Motion
Lexington seeks summary judgment as to Church's breach of
contract claims for the reasons that there is no evidence in the
summary judgment record that it breached any obligation it had
under the policy contract, and the summary judgment record
establishes as a matter of law that it performed its policy
contractual obligations.
Summary judgment is sought by Lexington as to Church's
extra-contractual claims (claims under chapters 541 and 542 of
the Texas Insurance Code, for alleged breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing, and alleged violations of the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act

("DTPA")) for

the reason that there is no summary judgment evidence that would
support a finding of the existence of all of the essential
elements of any of those theories of recovery.

5

III.
Analysis
A.

Pertinent Summary Judgment Principles
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides

that the court shall grant summary judgment on a claim or defense
if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247
(1986).

The movant bears the initial burden of pointing out to

the court that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 325 (1986).

The movant can discharge this burden by pointing out the absence
of evidence supporting one or more essential elements of the
nonmoving party's claim,

"since a complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."

Id. at 323.

Once the movant has carried its burden under Rule 56(a), the
nonmoving party must identify evidence in the record that creates
a genuine dispute as to each of the challenged elements of its
case.

Id. at 324; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)

asserting that a fact

is genuinely disputed must support
citing to particular parts of materials in

the assertion by
the record .

("A party

'

II )

•

If the evidence identified could not lead
6

a rational trier of fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party
as to each essential element of the nonmoving party's case, there
is no genuine dispute for trial and summary judgment is
appropriate.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587, 597 (1986).

In Mississippi Prat. & Advocacy

Sys. v. Cotten, the Fifth Circuit explained:
Where the record, including affidavits,
interrogatories, admissions, and depositions could not,
as a whole, lead a rational trier of fact to find for
the nonmoving party, there is no issue for trial.
929 F.2d 1054, 1058 (5th Cir. 1991).
The standard for granting a motion for summary judgment is
the same as the standard for rendering judgment as a matter of
law.'

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.

If the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597; see also Mississippi Prat. &
Advocacy Sys., 929 F.2d at 1058.

1
' In

Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411F.2d365, 374-75 (5th Cir. 1969) (en bane), the Fifth Circuit
explained the standard to be applied in determining whether the court should enter judgment on motions
for directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict by saying:
If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party
that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict,
granting of the motions is proper. On the other hand, ifthere is substantial evidence
opposed to the motions, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and
fair-minded men in the exercise of impmtial judgment might reach different conclusions,
the motions should be denied, and the case submitted to the jury. A mere scintilla of
evidence is insufficient to present a question for the jury.
7

B.

The Breach of Contract Claim
Church bases its breach of contract claim on statements made

by Allen Seymour ("Seymour"), an account manager for Eubank, in
his affidavit as follows:
5.
[Eubank] was hired as the roofing contractor
for University Baptist Church ("UBC") for storm damages
to their property at 2720 Wabash, Fort Worth, Texas
(the "Property") .
6.
Our original proposal was to complete the
Project for the price of $651,891.40.
See Exhibit A-1
attached hereto. However, the adjuster for York Risk
Services Group, Kevin Forman ("Forman"), would not
approve the tile that was of like kind and quality to
the original tile.
The like kind and quality roof tile
was a Ludowici product which was included in our
original estimate. Therefore, I had to use an inferior
tile product (Verea tile) to bring the project in line
with the price Forman would approve even though the
product of was inferior quality.
Doc. 54 at App. 0004-5, , , 5-6.
entire story.

But, Seymour did not tell the

If the roof damage had been repaired with Ludowici

tiles, as Seymour suggested, the work would have gone as expert
Brett A. Lockridge ("Lockridge") described in his unchallenged
declaration as follows:
13. The like, kind and quality repair to the roof
of the church following the storm [would be] to remove
and relay tiles on the damaged portion of the roof, and
any quantity deficiency could be made up from matching
tile from salvage yards or by replacing a smaller roof
facet with completely new, but matching clay roof
tiles.
Doc. 45 at App. 128, , 13.

Considering that the roof repair

work, as actually done, consisted of the replacement of all tiles
8

with entirely new clay tiles of the Versa brand, Lockridge added
in his declaration that:
14.
The church received better than a like, kind
and quality repair to its roof when it received a
replacement roof with new Versa brand clay tile.
Id., , 14.

Lockridge's explanation undoubtedly is why Church has

provided no evidence of any damage suffered by it by reason of
use of the new Versa tiles instead of the used Ludowici tiles.
The absence of evidence of damages is, standing alone, fatal to
Church's breach of contract claim, bearing in mind that proof of
damages is an essential element of such a claim.
Intercontinental Grp. P'ship v. KB Home Lone Star L.P., 295
S.W.3d 650, 655 & n.26

(Tex. 2009).

