Pina-Martinez, Jr. v. Romero Saldana et al
Filing
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ORDER granting 6 Motion to Remand. This case is remanded to the 103rd Judicial District Court of Cameron County, Texas.(Signed by Judge Fernando Rodriguez, Jr) Parties notified.(JenniferLongoria, 1)
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
ZENON PINA-MARTINEZ, JR.,
August 30, 2018
David J. Bradley, Clerk
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§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-CV-31
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Plaintiff,
VS.
JOSE FRANCISCO ROMERO
SALDANA, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Opposed Motion to Remand (Doc. 6). Having
reviewed the Motion, the briefing of the parties, the relevant facts, and the applicable law, the
Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand should be granted and this matter should be
remanded to state court for further proceedings.
Background
This case arises from an automobile accident that caused one fatality. In February 2016,
Plaintiff Zenon Piña-Martinez, Jr. was driving his sports utility vehicle on a Farm-to-Market
Road in South Texas, with his wife as a passenger next to him, and the youngest of their three
children in the back seat. In the moments before the accident, they drove behind a commercial
18-wheel tractor trailer. Although the parties dispute the cause of the accident, it is clear that Mr.
Piña-Martinez’s vehicle impacted with the rear corner of the tractor trailer, killing Mr. PiñaMartinez’s wife, and injuring Mr. Piña-Martinez.
In Texas state court, Mr. Piña-Martinez filed claims against Autotransportes Romedu SA
de CV, which is the owner of the truck, and against Jose Francisco Romero Saldaña, the truck
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driver at the time of the accident. Mr. Piña-Martinez filed his lawsuit in three capacities: (1) his
individual capacity; (2) as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Arely Guadalupe Vidal
Camacho, his wife (“Estate of Mrs. Camacho”); and (3) as next friend of EJP, BLP, and JLP,
their three minor children. The Plaintiffs allege causes of action based on Texas law for, inter
alia, negligence, gross negligence, and wrongful death.
In February 2018, the Defendants removed the action to federal court based on diversity
jurisdiction.
On March 2, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed their motion to remand, arguing that the Court
lacked jurisdiction due to the absence of complete diversity. The issue turns on the citizenship of
the parties. The Plaintiffs include citizens of Mexico (Mr. Piña-Martinez and the Estate of Mrs.
Camacho) and of Texas (the three minor children). Both defendants are citizens of Mexico.
Following the Initial Pretrial Conference, the Court requested supplemental briefing on
two issues. See Order (Doc. 12). First, the Court ordered briefing as to whether a conflict of
interest precluded Plaintiffs’ counsel from representing all of the Plaintiffs. The second issue
focused on whether the Court had the authority to realign the parties so that Mr. Piña-Martinez in
his individual capacity and as the representative of the Estate of Mrs. Camacho became
defendants with respect to the minor children’s claims and, if so, whether diversity jurisdiction
would exist if such a realignment occurred. The Court also appointed a guardian ad litem for the
minor Plaintiffs and requested that he also brief the indicated issues. The parties have provided
the requested supplemental briefing. See Plaintiffs’ Additional Briefing in Support of Motion to
Remand (Doc. 14); Defendants’ Briefing Regarding Conflict of Interest and Realignment (Doc.
15); Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant’s Briefing Regarding Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (Doc.
16); Guardian Ad Litem Brief (Doc. 17); Defendants Jose Francisco Romero Saldaña and
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Autotransportes Romedu, S.A. de C.V.’s Brief in Reply to Plaintiff’s Additional Brief in Support
of Motion to Remand (Doc. 18).
I.
Standard
Federal district courts are of limited jurisdiction, and may hear only those cases
authorized by a federal statute, the Constitution, or a United States treaty. Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir.
2001). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), any state-court civil action over which the federal courts
would have original jurisdiction may be removed from state to federal court. However, the
defendant seeking to remove a case to federal court shoulders the burden of proof in
demonstrating that removal is proper. Gasch v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 491 F.3d 278, 281
(5th Cir. 2007) (citing Guillory v. PPG Indus., Inc., 434 F.3d 303, 308 (5th Cir. 2005)). A court
must strictly construe the removal statute in favor of remand and against removal. See In re
HotHed Inc., 477 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). When there is no subjectmatter jurisdiction, remand is mandatory. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
To establish diversity jurisdiction, courts require complete diversity of parties. See Chick
Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 1148, 1151 (5th Cir. 1985). In cases involving parties with
citizenship in foreign countries, diversity jurisdiction cannot be maintained by an alien against a
citizen of a state and a citizen of some foreign country. Id. The requirement of complete
diversity in the alienage context requires, for instance, that if at least one plaintiff is a Mexican
citizen, no defendant can be a citizen of a foreign country.
