Mata v. Director, TDCJ-CID

Filing 27

Memorandum Opinion and Order: The Court denies the petition and dismisses this civil action with prejudice. The Court recognizes that fairminded jurists could find this Court's assessment of materiality, as it relates to Petitioner's cla ims under Brady, Napue, and Giglio, debatable or wrong. Thus, the Court grants Petitioner a certificate of appealability on these claims, (GroundsOne and Four), under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). T he Coun denies Petitioner a certificate of appealability on her other claims because she has failed to show that reasonable jurists would find this Court's "assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong," or find "it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right" and "debatable whether [this Court] was correct in its procedural ruling." Slack v. McDaniel,529 U.S. 473, 484(2000). (Ordered by Judge James Wesley Hendrix on 3/12/2025) (bdg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUBBOCK DIVISION
DESIRAE MONIQUE MATA,
Petitioner,

No. 5:20-CV-00086-H
(Consolidated with
No. 5:21-CV-00198-H)

DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID,
Respondent.

OPINIONAND ORDER
Petitioner Destae Monique Mata, a state prisoner proceeding with the assistance of
counsel, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 5 2254, challengngher

capitai murder conviction and life sentence out of Gaines County. D}:t. Nos . 1, 10. She asserts
that she was convicted on the false testimony of a jailhouse informant, which was aided by
prosecutorial misconduc and that she received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. She also
alleges that the state habeas court failed to substantively review her claims in violation ofdue

process. She seeks a new trial. Respondent frled an answer with copies of Petitioner's relevant
state-court records. Dkt. Nos. 15, 21. Respondent argues that Petitioner's state-process claim is

not cognizable and that she failed to otherwise meet her burden for reliefunder Section 2254.

Dkt. No. 21. Petitioner replied. Dkt. No. 26. As explained below, the Court finds that
Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief. Her claim that the state habeas court failed to
substantively review her claims is contradicted by the record, and in any event, not cognizable

under Section 2254. And the state couft's summary denial of her claims is entitled to substantial
deference. The record here provides a reasonable basis to support the state court's rejection of
Petitioner's claims-that the false testimony and withheld evidence were arguably immaterial.

To be sure, the prosecution should have disclosed evidence related to a witness's

oedibiliry, but the record as a whole amply supports the state court's denial of her claim. The
evidence at Petitioner's trial included the testimony of a jailhouse informant, Angie Brown, who

maintained that Petitioner shared details of the crime with her while they were detained in the
same cellblock. Brown and her lawyer both averred that Brown was testirying freely and did not

expect anything in retum. In reality, Brown and her lawyer had repeatedly written to the
prosecutor asking him to assist Brown in gening a sentence reduction in exchange for her help.
The prosecutor did not disclose these letters to the defense, nor did he corect the misleading

testimony. There is no question that the undisclosed letters contained useful impeachment
evidence, but the combination ofother impeachment evidence against Brown and independent
evidence of Petitioner's guilt make clear that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA)

could reasonably conclude that the letters were immaterial. The jury heard evidence that other
agents of the State-the Texas Rangers-promised to help Brown, and a defense witness

contradicted Brown's statement and testified that Brown was known for gathering ilformation
to try to get a deal for herself. And, because Brown was not the sole-or even the star-witness
who connected Petitioner to the murders, her reliability was not necessarily determinative of
Petitioner's guiJt or innocence.

Additionally, her counsel's failure to investigate an altemative suspect, who was later
identifred by her codefendant's trial team, was not constitutionally deficient based on the

information available to Petitioner's counsel before her trial. And although counsel admitted
that he ened in failing to request a mandatory jury instrucion, that error did not prejudice
Petitioner.

In short, Petitioner has failed to overcome the diffrcult, deferential standard of 28 U.S.C.
g 2254(d). Thus, the petition is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

2

l.

Backgromd
Petitioner challenges her state-court capital murder conviction and life sentence out of

the l06th District Court of Gaines County, Texas. In cause number 14486, styled State of
Texas v. Desirae Monique Mata, Petitioner was charged by indictment with two counts of capital

murder for her role in the deaths ofJohn Allen and Jay Doyal. Dkt. No. 15-13 at 10-11.
Petitioner pled not guilry, but a jury found her guilty as charged in the indictment. Id. at 32+
27

. The State did not seek the death penalty, and the trial court imposed mandatory sentences

of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Dkt. No. 15-13 at 324.

A,

Facts

Petitioner's counsel aptly summarized this case in her appellate briefing. "This case is
about a clique of individuals (mostly criminals) and the consequences of their lifestyles." Saa

Dkt. No. l5-3 at2; Dkt. No. 15-5 at2. Petitioner had a child with a drug dealer named Roiand
Canru, nicknamed "Rollie." Dkt. No. 15-3 at 5. One of Rollie's customers stole three diamond
rings and traded them to Rollie in exchange for drugs. /d. Petitioner liked one of the rings in

particular and began to refer to it as "my diamond." 1d But "[m]uch to [Petitioner's] appaent
consternation, Rollie asked a friend, John Allen . . . to sell all the rings. " .Id.

Allen "was a fence for stolen goods as well as a drug user," and he "believed that the
rings were'worth a whole lot of money."' Id. Later, Rollie wrote to Allen from prison and

"instructed him to sell the rings and give [Petitioner] ' 10 g's each' and to take the rest and 'live it
up homie, its all good."' Id. Allen and a friend went to New York City and fenced the
diamonds there, reportedly for $80,000. Id They bought a used Maserati for $20,000 and drove

it back to Seminole. Id. at 5-6. After Allen retumed to Seminole, Petitioner moved in with
him for a month or two. Id. at 6. Rumors spread that Allen had "gotten a good bit of money,
and people began to steal from him." He "became extremely paranoid[,] . . . carried a pistol,

3

wore a body cam[,] and kept a list of people whom he thought had done him wrong." Id. He
also "installed a surveillance system in his house and . . . boarded up [his] windows." .Id.

Allen apparently did not pay Rollie or Petitioner with any ofthe proceeds from the
diamond sale. Id. at 8. Petitioner expressed her "agitation over the nonpayment ofthe money
[and her] anger over the sale of 'my diamond" in recorded phone calls with Roilie, who

remained in prison.r 1d About a month before the murders, Petitioner and one of her
codefendants-Nicodemes "Dan Dan" Sosa-were captured on Allen's surveillance equipment

trying to tum offpower to his house. Id. at6.
Later, Petitioner and three of her associates-Juan "Smokey" Castillo, Dan Dan Sosa,
and Bobby Ruiz-went to rob Allen at his home. Things went awry, leaving Allen and another
man, Jay Doyal, dead. "After the murders, the perpetrators forcibly removed the surveillance

recording equipment and took it with them." /d Then, the four friends went their separate
ways.

Castillo tumed to a friend to "get something offhis chest," and told him about the
robbery-gone-wrong. See id. at 7. He also talked to law enforcement ofticers. .Id. In both
conversations, he "detailed the crime[,] . . . includ[ing] cenain details that the police had

intentionally withheld from the public." Id. Castillo shared that he went to rob Allen with
Bobby Ruiz, Dan Dan, and "Rollie's Desirae."2 Id. at 6-'1 . He explained that Petitioner
knocked on the door while the others waited offto the side. When someone opened the door,

"Bobby and Dan Dan rushed in with their pistols drawn, telling Allen that "a11 they wanted was
his safe." Id. "[W]ords were exchanged," and things escalated. Id. Bobby hit Doyal in the

I During these phone calls, Petitioner expressed that "people die for diamonds," sae Dkt. No. 15-20 at 84'

and "I want my diamonds. Fuck him. That was bullshit. He would die over diamonds. I don't give a

damn." Dkt. No. l5-20 at 9l-92.
Castillo identified a different woman-Desirae Reyna-as "Rollie's Desirae," but Ms' Reyna was
incarcerated at the time ofthe murders. /d

2

4

head with his pistol and shot him in the chest. Dan Dan hit Allen in the head with his pistol.