In addition, the breach of contract claim is also shown to
be without merit by the summary judgment evidence that Eubank
chose to give its estimate/bid with the Verea tile replacement
feature rather than the Ludowici tile repair feature in order to
successfully compete with estimates/bids by competing roofers.
Doc. 45 at App. 126, , , 7 & 8.

Thus, Lexington can hardly be

held accountable for the decision to use Verea tile.

By

accepting the work contemplated by Eubank's Verea bid, Church
itself made the choice to use Verea rather than Ludowici.
45 at App. 277-78.

9

Doc.

Therefore, for more than one reason, summary judgment should
be granted on Church's sole breach of contract claim.
C.

The Extra-Contractual Claims
The bases for all of Church's extra-contractual claims

against Lexington are the events related to Eubank's inadequate
$285,000 proposal to do the code upgrade work, and the conduct of
York, acting through its employee Forman, related to that
proposal.

Therefore, the court is commencing the discussion

relative to those claims by discussing the summary judgment
bearing on those events.
On November 22, 2016, Eubank addressed to Church its
"Proposal" related to the code upgrade work.
0031.

Doc. 54 at App.

The Proposal starts with the statement "[p]er your request

we respectfully submit the following scopes of work

"

following which is a listing of eight types of work to be done to
"Retrofit Deck System," which is followed by the statement "[w]e
will complete the above scope of work for the sum of
$285,798.00."

Id.

The Proposal was signed by Seymour, the account manager for
Eubank, who played a role in preparation of the Proposal.

His

role was such, Seymour later told Forman, that if it turned out
that Eubank had been required to do the code upgrade work for the
$285,798.00 figure used in the Proposal, Seymour would have lost

10

his job.

Id. at App. 0061 (dep. p. 105).

With respect to that

conversation, Forman testified as follows:
Allen [Seymour] said, "It's a good thing that we
didn't go with the original proposal because I would've
lost my job." And then I asked them to clarify what
else was going on. And he said, "Well, these costs are
being monitored." This is what we're running into.
It's requiring a tremendous amount of labor.
There's
some additional issues that have raised their head as
far as things that we're having to address on this roof
that we weren't expecting to have to address.

Eubank continued to do the code upgrade work at a total cost
to Church of $864,148.49, which exceeded the $285,798.00 proposal
by $578,350.49.

Doc. 54 at App. 0037, , 19.

Church's attempt to

cause Lexington to pay that difference is based on the conduct of
Forman.

When he learned of the $285,000 proposal of Eubank to do

the code upgrade work, he was concerned that the proposal was not
necessarily accurate.

Id. at App. 0064 (dep. p. 129).

He was

not comfortable with how the proposal was being calculated.

Id.

His recommendation to cause the work to be done on a time and
materials basis was to try to determine an accurate cost for the
work.

Id. at App. 0065 (dep. p. 131).

They knew that there

might be some things that they would run into that nobody
anticipated.

Id.

Church was aware that there was an agreement

to proceed on a time and materials basis.

11

Id.

(dep. p. 132).

The summary judgment record shows that the code upgrade work
was completed by Eubank.

Doc. 45 at App. 275.

There is no

indication in the record that Church was required to pay more
than the work was worth to Church, nor is there any indication in
the summary judgment record that Church would not have caused the
work to have been done even if it had known from the outset that
the cost of the work would end up being what it actually was.
Nor is there any indication in the summary judgment record that
any conduct of York or Forman caused the cost to be greater than
it should have been, and actually was, for performance of the
code upgrade work.
Turning now to Church's extra-contractual claims.

None of

them survives Lexington's motion for summary judgment.
1.

Church's Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim

Although the heading on page 8 of Church's responsive brief
suggests that Church is to make an argument in support of its
common law duty of good faith and fair dealing claim, doc. 53 at
8, the court is unable to find anything in the brief that can be
identified as argument or authority in support of such a claim
unless it is found in the general statements in paragraph 44 on
page 9 pertaining to Eubank's inadequate $285,000 proposal for
doing that work and the decision that was made to do the work on
a time and materials basis, id. at 9, , 44.

12

There simply is no basis in the summary judgment record for
an argument in support of a claim for violation of a duty of good
faith and fair dealing.
an insurer,

While Texas law imposes such a duty on

"there is no duty beyond the contract itself."

Higginbotham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 F.3d 456, 460
(5th Cir. 1997) . 5

Put another way, absent a breach of the policy

contract, there is no violation of the insurer's duty to act in
good faith and deal fairly with the insured.
The summary judgment record establishes without dispute that
there was no violation of the insurance policy issued by
Lexington related to the code upgrade work.