II.
Analysis
Under controlling law, complete diversity does not exist in this matter. While that
conclusion usually ends the matter and requires remand, the Defendants urge the Court to
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disregard the jurisdictional allegations as fraudulently made. Based on the facts in the record,
however, the Court denies this request. In addition, the Court also declines to realign the parties
so as to create complete diversity. As a result, no grounds exist to maintain this action in federal
court.
A.
Complete diversity does not exist.
Section 1332(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides a number of independent
bases for diversity jurisdiction, including what courts at times refer to as “alienage jurisdiction.”
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). While diversity jurisdiction usually concerns cases involving
citizens of different States within the United States, the doctrine of alienage jurisdiction arises in
cases involving a citizen of a foreign state and a citizen of the United States. The rules regarding
complete diversity apply equally to cases of alienage jurisdiction. See Vantage Drilling Co. v.
Hsin-Chi Su, 741 F.3d 535 (5th Cir. 2014); Chick Kam Choo, 764 F.2d at 1153. This means that
if at least one plaintiff and at least one defendant have citizenship in a foreign state, complete
diversity does not exist and the court cannot maintain the action. Chick Kam Choo, 764 F.2d at
1153.
In this lawsuit, the parties on both sides include citizens of Mexico. On the Plaintiffs’
side, Mr. Piña-Martinez and the estate of his deceased wife, Mrs. Camacho, are both citizens of
Mexico for diversity purposes.1 While the minor children are citizens of Texas, their presence
does not negate the Mexican citizenship of their father and the estate of their mother. As for the
defendants, both Mr. Saldaña and Autotransportes are citizens of Mexico. As a result, no
complete diversity exists under the controlling law of alienage jurisdiction.
1
For purposes of the survival claim, the citizenship of Mrs. Camacho controls. See, e.g., Acridge v. Evangelical
Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc., 334 F.3d 444, 447–48 (5th Cir. 2003); Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171
S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. 2004); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.021. The Plaintiffs allege that Mrs. Camacho was
a Mexican citizen. See Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (Doc. 6) at Exh. B.
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B.
The evidence before the Court does not establish fraud in the pleading of
jurisdictional facts.
Courts recognize the doctrine of fraudulent joinder as an exception to the complete
diversity rule. In these cases, the removing party typically argues that the plaintiff seeks to
defeat federal jurisdiction through the joinder of a non-diverse party against whom, under the
governing law, relief is impossible. See e.g., Johnson v. Heublein Inc., 227 F.3d 236, 240 (5th
Cir. 2000); Jernigan v. Ashland Oil Inc., 989 F.2d 812, 815 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 510 U.S. 868
(1993). The burden of showing fraudulent joinder is on the party alleging it, and this burden is a
heavy one. Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256, 259 (5th Cir. 1995); B. Inc.
v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1981). All doubts are resolved against
removal. Acuna v. Brown & Root Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1229
(2000); Blackmore v. Rock-Tenn Co., Mill Div., Inc., 756 F.Supp. 288, 289 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
A removing defendant can demonstrate improper joinder by showing “actual fraud in the
pleading of jurisdictional facts”. Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 646 (5th Cir. 2003). The court
must evaluate the factual allegations made in the state-court pleadings in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. See B. Inc., 663 F.2d at 549.
In the instant case, the Defendants challenge the alleged citizenship of Mr. Piña-Martinez
and the Estate of Mrs. Camacho, effectively arguing that the plaintiffs have engaged in fraud in
the pleading of jurisdictional facts, and that they should be treated as citizens of Texas and not of
Mexico. Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand (Doc 8) at ¶¶ 7-9. The
Defendants ground this argument on an allegation the Plaintiffs made in an initial lawsuit
concerning the same accident, which this Court dismissed without prejudice, and in which the
Plaintiffs alleged that they were citizens of Texas. See Application and Notice of Removal (Doc.
1) at Exh. 2 (Plaintiffs’ Original Petition in the previous state-court action, alleging that “[a]ll
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parties are Texas citizens”); id. at Exh. 1 (July 26, 2016, Order dismissing without prejudice the
previous lawsuit that had been removed to the Southern District of Texas). The Defendants
argue that it is only later, in the present action, that the Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Piña-Martinez
and the Estate of Mrs. Camacho are citizens of Mexico. See Response (Doc. 8) at ¶¶ 7-9.
The Defendants do not assert that the Plaintiffs have sued a non-diverse defendant solely
to defeat complete jurisdiction, and against which no plausible cause of action exists. Rather, the
dispute focuses on Mr. Piña-Martinez, in his individual capacity and as representative of the
Estate of Mrs. Camacho, alleging Texas citizenship in a previous, related matter, and now
alleging Mexican citizenship.
