Royal v. Scurry County et al

Filing 75

AMENDED ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND OVERRULING THE PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS: The Court overrules the plaintiff's objections (Dkt. No. 68) and adopts the FCR (Dkt. No. 65) as the findin gs of this Court. Accordingly, the Court grants the City and Chief Haggard's motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 51) and dismisses with prejudice the plaintiff's claims against the City and Chief Haggard. In addition, the Court denies as moot the City and Chief Haggards motion for a protective order to stay discovery (Dkt. No. 53). (Ordered by Judge James Wesley Hendrix on 3/5/2025) (bdg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUBBOCK DIVISION
ROMAN ANGELO ROYAL,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 5:23-CV-214-H-BV

SCURRY COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
AMENDED ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS,
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MAGISTRATE
JUDGE AND OVERRULING THE PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS
Before the Court are the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations (FCR) of
United States Magistrate Judge Amanda ‘Amy’ R. Burch (Dkt. No. 65) and the plaintiff’s
objections (Dkt. No. 68). Judge Burch recommends granting the motion to dismiss (Dkt.
No. 51) filed by the City of Snyder and Chief Haggard under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) because Royal has failed to adequately plead facts sufficient to support
his claims, and the excessive-force claim against Chief Haggard was brought in the wrong
capacity. Dkt. No. 65 at 2. The plaintiff timely filed objections to the FCR. Dkt. No. 68.
The Court overrules the plaintiff’s objections and adopts the FCR in full. The
plaintiff has failed to adequately plead any claim against Chief Haggard in his individual
capacity. Further, the plaintiff’s complaint lacks sufficient factual matter to support his
municipal-liability claim or his claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and
the Rehabilitation Act (RA).1

1

“The language in the ADA generally tracks the language set forth in the RA.” Delano-Pyle v.
Victoria County, 302 F.3d 567, 574 (5th Cir. 2002). As a result, “[j]urisprudence interpreting either
section is applicable to both.” Id. (citation omitted). The Court therefore refers throughout this
Order only to the ADA, but the analysis applies to both the ADA and the RA equally.

1.

Factual and Procedural Background
In evaluating the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true the

relevant facts alleged in Royal’s third amended complaint, as it must at this procedural
stage. See Richardson v. Axion Logistics, LLC, 780 F.3d 304, 306 (5th Cir. 2015). Royal has
paranoid schizophrenia. Dkt. No. 45 at 23. Royal had an outstanding misdemeanor
warrant issued by Mitchell County, Texas. Id. at 3, 7. In November 2022, officers in the
Snyder Police Department located his vehicle and conducted a traffic stop. Id. at 3, 4.
Department officers attempted to verify Royal’s identity, but Royal “did not wish to be
identified [or] cooperate.” Id. at 4. After nearly 40 minutes, in an attempt to get Royal out
of the vehicle, an officer struck a hole in the driver’s side window with a baton and stuck his
hand through the glass, pepper-spraying Royal. Id. Royal did not exit the vehicle and
instead pressed the gas pedal and escaped (the daytime evading). Id. The then-police chief,
Chief Haggard, began shooting at the vehicle as it left the scene. Id. at 7.
Royal evaded officers for several hours. Id. at 9. Meanwhile, Chief Haggard ordered
a helicopter to search for Royal. Id. at 6. Officers located Royal in “a large tractor,” which
Royal had driven “into the middle of a large moat” on another person’s land (the nighttime
evading). Id. at 8–9. Officers shot at the tractor using “glass-breaker bullets” or “rubber
bullets,” during which Royal lost a tooth “despite the fact he had his hands up.” Id.
Officers ordered Royal to exit the tractor and swim to the shore. Id. at 8. Once officers
detained Royal, they sent him to a local hospital for care. Id.
Royal was charged with three counts of aggravated assault of a peace officer and two
counts of evading arrest stemming from each of the daytime evading and the nighttime

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evading. Id. at 4, 7. Royal was convicted of the daytime-evading charge, and the nighttimeevading charge was dismissed. Id.
Royal brought suit against the City of Snyder and Chief Haggard2 for (1) failure to
accommodate and disability discrimination under the ADA, and (2) excessive use of force
and municipal liability for maintenance of unconstitutional policies and failure to train, in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Dkt. No. 45. The ADA
claim was brought against Chief Haggard in both his official and individual capacities,
while the excessive-force and municipal-liability claims were brought against Chief Haggard
in only his official capacity. See id. at 25, 27. The City and Chief Haggard moved to dismiss
Royal’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Dkt. No. 51. Judge Burch entered an FCR
recommending that the Court grant the City and Chief Haggard’s motion to dismiss
because: (1) the plaintiff has not pled facts adequate to establish a plausible claim for relief
under the ADA; (2) the plaintiff’s claim of municipal liability is conclusory and devoid of
factual support; and (3) the plaintiff has failed to plead an excessive-force claim against
Chief Haggard in his individual capacity. Dkt. No. 65 at 2. Royal filed objections to the
FCR within 14 days. See Dkt. No. 68.
2.

