The Trade Group, Inc. v. BTC Media, LLC

Filing 213

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS TTG's Motion to Enter Final Judgment (ECF No. 194 ) and its Motion for Attorney's Fees and Expenses (ECF No. 202 ). Accordingly, this final judgment is issued pursuant t o Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a), and this case is DISMISSED with prejudice. (See order for specifics.) Pursuant to LR 79.2 and LCrR 55.2, exhibits may be claimed during the 60-day period following final disposition (to do so, follow the proce dures found at Exhibit Guide). The clerk will discard exhibits that remain unclaimed after the 60-day period without additional notice. (Clerk to notice any party not electronically noticed.) (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 1/6/2025) (jnp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
THE TRADE GROUP, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 4:23-cv-00555-P

BTC MEDIA, LLC, ET AL.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court are two Motions advanced by Plaintiff The Trade
Group, Inc. (“TTG”): (1) a Motion to Enter Final Judgment (ECF No.
194); and (2) a Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses (ECF No. 202).
Having considered the Motions and applicable law, the Court hereby
GRANTS both Motions.

BACKGROUND
This case went to trial on August 26, 2024. On September 5, 2024,
the jury returned a verdict in favor of TTG. On Claim 1, breach of
contract, the jury awarded $4,429,536.25. On Claim 3, suit on sworn
account, the jury also awarded $4,429,536.25. However, on Claim 3, but
not on Claim 1, the jury found an offset in the amount of $186,493.68.
Two weeks later, on September 18, 2024, TTG filed a Motion for Final
Judgment, asking the Court to enter judgment on Claim 1, breach of
contract—not Claim 3, suit on sworn account. ECF No. 194. TTG also
asked that the Court award TTG pre- and post-judgment interest on
TTG’s breach of contract claim. Id. On October 3, 2024, TTG also filed a
Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses. Both Motions have now been
fully briefed.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under the one-satisfaction rule, “a plaintiff cannot obtain more than
one recovery for the same injury.” Joy Pipe, USA, L.P. v. ISMT Ltd., 703
F. App’x 253, 259 (5th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up) (citation omitted). Thus,
“[w]hen a party tries a case on alternative theories of recovery[,]” the
party can elect judgment on the claim “entitling him to the greatest or
most favorable relief.” Boyce Iron Works, Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 747
S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex. 1988).
State law governs pre-judgment interest in diversity cases. Wood v.
Armco, Inc., 814 F.2d 211, 213 n.2 (5th Cir. 1987). Courts may award
pre-judgment interests based on an enabling statute or general
principles of equity. Asta Partners, LLC v. Palaniswamy, No. 02-2000371-CV, 2021 WL 5133888, at *13 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 4,
2021, no pet.) (Bassel, J.). Unlike pre-judgment interest, federal law
governs post-judgment interest for civil cases based on diversity of
citizenship. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 7 F.3d 1203,
1209 (5th Cir. 1993). And “district courts do not have the discretion to
deny post-judgment interest on monetary judgments.” Paisano Capital
SA de CV v. 23 Tex. Produce, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-0852-B, 2019 WL
3239152, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 18, 2019) (Boyle, J.).
Additionally, a party prevailing on a breach-of-contract claim is
entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 38.001(8). In Texas, courts use the “lodestar method” to
determine reasonable attorney’s fees. See, e.g., Rohrmoos Venture v.
UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 496 (Tex. 2019). The
lodestar method has two steps: (1) “determin[ing] the reasonable hours
spent” and “a reasonable hourly rate”; and (2) “adjust[ing] the base
lodestar up or down . . . if relevant factors indicate an adjustment is
necessary . . . .” El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Tex.
2012).