The policy contract

said that Lexington would pay up to $250,000 for that work, and
there is no contention by Church that it did not receive that
payment.
Moreover, the summary judgment record does not contain any
evidence that Church suffered any damages related to the conduct
of Forman pertaining to the cost of the code upgrade work.
Without regard to Forman's conduct, Church was required to have
that work done, and there is no suggestion in the summary
judgment record that Church paid Eubank more than it should have

5

ln Higginbotham, the Fifth Circuit also noted that "Texas law does not recognize a cause of
action for negligent claims handling." Higginbotham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 F.3d 456,
460 (5th Cir. 1997).

13

paid for having the work done.

The fact that Church did not buy

enough insurance to cover the total cost of the work is not a
reason for causing Lexington at this time to bear more than its
$250,000 policy limit for that work.
2.

Texas Insurance Code Claims

Church alleged in the Complaint that Lexington violated
three parts of section 541.060 of the Texas Insurance Code.
Doc. 19 at 10, ,, 53-56. 6

The first provision is section

541. 060 (a) (2), which Church asserts Lexington violated by failing
to attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair and
equitable settlement when Lexington's liability was clear. The
second is section 541. 060 (a) (3), which, according to Church, was
violated when Lexington failed to promptly provide Church with a
reasonable explanation of the basis in the policy, for
Lexington's denial of its claim. And the third is section
541.060(a) (7), which Church alleges was violated when Lexington
refused to pay Church's claim without conducting a reasonable

'Church's response to Lexington's motion for summary judgment asserts a new alleged violation
of the Texas Insurance Code under section 541.060(a)(I), doc. 53 at 11, but this alleged violation was not
asse1ted in the Complaint. Therefore, the court will not consider Church's arguments as to that provision.
However, the court will note that, under Texas law, "post loss statements regarding coverage are not
misrepresentations under the Insurance Code," and thus this claim would likely fail even if it had been
properly raised by Church. Aguilar v. State Farm Lloyds, 4: l 5-CV-565-A, 2015 WL 5714654, at *3
(N.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 20l5)(citing Texas Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, 381S.W.3d430, 445-56 (Tex. 2012));
One Way Invs., Inc. v. Century Sur. Co., No. 3: 14-CV-2839-D, 2014 WL 6991277, *4-5 (N.D. Tex.
Dec. 11, 2014).

14

investigation. All three of Church's claims under the Texas
Insurance Code fail as a matter of law.
In order for the court to find that a section 541.060(a) (2)
violation took place, there must be (1) clear liability on the
part of Lexington, and (2) failure by Lexington to offer a
prompt, fair, and equitable settlement. Church has adduced no
summary judgment evidence to support either of the elements
required to show such a violation.

It asks the court to make

inferences not supported by the record. Church's insurance policy
required Lexington to pay Church after costs had been incurred by
Church, and Lexington did just that. There were no need for a
settlement because the Lexington timely paid Church the full
amount it was entitled to under the policy--$250,000.
Lexington did not violate section 541.060(a) (3) either.
That section requires that an insurer provide a policyholder a
reasonable explanation of the basis in the policy for the
insurer's denial of a claim. Here, Church and its insurance agent
knew of the policy sublimit for code upgrade work.
App. 273-74; App. 331-34.

Doc. 45 at

Thus, Lexington was not required to

inform Church of its policy limit as an explanation for why it
was not paying more than $250,000 for the code upgrade work.
Moreover, the policy itself disclosed that limit.

15

See Morris

County Nat. Bank v. John Deere Ins. Co., 254 F.3d 538, 541 (5th
Cir. 2001)

(An insured party is deemed to know the contents of

its insurance policy.). Further, as has already been pointed out,
there was no denial of claim, as Lexington paid out the full
amount owed to Church under its policy.
Finally, Church's claim under section 541.060(a) (7) fails
for substantially the same reasons articulated above. A claim
under that section requires

(1) that the insurer refuse to pay a

claim and (2) that it do so without conducting a reasonable
investigation. Lexington paid the claim, and did so after a
thorough investigation by York.
Finally, Church has not produced any evidence that it
suffered actual damages as a result of any alleged Insurance Code
violation.

There can be no recovery for extra-contractual

damages for mishandling claims unless the insured establishes
that it suffered damages by reason of the mishandling.

See USAA

Texas Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 500 (Tex. 2018).
In other words, the manner in which the claim was investigated or
handled must be the cause of damages to the insured.

See

Provident Am. Ins. Co. v. Castaneda, 988 S.W.2d 189, 198-99 (Tex.
1998).