Legal Standards
A.

Review of the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendations

When a party files objections to a Magistrate Judge’s recommendations, the Court
must review those objected-to portions de novo. Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, S.A. de C.V.,
22 F.3d 634, 646 (5th Cir. 1994); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, as for portions where no

2

Royal also brought claims against Scurry County and the Scurry County jail (see Dkt. No. 45), but
those entities are not parties to the instant motion to dismiss. See Dkt. No. 51.

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specific objections are filed within the 14-day period, the Court reviews the Magistrate
Judge’s findings and recommendations only for plain error. Serrano v. Customs & Border
Patrol, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 975 F.3d 488, 502 (5th Cir. 2020).
B.

Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Therefore, a plaintiff must allege
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). A plaintiff’s claim “has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This “plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). If a complaint “pleads facts that are
‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility
and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Defendants can challenge the sufficiency of a complaint through a motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In resolving a motion to dismiss, a court
must “accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view those facts in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff.” Richardson v. Axion Logistics, LLC, 780 F.3d 304, 306 (5th Cir. 2015) (cleaned
up) (quoting Bustos v. Martini Club, Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010)). However, this
tenet does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Further, “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice.” Id.

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3.

Analysis
A.

The Court has found no plain error in the unobjected-to portions of the
FCR and thus adopts those portions of the FCR.

The FCR determined that because Royal has brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against both the City and Chief Haggard in his official capacity, the official-capacity claims
are redundant and should be dismissed. Dkt. No. 65 at 10. The FCR also concluded that
Royal’s excessive-force claim fails against Chief Haggard for the same reason, and the
excessive-force claim against the City fails because a city is not liable under section 1983
under a respondeat-superior theory. Id. at 11–12. Finally, the Magistrate Judge declined to
consider Royal’s untimely filed exhibits in support of his objection to the motion to dismiss
because the exhibits presented were not central to his claims and therefore not properly
considered on a motion to dismiss. Id. at 8–9.
Royal appears to agree that the official-capacity claims against Chief Haggard were
properly dismissed, stating in his objections that “[m]oreover, admitted, Royal has sued
Haggard in the wrong capacity, to the extent he intends to assert an excessive force claim
against Haggard personally. Plaintiff has no objection thereto [sic].” Dkt. No. 68 at 6. In
any case, Royal did not specifically object to any of these portions of the FCR. See generally
id.
The Court has reviewed these unobjected-to portions of the FCR for plain error.
Finding none, the Court accepts and adopts those portions of the FCR.
B.

Royal fails to state a municipal-liability claim.

“To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) an
official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force
behind the violation of a constitutional right.” Trammell v. Fruge, 868 F.3d 332, 344 (5th Cir.

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2017) (quoting Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009)). “To proceed
beyond the pleading stage, a complaint’s description of a policy or custom and its
relationship to the underlying constitutional violation . . . cannot be conclusory; it must
contain specific facts.” Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 622 (5th Cir. 2018)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (ellipses original). The FCR recommends dismissal of
the municipal-liability claim as against the City and Chief Haggard because Royal has failed
to plausibly allege that there was any practice or policy that can form the basis of Royal’s
municipal-liability claim. See Dkt. No. 65 at 16–23.
First, Royal presents various “objections” that merely recite—nearly verbatim but for
minor, insignificant wording and formatting changes—large portions of the FCR. Compare
Dkt. No. 65 at 12–13, 15, with Dkt. No. 68 at 15–16; compare Dkt. No. 65 at 13–14, with
Dkt. No. 68 at 16–17; compare Dkt. No. 65 at 14–15, with Dkt. No. 68 at 17–18; compare
Dkt. No. 65 at 19–20, with Dkt. No. 68 at 20–21. However, an objection must be
“sufficiently specific to put the district court on notice of the urged error.” Williams v. K & B
Equipment Co., 724 F.2d 508, 511 (5th Cir. 1984). Thus, “[f]rivolous, conclusive[,] or
general objections need not be considered by the district court.” Battle v. U.S. Parole
Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410
n.8 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc)). These “objections” by Royal merely inform the Court that
Royal disagrees with some unspecified finding or conclusion within each section recited by
Royal. They do not put the Court on notice of the specific error that Royal urges. See
Williams, 724 F.2d at 511. The Court therefore overrules those “objections” because they
merely repeat the portions of the FCR with which Royal disagrees rather than explaining
the basis of Royal’s objection.

