Hale v. Walterbach

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Officer Walterbach's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14 ). It is further ordered that the stay previously implemented by the Court (ECF No. 15 ) is hereby lifted. (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 9/24/2024) (jnp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
JOE HALE,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 4:24-cv-00455-P

JONATHAN R. WALTERBACH,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Officer Jonathan R. Walterbach
(“Officer Walterbach”)’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14). For the reasons
set out below, Officer Walterbach’s Motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Joe Hale (“Hale”) filed this lawsuit on May 17, 2024, against
Officer Walterbach alleging two claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983 for
violations of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, Hale brings claims for
excessive use of force and unlawful arrest. Officer Walterbach filed the
present Motion on July 12, 2024, arguing that Hale’s claims should be
dismissed because he is entitled to qualified immunity.
Hale’s claims arise out of an incident that occurred on or about May
21, 2022, when Officer Walterbach arrived at Hale’s residence in
response to a domestic dispute 9-1-1 call that was placed by Hale’s wife
(“Mrs. Hale”). Upon arrival, Officer Walterbach was informed by Hale
that Mrs. Hale had slapped him twice. After Mrs. Hale confirmed that
she had slapped Hale, Hale announced that he was leaving and began
walking to his car. Officer Walterbach instructed Hale to stop walking
away and stated that Hale was “not going anywhere right now.” In
coordination with his statements, Officer Walterbach grabbed Hale’s
shoulder. A few seconds after letting go of Hale’s shoulder, Officer
Walterbach tackled Hale to the ground and, thereafter, placed him
under arrest for resisting arrest. As a result of the incident, Hale

required four surgeries and two skin grafts to fix his torn rotator cuff,
broken ribs, and broken collarbone.

LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a claim for relief to
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 does not
require detailed factual allegations, but “it demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). If a plaintiff fails to satisfy Rule 8(a), the
defendant may file a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
To defeat a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff
must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a
complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s
liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept all wellpleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Sonnier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 509
F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007). The Court is not bound to accept legal
conclusions as true, and only a complaint that states a plausible claim
for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. When
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court assumes their

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veracity and then determines whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief. Id.

B. Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity “protects government officials
from civil damages liability when their actions could reasonably have
been believed to be legal.” Anderson v. Valdez, 845 F.3d 580, 599 (5th
Cir. 2016). “This immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law.’” Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475
U.S. 335, 335 (1986)). “Accordingly, we do not deny immunity unless
‘existing precedent [has] placed the statutory or constitutional question
beyond debate.’” Id. at 599–600 (citation omitted). To defeat qualified
immunity, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that the official violated a
statutory or constitutional right; and (2) that the right was ‘clearly
established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Id. at 600.
“If the defendant’s actions violated a clearly established
constitutional right” courts examine “whether qualified immunity is still
appropriate because the defendant’s actions were objectively reasonable
in light of law which was clearly established at the time of the disputed
action.” Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotations omitted). Courts must focus on the state of the law at the
time of the incident and whether it provided fair warning to the
defendant that his conduct was unconstitutional. Tolan v. Cotton, 572
U.S. 650, 656 (2014). The caselaw must establish beyond debate that
the officer’s conduct violated then-clearly established law. Baldwin v.
Dorsey, 964 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 2020). Plaintiffs must “identify a
case in which an officer acting under similar circumstances was held to
[have committed a constitutional violation] and explain why the case
clearly proscribed the conduct of the officer.” Joseph ex rel. Estate of
Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 345 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation amended).
“It is the plaintiff’s burden to find a case in his favor that does not define
the law at a high level of generality.” Rich v. Palko, 920 F.3d 288, 294
(5th Cir. 2019) (quotations and citation omitted).
Though this test appears to be straightforward, its application in the
Fifth Circuit is often a morass of unpredictability. Compare Crane v.

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City of Arlington, 50 F.4th 453, 458 (5th Cir. 2022) (relying in part on
extra-record sources such as the New York Times and The Guardian in
finding no qualified immunity for an officer’s use of deadly force where
suspect resisted arrest and ran over another officer with his vehicle)
with Ramirez v. Guadarrama, 844 F. App’x 710, 712–17 (5th Cir. 2021)
(holding that qualified immunity barred suit when officers found a
suspect doused in gasoline, knew their tasers would ignite him, and
quickly tased him, “causing him to burst into flames”). This uneasy
analysis has been called the “QI dance.” Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307,
311 (5th Cir. 2022).

