Medley v. Astrue
Filing
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Memorandum Opinion and Order: For these reasons, the court sustains Plaintiffs objection to the Magistrate Judges finding that the ALJs hypothetical question to the VE at the hearing was not defective. Because the ALJ based his finding that Medley w as not disabled on answers to a defective hypothetical, substantial evidence does not support the finding of no disability. Accordingly, the Court reverses and remands this civil action for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order. Boyd, 239 F.3d at 706-07; Bowling, 36 F.3d at 436.3 (Ordered by Judge Reed C O'Connor on 12/29/2011) (trt)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
WICHITA FALLS DIVISION
SANDRA MEDLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 7:11-CV-0053-O-KA
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is a social security case. Plaintiff Sandra Medley (“Plaintiff” or “Medley”) filed this
action seeking judicial review of a adverse final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and an order of the court in
implementation thereof, the case was referred to United States Magistrate Robert K. Roach, for
review and submission of proposed findings of fact and recommendation for disposition. On
October 25, 2011, the Magistrate Judge issued his Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation (the
“Report”), wherein he recommended that the Court affirm the decision of the Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) to deny Plaintiff Sandra Medley (“Medley”) disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income payments under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act,
respectively. [doc. 17]. On October 26, 2011, Medley filed her Objections to Findings, Conclusions
and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge. [doc. 18]. On December 2, 2011,
Defendant filed its Response to Plaintiff’s Objections [doc. 21], and on December 5, 2011, Plaintiff
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filed her Reply. [doc. 22].
After an independent review of the pleadings, file, record, applicable law, the Magistrate
Judge’s Report, Plaintiff’s Objections, Defendant’s Response and Plaintiff’s Reply, the court rejects
the Magistrate Judge’s finding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff
was not disabled, and hereby reverses and remands this case to the Commissioner for further
proceedings consistent with this order.
I.
Judicial review in a social security case is limited to a determination of whether the ALJ’s
decision to deny benefits is: (1) supported by substantial evidence and (2) whether the proper legal
standard was applied. Austin v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1170, 1147 (5th Cir. 1993). Substantial evidence
is defined as relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as sufficient to support a
conclusion. Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th 1994)(citing Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 (1977)). It is more then a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Perales, 402 U.S.
at 401; Haywood v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 1463, 1466 (5th Cir. 1989). The district court may not
reweigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Johnson v.
Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1988). The court must scrutinize the record, however, to
ascertain whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s findings. Hollis v. Bowen, 837
F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir. 1988). A finding of no substantial evidence is appropriate only when there
is no medical evidence or credible evidentiary choices in the record to support the Commissioner’s
decision. Johnson, 864 F.2d at 343-44; Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 2005 WL 1994289 at *7 (5th Cir.
Aug. 19, 2005). If the findings are supported by substantial evidence, “they are conclusive and must
be affirmed.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
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A disabled worker is entitled to monthly benefits under the Social Security Act if certain
conditions are met. 42 U.S.C. §423(a). The Act defines “disability” as the inability to engage in
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
that can be expected to result in death or last for a continued period of twelve months. Id. §
423(d)(1)(A); Cook v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 393 (5th Cir. 1985).
The Commissioner has promulgated a five-step sequential process to be used by hearing
officers in disability cases. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f); Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 125
(5th Cir. 1991). The hearing officer is required to ascertain: (1) whether the claimant is currently
engaging in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that “meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1"
of the regulations; (4) if the claimant has a “severe impairment” under the regulations, whether the
claimant can perform his past work despite any limitations; and (5) if the claimant does not have the
residual functional capacity to perform past work, whether the claimant can perform any other
gainful and substantial work in the economy, considering his age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f). In the first four steps of the evaluation
process, the claimant bears the burden of proving disability. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146
(1987). The burden then shifts to the Commissioner at the fifth step to show that the claimant is
capable of performing work in the national economy. Id. If the Commissioner meets this burden,
the claimant must then prove that he cannot in fact perform the work suggested. Waters v. Barnhart,
276 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir. 2002). A finding that the claimant is disabled or not disabled at any
point in the five-step review is conclusive and terminates the analysis. Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d
55, 58 (5th Cir. 1987).