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Next, Royal does raise disagreements going beyond recitation of the FCR that
contest the FCR’s determination that Royal failed to state a municipal-liability claim based
on either an unconstitutional policy or a failure to train. However, even construing those
disagreements as objections and conducting de novo review, the Court overrules each
objection.
i.

Royal’s objection that he has stated a claim based on the
single-decision exception or ratification are overruled.

For a municipal-liability clam, the plaintiff must ultimately show that the
municipality’s policy either is itself unconstitutional or was “‘adopted with deliberate
indifference to the known or obvious fact’ that a specific constitutional violation would
follow.” Liggins v. Duncanville, 52 F.4th 953, 955 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Webb v. Town of
Saint Joseph, 925 F.3d 209, 219 (5th Cir. 2019)). A “policy can be shown through evidence
of an actual policy, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by
lawmakers or others with policymaking authority.” Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536,
542 (5th Cir. 2010). In addition, the plaintiff may show that there is a “persistent,
widespread practice of [municipal] officials or employees” that “is so common and
well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.” Piotrowski v.
City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Webster v. City of Houston, 735
F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984)). Finally, a single incident or decision may satisfy the
deliberate-indifference standard where the constitutional harm was a “plainly obvious
consequence of the actor’s single decision.” Liggins, 52 F.4th at 955. The FCR
recommends dismissal because Royal has failed to (1) allege a widespread practice of using
excessive force, (2) plead facts supporting the single-decision exception, and (3) allege that
the City ratified an extreme use of excessive force. Dkt. No. 65 at 17–20.

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Regarding widespread practice, the FCR determined that Royal failed to identify any
such practice based on two dissimilar incidents in which the City allegedly used excessive
force. See Dkt. No. 65 at 17. Royal does not contest this determination and, in fact, agrees
that his municipal-liability claim “derive[s] from an isolated incident.” Dkt. No. 68 at 18.
Having reviewed the widespread-practice finding for plain error and finding none, the Court
adopts the FCR’s findings and conclusions on that issue.
Regarding the single-decision exception, Royal objects that “[e]vidence exists that
shooting at suspect and directing officers to light him up could be construed as a deliberate
indifference [sic].” Dkt. No. 68 at 19. Royal further asserts that he “was no imminent
threat to others,” that he “was unarmed,” and that “[n]o exigent circumstances existed to
justify helicopters and glass breaker bullets.” Id. As the FCR thoroughly addressed, when
officers must make quick decisions regarding how to intervene with an individual acting
erratically and endangering himself—for example, shooting an unarmed suspect suffering a
“mental breakdown” when he reached for a cell phone—the officers’ actions do not
“evidence an intentional ignorance of all the associated risks” sufficient for a
municipal-liability claim to survive dismissal. Liggins, 52 F.4th at 954, 956. Here, even
accepting that Royal was unarmed, Royal had fled the scene of an immediately prior arrest,
used his vehicle to commit aggravated assault against a police officer, stolen a tractor and
driven it into a moat, and repeatedly denied police orders. See Dkt. No. 65 at 18. Royal’s
allegations fail to plead any facts that “evidence an intentional ignorance” of the risks to
Royal’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Liggins, 52 F.4th at 956; see also Dkt. No. 65 at 18–
19. This objection is therefore overruled.

