Walker v. Tarrant County et al

Filing 68

ORDER ACCEPTING 65 FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE: After conducting a de novo review and finding no error, the Magistrate Judge's Findings and Conclusions are correct, and they are ACCEPTED as the Findings and Conclusions of the Court. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: (1) Tarrant County's Motion for Partial Dismissal (ECF No. 39 ) is GRANTED, and Walker's claims against it under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Texas Commission on Hum an Rights Act, and the Texas Whistleblower Act are DISMISSED with prejudice; and (2) the Motions to Dismiss (ECF No. 40 , 54 ) of the remaining defendants are GRANTED, and Walker's claims against them under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, and the Texas Whistleblower Act are DISMISSED with prejudice. (Ordered by Judge Reed C. O'Connor on 1/7/2025) (jnp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
BRANDON WALKER,
Plaintiff,
v.
TARRANT COUNTY
SHERIFF’S OFFICE, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 4:24-cv-00245-O-BP

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court are the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States
Magistrate Judge (“FCR”) (ECF No. 65), filed November 21, 2024, and Plaintiff’s Objections
(ECF No. 67), filed December 4, 2024. After reviewing all relevant matters of record in this case
de novo—including Plaintiff’s specific objections—the Court determines that the Findings and
Conclusions of the Magistrate Judge are correct, and they are ACCEPTED as the Findings and
Conclusions of the Court in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
I.

LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 provides that “a party may serve and file specific

written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations” of a magistrate judge related to
a dispositive motion. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2). An objection must be “sufficiently specific to put
the district court on notice of the urged error.” Williams v. K & B Equip. Co., Inc., 724 F.2d 508,
511 (5th Cir. 1984). A “district judge must only determine de novo any part of the magistrate
judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.” FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). Otherwise, a
district court reviews the recommendation under a plain error standard. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a).

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II.

ANALYSIS
Plaintiff makes several objections to the Findings and Conclusions of the Magistrate

Judge.1 First, he objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that his claims are time barred.2
Second, he argues that “[t]he Magistrate Judge improperly applied qualified immunity without
addressing the well-established constitutional rights violated by Defendants.”3 Third, he objects to
the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion “that Plaintiff failed to allege a policy or custom attributable to
Tarrant County” under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,
690–91 (1978).4 Fourth, and finally, he objects to the Magistrate Judge dismissing Plaintiff’s
claims without leave to amend.5
1. Time Barred
The Magistrate Judge concluded that the two-year statute of limitations bars Plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claims and declined to equitably toll the statute of limitations.6 Plaintiff contends that the
Magistrate Judge erroneously applied the statute of limitations and improperly rejected his
equitable tolling argument.7
After conducting a de novo review, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are time barred. “Under federal law, the [limitations] period begins to run
the moment the plaintiff becomes aware that he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information
to know that he has been injured.” Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1995)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A plaintiff need not realize that a legal cause of
action exists; a plaintiff need only know the facts that would support a claim.” Id. “Moreover, a
Pl.’s Objs. FCR, ECF No. 67.
Id. at 2–4.
3
Id. at 5.
4
Id. at 10.
5
Id. at 12–13.
6
FCR 8–10, ECF No. 65.
7
Pl.’s Objs. FCR 2–4, 8, ECF No. 67.
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2

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plaintiff need not have actual knowledge if the circumstances would lead a reasonable person to
investigate further.” Id.
Plaintiff’s objections do not undermine the conclusion of the Magistrate Judge. All of the
conduct forming the basis of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims occurred during the course of his
employment.8 Thus, because his employment ended on July 27, 2021, the Magistrate Judge
concluded that the two-year statute of limitations began to run on that day and had expired by the
time Plaintiff filed his Original Complaint on March 15, 2024.9 Plaintiff now contends that “the
last known injury” was on October 3, 2022, when his termination was upheld by the reviewing
Commission, and this “extends the accrual period for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims under the continuing
violations doctrine.”10 But Plaintiff fails to explain how the continuing violations doctrine would
be operative here. Nor does he explain why the conduct that occurred on October 3, 2022, gives
rise to a § 1983 claim. At best, he appears to argue that the appeal of his termination was tainted
by “perjury” committed by witnesses during the appeal proceedings.11 But this unsupported
allegation is insufficient to support a constitutional violation.
Moreover, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that equitable tolling does not apply.
“Equitable tolling applies principally where the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about
the cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights.” Rashidi
v. Am. President Lines, 96 F.3d 124, 128 (5th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff argues that equitable tolling
should apply because “perjury during a legal appeal proceeding . . . obstructed Plaintiff’s ability
to file other claims timely by creating procedural and psychological barriers.”12 But this conclusory