ANALYSIS
The Court will first address the issue of final judgment before
turning to the issue of reasonable attorney’s fees.
A. Final Judgment
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TTG asks the Court to enter final judgment on its breach of contract
claim based on the one-satisfaction rule. TTG then requests that the
Court award both pre- and post-judgment interest for the breach of
contract claim.
1. Breach of Contract
TTG argues that under Texas’s one-satisfaction rule, it may elect
judgment on its breach of contract claim, which the jury found is not
subject to an offset, rather than the suit on sworn account claim, which
the jury determined is subject to an offset. Under the one-satisfaction
rule, “a plaintiff cannot obtain more than one recovery for the same
injury.” Joy Pipe, 703 F. App’x at 259 (cleaned up). Thus, “when a party
tries a case on alternative theories of recovery[,]” the party can elect
judgment on the claim “entitling him to the greatest or most favorable
relief.” Boyce Iron Works, 747 S.W.2d at 787.
TTG is entitled to select its award under the breach of contract claim
based on the one-satisfaction rule. The breach of contract and suit on
sworn account claims were alternative claims at trial. This was
articulated at the summary judgment stage as well. See ECF No. 83 at
18 (asking the Court to “alternatively” grant summary judgment on the
breach of contract claim if not the suit on account claim).
Defendant BTC Media, LLC (“BTC”) does not respond to TTG’s
caselaw on the one-satisfaction rule but instead argues that Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 49 gives the Court power to reconcile
inconsistent answers in the jury verdict. According to BTC, the offset
found for the suit on sworn account claim should also be applied to the
breach of contract claim. Rule 49 allows courts to “approve for entry
under Rule 58, an appropriate judgment according to the answers,
notwithstanding the general verdict.” FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b)(3)(A).
However, this ability only applies when a court submits a general
verdict “together with written questions on one or more issues of fact
that the jury must decide.” FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b)(1). If the “answers [to
the written questions] are consistent with each other but . . . inconsistent
with the general verdict,” only then can the court modify the judgment.
FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b)(3).
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The alleged contradictions in the jury’s verdict in this case do not
involve answers to written questions and a general verdict. And Rule 49
provides no guidance on whether a court can modify a jury’s verdict for
one claim when the answer to an alternative claim potentially suggests
a different result.
The caselaw cited by BTC is unavailing. For example, in Carr v. WalMart Stores, Inc., the Fifth Circuit stated, “[i]f the answers to the
interrogatories seem to conflict, the court is obligated to reconcile the
answers, if possible, in order to validate the jury’s verdict.” 312 F.3d 667,
672 (5th Cir. 2002). There, with respect to a single claim for negligence,
the verdict form instructed the jury to only answer question 2 if it
answered “yes” to question 1. Id. at 669. Yet even though the jury
answered “no” to question 1, it proceeded to answer question 2. Id. As
discussed above, that is not the case here. The jury did not provide two
legally inconsistent interrogatories for a single claim—it decided two
alternative claims differently. BTC cites two other cases in support of
its contention that Rule 49 authorizes this Court to reconcile the jury’s
verdict on breach of contract and suit on sworn account, but neither of
them involve analogous facts. 1
Finding that Rule 49 is inapplicable in this case, and that TTG is
entitled to elect the breach of contract damages under the onesatisfaction rule, the Court ORDERS that Plaintiff be awarded
$4,429,536.25 in compensatory damages under its breach of contract
claim.
2. Pre-Judgment Interest
TTG further requests pre-judgment interest on its breach of contract
claim. “State law governs the award of prejudgment interest in diversity
cases.” Harris v. Mickel, 15 F.3d 428, 429 (5th Cir. 1994). Even with no
enabling statute, “Texas law allows for an award of equitable
prejudgment interest . . . .” Meaux Surface Prot., Inc. v. Fogleman, 607
1See Richard v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 853 F.2d 1258, 1260 (5th Cir.

1988) (trial court had discretion to resubmit inconsistent special verdict); see
also United States v. $9,041,598.68, 163 F.3d 238 (5th Cir. 1998) (trial court
had discretion to enter judgment as a matter of law, disregarding a logically
inconsistent finding in the special jury verdict).

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F.3d 161, 172 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Vacuum
Tanks, Inc., 75 F.3d 1048, 1057 (5th Cir. 1996)). “Under this standard,
‘an equitable award of prejudgment interest should be granted to a
prevailing plaintiff in all but exceptional circumstances.’” Id. And
“[w]hen the pleadings contain a simple prayer for interest on the
judgment, this suffices in any case to preserve the request.” Id.
BTC argues TTG should receive no pre-judgment interest because:
(1) TTG never requested pre-judgment interest; (2) the jury awarded
less than TTG’s demand for damages; and (3) there are exceptional
circumstances warranting an award of $0. ECF No. 208 at 7–9. As for
the first, TTG’s Second Amended Complaint, which is the live pleading
in this case, contained a simple prayer for interest on the judgment, 2
and as explained in Meaux, that suffices. 607 F.3d at 172. For the
second, the Court finds that a jury verdict awarding less than what
Plaintiff sought is insufficient to prevent an award of pre-judgment
interest. 3 And for the third, the Court is unpersuaded by the alleged
exceptional circumstances that would deprive TTG of pre-judgment
interest.
Having determined that pre-judgment interest is warranted, the
Court must now calculate the appropriate amount. The accrual period
for pre-judgment interest “begin[s] on the earlier of the 180th day after
the date the defendant receives written notice of a claim or the date the
suit is filed and end[s] on the day preceding the date judgment is
rendered.” TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 304.104. And the pre-judgment
interest rate is “the prime rate as published by the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System on the date of computation.” Id. §
304.003(a), (c)(1). The accrual period begins on May 10, 2023, the day
2ECF No. 38 at 15 (“Plaintiff . . . seeks judgment against Defendants . . .