Allen told them to take the safe and leave, but when Allen tried to go toward a back room, Dan
Dan shot him r,wice in the back. Id Castillo reported to both law enforcement and his friend
that after the killings, they positioned Doyal's body and placed a meth pipe in his hand to
"make it look like the victims were there smoking and'that somebody did a drive-by."' Id,
Investigators tested a DNA sample from the meth pipe and "could not exclude [Petitioner] as a

donor." Id. at 6.
Meanwhile, Petitioner went to Alabama to visit family after the murders. Id. at7. The
day before she was set to return, authorities in Texas obtained arrest warrants for all four

suspects. /d. That evening, Petitioner canceled her flight home. Id Petitioner was ultimately
arrested in Alabama and was held there on these charges for about a week. /d. at 2. While in

Alabama, Petitioner was incarcerated on the same cellblock as Angie Brown. Id Brown says
that Petitioner told her about the murders. /d. Brown told her attorney, futa Briles, what she
leamed fiom Petitioner. Id. Briles ananged for Brown to meet with Texas Rangers. Id. Both

Brown and Briles testified at Petitioner's t:ial. Id. Additionally, Briles typed Brown's statement,
and it was admitted as an exhibit in Petitioner's tial. Id.

Petitioner's habeas claims focus on Brown's testimony as a jailhouse informant.

B.

Procedural History

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence in an
unpublished opinion. Dkt. No. 15-3. The Eleventh Court found that the trial coun erred in

failing to insmrct the jury on the law requiring corroboration ofjailhouse-informant testimony.
Id. at 4. But the court found the error harmless because, excluding Brown's testimony, the
record contained enough other evidence connecting Petitioner to the murders that "the omission

of the instruction on corroboration likely had a very minimal effect on the verdict." 1d. at 8

5

(intemal quotation marks and citation omitted). The TCCA refused Petitioner's petition for
discretionary review (PDR). See Dkt. No. 15-12.
Petitioner then filed a state habeas application with an unopposed motion to stay and
hold the case in abeyance in the trial court for 90 days while Petitioner gathered transcripts and
exhibits from the later trial of a codefendant. Dkt. No. 21-l at 1G20. The trial court granted
the stay, id. at23, but the district clerk mistakenly transfened the case to the TCCA before the
parties had completed their investigation and briefing in the trial court. SeeDkt. No. 15-34. So
the TCCA found that the case was prematurely forwarded and remanded it "to allow the parties
and the trial court to complete the proceedings, including an evidentiary investigation and the

entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law if appropriate." Id.; see also Dlct. No. 15-29.
Petitioner completed her investigation and f,rled her amended state habeas application on
February 3, 2020. Dkt. No. 15-32 at 7. The trial court forwarded it, along with a supplemental
record, to the TCCA on February 14,2020. Id Public records show that the writ was
submitted to the TCCA for review on February 28, 2020.3 A couple of months later, on April

15,2020, the TCCA denied Petitioner's amended habeas application without written order "on
the findings ofthe trial court without a hearing and on the Court's independent review ofthe

record." Dkt. No. 21-1 at28. It is undisputed that the trial court entered no fmdings or
conclusions.

Petitioner filed her first federal habeas petition in this Court on April 20, 2020. Dkl

No. 1 . Then she returned to state court and f ed a suggestion that the TCCA reconsider its
disposition of her state habeas application. Dkt. No. 15-30. On Petitioner's motion and before
Respondent flrled an answer, this Court stayed Petitioner's federal habeas petition pending the

resolution of her suggestion for reconsideration in the TCCA. Dkt. No. 7. Petitioner also filed

3See https://search.txcourts.govlCase.aspx?cn=WR-90,058-01&coa=coscca

202s).
6

(last visited Feb. 12,

a second state application for habeas relief. Dkt. No. 21-l at 32. The TCCA denied in part

Petitioner's second habeas application and dismissed the rest as subsequent. Dk. No. 21-l at
34; Dkt. No. 15-35. The same day, the TCCA denied Petitioner's suggestion for reconsideration

ofthe denial ofher first habeas application. Dkt. No.21-lat30.
Then Petitioner returned to this Court and filed a second habeas petition. ,Sea Dkt. No.
5:21-CV-00198 at Dkt. No.

l. Respondent answered the second petition and provided relevant

state-court records. Id. at Dkt. Nos. 6, 7. And Petitioner replied. Id. at Dkt. No. 11. The Court

lifted the stay in the first federal habeas proceeding, consolidated the two petitions, and required
amended briefinE. Id. arDkl No. l2; No. 5:20-CV-00086 at Dkt. No. 9. Respondent filed its
amended answer with the required appendix in support. Dkt. No. 21. The state-court records
submined in the later-filed habeas proceeding were copied into this case at Dkt. No. 15.

Petitioner submitted her reply. Dkt. No. 26.
Petitioner seeks federal habeas reliefbased on these gtounds:

L She was convicted based on the testimony of a jailhouse informant who falsely
testified that she was not expecting anything in exchange for her testimony;

2. The state court failed to substantively review the facts underlying Petitioner's claims
in violation of the Due Process Clause;

3. The state court unreasonably rejected her ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims
despite trial counsel's uncontested admissions ofdeficient performance; and

4. The state court denied her prosecutorial misconduct claims contrary to Brady v.
Maryland,373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Kyles v. Whitley,54l U.S. 419 (1995), even though
the prosecutor lied to defense counsel about the jailhouse informant's expectations of
favorable treatment and misrepresented the informant's expectations to the jury.

Dkt. Nos. 1, 10.4

a

Petitioner's grounds for reliefare essentially the same in both petitions, except that her second ground
for relief-that the state habeas coun violated her right to due process----only appears in her second
habeas petition. Dkt. No. 10.
7

Respondent argues that Petitioner's complaint about deficiencies in the state-court
process (Ground Two) is not cognizable under Section 2254 and wges the Court to dismiss it

with prejudice. Otherwise, Respondent contends that Petitioner's claims fail to overcome the
deferential standard imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA).
In reply, Petitioner emphasizes her claims that the jailhouse informant lied-and that lie
was endorsed by the prosecutor-in violation ofher constitutional rights and clearly established

Supreme Court precedent. Dk. No. 26. She also acknowledges that, normally, defects in the
state habeas process are not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding, but she contends that this
is not a normal case. She claims that the state habeas court's deviation from its standard

procedures was so egregious that it deprived her of all process in violation of her constitutional

rights. Id. Finally, she reiterates her claim that her trial counsel was ineffecive for failing to
investigate an altemate suspect and failing to request a mandatory jury instruction on

corroboration ofjailhouse informant testim ony. Id.

2.

Legal Standard
Section 2254 provides federal courts with a limited, but important opportunity to review

a state prisoner's conviction and sentence. See Harrington v. Richter,562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).

This statute, as amended by AEDPA, creates a "highly deferential standard for evaluating statecourt rulings, . . . which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit ofthe doubt."
Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (intemal quotation marks omitted).

The basic strucnlre ofthe federal habeas statute is "designed to confrm that state courts
are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions." Richter, 562

U.S. at 103. Ftst, the statute requires that a habeas petitioner exhaust his claims in state court.
28 U. S. C.

i 2254(b). If the state court dismisses the claim on procedural grounds, then the
8

claim is barred from federal review unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice. Richto,562
U.S. at 103. And if the state court denies the claim on the merits, then AEDPA's relitigation
bar applies. Lucio v. Lumpkin, 987 F.3d 451, 464.55 (5th Cn. 2021).
Once a state court has rejected a claim on the merits, a federal court may grant reliefon

that claim only if the state court's decision was (l) "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States," or (2) was "based on an unreasonable determination ofthe facts in light of the
evidence presented in the state court proce edng." 2S U.S.C.0 22SA@); Adekeyer. Davis,938

F.3d 678, 682 (5th Ct. 2019). And "[t]he question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court
believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was

unreasonable-a substantially higher threshold." Schrirov. Landrigan,550 U.S. 465,473 (2007).

A state-coun decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if "it relies on legal
rules that directly conflict with prior holdings of the Supreme Court or if it reaches a different

conclusion than the Supreme Court on materially indistinguishable facts." Busby,359 F.3d at
713. A decision constitutes an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if "the
state court identifies the correct goveming legal principle fiom [the Supreme] Court's decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts ofthe prisoner's case." Williams v. Taylor,
529 U. S. 362, 413 (2000); see also Pierre tt. Vannoy,891 F.3d 224, 227 (5th Cir. 2018) (explaining

that a petitioner's lack of"supreme Court precedent to support" a ground for habeas relief
"ends [his] case" as to that gound).

"[A] state-coun factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the
federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the ftst'nstance." l|'ood v.

