Williams v. Berryhill

Filing 19

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE: For the reasons stated above, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff's objection and hereby ADOPTS the FCR as the Findings and Conclusions of the Court. It is therefore ORDERED that the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED. (Ordered by Judge Reed C. O'Connor on 3/30/2018) (skg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
WICHITA FALLS DIVISION
TONI JEAN WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 7:17-cv-00053-O

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The United States Magistrate Judge made Findings, Conclusions, and a Recommendation
(“FCR”) (ECF No. 17) in this case. The FCR recommended that this Court affirm the
Commissioner’s decision that Plaintiff is not disabled. Plaintiff filed an objection (ECF No. 18).
The Court reviewed de novo those portions of the FCR to which Plaintiff made her objection. For
the following reasons, Plaintiff’s objection is OVERRULED, and the Court ADOPTS the
Magistrate Judge’s FCR as the Findings and Conclusions of the Court.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that her disability began on September 24, 2011. Tr. 26. The Commissioner

of the Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner”) denied her claim on March 25, 2015,
and again on reconsideration on June 16, 2015. Tr. 26. Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
Angelita Hamilton conducted a hearing on June 15, 2016, and issued a decision on July 29, 2016,
finding that Williams was not disabled. Tr. 39. The ALJ applied the five-step analysis for
determining disability under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Tr. 27–39. The ALJ found, concerning step
three, that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet the Listing of Impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404(p).
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Tr. 30–32. In doing so, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform sedentary work. Tr. 32–38. The ALJ then found—concerning step four—that
Plaintiff’s impairments did not prevent Plaintiff from returning to her past relevant work. Tr. 38.
Accordingly, the ALJ did not reach step five and found that Plaintiff was not disabled. Tr. 39. On
March 2, 2017, the Social Security Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making
the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. Tr. 1. On January 25, 2018, the United
States Magistrate Judge issued an FCR recommending that this Court affirm the Commissioner’s
decision. FCR, ECF No. 17.
II.

LEGAL STANDARDS
To determine whether a claimant is disabled and thus entitled to disability benefits, the

Commissioner employs a five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The
third step requires the Commissioner to consider whether the claimant’s impairment meets one of
the listings in the Listing of Impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404(p). Id. In doing so, the Commissioner
will consider opinions from medical sources, the claimant’s residual functional capacity or RFC,
and the application of vocational factors, but the final determination whether a claimant’s
impairment meets the Listing of Impairments is reserved solely to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(d)(2). Before moving to step four, the Commissioner must assess the claimant’s RFC,
which is “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1);
see Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005). Having determined the claimant’s RFC,
the fourth step requires the Commissioner to consider whether the claimant can still do past
relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). “The claimant bears the burden of showing that [she]
is disabled through the first four steps of the analysis . . . .” Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 448
(5th Cir. 2007).

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In determining disability, the Commissioner should give “great weight” to “[t]he opinion
of the treating physician who is familiar with the claimant’s impairments . . . .” Newton v. Apfel,
209 F.3d 448, 455 (5th Cir. 2000). Indeed, the Commissioner should give “controlling weight” to
the treating physician’s opinion on the nature and severity of a patient’s impairment if that opinion
is (1) “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” and
(2) “not inconsistent with . . . other substantial evidence.” Id. (quoting Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d
172, 176 (5th Cir. 1995)). If the Commissioner does not give that well-supported, undisputed
treating physician’s opinion controlling weight, the Commissioner must go through a detailed sixfactor analysis to explain why he did not do so. Newton, 209 F.3d at 455–56. But if a treating
physician’s opinion is either disputed or not well-supported, the Commissioner is not required to
go through the six factor analysis. Heck v. Colvin, 674 F. App’x 411, 415 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Nor
did the ALJ err in failing to consider the factors identified in the regulation before declining to
give controlling weight to Dr. Henderson's responses . . . because such consideration is required
only when there is no other reliable evidence from treating physicians that contradicts the
responses.” (citations omitted)).
This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to deciding whether the
Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether substantial evidence in the record
supports the decision. Audler, 501 F.3d at 447. “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as
a responsible mind might accept to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere scintilla and less
than a preponderance. A finding of no substantial evidence is appropriate only if no credible
evidentiary choices or medical findings support the decision.” Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 704
(5th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted). The Court may neither reweigh the evidence in the
record nor substitute its judgment for the Commissioner’s, but it will carefully scrutinize the record
to determine if substantial evidence is present. Hollis v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir.
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1988). “Conflicts in the evidence are for the [Commissioner] and not the courts to resolve.” Newton
v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000).
III.

ANALYSIS
In his FCR, the Magistrate Judge recommended that this Court affirm the Commissioner’s

findings. FCR 1, ECF No. 17. The Magistrate Judge found that substantial evidence supported the
ALJ’s determination of Plaintiff’s RFC, and that the ALJ properly weighed the medical source
opinions of record. See Id. at 4–13. Plaintiff generally objects to the Magistrate Judge’s findings.
See Obj., ECF No. 18. The Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objection for the following reasons.
A.