awarding Plaintiff actual and consequential damages, attorneys’ fees, costs of
court, pre- and post-judgment interest, and all other relief to which it may be
entitled.”).
3This Court has itself awarded pre-judgment interest in cases where the
jury awarded less than what a plaintiff sought. See, e.g., Mays v. Meridian Sec.
Ins. Co. State Auto Ins. Cos., No. 4:22-CV-1150-P, 2024 WL 821198, at *3 n.1
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2024) (awarding pre-judgment interest even though
plaintiffs “only recovered $70,000.00 at trial” despite seeking “approximately
$220,000.00 in damages at trial”).

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TTG filed its breach of contract claim against BTC. The current prime
interest rate is 7.5% as determined by the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors. Thus, TTG is entitled to recover pre-judgment interest for its
breach of contract award of $4,429,536.25 at a rate of 7.5% per annum
from May 10, 2023, to the date of this Order, totaling $552,478.46.
3. Post-Judgment Interest
TTG further requests post-judgment interest on its breach of
contract claim. Unlike pre-judgment interest, federal law governs postjudgment interest in diversity cases. See Liljeberg Enters., 7 F.3d at
1209. And “district courts do not have the discretion to deny postjudgment interest on monetary judgments.” Paisano Cap. SA de CV,
2019 WL 3239152, at *5.
BTC does not contest TTG’s right to post-judgment interest. Thus,
the only required analysis is the appropriate amount of post-judgment
interest. Federal law states that the post-judgment interest rate is the
rate of the “weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as
published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for
the calendar week preceding the date of judgment.” See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1961(a). Post-judgment interest is also compounded annually and
calculated on both the principal and prejudgment interest amounts. See
TEX. FIN. CODE § 304.006.
Thus, TTG is entitled to post-judgment interest, the total sum of
compensatory damages and pre-judgment interest, at the applicable
rate of 4.23% as published by the Northern District of Texas 4,
compounded annually from the day the judgment is signed until it is
paid in full.
4. BTC Media, LLC vs BTC Inc
In its initial Motion, TTG asked the Court to enter final judgment
against both Defendants BTC Media, LLC and BTC Inc. ECF No. 194.
In response, BTC highlighted that the jury was only charged with claims
against BTC Media, not BTC Inc. ECF No. 201. On reply, TTG excluded
4Post

Judgment Interest Rates, https://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/postjudgment-rates (last visited Jan. 6, 2025).

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BTC Inc. from its request for final judgment. ECF No. 205. To resolve
any doubt, the Court enters this final judgment against BTC Media,
LLC, not BTC Inc.
B. Attorney’s Fees
TTG next asks this Court to award it reasonable attorney’s fees and
expenses. Under federal and Texas law, determining the amount of
attorney’s fees is a two-step process. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 433 (1983). The first step requires the district court to determine
the “lodestar”—the “reasonable number of hours expended on the
litigation and the reasonable hourly rates for the participating lawyers.
Then, the district court must multiply the reasonable hours by the
reasonable hourly rates.” La. Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d
319, 324 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). In the second step, the
“lodestar” can be adjusted upward or downward, if necessary to make
the award reasonable, based on the Court’s consideration of the Johnson
factors. Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 459 (5th Cir. 1993). The twelve
factors in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. are: (1) the time
and labor required for the litigation; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions presented; (3) the skill required to perform the legal services
properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney by
acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed
or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or
circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the result obtained; (9) the
experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys; (10) the
“undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar
cases. 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Omni USA, Inc. v.
Parker Hannifin Corp., 964 F. Supp. 2d 805, 842 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (noting