Atlen,558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). Federal habeas reliefis precluded even when the state court's
factual determination is debatable. Id. at 303. State-court factual determinations are entitled to

9

a "presumption ofcorrectness" that a petitioner may rebut only by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C. $ 2254(e)(1). This "deference extends not only to express findings offact,
but to the implicit frndings of the state court." Ford v. Davis,9l0 F.3d 232,234-35 (5th Cir.
2018).
State courts need not provide reasons for their decisions, and even summary denials of

reliefare entitled to substantial deference. Richter,562 U.S. at 100-01. Ofcourse, when the
state high court "explains its decision on the merits in a reasoned opinion," then the federal

court's review is straightforward-it "simply reviews the specific reasons given by the state court
and defers to those reasons if they are reasonable." Wilsonv. Sellm,584U.S.l22, 125 (2018).
But when reviewing a summary denial, "the federal coun should'look through'the unexplained
decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale." Id. If the

lower court's rationale is reasonable, the federal court must "presume that the unexplained
decision adopted the same reasoning." .rd This presumption may be rebutted, however, by
evidence that the summary decision "relied or most lilely did rely on difierent grounds." Id. at

125-26. And when the lower state court decision is unreasonable, then it is more likely that the
state high court's single-word decision rests on alternative grounds. Id. atl32.

However, when there is no reasoned state-court decision to look to, then courts "must
determine what arguments or theories supported or, . . . could have supported, the state court's

decision." See id, at 131; Wooten v. Lumpkin,l13 F.4th 560, 569 n.7 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting
Richter,562 U.S. at i02). Then, the court determines "whether it is possible fairminded jurists

could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent" with Supreme Court
precedent. Richter,562 U.S. at 102. "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal
court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in

t0

federal court was so lacking in justifrcation that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement. " 1d.

Moreover, "federal habeas reliefdoes not lie for errors ofstate law," and "it is not the
province ofa federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law

questions." Estelle v. McGuire,502 U.S. 62,67-68 (1991); We* v. Johnson,92 F.3d 1385, 1404
(5th Cir. 1996). AEDPA "modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner
applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state court
convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bellv.Cone,535 U.S.685,693

(2002). Federal habeas review is reserved only as a "guard against extreme malfunctions in the
state criminai justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal"

Richter,562 U.S. at 102-03. This standard is intentionally "diffrcult to nr,eet." Id.

Additionally, federal habeas review is limited "to the record that was before the state
court that adjudicated the claim on the merits." Cullen v. Pinholster,563 U.S. 170, 181-82

(201l).- In short, to overcome AEDPA's highly deferential, diffrcult standard, a petitioner "must
show, based on the state-court record alone, that any argument or theory the state habeas court

could have relied on to deny . . . relief was contrary to or an unreasonable application ofclearly
established federal law as determined by the Supreme Co:urt." Evans v. Davis,875 F.3d210' 217

(5th Cir. 2017).

Finally, even if a petitioner satisfies the onerous requirements of AEDPA, a federal court
cannot grant reliefunless the petitioner also proves that the state-court error was prejudicial.
Brown v. Davenpon,596 U.S. 118 (2022). To do so, the petitioner must show that the eror was

not harmless. In other words, the petitioner must establish that the state-court error had a
"substantial and injurious effect or influence" on the verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamsor, 507 U.S.
619, 622 (1993).

ll

3.

Analysis
The Court thoroughly examined Petitioner's pleadings, Respondent's answer, the

relevant state court records, and the applicable law. The Court finds that an evidentiary hearing
is not necessary to resolve the instant petition. See Young v. Herring,938F.2d 543,560 n.12 (5th

Cir. l99l ) ("[A] petitioner need not receive an evidentiary hearing if it would not develop
material facts relevant to the constitutionaliry of his conviction."). As explained below, the
Court denies Petitioner's claims.

A.

Petitioner's state-process slaim (Ground Two) is contradicted by the record
and is not cop.izable under Section 2254.

Petitioner's second ground for relieffocuses on irregularities in the state habeas process.
Petitioner contends that there was a complete breakdown in her state habeas process. She
claims that, after the TCCA remanded the habeas application to the trial court, the trial court
never forwarded the record or the case back to the TCCA. Dkt. No. 26 at 26 &n.l. Instead,
she says that while "[t]he writ was still pending with the district court, . . . out of left field," the

TCCA denied the application, even though il "was not even pending with the CCA." Id. at 26
(emphasis original). Then, she emphasizes that the white-card, summary denial referred to the

trial court's findings offact and conclusions of law, even though the trial court never made
findings or conclusions.
Petitioner then claims that the TCCA's decision on her successive writ was equally

perplexing. She argues that, by denying some of her claims on the merits and dismissing others
as subsequent, the TCCA is "trying to have its cake and eat it too, by acting as though the [fust]

denial exists as to some issues but not as to others." 1d. at 28. She argues that ifthe first denial
was a true ruling on the merits, then the TCCA should have dismissed her second writ in its

enttety. And if it wasn't, then the TCCA should have rescinded the fust order and considered

t2

all ofher claims anew. Id. Thus, she argues that throughout the process, the TCCA "departed

Iiom its own procedures in an entirely unexpected, unpredictable, and indefensible way." Id.
Petitioner faults Respondent for "wholly fail[ing] to acknowledge" the TCCA's
procedural short-cfucuit. Id. at24-25,27. But Respondent does acknowledge that the TCCA's

initial summary denial contains an error-that it refers to findings and conclusions that are not
contained in the record. See DlI. No. 21 at 4 & n.2. Otherwise, Respondent lets the record
speak for itself.

Contrary to Petitioner's allegations, the records reflect that the trial court did forward the
record to the TCCA.s SeeNo. 5:20-CV-00086 at Dkt. No. 15-32; 5:21-CV-00198 at Dkt. No. 6-

32. The records show that Petitioner f ed her original state habeas application in the trial coun
on May 28, 2019, along with a motion to stay the proceedings for 90 days while she continued

to investigate and gather records and evidence fiom the recent trial ofone ofher codefendants.

Dkt. No. 15-33 at 67. The trial court granted the motion, but the case was mistakenly
forwarded to the TCCA before Petitioner flrled her amended application. Dkt. Nos. l5-33 at 1;
15-34. The TCCA remanded the case to the trial court "to complete the proceedings," including
directions that the trial court must resolve fact issues within 150 days (by January 21,2020) and
forward the case back to the TCCA with a supplemental record within 180 days (by February

18,2020). Dkt. No. 15-34.

5

The Court recognizes that a docketing error in this cause number likely contributed to Petitioner's

confusion. The state-court record, comprised ofover 2,500 pages in 35 separate attachments, was
originally flrled in Petitioner's second federal habeas case. SeaNo.5:21-cv-00l98atDkt.No.6. When
the two cases were consolidated, the state-court record was copied into the lead case, No. 5:20-cv-00086
at Dkt. No. 15. But attachment no. 32-the trial court's 69-page supplemental e-record in Petitioner's
first state habeas writ, No. WR-90,058-01-was inadvertently omitted and replaced with a duplicate of
attachment no, 3 t. Thatenorhasbeen corrected, and the panies were notiFred ofthe change. However,
the Coun notes that Petitioner's counsel was also counsel of record in the second federal habeas case as
well as in Petitioner's state habeas proceedings. Thus, the Court finds that counsel had access to the
complete state-court record throughout this pending proceedrng and had personal, real-time knowledge of
the state-court proceedings.

l3

The trial court entered its certification that there were no controverted, unresolved

material facts just days before the TCCA's deadline, and before Petitioner filed her promised
amended application. Dkt. No. 15-32 at6. Petitioner did not file her amended state habeas

application until three weeks later, on February 3, 2020. Dkt. No. 15-32 at 7. In response, the
State filed its general denial on February 13,2020, Dkt. No. 15-25, and the supplemental record

of the case was prepared and forwarded to the TCCA the same day. Sea Dkt. No. 15-32. The
case was received by the TCCA just one business day before the deadline. Id. Two months

later, the TCCA denied the application without written order "on the frndings ofthe uial court

without a hearing and on the Court's independent review ofthe record." Dkt. No. 2l-1 at28.