ANALYSIS
Officer Walterbach argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity
on both of Hale’s claims. See generally ECF No. 14. Hale, in contrast,
asserts that Officer Walterbach is not entitled to immunity. ECF No. 19
at 17–19. The Court will begin with Hale’s excessive force claim and
conclude with his unlawful arrest claim. 1
A. Hale’s Excessive Force Claim
Officer Walterbach argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity
on Hale’s excessive force claim because Hale has failed to sufficiently
plead such a claim. ECF No. 14 at 8–11. Additionally, Officer
Walterbach claims that even if the Court finds that Hale has sufficiently
pled an excessive force claim, such a violation was not clearly
established. Id. at 11–13. In response, Hale asserts that he has
sufficiently alleged his claim, and that this is an obvious case, excusing
him from having to provide a case sufficiently on point. ECF No. 19 at
8–14, 17–19).
1. Hale has sufficiently pled his excessive force claim

“‘To overcome [an officer’s] claim of qualified immunity on [a] claim of
excessive force, [a plaintiff] must show (1) an injury, (2) which resulted
1Officer

Walterbach also argues that Hale’s claim for punitive damages
should be dismissed with his constitutional claims as it is not a standalone
claim. ECF No. 14 at 13–14. Because, as discussed below, Officer Walterbach’s
Motion is denied on the constitutional claims, it is also DENIED on the
punitive damages claim.

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directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the
excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.” Terrell v. Allgrunn, No.
23-30723, 2024 WL 3948595, at *6 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Poole v. City of
Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 628 (5th Cir. 2012)). “‘[T]he right to make an
arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some
degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.’” Id. (quoting
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). Courts must pay “‘careful
attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat
to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.’” Id. Courts must “‘focus [] on
the officers’ reasonable perception of the events at issue, as they happened,
without the aid of hindsight, multiple viewing angles, slow motion, or the
ability to pause, rewind, and zoom.’” Id. (quoting Tucker v. City of
Shreveport, 998 F.3d 165, 176 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up)).
As a preliminary matter, the Parties do not dispute that Hale suffered
multiple injuries from the incident. However, the Parties do dispute whether
the force used was objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances. Hale
has pled that he “was standing still and compliant with Defendant
Walterbach’s command to stop walking, was not resisting arrest, and not
threatening anyone” when Officer Walterbach tackled him. ECF No. 1 at 11.
In contrast, Officer Walterbach accuses Hale of selectively omitting facts that
would show his takedown to be reasonable under the circumstances. ECF
No. 14 at 8–11. Officer Walterbach may be correct that Hale is cherrypicking facts to create a narrative that Officer Walterbach tackled and injured
a man who was doing nothing wrong. But at this stage, the Court does not go
beyond the allegations of Hale’s Complaint to make such factual
determinations.
Based on Hale’s pleadings, at the time Officer Walterbach tackled Hale
to the ground, Hale “had complied with Defendant’s command to stop
walking toward his truck.” ECF No. 1 at 12. Additionally, Hale has pled that
“he never made any threatening statements, never made any threatening
gestures or postures toward anyone, never raised his voice, and was not
holding a weapon.” Id. at 12–13. In fact, Hale has pled that he was the
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victim—not the perpetrator—of the domestic abuse, as Mrs. Hale had
slapped him. Id. at 14. These allegations, taken as true for purposes of this
motion, sufficiently allege that Officer Walterbach’s use of force was
objectively unreasonable. Thus, the Court finds that Hale has sufficiently
pled his excessive force claim.
2. The alleged violation was clearly established
In his Motion, Officer Walterbach claims that Hale cannot satisfy the
second prong of the qualified immunity test because “even if the Court
overlooks the paucity of detail in Plaintiff’s pleadings . . . Plaintiff is unable
to cite to a case of controlling authority, wherein a court considered facts
sufficiently similar to the particular facts of this case. . . .” ECF No. 14 at 13.
However, as pointed out by Hale, the Fifth Circuit has consistently held that
“a police officer uses excessive force when the officer strikes, punches, or
violently slams a suspect who is not resisting arrest.” See Ruben Cantu, v.
Christian Tamez, et al., No. 23-40673, 2024 WL 4057575, at *2 (5th Cir.
2024) (quoting Darden v. City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 732 (5th Cir.
2018) (collecting cases)); see also Curran v. Aleshire, 800 F.3d 656, 663 (5th
Cir. 2015) (finding no legal error in a district court’s conclusion that
“slamming a student’s head into the wall after her resistance had ceased is a
violation of clearly established law”). As discussed above, Hale has pled that
he was not resisting arrest and was complying with Officer Walterbach’s
orders when he was tackled. Thus, the Court finds that the alleged conduct
violated a clearly established right under Darden and its progeny. See, e.g.,
Spiller v. Harris Cnty., Texas, No. 22-20028, 2024 WL 4002382, at *4 (5th
Cir. 2024) (finding that “the right to be free from excessive force was clearly
established at the time of the violation in this case.”); see also Arreola as
Next Friend of Vallejo v. City of Fort Worth, No. 4:17-CV-00629-P, 2020
WL 3404120, at *7 (N.D. Tex. June 19, 2020) (Pittman, J). Accordingly,
Officer Walterbach’s Motion is DENIED as to Hale’s excessive force claim.
B. Hale’s Unlawful Arrest Claim