the determination of reasonable attorney’s fees under Texas law is
“virtually identical to the Johnson factors used by the Fifth Circuit”)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
The lodestar amount claimed by TTG is $3,315,430.46 for attorney’s
fees, expenses, and pre-judgment interest. According to the declaration
of David T. Moran, an attorney at Jackson Walker and designated
expert on reasonable attorney’s fees, TTG’s counsel seeks a rate between
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$355 and $850 per hour depending on the specific attorney. In total,
counsel for TTG claims 4,390.5 hours of work in prosecuting its breach
of contract claim and in fighting BTC’s affirmative defenses and related
counterclaims. Moran further states that this case required extensive
discovery, including five sets of discovery requests from BTC, the taking
of ten depositions by TTG’s attorneys, and voluminous written
discovery, to name a few items. Given the length of time, and the caliber
and quantity of work demanded in carrying this case forward to trial,
these rates are reasonable and customary.
BTC raises a myriad of discount arguments, though untethered to
the Johnson factors, for the Court’s consideration. The proposed
discounts include a 15% reduction for over-redacted invoices; 10%
reduction for extensive block billing; 10% reduction for excessive
briefing on motions lost by TTG; 10% reduction for failing to segregate
fees; and a 20% reduction for failing to account for unrecoverable clerical
tasks. As for over-redacted invoices and block billing, while invoices
could always be more detailed, the Court concludes they are not too
vague to prevent the Court from a meaningful judicial review of the work
completed on Plaintiffs’ behalf. See La. Power & Light Co., 50 F.3d at
326–27 (rejecting a discount despite the fact that many of the time
entries were “scanty as to subject matter”). Plaintiffs submitted twentythree invoices, totaling more than 200 pages, along with its Motion. The
two invoices selected and scrutinized by Defendant are thus not fully
representative nor incapable of demonstrating “sufficient information to
classify and evaluate the activities and hours expended.” Randolph v.
Dimension Films, 634 F. Supp. 2d 779, 800 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
Additionally, as this Court has held, the fact that a motion does “not
ultimately succeed” does not necessarily mean time spent on the motion
was unreasonable. Miller v. Raytheon Co., No. 3:09-CV-440-O, 2011 WL

13234115, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2011) (O’Connor, J.), aff’d, 716 F.3d
138 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[A] party may recover for time spent on
unsuccessful motions so long as it succeeds in the overall claim.”)
(internal quotations omitted). And as for failing to segregate fees on
unrelated matters and recover fees for unrecoverable clerical tasks, the

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Court does not find sufficient evidence to warrant the reduction
requested by BTC.
On the other hand, factors 1, 3, 4, 5, and 9 of the Johnson factors all
support TGG’s lodestar calculation. Although this was a relatively
straightforward breach of contract case, and therefore did not present
any particularly novel legal issues, it nonetheless required substantial
work by counsel for TTG, including the lengthy and voluminous
discovery discussed above, and the extensive preparation required for
trial. Thus, because TTG’s lodestar is reasonable based on the time and
effort expended by experienced attorneys charging a reasonable rate for
this market, the Court declines to adjust the lodestar.
The Court therefore awards TTG $3,315,430.46 in reasonable
attorney’s fees, expenses, and pre-judgment interest. TTG may seek to
recover its costs by filing the appropriate bill of costs with the clerk of
this Court within fourteen days of the date of this Order.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS TTG’s Motion to Enter
Final Judgment (ECF No. 194) and its Motion for Attorney’s Fees and
Expenses (ECF No. 202). Accordingly, this final judgment is issued
STATES
DISTRICT
COURT
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil UNITED
Procedure
58(a),
and
this case is
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORTfurther
WORTH DIVISION
DISMISSED with prejudice. The Court
ORDERS that (1)
TTG is entitled to $4,429,536.25
compensatory
damages under its
REGINALEAin
KEMP
,

breach of contract claim; (2)Plaintiff,
TTG is entitled to recover pre-judgment
interest for its breach of contract
award in the amount ofNo.
$552,478.46;
v.
4:23-cv-00841-P
(3) TTG is entitled to post-judgment
interest, the total sum of
REGIONS BANK ET AL.,

compensatory damages and pre-judgment interest, at the applicable
Defendants.
ORDER
rate of 4.23% compounded annually from the day
the judgment is signed
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File
until it is paid in full; and
(4) TTG is entitled to $3,315,430.46 in
Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 18. Having considered the Motion
applicable
entries,
the Court
GRANTS
the Motion.
reasonable attorney’s fees. and
The
Clerkdocket
of the
Court
shall
transmit
a true
SO ORDERED on this 18th day of September 2023.
copy of this judgment to the parties.

SO ORDERED on this 6th day of January 2025.
______________________________________________
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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