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II.
Under the five-step sequential process, the ALJ determined that Medley demonstrated a
combination of three severe impairments consisting of “fibromyalgia, history of cardiac impairment,
and personality disorder” but found that the combination did not meet or medically equal the listed
impairments. Transcript at 19, Finding 3. The ALJ thus proceeded to the next step, to determine
Medley’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), finding that Medley retained the functional capacity
to perform a wide range of “light work” but with severe physical limitations and that she retained
the ability to “sustain concentration necessary for unskilled work,” but also required working “in
relative isolation with limited contact with peers, supervisors and the general public.” Transcript at
20, Finding 5.
The ALJ’s initial hypothetical question to the Vocational Expert (“VE”) at the hearing, as
to mental limitations, states:
All right. The first hypothetical you’re to consider assumes the vocational factors of
an individual who is 52 years of age at the date of hearing . . .This individual in the
non-exertional areas would possess the concentration necessary for unskilled work.
This person would also really be required to work in relative isolation with limited
contact with various coworkers and the general public.
Transcript at 45-46. In response to this hypothetical, the VE testified that a person such as that
described in the hypothetical question could perform three exertionally light, unskilled jobs,
including the jobs of deli cutter/slicer, with 100,000 positions in the national economy; assemblerplastic hospital products, with 30,000 positions in the national economy; and assembler-small
products II with 200,000 position in the national economy. Transcript at 23, 46-47. In his
subsequent decision, the ALJ explicitly relied on the VE’s testimony as support for his finding of
non-disability, stating: “Based on the testimony of the vocational expert, the undersigned concludes
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that, considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity,
the claimant is capable of making an adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in
the national economy. A finding of ‘not disabled’ is therefore appropriate [].”). Transcript at 24.
As set forth above, however, in the residual functional capacity finding in his decision, the
ALJ recognized a limitation to “work in relative isolation with limited contact with peers,
supervisors and the general public.” Transcript at 20, Finding 5 (emphasis added). By contrast, the
only limitations set forth by the ALJ in his hypothetical question to the VE concerned limiting
contact with coworkers and the general public.
III.
Medley objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding at pages 12 through 14 of his Report that
the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational expert at the hearing was not defective under the
standard enunciated in Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 706-07 (5th Cir. 2001) and Bowling v. Shalala,
36 F.3d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1994). Under this standard, a hypothetical question to a vocational expert
cannot provide substantial evidence supporting the denial of benefits unless: (1) the hypothetical
reasonably incorporates all the disabilities of the claimant recognized by the ALJ; and (2) the
claimant or his representative is afforded the opportunity to correct the deficiencies in the question.
Boyd, supra; Bowling, supra. Further, where the ALJ bases his finding that a claimant is not
disabled on answers to a defective hypothetical, substantial evidence does not support the finding
of no disability, and the court should reverse the case and remand for further proceedings. See, e.g.,
Bridges v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 278 F. Supp. 2d 797, 807 (N.D. Tex. 2003)(citing Boyd,
239 F.3d at 706-07). Medley in her objections cites evidence from the record and case law to
support her contention that the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational expert “did not
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reasonably incorporate all the limitations recognized by the ALJ in his [residual functional capacity]
finding, in that the hypothetical question’s limitation in interaction with ‘various coworkers’ cannot,
in this context, be taken to include the additional limitation in interaction with ‘supervisors,’ which
the ALJ found to exist in his RFC finding.” [doc. 18, Obj. at 3]. Medley argues that, “[a]s a result,
the VE’s testimony in response to the ALJ’s hypothetical question cannot constitute substantial
evidence to meet Defendant’s burden of proof at ‘Step 5’ of Defendant’s sequential disability
evaluation to show jobs which Plaintiff could perform despite her functional limitations[.]” [Id.]