Moreover, there is no basis in the summary judgment

record for a finding that Lexington withheld any benefits to

16

which Church was entitled under the insurance policy, thus
eliminating any possible area of recovery by Church from
Lexington under any extra-contractual liability.
For the above-stated reasons, all of Church's claims under
the Texas Insurance Code fail as a matter of law.
3.

Deceptive Trade Practices Act Claims

The DPTA provides recourse to consumers who are victims of
"[f]alse, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce" to recover for such clams.
Tex. Bus. & Com. Code§ 17.46(a).
are:

The elements of a DTPA claim

"(1) the plaintiff is a consumer;

(2) the defendant engaged

in false, misleading, or deceptive acts; and (3) these acts
constituted a producing cause of the consumer's damages".
Symons Group, plc v. Motorola, Inc., 292 F.3d 466, 468
2002).

Hugh

(5th Cir.

Claims under the DTPA are subject to the heightened

pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).
Ins. Co., 608 F. Supp. 2d 785, 800

Berry v. Indianapolis Life
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2009)

Church specifically alleged that Lexington violated
§ § 1 7 . 4 6 ( b) ( 7 ) , 1 7 . 4 6 (b) ( 12 ) , and § 1 7 . 5 O (a) ( 4 ) by :
a.

Representing that York's services were of a
particular standard, quality, or grade, when they
were of another.

b

Representing that an agreement confers or involves
rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not
have or involve.

17

c.

Employing an act or practice in violation of the
Texas Insurance Code, Chapter 541, as more
specifically enumerated in Section VII of
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.

Doc. 19 at 12, , , 71-73.

The court earlier dismissed Church's

DTPA claims against York because Church failed to point to the
specific factual allegations supporting its claims, and stated
that the statements made by Foreman were not misrepresentations
under the Texas Insurance Code. Doc. 17 at 14-15. Despite having
two opportunities to point to the specific factual allegations
supporting its DTPA claims under §17.46(7) in its amended
complaint and response to summary judgment, Church still fails to
do so. Church has not identified the "who, what, when, where and
how" of Lexington's purported violation under §17.46(7). Dorsey
v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 339

(5th Cir. 2008).

Because of this, the court finds that Church's §17.46(b) (7) DTPA
claim fails to state a claim against Lexington.
Church's latter two DTPA claims arguably also fail the
Dorsey test, but because Church at least addressed them in its
response to Lexington's motion for summary judgment, the court
will consider them on their merits. Church alleges that Lexington
or its agents represented to Church that its insurance policy
confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it
does not have or involve, in violation of §17.46(b) (12) of the

18

DTPA. The record does not reflect that Lexington did so, and
Church has not identified misrepresentations upon which its claim
for relief can be granted. Even if this court does Church's work
for it and tries to identify the statements that Church believes
provide a basis for its DTPA claim under §17.46(b) (12), none rise
to the level of a DTPA violation. As made clear by testimony from
both Foreman and Kathy Raines, Foreman was clear at all times
with Church that he did not make coverage decisions. Doc. 45 at
297, 336-337. His emails, though unclear at times, do not
contradict this position.'
Finally, as the court has found that Lexington did not
violate the Texas Insurance Code, its §17.50(a) (4) claim
necessarily fails.
4.

Benefits-Lost and Independent-Injury Rules

For the reasons already discussed, neither the Benefits-Lost
Rule nor the Independent-Injury Rule of USAA Texas Lloyds Co.,
545 S.W.3d at 497, 499, applies to the claims made by Church in
this action.

The summary judgment record establishes

7

Also worth noting is that the single case cited by Chnrch in support of its position, Royal Globe
Ins. Co. v. Bar Consultants, Inc., 577 S.W.2d 688, 694 (Tex. 1979), is a case decided under the former
DTPA statute, where a plaintiff had to only prove that she was "adversely affected" by the
misrepresentation, and not that the misrepresentation was a "producing cause" of her damages. Given the
policy's unambiguous sub limit for Ordinance and Law work, it is at least unclear that a misrepresentation
by Foreman would be a prnducing cause ofChnrch's damages. Regardless, the court need not rule on this
issue since it has found that Foreman and Lexington made no representations that rise to the level of a
§17.46(b)(l2) DTPA violation.

19

conclusively that Lexington satisfied all its policy payment
obligations to Church; and, there is no summary judgment evidence
that any conduct of the independent adjuster, York, caused any
injury to Church by reason of any conduct about which Church has
complained.

v.
Order
The court ORDERS that the motion of Lexington be, and is
hereby, granted, and that Church's claims be, and are hereby,
dismissed.
SIGNED October 11, 2018.

20