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Next, regarding ratification, Royal notes that the ratification theory is limited to
“extreme factual situations” but argues that he has “pled ‘extreme’ [facts]” to support the
theory. Dkt. No. 68 at 20 (citations omitted). Other than Royal’s contention that the
circumstances he has pled are extreme, he provides no argument, instead repeating the
FCR’s determination that the circumstances alleged are not sufficiently extreme and require
dismissal. See Dkt. No. 68 at 20–21. But even taking this mere disagreement with the FCR
as an objection, Royal’s allegations are insufficient to state a municipal-liability claim based
on ratification for the same reasons explained in detail in the FCR. See Dkt. No. 65 at 19–
20. As explained by the Fifth Circuit in Peterson, ratification is limited to “extreme factual
situations.” 588 F.3d at 848 (quoting Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 798 (5th Cir.
1998)). For instance, the Fifth Circuit held that ratification does not apply in a case “in
which [an] officer shot [a] fleeing suspect in the back.” Id. (citing Synder, 142 F.3d at 798).
In addition, ratification “does not stand for the broad proposition that” an official policy
exists “if a policymaker defends his subordinates and if those subordinates are later found to
have broken the law.” Id.
Here, Royal asserts only that the City did not discipline the officers that used force
during Royal’s arrest. Dkt. No. 45 at 12–13. This allegation lacks sufficient factual support
for Royal’s assertion of ratification and does not present the kind of extreme conduct
required for ratification. See Peterson, 588 F.3d at 848; Synder, 142 F.3d at 798; see also Dkt.
No. 65 at 19–20. Accordingly, the Court overrules Royal’s objection regarding ratification.
ii.

Royal’s objection that he has stated a claim based on a failure to
train or supervise is overruled.

In addition to adequately alleging a policy of excessive force, a plaintiff may state a
municipal-liability claim by pleading that “(1) the city failed to train or supervise the officers

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involved; (2) there is a causal connection between the alleged failure to supervise or train
and the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise
constituted deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Edwards v. City of
Balch Springs, 70 F.4th 302, 312 (5th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Peña, 879 F.3d at 623). To adequately support a failure-to-train claim, “a plaintiff must
allege with specificity how a particular training program is defective.” Id. (quoting
Trammell, 868 F.3d at 345).
The FCR recommends dismissal of Royal’s claims based on a failure to train and
supervise because (1) Royal failed to plead facts showing the deficiencies in the City’s
training and (2) Royal’s claim relies on a single incident of alleged misconduct that does not
satisfy the single-incident exception. Dkt. No. 65 at 21–23. Royal objects that requiring
him to “plead facts showing the deficiencies in the City’s training is illogical[,] for there was
no training with regard to mental illness.” Dkt. No. 68 at 21 (emphasis omitted).
As the FCR explains, Royal’s third amended complaint lacks sufficient factual
allegations to state a claim for relief. Royal’s complaint asserts that the City failed to
“properly train or supervise members of the Snyder Police Department not to use
intermediate or deadly force against an individual who does not place the officer or another
at risk of imminent serious bodily injury or death” and failed to “train officers on
responding to mental health crises.” Dkt. No. 45 at 12–13. But “a plaintiff must allege with
specificity how a particular training program is defective.” Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls,
614 F.3d 161, 170 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 293 (5th
Cir. 2005)). Royal’s complaint provides his proffered conclusion that the City’s training is
inadequate, but he provides no factual allegations alleging what those inadequacies are.

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Contrary to Royal’s assertion that it is “illogical” to require him to plead how the City’s
training was deficient, Fifth Circuit precedent requires a plaintiff to do just that, with
specificity. Id.; see also Dkt. No. 65 at 21–22. The Court thus overrules Royal’s objection.
C.

Royal fails to state a claim under the ADA.

To state a viable claim for disability discrimination under the ADA, the plaintiff
must allege, and ultimately show, that (1) “he is a qualified individual within the meaning
of the ADA,” (2) the public entity is excluding him “from participation in, or” denying him
the “benefits of, services, programs, or activities for which the public entity is responsible,
or” the entity is otherwise discriminating against him, and (3) “that such exclusion, denial
of benefits, or discrimination is by reason of his disability.” Windham v. Harris County, 875
F.3d 229, 235 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Melton v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 671–
72 (5th Cir. 2004)).
A plaintiff may satisfy the third element by alleging that the public entity failed to
accommodate, under which theory a plaintiff must allege that “(1) he is a qualified
individual with a disability; (2) the disability and its consequential limitations were known
by the covered entity; and (3) the entity failed to make reasonable accommodations.” Sligh
v. City of Conroe, 87 F.4th 290, 304 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584, 596
n.9 (5th Cir. 2015)). Ordinarily, a plaintiff may satisfy this theory by alleging that he
identified his disability and its resulting limitations and requested an accommodation “in
direct and specific terms.” Id. If a plaintiff does not so directly request an accommodation,
then he must plead sufficient factual matter to support that “the disability, resulting
limitation, and necessary reasonable accommodation were open, obvious, and apparent.”
Id. (cleaned up).