It is undisputed that the trial court entered no findings or conclusions.
Although the TCCA's summary denial contains a mistake-referring to findings that the
trial court never entered-the record contradicts Petitioner's assertion that the TCCA acted "out
of left field" in a case that was never submitted to it. To the contrary, the record shows that the

trial court forwarded the case and supplemental records according to the timeline imposed by
the TCCA---even with Petitioner's last-minute, tardy amendment. The case was properly
submitted to the TCCA, and its summary denial is entitled to substantial deference-despite the

clerical error. See Richter,562 U.S. at 100-01.
Likewise, there is nothing improper or unexpected about the TCCA's determination on
Petitioner's subsequent state writ. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits the state
court from considering the merits of a subsequent habeas application unless the applicant
establishes that the issues could not have been presented previously because the factual or legal
basis for the claim was unavailable when the first habeas application was filed. Tex. Code

Crim. P. art. 1 1.07 $ 4. Petitioner states that she frled her subsequent writ after obtaining
previously sealed documents from the jailhouse informant's federal criminal proceedings
showing that the informant received a sentence reduction based on her testimony against
14

Petitioner. Dkt. No. 26 at2l. She attached this newly discovered evidence to her second state

writ. Id. And, although she re-urged some ofher other claims, it does not appear that she
aftached any newly discovered evidence or argument related to those claims. The TCCA
considered Petitioner's subsequent jailhouse informant claims based on her newly discovered
evidence and denied them on the merits. Dkt. No. l5-35. But it dismissed her other claims,
expressly finding that they didnot sadsry the requirements of art. 11.07$4. .I4 Thus, the state

courl's order on Petitioner's subsequent writ was entirely consistent with its own procedure.
The record reveals that the state habeas process here was far from the outrageous,
extreme deprivation of process she describes. Indeed, the only irregularity shown in the record
is the TCCA's clerical error in referring to the trial court's nonexistent frndings. But as argued

by the respondent, it is well established that alleged errors in a state habeas proceeding do not
state a claim for federai habeas corpus relief. Vail v. Procunier,747 F.2d277 (sth Cir. 1984). The

Fifth Circuit has repeatedly confirmed that "an attack on the state habeas proceeding is an
attack on a proceeding collateral to the detention and not the detention itself." Rudd v. Johnson,
256 F.3d 317,320 (5th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases). Thus, Petitioner's state-court process claim

(Ground Two) is contradicted by the record and, in any event, is not actionable under Section
2254.

B.

Petitioner failed to overcome AEDPA's relitigation bar with respect to her
jailhouse-informant claims (Grounds One and Four).

Petitioner fairly presented her jailhouse-informant claims to the TCCA in her state
habeas applications. The TCCA's summary denial of these claims was a decision on the merits6

and is entitled to substantial deference. Richtn,562 U.S. at 100-01. The Court must fust

6In Texas writ jurisprudence, a "denial" signifies that the state high court "addressed and rejected the
merits ofa particular claim," but a "dismissal" means that the court "declined to consider the claim for
reasons unrelated to the claim's meits." E)( parte Torres,943 S.w.2d 469, 472 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997);
Baffientes v. Johnson,22l F.3d 741,780 (5th Cir. 2000).

l5

determine what arguments or theories supported or could have supported the state court's
decision, then determine whether it is possible fairmilded jurists could disagree that those
arguments or theories conflict with Supreme Court precedent. Wilson,584 U.S. at 131; Richter,
562 U.S. at 102.

i.

Background

Petitioner's fust and fourth grounds for relief revolve around Brown's testimony as a
jailhouse informant. Before her trial, Petitioner's lawyer asked the Gaines County District

Attomey, Michael Munk "whether he was going to do anything to help Brown out with her
federal sentence in exchange for her testimony." Dkt. No. 15-24 at 68. But Munk "assured

[him] that there was no deal or expectation ofa deal with Brown that he knew abont." Id.

At Petitioner's trial, Brown testified that no one told her she would get "any kind of
favorable deal" in exchange for her testimony. Dkt. No. I5-18 at 105. She admitted that after
she was sentenced in her federal criminal case, she wrote a letter to Texas Ranger Brian Burney

asking him to "keep his promise," but clarified that Munk had not made her any promises. Id.

at 110. Additionally, Brown's attomey, Rita Briles, testified that nothing was "communicated

to [Brown] that she would gain some advantage or lose something if she didn't make the
statement." Dkt. No. 15-17 at 188. And Briles confrmed that, as far as she knew, Brown "was
making this statement freely and of her own wr11." Id.

In his closing argument, Munk recalled Brown's testimony. He questioned whether

"Ms. Brown's testimony is less credible because possibly detectives might have suggested some
kind ofdeal." Dkt. No. 15-20 at 89-90. But he stated, "I don't know anything about that. You
heard her testifo. 'Not that man sitting right there,' . . . I didn't make her any deal." Id. He
then asks "what difference does it make whether a deal was offeted?" Id. at90.

t6

Petitioner's trial counsel avers that he later leamed ofa "handshake agreement between

Munk and Brown for Munk to try to get Brown's sentence reduced in exchange for her
testimony." Dkt. No. 15-24 at69. And, although there is no evidence of a formal deal,
evidence discovered after Petitioner's trial strongly suggests that she hoped-or even expected-

to get her federal sentence reduced in exchange for her statement to law enforcement and her
testimony against Petitioner. After Petitioner's trial in 2015 and before her codefendant Bobby
Ruiz's trial in 2018, Munk lost a bid for reelection and was replaced by a new District Attomey.

At that point, several previously undisclosed letters surfaced.
In late 2013, more than a year before Petitioner's trial, Briles sent a letter to Munk asking
him to "[p]lease . . . forward a letter to [the] U.S. Attomey . . . and let him know that Ms.
Brown's information was extremely helpful in the investigation and pending prosecution of the
double homicide." Dkt. No. 15-24 at 51. She explains that the U.S. Attomey "would seriously
consider filing a motion to have Ms. Brown's present sentence reduced." Id. Brrles also sent a
letter to Brown, informing her that "the Texas Ranger were [sic] very favorable about helping"
and that Briles would ask the Ranger to prepare a statement for the U.S. Attorney summarizing
her assistance. Dkt. No. 15-24 at 49. Brown and Briles also exchanged other letters discussirg
the sentence-reduction process. Then Brown personally wrote to Munk, explaining that she

"was expecting the assistance that [she] gave to help reduce [her] federal sentence," and asking

him to contact the U.S. Anomey on her behalf. Dkt. No. 15-24 at47.
After Petitioner's trial, Munk wrote a letter on Brown's behalf to the U.S. Attomey. He
described Brown's testimony as important and stated that "although Brown's was not the only

testimony to implicate the four codefendants, . . . it corroborated many details of Juan Castillo's

confession." Dkt. No. 15-24 at 61-62. He also gave his opinion that Brown's testimony
"played a large role in the convictions of both [Petitioner] and Mr. Castillo." 1d Brown

t7

ultimately received a 60-month sentence reduction based on her assistance in the investigation
and prosecution ofPetitioner and her codefendants. Id. at63.

After the letters were disclosed, Brown testified in the trial ofPetitioner's codefendant
Bobby Ruiz. There, she admitted that she and her attorney were "trying to get a deal" for the

information she provided against Petitioner. Dkt. No. 15-32 at 37 . She also agreed that her
attomey wrote to Munl "trying to get some help for . . . Brown" and that she "want[ed] some
consideration for the[] notes" she shared. Id. at 38-39. She testified that she felt entitled to
something in retum for her testimony. Id. at 40. But she confirmed that Munk did not write her
any letters back h 2013, impliedly because she "hadn't closedthe dea|." Id.
Based on these facts, Petitioner argues that Munk wrongfully withheld the letters to

conceal Brown's incentive to testiry, and he allowed Brown (and Briles) to lie to the jury about
her incentivized testimony. Petitioner also argues that she would not have been convicted but

for Brown's testimony, and the jury "would have ueated the testimony differently" had it
known that "several years of freedom for Brown hung on her testimony. " Dkt. No. 26 at 20.

ii,

Relevant legal standards

"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the govemment from

knowingly using, or failing to correct, false testimony." United States v. Mason,293 F.3d 826,
828 (5th C:8. 2002) (citng Giglio v. (Jnited States,405 U.S. 150 (1972) and Napue

t lllinois, 360

U.S. 264 (1959). To establish a due-process violation, a petitioner must prove that (1) a witness
testified falsely, (2) the govemment knew the testimony was false, and (3) the testimony was

material. /d. Evidence may be considered false if it is misleading and important to the
prosecution's case. Noblesv. Johnson,l27 F.3d409,415 (5th Cn. 1997) (citing Donnelly v'
DeChristoforo, 41 6 U.S. 637,647 (1974). False testimony is material if there is "any reasonable

l8

likelihood" that it "could . . . have affected the judgment of the jury. " Uvukansi v. Guerao, 126
F.4th 382, 390 (5th Ct.2025) (quoting Giglio,405 U.S. at 154; Napue,360 U.S. at271).
Prosecutors have a weil-established duty to disclose favorable evidence for purposes of
ensuring a fair trial. Brady, 373 U.S. 83. It does not mafter whether the favorable evidence is

exculpatory or impeaching. SeeUnitedStatesv. Bagley,473 U.S.667,676 (1985). "When the

'reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of
evidence affecting oedibility" requires a new trial. Giglio,405 U.S. at 153-54 (quoting Napue,
360 U.S. at 269). But a new trial is not automatically requhed when prosecutors fail to disclose

"evidence possibly useful to the defense but not likely to have changed the verdict. " 1d.

