Strange et al v. Mansfield Independent School District et al

Filing 37

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONOF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 34 : For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs' objection is OVERRULED, the FCR (ECF No. 34 ) is ADOPTED as the findings and conclusions of the Court, and MISDs motion to dismiss (ECF No. 25 ) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. (Ordered by Judge Reed C. O'Connor on 8/17/2018) (skg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION

DARLA STRANGE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MANSFIELD INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 4:18-cv-00101-O

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The United States Magistrate Judge made findings, conclusions, and a recommendation
(“FCR”) in this case. July 5, 2018 FCR, ECF No. 34. Plaintiffs timely filed objections, ECF No.
35, on July 19, 2018. Defendant Mansfield Independent School District (“MISD”) responded to
Plaintiffs’ objections on July 23, 2018. MISD Resp. Pls.’ Obj., ECF No. 36.
The Court conducts a de novo review of those portions of the FCR to which a party objects.
Anything that Plaintiffs did not specifically object to is subject to plain error review. For the
following reasons, Plaintiffs’ objections are OVERRULED, the FCR (ECF No. 34) is ADOPTED
as the findings and conclusions of the Court, and MISD’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 25) is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the Magistrate Judge’s FCR (ECF No. 34) unless

otherwise noted.1 This case concerns alleged violations of Title IX, Section 504 of the

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No party objects to the Magistrate Judge’s factual recitation.

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Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants MISD and Kelly Dan
Williams (“Williams”), as well as claims for assault and battery against Williams, related to child
sexual abuse by Williams while employed as a teacher by MISD. Plaintiffs Darla Strange and Tim
Strange, the parents of minor child CS; Tisha Zuniga, the parent of minor child AZ; and Michelle
Miller, the parent of minor child KM, bring this action individually and as next friends of their
children.
MISD hired Williams in 2010 to be a teacher in MISD’s Functional Academics Life Skills
(“FALS”) program. ECF No. 21 ¶ 14. FALS is a program for “students who demonstrate
significant cognitive disabilities and require an alternate curriculum.” Id. Prior to being hired by
MISD, Williams worked at Cedar Hill ISD, where a parent of a third-grade special-needs student
reported him to the Cedar Hill administration for spending excessive time alone with that student,
as well as not turning on surveillance cameras in the classroom. Id. ¶ 15. These reports were in
Williams’s employment file at Cedar Hill ISD. Id. Plaintiffs allege, based on information and
belief, and pursuant to MISD policy, that these reports were known to MISD’s Board of Trustees
when it hired Williams. Id. ¶ 17. Williams first worked for MISD as a substitute teacher during the
2009–10 school year. Id. ¶ 18.
During that school year, the parents of an unnamed student (“John Doe”) contacted MISD
about Williams’s sexual misconduct with their son while Williams worked as a substitute teacher
at Cross Timbers Intermediate School. Id. John Doe was a participant in MISD’s FALS program.
Id. John Doe’s mother saw Williams and her son exit a restroom together at the Rock Gym, a
facility owned by MISD. Id. at ¶ 19. John Doe’s mother reported the misconduct to Cross Timbers
Intermediate School’s principal, Gerald Kokenes, and she requested that the school district
investigate and take action. Id. Kokenes then reported the complaint to the Board of Trustees,