The Court turns now to Hales’ unlawful arrest claim. It is well settled that
in the context of a claim for unlawful arrest, Hale must show an absence of
probable cause. See, e.g., Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 2001).

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Probable cause is present “when the totality of the facts and circumstances
within a police officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for
a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed or was
committing an offense.” United States v. Levine, 80 F.3d 129, 132 (5th
Cir.1996). In this case, similar to his arguments on Hale’s excessive force
claim, Officer Walterbach accuses Hale of omitting certain facts that would
show that he had probable cause to arrest Hale. ECF No. 14 at 6–8.
Specifically, Officer Walterbach claims that Hale was not complying with
his orders, which the Fifth Circuit has found sufficient to establish probable
cause. Id.; see, e.g., Childers v. Iglesias, 848 F.3d 412, 415 (5th Cir. 2017)
(reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed where
arrestee “failed to comply with an officer’s instruction, made within the
scope of the officer’s official duty and pertaining to physical conduct rather
than speech”).
In response, Hale asserts that he was complying with Officer
Walterbach’s orders when he was tackled and did not fight back even after
being tackled. ECF No. 19 at 14–15. Additionally, Hale claims that he
complied with Officer Walterbach’s order to roll onto his stomach despite
having numerous broken bones and that he was not told he was under arrest
until after being placed into the squad car. Id. at 15.
Again, while Hale may be cherry-picking certain facts to fit his narrative
of the incident, it is improper—for the purpose of a motion to dismiss—for
the Court to resolve the factual dispute regarding Hale’s compliance with
Officer Walterbach’s orders. While it is possible that ultimately it may be
decided that Officer Walterbach had probable cause for the arrest, at this
stage the Court must take Hale’s pleadings as true and look at them in a light
most favorable to him. Thus, the Court finds that Hale has sufficiently pled
that Officer Walterbach lacked probable cause to arrest him. Consequently,
Hale has sufficiently pled his unlawful arrest claim, which is clearly
established under Fifth Circuit precedent. See Gorsky v. Guajardo, No. 2020084, 2023 WL 3690429, at *9 (5th Cir. 2023) (affirming the district court’s
denial of qualified immunity on a false arrest claim because there was a
factual dispute over whether the arrestee was complying with the officer’s

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orders). Accordingly, Officer Walterbach’s Motion is DENIED with regard
to Hale’s false arrest claim.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Officer Walterbach’s

Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14). It is further ordered that the stay
previously implemented by the Court (ECF No. 15) is hereby lifted.
SO ORDERED on this 24th day of September 2024.

MARK T. PITTMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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