A successful Brady claim must show three essential elements: (1) the evidence was
favorable to the accused, (2) the evidence was withheld by the State, and (3) the withholding
prejudiced the accused. Strickler v. Greene,527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). To show prejudice, the
evidence must be material. In other words, the nondisclosure must be "so serious that there is a
reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict."

Id.; see also Banks v. Dretke,540 U.S. 668, 688 (2004) (explaining that, to satisry the materiality
requirement, a petitioner must show a "reasonable probability of a different result").
The materiality inquiry "is not a suffrciency of evidence test." Kyles e. lVhitley, 514U.5.

419,434 (1995). "The question is not whether [Petitioner] would more likely than not have
received a different verdict" if the letters were disclosed before trial, but whether she "received a

fair trial . . . resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." Id. Accordingly, a "'reasonable

probability' ofa different result" can be shown if the withheld evidence "undermines confidence
in the outcome of the tial." Id (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678)).

l9

iii.

Discussion

a.

Falsity and Favorability

Respondent argues that the state court reasonably rejected Petitioner's jailhouse-

informant claims because Petitioner failed to show that Brown's testimony was false. But
testimony, even "ifnot outright lies," may be considered false if it "conveyed [a] false
impression" to the jury that the witness had no expectation ofleniency or other motivation for

testirying. IJnited States v. Barham, 595 F .2d 231,24142 (sth Cn. 1979). And it does not matter
whether the prosecutor consciously solicited the false or misleading testimony or simply failed

to correct it. Id.
Notably, Respondent does not dispute that the lemers berween Briles, Brown, and Munk
were withheld from defense counsel. Nor do they dispute that the evidence was favorable.
Indeed, evidence that a govemment witness is seeking a sentence reduction in exchange for

testirying "provide[s] fertile grounds for impeachment." Uvukansi, 126 F.4th at 385.
Respondent instead emphasizes that, even with the letters, "nothing shows that a deal was in
fact in place with the Distdct Attorney's offrce at the time of [Petitioner's] trial." Dkt. No. 21 at

13. But even in the absence ofa "flrm promise," the State is required to disclose evidence ofa
witness's incentive to testiry. See Tassinv. Cain,5l7 F.3d770,778-80 (explaining that a
witness's expectation ofpotential favors in exchange for testimony need not be a "firm promise"

to triq;:er Brady, because "the cnrx of a Fourteenth Amendment violation is deception"); sea a/so
Bagley,473 U.S. at 683 (explaining that the "possibility of a reward" gave witnesses "a direct,
personal stake" in obtaining a conviction, and "[t]he fact that the stake was not guaranteed

through a promise or binding contract, but was expressly contingent on the Govemment's
satisfaction with the end result, served only to sffengthen any incentive to testiry falsely in order

to secure a conviction").

20

Thus, assuming that Brown's testimony was false and that the undisclosed letters were
favorable, the Court must consider whether the evidence was material-or whether a frnding

that the evidence was immaterial could have reasonably supported the state court's decision.

b.

Materiality

First, for Petitioner's false-testimony claim, the Court must determine whether there is
"any reasonable likelihood" that the false or misleading testimony could have affected the
judgment of the jury. Then, for Petitio ner's Brady claim, the Court must consider whether there
is a reasonable probability that disclosure ofthe letters would have produced a different result.

Ultimately, the Court must determine "whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree"
that a fmding of immateriality conflicts with Supreme Court precedent. Rbhter,562 U.S. at 102
Relief is not warranted unless the state court's conclusion was so wrong that there is no room
for disagreement. Id
Petitioner argues that Brown was the State's "star witness." Dkt. No. 26 at22. She
contends that "[t]ruly, the only glue that held together the State's case against Petitioner was

Brown," id. at 13, and that "Brown is the only person putthg [Petitioner] at the scene ofthe
crime," id. at 20. Thus, she argues that Brown's false testimony and the State's withholding of

"honibly damaging impeachment evidence" was clearly material. Id. at20,22.
Of course, "false credibility testimony may be material ." Uvukansi, 126 F .4th at 391

(citng Napue,360 U.S. at 269). But the fact that the false evidence only affects oedibilityrather than false inculpatory testimony-may be considered "as a factor in judging its

materiality." Id. And nothing forbids courts from considering whether the force of the false
testimony is "diminished by later testimony impeaching [the witness's] credibility." Id. Here,
there was other testimony impeaching Brown's oedibility. First, Brown herself testified that
before Petitioner's trial, she wrote a letter to Texas Ranger Bumey asking him to "keep his

2t

promise," Dkt. No. 15-18 at 110. Indeed, in the letter referenced by Petitioner's counsel,
Brown asked Ranger Bumey to "do what you agreed to do to help me."7 Dk. No. 15-24 at 48.
The letter and the potential promise were mentioned again by both the prosecutor and

Petitioner's counsel in closing arguments. Dkt. No. 15-20 at 60, 89-90.
The defense also impeached Brown's testimony with the testimony of another Alabama

jail inmate, Bella Cowan, who was housed on the same cellblock as Petitioner and Brown. Dlt.
No. 15- 19 at 9-57. Brown testified that Bella "came in during the conversation" while
Petitioner allegedly shared the details of the crime with Brown. Dkt. No. 15-18 at 100. But
Bella testifred that Brown was lying-she never walked in on any conversation between

Petitioner and Brown. Dkt. No. 15-19 at 14. Bella said that no such conversation would not
have happened because she "warned" Petitioner about Brown when she came into the jarl. Id.

at 14 & 46. Bel1a explained that Brown was known in the Alabama jail for "ear hustling"-that
she was "very nosy," id. at 46, and "liked to try to find out things about your case," id at 1 1.
She also described how Brown "would call her folk on the phone and she would ask them to

google" to frnd out information about other inmate's cases. Id. at 14. Bella testified that if she
had heard any ofthe information about Petitioner's case that Brown says she heard, she would
have "gone to the authorities" to "get a deal." Id. at 24, 31 . So, Bella speculated that Brown

"may have ear-hustled on some things that [Petitioner] and I talked about and concocted her
own little version of events." Id. at49.
Despite Petitioner's framing of the importance of Brown's testimony, the record does not
depict her as the State's star witness. During the trial, Munk emphasized that "[t]here would

Although Petitioner's counsel refened to the letter, and Brown conFrmed both that she wrote the lefter
and that she asked Burney to keep his promise, the letter was not admitted at Petitioner's trial. Sre Dkt.
No. 15-18 at 116-17.
7

22

have been a case with or without Angie Brown's testimony." Dkt. No. 15-20 at 89. In his

closing argument, he asked thejury to consider ali the evidence together. Id at 81-82. Munk
also addressed Brown's credibility. He recognized that the defense was "trying to discredit Ms.

Brown's testimony by saying it's a complete fabrication or she was ear-hustling or she heard
about this in the Shelby County news." Id. at85. And he acknowledged the implication that

"Brown's testimony is less credible because possibly detectives might have suggested a deal."
Id. at89-90. Munk asked "what difference does it make whether a deal was offered?" He
focused his argument on the consistent details across Brown's inculpatory testimony and other

evidence in the record, including the statements ofPetitioner's codefendant and other witnesses.