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directly or indirectly. Id. Kokenes also sent an email on June 9, 2010, to the MISD Title IX
compliance officer. Id. at ¶ 20. However, the email only stated that John Doe’s family was
uncomfortable with Williams, and did not include any concerns about sexual misconduct. Id.
MISD responded by changing Williams’s duties so that he would not have contact with John Doe.
Id. ¶ 21.
MISD hired Williams as a full-time teacher in the FALS program. Id. The MISD Board of
Trustees allegedly made the ultimate hiring decision, and according to Plaintiffs’ allegations,
MISD policy required the Board to conduct a background check that would have revealed
Williams’s prior misconduct at Cedar Hill ISD. Id. Williams had taken pornographic images of
John Doe on school property during February, April, and May, 2010, and shared those images over
the internet, but Plaintiffs do not allege that MISD was aware of these criminal actions. Id. ¶ 22.
MISD assigned Williams to work at Della Icenhower Intermediate Middle School for the 2010–
11 school year. Id. ¶ 24.
While on this assignment, Williams took pornographic photographs of Plaintiff AZ, an
autistic and completely nonverbal eleven-year-old boy who was part of the FALS program. Id. ¶¶
25–26. The investigation of Williams’s 2015 molestation of Plaintiff CS revealed the existence of
these photographs. Id. ¶ 26. MISD assigned Williams to work at Mary Orr Intermediate Middle
School for the 2014–15 school year. Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiffs CS and KM, both eleven-year-old autistic
boys, were students in Williams’s class and part of the FALS program. Id. ¶ 28. At some point
during this school year, before June 1, 2015, Williams sexually assaulted KM in a restroom at
Mary Orr Intermediate Middle School. Id. at ¶ 29. KM ran to Principal Duane Thurston’s office
and told Thurston that Williams had sexually assaulted him. Id. at ¶ 31. Plaintiffs allege, according

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to information and belief, and pursuant to MISD policy, that Thurston reported KM’s complaint
to the MISD Board of Trustees. Id.
On June 1, 2015, MISD employee Lorena Alvarenga (“Alvarenga”) discovered Williams
performing oral sex on CS, an eleven-year-old autistic boy with very limited verbal capabilities in
a restroom at Mary Orr Intermediate Middle School. Id. ¶¶ 33, 39. In the ensuing investigation,
law enforcement personnel found a large number of pornographic images and videos of children,
including depictions of Williams engaged in sexual acts with young boys on his computers and
electronic storage hardware. Id. ¶ 34. Law enforcement personnel also discovered that Williams
had committed multiple prior acts of sexual assault against students in MISD’s FALS program. Id.
¶ 36.
Plaintiffs assert that MISD failed to train its employees how to recognize signs of sexual
abuse in children, particularly those with learning disabilities, and predatory behavior in adults. Id.
Two weeks before witnessing Williams abusing CS, Alvarenga saw Williams in a bathroom stall
with CS, according to her statement to law enforcement officers. Id. ¶ 39. Another employee of
MISD, Patricia Talley (“Talley”), noticed that Williams would allow CS to come behind
Williams’s desk and play with CS’s hair. Id. ¶ 40. Talley also noticed that Williams took longer
when taking CS and another student to the restroom. Id. A third MISD employee, DeRhonda
Waller (“Waller”), said that this other student would come back from the restroom “upset and
aggravated so he would act out by screaming and crying.” Id. ¶ 41.
II.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed this suit on February 8, 2018, bringing claims against MISD: (1) under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to investigate, train, and discipline Williams and other employees; (2)

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under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act for discriminating against their disabled children; and
(3) under Title IX for deliberate indifference. See generally Am. Compl., ECF No. 21.
MISD moved to dismiss all the claims against it. MISD Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 25. The
Magistrate Judge’s FCR recommended, in relevant part, that the Court grant MISD’s motion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 504 claims. FCR 18–19, ECF No. 34. Plaintiffs objected, arguing that
while the Magistrate Judge applied the correct standard to Plaintiffs’ Section 504 claim, he erred
by finding that Plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged facts as to the third element—that the
Plaintiffs are qualified handicapped persons that were denied benefits from a federal program
because of their handicap. Pls.’ Obj. 2, ECF No. 35. MISD responded that the Magistrate Judge
correctly applied the 5th Circuit’s standard in Melton to this claim and Plaintiffs seek an extension
of that standard to comport with Gaudino, a case from the Middle District of Pennsylvania that is
not controlling. MISD Resp. Pls.’ Obj. 2, ECF No. 36 (citing Gaudino v. Stroudsburg Area Sch.
Dist., 3:CV-12-2159, 2013 WL 3863955, at *6 (M.D. Pa. July 23, 2013). The Court will analyze
the objection below.
III.