Pl.’s SAC ¶¶ 86–90, ECF No. 37.
FCR 9, ECF No. 65.
10
Pl.’s Objs. FCR 8 & Ex. D, ECF No. 67.
11
Id. at 2; Pl.’s SAC ¶ 74, ECF No. 37.
12
Pl.’s Objs. FCR 2, ECF No. 67.
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statement fails to show that Plaintiff was “prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his
rights.” Id. And Plaintiff cites no new authority to support his equitable tolling argument.
2. Qualified Immunity (Individual Defendants)
The Magistrate Judge concluded that the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity.13 Plaintiff objects that “[t]he Magistrate Judge improperly applied qualified immunity
without addressing the well-established constitutional rights violated by Defendants.”14 To
overcome the defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show “(1) that the official violated a
statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the
challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (citations omitted). Here, the
Magistrate Judge dedicated seven paragraphs to addressing whether the individual Defendants
violated a number of constitutional rights.15 In concluding that there were no constitutional
violations, it was entirely proper for the Magistrate Judge to omit a discussion of the “clearly
established” prong, as “a failure by the plaintiff to establish either prong entitles the defendant to
qualified immunity.” Scott v. Santos, 700 F. Supp. 3d 548, 553 (W.D. Tex. 2023).
Plaintiff appears to argue that the “retaliatory action” taken by Sheriff Waybourn in
response to Plaintiff reporting misconduct amounts to a constitutional violation.16 But he has not
shown as much, and accordingly, his objection that there is “no [qualified immunity] protection
for retaliatory actions” is an overly broad and inaccurate statement of law.17 Plaintiff otherwise reasserts the same constitutional violations rejected by the Magistrate Judge.18 Seeing no new facts
or law in support of Plaintiff’s claimed constitutional violations, and finding no error in the

13

FCR 11, ECF No. 65.
Pl.’s Objs. FCR 5, ECF No. 67.
15
FCR 11–13, ECF No. 65.
16
Pl.’s Objs. FCR 5–8, ECF No. 67.
17
Id. at 6. Moreover, Plaintiff misstates and misapplies Taylor v Riojas, the holding of which only
concerns the “clearly established” prong. 592 U.S. 7, 9 (2020).
18
Pl.’s Objs. FCR 5–8, ECF No. 67.
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Magistrate Judge’s analysis, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that there are no
constitutional violations. Thus, Plaintiff’s failure to establish a constitutional violation entitles the
individual Defendants to qualified immunity.
3. Monell Liability (County)
The Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff has not alleged facts to show a violation of
his constitutional rights, and even if there had been a violation, the County would not be liable
under Monell.19 Plaintiff asks this Court to reconsider the County’s liability under Monell.20 Before
a plaintiff can sue a governmental entity under the theory of municipal liability for a policy or
practice, there must be an actual violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights underlying the claim.
See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). As explained above, Plaintiff does
not establish a constitutional violation, so no liability can be imputed to the County.
4. Leave to Amend
Finally, the Magistrate Judge concluded that “allowing [Plaintiff] another opportunity to
amend his lengthy pleadings would be an inefficient use of the Court’s resources, would cause
unnecessary delay, and would be futile.”21 Plaintiff objects on the basis that “further factual
development” is “warrant[ed]” and “additional facts could support a viable claim.”22 But this form
of pleading is barred by Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, which rejected a pleading standard
based on “the prospect of unearthing direct evidence” or in which “a plaintiff might later establish
some ‘set of [undisclosed] facts’ to support recovery.” 550 U.S. 544, 561 (2007). Nor would justice
require leave to amend in this case because Plaintiff has twice amended his Complaint.23 See

19

FCR 14, ECF No. 65.
Pl.’s Objs. FCR 9–10, ECF No. 67.
21
FCR 18, ECF No. 65.
22
Pl.’s Objs. FCR 13, ECF No. 67.
23
Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1; Pl.’s FAC, ECF No. 11; Pl.’s SAC, ECF No. 37.
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Herrmann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent Technologies Inc., 302 F.3d 552, 567 (5th Cir. 2002) (upholding
denial of leave to amend where plaintiffs had already filed original complaint and two amended
complaints). Accordingly, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s denial of leave to amend.
III.

CONCLUSION
After conducting a de novo review and finding no error, the Magistrate Judge’s Findings

and Conclusions are correct, and they are ACCEPTED as the Findings and Conclusions of the
Court. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: (1) Tarrant County’s Motion for Partial Dismissal (ECF
No. 39) is GRANTED, and Walker’s claims against it under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Texas
Commission on Human Rights Act, and the Texas Whistleblower Act are DISMISSED with
prejudice;24 and (2) the Motions to Dismiss (ECF No. 40, 54) of the remaining defendants are
GRANTED, and Walker’s claims against them under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Texas
Commission on Human Rights Act, and the Texas Whistleblower Act are DISMISSED with
prejudice.
SO ORDERED on this 7th day of January, 2025.

_____________________________________
Reed O’Connor
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
.

24

Plaintiff’s Title VII claim against Tarrant County is not dismissed by this Order.

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