And although there is no reasoned state-court opinion addressing Petitioner's habeas
claims, the opinion ofthe Eleventh Coun ofAppeals on Petitioner's dkect appeal also provides
some helpful insight. Specifically, the appellate court found that even "excluding Brown's

testimony, the evidence . . . tended to connect [Petitioner] to the murders." Dkt. No. 15-3 at 7.
The court then summarized the other evidence:

[W]hen we read the entire transcripts of the jail phone calls berween
Rollie and Appellant, we find that there was a good bit of testimony
that showed Appellant's agitation over the nonpayment of the
money, in addition to anger over the sale of "my diamond. "
Appellant lived with Allen for a time and would have been fami.liar
with his paranoia, his safe, and his surveillance equipment.
Appellant could not be excluded as a contributor of DNA to the
meth pipe that was purposefully placed in Doyal's hands after he
was dead. Appellant and Rollie had lived together and were the
parents of a young boy. There was testimony that "Rollie's
Desirae" was the fourth person involved in the killings and that she
was the one to gain access to Allen's house on the date of the
murders. The only other "Desirae" connected to Appellant was
Desirae Reyna, and she was in jail on the date that the murders took
place. Appellant had reservations to retum to Texas from Alabama
the day after an arrest warrant was issued for her in Texas. After the
Texas wanant was issued, Appellant canceled that retum flight.

23

/d Notably, the Eleventh Court underscored that they were not reviewing the record for
suffrciency ofthe evidence. Id Rather, they were considering the effect, if any, of the omission

of a jury instruction on corroboration of jailhouse-informant testimony. Ultimately, the
appellate court found that "because ofthe corroborating evidence in the record," the failure to

instnrct the jury on corroboration "likely had very minimal effect on the verdict. " Id. at 8.
In light ofthe record, the state court could have reasonably determined that the false

oedibiliry evidence was immaterial. The force of the false testimony is diminished by the
introduction of other impeachment evidence. The jury heard other evidence suggesting that
Brown was expecting help from the Texas Rangers. And it heard testimony that Brown was

untrusfworthy-that she often searched for information about other inmates' cases to leverage.
There was also other impeachment evidence-con$adicting her claim that Bella witnessed part

of the conversation between Petitioner and Brown. And the TCCA could have reasonably
determined, like the Eleventh Court of Appeals did, that even "excluding Brown's testimony,"
the evidence . . . tended to connect [Petitioner] to the murders." Dkt. No. 15-3 at 7.

After hearing the evidence, the jury could have determined that Brown was qedible
despite the evidence of Brown's potential motive for testirying and other impeachment evidence
because, as argued by Munk, the details in her statement were largely consistent with the other

evidence in the case. Or the jury might have determined, based on the other impeachment
evidence before them, that Brown was not credible but convicted Petitioner on the totality of
other evidence connecing her to the murders. Either way, the TCCA could have reasonably
concluded that, in light ofthe impeachment evidence introduced at trial, and the other evidence
connecting Petitioner to the murders, there was no reasonable likelihood that the false testimony

could have moved the needle enough to affect the judgment of the jury.

l+

Likewise, the state court could have reasonably determined that the withheld letters were
not material for purposes of Petitioner's Brady clarm. The suppressed letters show only that
Brown was expecting or hoping for favorable ueatment. They do not establish that Munk made
any promises, agreements, or even responded to Brown's requests. Brown's testimony may
have been false even without a fum agreement in place, but the fact that her expectation was

one-sided affects the weight of the evidence. As a whole, the letters show that Browa asked

both the Texas Rangers and Munk to contact the U.S. Attomey on her behalf. And as discussed
above, the jury heard about Brown's potential deal with the Texas Rangers. The fact that she
also asked Munk for his help in seeking a sentence reduction does not tip the scale all that

much. In light ofthe totaliry ofthe evidence, as discussed above, the TCCA could have
reasonably determined that there is not a reasonable probability that the suppressed letters

would have produced a different verdict. In other words, the content ofthe letters and their
nondisclosure are not so egregious that they undermine confidence in the verdict.

In sum, fairminded jurists could reasonably find that the evidence was immaterial
without conflicting with established Supreme Court precedent. Richter,562 U.S. at 102. "lt
bears repeating that even a sffong case for reliefdoes not mean the state court's contrary

conclusion was unreasonable. " 1d. Petitioner has not pointed to any Supreme Court case
reaching the opposite conclusion on a set of matedally indistinguishable facts, and the Court has

found none.
This case is distinguishable from Napue, where the State's star witness-a codefendant
by the name of Hamer-falsely testified that nobody promised to help him get a sentence

reduction ifhe testified. Napue,360 U.S. 264. In fact, the prosecutor had promised to
recommend a sentence reduction for Hamer in exchange for his testimony. The Supreme Court
described Hamer's testimony as "extremely impotant" because of the passage of time and the

a<

unavailability ofother witnesses. So, the evidence against Napue "consisted largely" of
Hamer's testimony. Hamer admitted that a public defender had offered to do what he could to
help, but the Supreme Court found that this insignificant admission did not render his false

testimony immaterial-had the jury known that the prosecutor had cut a deal with him, it

would have "put the testimony in a substantially different light. " .9ee Uvukansi, 126 F .4th at 391
(discussing Napre).

Here, il contrast, multiple facts lead the Court to the opposite conclusion. First,

Brown's testimony was not the sole-or even the primary-evidence connecting Petitioner to
the crime. Brown's statement was corroborated by statements of Petitioner's codefendant, Juan

Castillo, and supported by physical evidence at the scene, including her DNA on the meth pipe

intentionally positioned in one of the victims' hands after the killings. Moreover, her recorded
phone calls provided motive and context, and her preliminary attempt to disable the victim's
cameras with Dan Dan aiso connect her to the crime. Additionally, the false evidence is

substantially less forceful here. The undisclosed letters establish only that Brown asked the
prosecutor to help her get a sentence reduction-not that he had agreed to do so. And the jury
heard evidence suggesting that other agents of the State-the Texas Rangers-had promised to
help her. Finally, there was other impeachment evidence, including the testimony of a different
inmate that conhadicted parts of Brown's statement and described her reputation for "ear

hustling" to try to get a deal for herself. Given that Brown's testimony was less important to the
State's overall case against Petitioner, and her false testimony less forceful than that rn Napue,

the Court cannot fault the state court for reaching a different conclusion.

Newer case law also supports the Court's analysis. The Supreme Court recently granted
habeas relief based on egregious-and admitted-violations of Napue and Brady. Glossip v.

(Feb. 25,2025). There, the State withheld eight

Oklahoma,604 U.S.

-,2025WL594736
26

boxes of evidence showing that its primary witness suffered from bipolar disorder, for which he
was prescribed lithium. The State then failed to correct the witness's false trial testimony that he

had never seen a psychiatrist and had been inadvertently given lithium instead ofcold medicine.
Because the witness's testimony was the only direct evidence of the Glossip's guilt, the jury's
assessment of his oedibility was "necessarily determinative"-"no other witness and no

physical evidence established" Glossip's guilt. Moreover, the undisclosed evidence directly

undermined other components ofthe State's case, including its repeated theory that the witness
was harmless on his own and only participated in the killing at Glossip's direction.

Again, Petitioner's case is easily distinguishable from the egregious, material, and
admitted violations described n Glossip. Brown did not supply the only evidence ofPetitioner's

guilt. As the Eleventh Court found, even excluding Brown's testimony, there was ample other
evidence in the record connecting Petitioner to the murders. As a result, the jury's

determination of Petitioner's guilt did not depend on Brown's oedibility.

Finally, although not determinative here, the Court finds recent new Fifth Circuit cases
instructive. Last week, a split panel ofthe Fifth Circuit granted habeas relief in a capital murder
case after finding that the State "failed to disclose impeachment evidence that its oitical ffial

witness was a paid informant." Holberg v. Guerero, No. 21-10010, slip op. at 1 (5th Cir. Mar. 7,

2025). In that case, it was undisputed that Holberg killed the victim-the only issue was
whether she killed him in self-defense or whether she kilied him callously while robbing him.

Id. The informant's testimony was the State's only testimonial account of the violent encounter
and the only evidence suggesting that Holberg "took pleasure in the gruesome act.