ANALYSIS OF OBJECTION
The Court reviews de novo the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the Court should grant

MISD’s motion to dismiss on Plaintiff’s Section 504 claim. The Fifth Circuit in Melton set forth
the standard to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Section 504. See Melton v.
Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 676 n.8 (5th Cir. 2004). Under Melton, the plaintiff must
allege: (1) the existence of a program or activity within the state which receives federal financial
assistance; (2) the plaintiff is an intended beneficiary of federal assistance; and (3) the plaintiff is
a qualified handicapped person, who solely by the reason of his handicap has been excluded from
participation in, been denied benefits from, or otherwise has been subject to discrimination under

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such program or activity. Id. The Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiffs could not state a Section
504 claim because Defendant Williams’ alleged actions fall outside the scope of the type of
“discrimination” that the Act was enacted to address. FCR 18–19, ECF No. 34. He noted that two
other district courts in this circuit have cautioned against reading Section 504 too broadly because
the Title II definition of discrimination does not typically apply to instances of physical or sexual
abuse. Id. at 19 (citing Woods v. G.B. Cooley Hosp. Serv. Dist., CIV. A. 07-0926, 2007 WL
4812054, at *2 (W.D. La. Dec. 10, 2007); Woodberry v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, No. 3:14-CV03980-L, 2017 WL 840976, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2017)).
Here, the Court, on de novo review of the applicable law, agrees with the Magistrate
Judge’s (and other judges in this circuit) legal conclusions about the scope of Section 504.
Plaintiffs’ allegations in the amended complaint do not state a claim for relief under the statute.
MISD did not exclude or deny benefits to Plaintiffs’ children in this case. Rather, MISD placed
the children in the FALS program. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25, 28, ECF No. 21. What allegedly occurred—
Williams’ physical and sexual assault of the children—is jarring, but Plaintiffs’ amended
complaint does not state facts that would lead the Court to reasonably infer that MISD subjected
the children to discrimination because they were disabled. See Woods, 2007 WL 4812054, at *2
(finding that recognizing “intentional tortious conduct” committed by a defendant as falling within
the scope of Section 504 would result in “unduly broadening the scope of the ADA.”).
Plaintiffs direct the Court to Gaudino to support their argument that intentional acts of
abuse may create a plausible claim of discrimination under Section 504. Pls.’ Obj. 4, ECF No. 35
(citing Gaudino v. Stroudsburg Area Sch. Dist., 3:CV-12-2159, 2013 WL 3863955, at *6 (M.D.
Pa. July 23, 2013). As an initial matter, the Court notes that Gaudino is not controlling here and
does not align with the Fifth Circuit’s general direction to read statutory language narrowly. See,

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e.g., In re Hickman, 260 F.3d 400, 403 (5th Cir. 2001) (endorsing noscitur a soccis principle of
statutory construction where courts apply canon to “avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the
Acts of Congress.”). Further, the court in Gaudino did not articulate its reasoning for finding the
allegations of assault sufficient to allege the third element of the plaintiff’s Section 504 claim.
Instead, the Gaudino court analyzed the first two elements of plaintiff’s claim and then, seemingly
giving plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, found that he had stated a plausible claim. 2013 WL
3863955, at *6. Here, as the Magistrate Judge noted, Plaintiffs’ relief lies with their other causes
of action that survived the motion to dismiss, not with Section 504. Cf. Woodberry, 2017 WL
840976, at *7; Ball v. St. Mary’s Residential Training Sch., 2015 WL 3448470, at *1–3 (W.D. La.
May 28, 2015). For those reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ objection to the FCR should be
OVERRULED.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ objection is OVERRULED, the FCR (ECF No.

34) is ADOPTED as the findings and conclusions of the Court, and MISD’s motion to dismiss
(ECF No. 25) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
SO ORDERED on this 17th day of August, 2018.

_____________________________________
Reed O’Connor
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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