The Magistrate Judge Correctly Found that Substantial Evidence Supports
the ALJ’s RFC Determination

The ALJ found that Plaintiff has severe impairments that include obesity, connective tissue
disease, Sjogren’s syndrome, osteoarthritis, and degenerative disc disease. Tr. 28–30.
Notwithstanding these severe impairments, the ALJ found that they did not meet an impairment
on the Listing of Impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404(p). See Tr. 30–2. The ALJ then found that the
claimant had the residual functional capacity, or RFC, to perform “sedentary work” as defined in
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). Tr. 32–38. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
“retains a robust set of activities of daily living that is generally inconsistent with disability,” and
that “[r]eview of the medical evidence reveals that the claimant’s symptoms and functional loss
are not as severe as alleged, and that her symptoms are largely intermittent and variable in
intensity.” Tr. 33. The ALJ reached this conclusion by relying on the entire medical record,
including medical evaluations by Dr. Chris Codding, Dr. Jerome Adams, Dr. Patty Rowley, Dr.
Amita Hedge, Dr. Jeremy Phelps, Dr. Jeff Swanson, Dr. F. Najan, and other physical impairment
evaluations. See Tr. 32–38. While Plaintiff testified that she could only work for about two days
out of the week due to her impairments, Tr. 71–73, the ALJ gave these statements little weight in
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view of the whole evidence. Tr. 33 (“[C]laimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence,
and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and
other evidence in the record . . . .”).
Plaintiff objects that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s conclusion about
Plaintiff’s RFC. Plaintiff points to testimony by a vocational expert that missing two or more days
of work per month would “probably eliminate work.” Tr. 82. Because Plaintiff testified that she
could only work about two days a week, Tr. 71–73, and because evidence in the record
corroborated this claim, Plaintiff argues that she could not maintain substantial gainful
employment. Obj. 2–3, ECF No. 18. In support of these arguments, Plaintiff analogizes this case
to Ripley v. Chater, wherein the ALJ erroneously found that claimant could perform sedentary
work even though “[t]he only evidence regarding Ripley’s ability to work came from Ripley’s own
testimony.” 67 F.3d 552, 557 (5th Cir. 1995).
In determining residual functional capacity, “[t]he ALJ must consider subjective evidence
of pain, but it is within his discretion to determine the pain’s disabling nature.” Dunbar v. Barnhart,
330 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). Here the ALJ weighed Plaintiff’s
own subjective testimony of her impairments against the rest of the medical evidence in the record
and, giving the other evidence greater weight, concluded that Plaintiff’s impairments were not so
severe as to be disabling. Tr. 32–38. Substantial evidence in the record supports this conclusion,
see id.—indeed, the evidence that the ALJ relies upon is certainly more than a scintilla, cf. Boyd,
239 F.3d at 74, more than a single piece of testimony, cf. Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557, and more than
enough for a reasonable mind to accept the ALJ’s conclusion. Cf. Boyd, 239 F.3d at 704. “A finding
of no substantial evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings
support the decision,” id., but here the ALJ conducted a thorough review of the record and reached
a decision well supported by the evidence. See Tr. 32–38. The Court therefore commends the
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Magistrate Judge’s declination of Plaintiff’s invitation to reweigh the evidence, cf. Hollis, 837 F.2d
at 1383, and accordingly OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objection on this point.
B.

The Magistrate Judge Correctly Found that the ALJ Properly Weighed the
Medical Source Opinions of Record

Plaintiff further claims that substantial evidence did not support the ALJ’s decision because
the ALJ did not properly weigh medical source opinion in the record.
First, Plaintiff notes that her attorney asked a vocational expert at the oral hearing a
hypothetical question describing a hypothetical person with Plaintiff’s impairments and asking
whether someone in that situation could maintain full time work. Tr. 82–83. In response to this
hypothetical question, the vocational expert responded that someone in Plaintiff’s position could
not maintain full time work. Id. Plaintiff argues in her objection that the ALJ improperly weighed
the medical opinion evidence by not relying on this corrected hypothetical. Obj. 5, ECF No 18.
But again, a reviewing court is not permitted to reweigh the evidence. Cf. Hollis, 837 F.2d at 1383.
Even if this Court might have weighed the vocational expert’s testimony differently, the ALJ’s
legal conclusions find support in an abundance of factual findings that she considered and weighed
in making her decision. See Tr. 32–38.
Second, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred by failing to give controlling
weight to the opinions of Drs. Swanson and Najan that Plaintiff could not sustain full time work,
and by failing to explain this oversight with the six-factor analysis in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.
However, “an ALJ is not required to give controlling weight to a treating physician opinion
when . . . there is competing first-hand medical evidence.” Heck, 674 F. App’x at 415 (quotation
marks omitted) (alterations in original). Such competing evidence exists here. See Tr. 32–38.
Moreover, the six-factor analysis in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 “is required only when there is no other

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reliable evidence from treating physicians that contradicts the responses.” Heck, 674 F. App’x at
415. Such contradictory evidence exists here. See Tr. 32–38.
Third and finally, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred by failing to consider Dr.
Adams’s medical opinion or explain this oversight by applying the six factors in 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527. However, the ALJ is only required to give controlling weight, or apply the six-factor
analysis, to treating physicians, see Newton, 209 F.3d at 455–56, and Dr. Adams only provided a
consultative examination. See Tr. 35. Moreover, the ALJ did consider Dr. Adam’s opinion by
explicitly referencing and describing Dr. Adam’s examination and findings. Tr. 35.
In sum, Plaintiff asks this Court to reweigh evidence that the ALJ has already considered
and weighed. See Obj. 5, ECF No. 5 (“The Magistrate Judge submits that the ALJ properly
weighed the medical source opinions of record. The Plaintiff disagrees.” (citation omitted)). But
neither the Magistrate Judge nor this Court may reweigh the evidence. See Hollis, 837 F.2d at
1383. This Court’s review is for whether the ALJ applied correct principles of law and reached a
conclusion supported by substantial evidence. Audler, 501 F.3d at 447. Because the Magistrate
Judge correctly found that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision here, the Court
OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objection.
VI.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objection and hereby

ADOPTS the FCR as the Findings and Conclusions of the Court. It is therefore ORDERED that
the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED on this 30th day of March, 2018.

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Reed O’Connor
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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