" It also

reinforced the State's robbery theory-that Holberg killed the victim to get his money and to get

drugs. The informant's testimony provided the primary basis for the penalry-phase finding of
furure dangerousness required to impose the death penalry. In short, Holberg's trial hinged on

27

the informant's oedibility, and without the suppressed evidence, the defense had nothing with

which to impeach her. The majority concluded that, on the record ofthat case, and in light of
the informant's role as a key witness who supplied direct evidence of the robbery element of the

capital murder offense, "there is no sound theory . . . to suppon the conclusion that [the
suppressed evidencel did not reasonably affect Holberg's trial."

Once again, Petitioner's case is immediately distinguishable because Brown's testimony
was corroborated by a range ofother evidence in the record-she did not provide the sole basis

for any element of Petitioner's conviction. She was not the State's key witness. And the jury
heard other evidence diminishing Brown's credibility, including evidence of her potential

motivation for testiSing. The facts in Petitioner's case are nowhere near as extreme as those
depicted in Holberg, and the testimony of the informant was not nearly as important.

In another capital murder case, Uvukansi, 126F.4rh 382, the sole identification witness
falsely testified that he had no agreement with ptosecutors regarding his testimony, when in
fact, he did have an agreement. There, the Fifth Circuit found that the witness's testimony was

"[u]ndoubtedly . . . critical to the State's case." Id. at 385. But because the jury heard about
parts ofthe agreement from another witness, the state court was not unreasonable in concluding

that the false evidence was immaterial. Here, similarly, a finding of immaterialiry reasonably
supports the state court's rejection of Petitioner's claims because the jury heard other evidence
suggesting that Brown hoped to get a deal from her testimony.
These cases underscore the balance between "the necessity ofensuring fair andjust

trials," Weaver v. Mass.,582 U.S. 286, 305 (2017), and the "principles of comity, finality, and
federalism" that prevent federal courts from disrupting state-cout judgments except in the most
egregious cases. ,See []vukansi, 126 F.4th at 392. This is not such an extreme case. It is not

"'beyond the realm of possibility that a fairminded jurist could' agtee with the state court."

28

Longleyv. Prince,926 F.3d 145, 156 (sth Cir. 2019) (quoting Woodsv. Ethmon, 578 U.S. 113, 117

(2016)). The state court could have reasonably determined that Petitioner received a fair trial,
resulting in a verdict worthy ofconfidence.
Stated differently, the TCCA's summary denial of Petitioner's false-evidence and

withheld-evidence claims was not "so lacking in justification that there was an error well
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.

" /d It is possible that fairminded jurists could disagree about whether the

evidence was material. But under Section 2254, the Court cannot disturb a state-court judgment

ifthere is any room for disagreement. In other words, because it is debatable, relief under
Sect.ion 2254 is precluded. Richter,562 U.S. at 103. As a result, Petitioner is not entitled to

habeas relief on these grounds.

C.

Petitioner failed to overcome the doubly deferential AEDPA standard on her
ineffective-assistance-of-couasel (IAC) claims.

Finally, in her thtd ground for reliel Petitioner argues that her trial attomey was
constitutionally ineffective because he failed to (1) investigate a viable altemative suspect, and
(2) request a mandatory jury instruoion.
The well-known standard applicable to IAC claims is set out in Strickland v. Washington,

466U.S.668,689 (1984). Under the two-pronged Strickland test, a petitioner must show that
counsel's performance was both deficient and prejudicial. Id. at 687 . An attomey's
performance was deficient if the attorney made errors so serious that the attomey was not

functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Id. That is,
counsel's performance must have fallen below the standards ofreasonably competent
representation as determined by the norms of the profession.

A reviewing court's scnrtiny oftrial counsel's performance is highly deferential, with a
strong presumption that counsel's performance falls within the wide range of reasonable
29

professional assistance. Id. at 689. A strong presumption exists "that trial counsel rendered
adequate assistance and that the challenged conduct was reasoned trial strategy.

" Ililkmon v.

Collins,950 F.2d 1054, 1065 (5th Cir. 1992)(citingSt/ickland,466U.S. at694).

Additionally, a petitioner must show that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. To establish this prong, a petitioner must show that counsei's erors were so serious as

to deprive petitioner of a fair trial. Strickland,466 U.S. at 687. Speci-fically, a petitioner must
show "(1) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
ultimate result ofthe proceeding would have been different. . . and (2) counsel's deficient
performance rendered the trial fundamentally unfair." Creelr Johnson, 162 F.3d385,395 (5th

Cir. 1998). "Unreliability or unfairness does not result ifthe ineffectiveness ofcounsel does not
deprive the defendant ofany substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles him."
Lockhart v. Frerwell,506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). This is a heavy burden that requires a

"substantial," and notjust a "conceivable," likelihood ofa different res'uJt. Richter,562 U.S. at

ll2; see also Pinhokto,563 U.S. at 189.
In the context ofSection 2254(d), the deferential standard that must be given to counsel's
representation must also be considered in tandem with the deference that must be given to state-

court decisions, which has been called "doubly" deferential. Richter,562 U.S. at 105. "When $
2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is
whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied St/ickland s deferential
standard. " Id. Additionally, if a petitioner fails to show either the deficiency or prejudice prong

of the Snickland test, then the Court need not consider the other prong. Strickland,466 U.S. at
697.

30

i.

Alternative suspect

First, Petitioner claims that her counsel was ineffective when he failed to investigate an
alternative suspect. Dkt. No. 26 at 30-32. She points to the affrdavit prepared by Petitioner's

trial counsel. In it, counsel asserts that in his initial meeting with Petitioner, she told him that
the night of the murders, or early the next moming, her codefendant Nicodemes Sosa (Dan

Dan) came to her house with another man, and the two men argued over something. Dkt. No.
15-24 at 66. Petitioner also asserts that her counsel received discovery including DNA reports

from various items found at the crime scene. Dkt. No. 26 at 31. She claims that one of those
reports named Jerry Castillo8 as a contributor to DNA found on a lighter at the victim's house.

Petitioner contends that gial counsel should have connected the dots and investigated whether
Jerry Castillo is the man who argued with Sosa at Petitioner's house.
She explains that Petitioner's codefendant Bobby Ruiz's trial team did just that. Ruiz

hired an investigator, who found Jerry Castillo and talked to him. Ruiz also requested more

DNA testing, which confirmed that Jerry's DNA was on multiple items at the crime scene.
Ruiz's uial team developed a theory that Dan Dan and Jerry committed the murders, and
Petitioner, Ruiz, and Juan Castillo were not there. .!ee Dkt. No. 15-24 at76-78. Petitioner
claims that ifher trial counsel had investigated like Ruiz's attorneys did, she would have been
able to offer the jury a viable altemative story to undermine the State's narative. She argues

that counsel's failure to investigate was deficient and that the outcome ofher trial would have
been different absent counsel's failure to investigate.

The Supreme Court has recognized that "counsel has a duty to make reasonable
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations

8It appears that Jerry Castrllo is not related to Petitioner's codefendant, Juan Castillo. Sea Dkt. No. 1524 at 75.

3l

unnecessary." St/ickland,466 U.S. at 691. But the reasonableness ofcounsel's investigation
decisions depends substantially on the information provided by the defendant. Id. 'Defense
counsel is not required 'to investigate everyone whose name happens to be mentioned by the

defendant."' Schwander v. Blackbum,750 F.2d 494,500 (5th Ct. 1985) (quoting United States v.
Cockrett, 720 F.2d 1423, 1428 (5th Cn. 1983).

Petitioner has not shown that the TCCA's rejection of this claim was unreasonable.
Here, trial counsel represented that Petitioner gave him very little information about the mystery
man who came to her house and argued with Sosa. Dkt. No. 15-24 at66. Not only did

Petitioner not know the identity ofthe other man, but she reportedly did not know any details
about the men's argument. /d Petitioner's counsel explains that he learned of the
codefendant's mysterious argument with the unknown man during his initial meeting with

Petitioner, early in the case. Id. And, at the time, he knew that the police were looking into a
different suspect, Thomas May, who was later ruled out. 1d. With so little information to go
on, it is unsurprising that counsel opted to chase down other leads instead.e

Nor is it unreasonable that counsel allegedly failed to follow up on a DNA report
identi$ing Jerry Castillo as a possible contributor to DNA found in the victim's house. As
detailed above, this case centers on a subculture of drug users and criminals in Seminole, Texas.