In response to Medley’s objections, the Commissioner contends that “Judge Roach correctly
determined that the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational expert was not defective despite
the ALJ’s omission of a limitation of Medley from interacting with ‘supervisors’.” [doc. 21, Resp.
at 2].1 In reply, Medley argues that the Commissioner “does not squarely address the actual issue
raised by Plaintiff in her objections: whether the ALJ’s hypothetical question was defective because
of the discrepancy between (a) the limitations included in the hypothetical question, and (b) the
limitations later recognized by the ALJ in the residual functional capacity finding in his decision[.]”
[doc. 22, Reply at 1, original emphasis].
Having reviewed the Magistrate Judge’s Report, Medley’s objections, Defendant’s response,
Medley’s reply, the record, and applicable law, the Court concludes that (a) the ALJ’s hypothetical
question to the VE did not reasonably incorporate all the limitations recognized by the ALJ as stated
in his final residual functional capacity findings, and (b) consequently, the vocational expert’s
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In Defendant’s responsive briefing before the Magistrate Judge, Defendant asserted that the ALJ’s hypothetical
to the VE was not defective because “peers are coworkers and a supervisor is a coworker. Thus, there is no material
difference between the ALJ’s hypothetical question and his RFC determination.” [doc. 15, Def. Resp. Brief at 10]. Other
cases in this district have recognized a clear distinction between limitations as to “coworkers” alone and limitations as
to “supervisors.” See, e.g., Seibert v. Astrue, 2010 WL 6389303, at *12 (N.D. Tex. June 14, 2010), rec. adopted, 2011
WL 1211350 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2011) (McBryde, J.).
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testimony cannot suffice to support the ALJ’s finding of non-disability. See Field v. Astrue, No.
7:10-CV-0052-BD, Mem. Op. and Order at 6-7 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2011) (Kaplan, J.) (finding
hypothetical question to VE to be defective under Boyd/Bowling standard (see supra), and remand
warranted, where the question to the VE included only a reference to “coworkers,” but the ALJ’s
later RFC finding recognized a limitation in dealing with “supervisors” as well as “coworkers”);
Seibert v. Astrue, No. 4:09-CV-090-A at 23-24 and n. 13, 2010 WL 6389303, at *12 (N.D. Tex. June
14, 2010), recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 1211350 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2011)(McBryde, J.)
(ALJ erred in limiting plaintiff to only incidental contact with the public and co-workers because
such restrictions do not adequately incorporate limitations in responding to or interacting with
supervisors); see also Stearns v. Astrue, 2010 WL 1072828, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2010) (finding
that ALJ erred in making a RFC assessment as to plaintiff’s mental impairments that only limited
plaintiff to no more than superficial contact with the public when the evidence of record indicated
that plaintiff also consistently had difficulty interaction appropriately with supervisors).2
IV.
For these reasons, the court sustains Plaintiff’s objection to the Magistrate Judge’s finding
that the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the VE at the hearing was not defective. Because the ALJ
based his finding that Medley was not disabled on answers to a defective hypothetical, substantial
evidence does not support the finding of no disability. Accordingly, the Court reverses and
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The Court rejects Defendant’s argument that the Magistrate Judge was correct to conclude that the record does
not contain any medical opinion that Medley had any limitation in her ability to have contact with her supervisors. [see
doc. 21, Def. Resp. at 2-3]. In fact, the state agency psychological consultant opined that Medley would have “moderate
limitation” in her abilities to “interact appropriately with the general public,” to “get along with coworkers and peers”,
and also to “accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors.” See Transcript at 714
(emphasis added). Thus, the record does indicate that Medley has at least the same difficulty interacting with
supervisors, as she did with coworkers or peers.
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remands this civil action for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and
Order. Boyd, 239 F.3d at 706-07; Bowling, 36 F.3d at 436.3
SO ORDERED this 29th day of December, 2011.
_____________________________________
Reed O’Connor
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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By remanding this case for further administrative proceedings, the Court does not suggest that Plaintiff is or
should be found disabled. Rather, the Court’s remand is required so that the Commissioner has an opportunity to include
all of Medley’s impairments that are supported in the record in any hypothetical question to the VE, and so that the
Commissioner then has the opportunity to properly consider the VE’s testimony in formulating his final decision.
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