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Royal challenges the FCR’s determination that he has pled insufficient facts to
support an inference that the City discriminated against him on the basis of disability. First,
Royal argues that the officers had interacted with Royal in the past and therefore “were
aware of his mental history.” Dkt. No. 68 at 12. Royal similarly argues that the officers
were on notice of a mental-health condition because Royal “requested an accommodation
or identified his disability and resulting limitations when he called 911 while he was trapped
in his car.” Dkt. No. 68 at 12; see also id. at 26. Royal asserts that the 911 call during the
daytime evading put the officers on notice of his disability, such that his disability and his
need for accommodation were “open, obvious, and apparent” by the time of the nighttime
evasion. Id. at 12–13. Her further asserts that the 911 call Royal made “while he was being
attacked by police . . . can be construed as his attempts to request accommodation.” Id. at
26.
Regarding the argument that Royal’s 911 call disclosed his disability and “can be
construed as his attempts to request accommodation,” Royal provides no authority to
support his assertion. See Dkt. No. 68 at 12, 26. Moreover, even taking as true his
allegation that officers knew of the his mental-health issues, the plaintiff must still have
requested an accommodation “in direct and specific terms.” Sligh, 87 F.4th at 304 (quoting
Smith v. Harris County, 956 F.3d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 2020)). Royal’s complaint contains no
factual allegations regarding how statements made during the 911 call would have
constituted a request for an accommodation, much less how any request was direct and
specific. See Dkt. No. 45 at 18, 21.
In addition, Royal’s allegations lack sufficient facts to plead that his proposed
accommodations were open, obvious, and apparent. Royal asserts that his proposed

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reasonable accommodations, such as “talking calmly” and admitting Royal to a mental
hospital rather than a jail, “were open, obvious, and apparent” because the officers were
aware of Royal’s mental disability. See Dkt. No. 68 at 13. Even accepting that the officers
were aware of Royal’s mental disability, though, that does not support an inference that
Royal’s “limitations [or his] . . . specific desired accommodations were open, obvious, and
apparent under the given facts,” where Royal had was evading arrest, refusing to comply
with officers’ orders, and had committed aggravated assault on the officers. Sligh, 87 F.4th
at 305; see also Dkt. Nos. 45 at 4, 7–9; 65 at 5, 27–28. Indeed, even when officers are aware
of a mental disability, “when dealing in the amorphous world of mental disability,” it is
often “impossible” to identify the specific disability, accompanying limitations, and
reasonable accommodations. Choi v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio, 633 F.
App’x 214, 216 (5th Cir. 2015); see also Dkt. No. 65 at 27–28.
Moreover, even if Royal had pled a viable ADA claim, the exigent-circumstances
exception would mandate dismissal. This doctrine “forclose[s] ADA claims where police
officers face exigent circumstances.” Winder v. Gallardo, 118 F.4th 638, 647 (5th Cir. 2024).
Such exigent circumstances include “an officer’s on-the-street responses to reported
disturbances or other similar incidents . . . prior to the officer’s securing the scene and
ensuring that there is no threat to human life,” regardless of whether the call “involve[s]
subjects with mental disabilities.” Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000).
Here, even accepting Royal’s argument that the officers knew or should have known that
Royal was having delusions and was requesting an accommodation, Royal’s allegations also
show that he refused to comply with officers’ orders, fled the scene in his car during the
traffic stop, and was behaving erratically. See Dkt. No. 45 at 4, 7–9; see also Dkt. No. 65 at

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18. Because the officers were attempting to secure the scene and dealing with a suspect that
was refusing to comply and evading police orders, those exigent circumstances foreclose
Royal’s ADA claim. See Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801. Accordingly, the Court adopts in full the
FCR’s recommendation to dismiss Royal’s ADA claim against the City and Chief Haggard.
See Dkt. No. 65 at 29.
4.

Conclusion
The Court overrules the plaintiff’s objections (Dkt. No. 68) and adopts the FCR

(Dkt. No. 65) as the findings of this Court. Accordingly, the Court grants the City and
Chief Haggard’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 51) and dismisses with prejudice the plaintiff’s
claims against the City and Chief Haggard. In addition, the Court denies as moot the City
and Chief Haggard’s motion for a protective order to stay discovery (Dkt. No. 53).
So ordered on March 5, 2025.

JAMES WESLEY HENDRIX
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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