Petitioner's DNA was found on the meth pipe placed in one of the victim's hands. Her
codefendant Bobby Ruiz's DNA was found on a lighter, along with the DNA of three other

individuals.r0 The presence of DNA from other known criminals or drug users on drug
paraphernalia found at the victim's house was not surprising.

For example, trial counsel investigated to identiff the other inmate mentioned in Brown's statementand her testimony at trial helped impeach Brown's otherwise damaging statement. Ser Dkt. No. l5-20
at 73-74.
e

t0 See Ruiz v. Srarr, No. I l - 18-00267-CR, 631 S.W.3d 841

32

, 848 (Tex.App.-Eastland, 2021)

Finally, the Court is mindful of the Supreme Court's dhective that "a fair assessment of
attomey performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight, to reconstruct the ckcumstances ofcounsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the
conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Strickland,466 U.S. at 669. The affrdavit of

Ruiz's investigator makes clear that he zeroed in on Jerry Castillo based on information leamed
after Petitioner's trial, not from any DNA report provided in discovery or from any vague

mention of a mysterious argument with an unknown man. Dkt. No. 15-24 ai74. lrctead,
Ruiz's investigator had something that Petitioner's afforney did not-the statement of
Nicodemes Sosa (Dan Dan), given to his attorneys after he pled guilty in the double homicide.

But that statement did not exist when Petitioner's attomey was preparing for her trial. Counsel
need not be clairvoyant to be effective. Based on the scant information available to Petitioner's

counsel during his investigation ofher case, his failure to identi$ and investigate Jerry Castillo
as an alternative suspect was not constitutionally def,rcient.

ii.

Jury instruction

Second, Petitioner claims that her counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury

instruction on corroboration ofjailhouse-informant testimony. Texas law requLes that
jailhouse-informant testimony be corroborated by other evidence connecting the defendant with
the offense committed. Dkt. No. 25-3 at34 (citing Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 38.075). The

Eleventh Court ofAppeals determined that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury in
accordance with this law.

Id Likewise, the Court assumes that counsel's failure to request the

mandatory instruction was deficient. Counsel admits as much in his affidavit. Dkt. No. 15-24

at7l.
But Petitioner cannot show that she was prejudiced by counsel's failure. As explained
by the Eleventh Court ofAppeals, because there was plenty of corroborating evidence, "the

33

omission of the instruction on co[oboration 'likely had a very minimal effect' on the verdict.
The omission . . . did not affect the very basis of this case, deprive [Petitioner] ofa valuable

right, or vitally affect a defensive theory." Dkt. No. 15-3 at 8 (intemal citation omitted). For
the same reason, the state court could have reasonably determined that Petitioner was not
prejudiced by counsel's failure to request the instruction.

In sum, there are reasonable arguments to support a finding that counsel satisf,ied
Strickland's requhements. Giving appropriate deference both to counsel's performance and the
state court'decision, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to reliefon her IAC

claims.

D.

Petitioner has not overcome Brecfrr's harmless-eror standard.

On top of analyzing a petitioner's claims under the difficult, deferential AEDPA
standard, "where Brecht is implicated a federal court must also ensure a habeas petitioner has
carried his burden under its terms." Brown,596 U.S. at 127 (2022).tt A1l of Petitioner's
substantive habeas claims requied the Court to determine the effect, if any, ofthe alleged errors
on the jury's verdict. Petltioner has failed to identi$ any enor that had a substantial and

injurious effect on the outcome. Indeed, Petitioner relies considerably on evidence discovered
by her codefendant, Bobby Ruiz's attomeys. The record establishes that Petitioner and Ruiz's
defenses were aligned-under any theory presented, either they both participated in the

murders, or neither of them was present. Dkt. No. 15-24 at70; see also Rur, 631 S.W.3d 841.

Petitioner even asks the Court to take judicial notice ofthe transcript of Ruiz's trial.

Dkt. No. 26 at3l. But although Petitioner cites Ruiz's transcript, she did not provide a full
r1 Harmless-error analysis under Brecir is unnecessary where the more demanding "reasonable
probabiliry" standard applies, such as with Brady claims and IAC claims under Stickland. Kyles, 514 U .5.
at 435-36. But it may be appropriate to condtct a Brecht review of claims analyzed under the "reasonable
likelihood" standard for materiality . See Baffientos v. Johnson, 221 F .3d 741, 756-57 (5th Cir. 2000).
Because the Coun analyzed P etitioner's Napue and Giglio clatm under the reasonable-likelihood standard,
it now discusses Brecht outof an abundance ofcaution.

34

copy of the transoipt to the Court. The record here contains only a few short excerpts from

Ruiz's trial transcript, which were included with Petitioner's state habeas application. Under
Federal Rule ofEvidence 201, "[t]he court . . . must take judicial notice ifa party requests it and
the court is supplied with the necessary information. " Petitioner has not supplied the Court

with the necessary information here, so the Coun must deny her request for judicial notice of
Ruiz's trial transoipt. The Court can, however, judicially notice "fao[s] . . . not subject to
reasonable dispute because [they] . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid.20l(b)(2). Accordingly, the

Court takes judicial notice of the Eleventh Court ofAppeals' published opinion on Ruiz's direct
appeal. Ruizt..Stara, No. t 1-18-00267-CR, 631 S.W.3d 841 (Tex.App.-Eastland, 2021).
Ruiz's attomeys had the letters between Brown, Briles, and Munk. They questioned
Brown at length about the letters. Dkt. No. 15-32 ar3740. And Brown admitted during Ruiz's

trial that she was "stil1 trying to get a deal for what [she] sent them in on Dez Mata." Dkt. No.
15-32 at 37 . Ruiz's trial team also found Jerry Castillo and talked with him, developing a theory

that he and Sosa committed the murders without any participation from Ruiz, Petitioner, or
Juan Castillo.12 But like Petitioner, Ruiz was convicted by a jury oftwo counts ofcapital

murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Ruiz,631 S.W.3d at 847.
Petitioner essentially argues that her trial was unfair because Brown testified falsely, she didn't
have the letters between Brown, Briles, and Munk to impeach Brown's testimony, and her

counsel failed to find and interview Jerry Castillo. So she asks to be granted a new trial, with

r2

Ultimately, Jerry exercised his right against self-incrimination and refused to testiry in Ruiz's tnal

Ruiz, 631 S.W.3d at 857-58. Although Ruiz's investigator testified, the rial court excluded the
substance of Jerry's statement to Ruiz's investigator as hearsay. /d

35

access to aU the information that Ruiz's attorneys had.rr But even without the alleged Brady,

Napue, and Strickland violations, Ruiz ended up with the same outcome as Petitioner. For these
reasons, and those explained above, Petitioner has failed to show that any these alleged errors

had a substantial or injurious effect on the jury's verdict in her case.

4,

Conclusion
In sum, Petitioner's state-process claims are contradicted by the record and, in any event,

not cognizable under Section 2254. As to the remainder of her claims, Petitioner has failed to
show that the state-couft's adjudication resulted in a decision conffary to clearly established
federal law or resulted in a decision based on an urueasonable determination ofthe facts in light

ofthe evidence presented in the state court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d). Petitioner has
also failed to identiff any error that had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdr9' Brecht,
507 U.S. at 622. For these reasons, the Court denies the petition and dismisses this civil action

with prejudice.
The Court recognizes that fairminded jurists could find this Court's assessment of

materiality, as it relates to Petitioner's claims under Brady, Napue, ard Giglio, debatable or

wrong. Thus, the Court grants Petitioner a certificate of appealability on these claims, (Grounds
One and Four), under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and 28 U.S.C.
$ 2253(c). The Coun denies Petitioner a cefiificate of appealability on her other claims because

she has failed to show that reasonable jurists would (1) f,rnd this Court's "assessment ofthe

constitutional claims debatable or wrong," or (2) fhd "it debatable whether the petition states a
valid claim ofthe denial of a constitutional right" and "debatable whether [this Court] was
correct in its procedural ruling." Slackv. McDaniel,529 U.S. 473,484(2000).

Ruiz's trial team also argued for the conoboration instruction, but the state court determined that the
instruction did not apply to Brown's testimony in Ruiz's case because he was not the one who made a
statement against interest to her rn the jail facrliry. Ruk,631 S.W.3dat854.
13

36

So ordered.

The Court will enter judgrnent accordingly.

purr6yughl?-,2025.

A^
S WESLEY

U

37

RIX

States District Judge