Mr. Piña-Martinez has submitted evidence confirming the
Mexican citizenship of himself and his deceased wife. See Plaintiffs’ Opposed Motion to
Remand (Doc. 6) at Exh. B. The Defendants offer no controverting evidence, despite bearing the
burden on the issue. See Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396 (5th Cir. 1974) (recognizing that the party
invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden when “diversity jurisdiction is properly
challenged”). The Defendants do highlight Mr. Piña-Martinez’s allegation in the prior lawsuit,
but cite no authority establishing that a party is bound for the purpose of jurisdictional analysis to
an allegation filed in an antecedent case.2 In addition, any doubts that affect whether diversity
jurisdiction exists are resolved in favor of the party contesting removal. As a result, this Court
finds that Mr. Piña-Martinez, in both his individual capacity and as representative of the Estate
of Mrs. Camacho, is a Mexican citizen.
C.
The Court declines to realign the parties to create complete diversity.
While typically a court determines diversity at the time suit is filed, the court is not
2
At the Initial Pretrial Conference on May 1, 2018, the Court confirmed the Defendants’ ability to depose Mr. PiñaMartinez regarding the jurisdictional allegations. While the parties noted that some difficulties could arise because
Mr. Piña-Martinez resided in Mexico and did not have the ability to travel to the United States legally, the
Defendants have not argued that they lacked the ability to probe the veracity of the Plaintiffs’ jurisdictional
allegations.
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always bound by the way a plaintiff aligns the parties. In certain situations “[i]t is the court’s
duty to ‘look beyond the pleadings, and arrange the parties according to their sides in the
dispute.’” Lowe v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, A Div. of Litton Sys., Inc., 723 F.2d 1173, 1178 (5th Cir.
1984) (citing Wright, Miller, & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3607–
8.). Generally, the test of proper alignment “is whether the parties with the same ‘ultimate
interests' in the outcome of the action are on the same side.” Id.
Courts have considered whether it is appropriate to realign the parties so as to establish
complete diversity. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat’l Bank of City of N.Y., 314 U.S.
63 (1941); Zurn Indus., Inc. v. Acton Constr. Co., Inc., 847 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1988). When
determining whether the opposing parties are properly aligned in matters involving a challenge
to diversity jurisdiction, courts assess whether “the necessary collision of interest exists,”
analyzing “the principal purpose of the suit, and the primary and controlling matter in dispute.”
City of Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 71. The court asks whether the case entails a “bona fide dispute
between citizens of different states.” Zurn, 847 F.2d at 237.
In several cases involving vehicular accidents, for example, family members have
brought suit not only against a vehicle’s manufacturer, but also against a relative who drove the
vehicle and who had the same citizenship as the plaintiffs. See, e.g., Martinez v. Cont’l Tire N.
Am., Inc., No. H-08-2148, 2008 WL 10720254 at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2008); Kahn Swick &
Foti, LLC v. Spector Roseman Kodroff & Willis, PC, No. 14–1979, 2014 WL 7140312 at *4
(E.D. La. Dec. 12, 2014); Eagle Capital Corp. v. Munlake Contractors, Inc., No. 5:10–cv–99,
2012 WL 568701 at *7 (S.D. Miss. Feb 21, 2012). These courts considered whether the nondiverse, defendant family member should be realigned as a plaintiff, establishing complete
diversity as against the corporate defendant. They declined to do so, as have other courts in
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cases involving other factual scenarios. See e.g., Washington v. Ernster, 551 F.Supp 2d 568
(E.D. Tex. 2007); Prime Income Asset Mgmt. Co., Inc., v. Waters Edge Living LLC, No. 3:07CV-0102-D, 2007 WL 2229050 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2007); Roblez v. Ramos, No. Civ.A.
301CV0336-G, 2001 WL 896942 at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2001); but see, e.g., Keen v.
Burlington N. Santa Fe. Corp., 438 F.Supp.2d 724 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (realigning a non-diverse
defendant as a plaintiff, and denying the motion to remand).
The heavy burden that courts apply when considering realignment in the context of
removal stems from the need to balance “the plaintiff’s (mostly unlimited) right to choose his
forum against the defendant’s (conditional) right to a federal forum.” Roblez, 2001 WL 896942
at *2. The doctrine strikes a “reasonable balance among not rewarding abusive pleading by the
plaintiff, the plaintiff’s tactical prerogative to select the forum, and the defendant’s statutory
right to remove.” Id. To prove fraudulent joinder, a defendant must not simply present a
plausible rationale favoring realignment. The defendant must demonstrate that a party should be
realigned, and that the supporting reasons overcome the court’s deference to the plaintiff’s
choice of forum. If the plaintiff has a “plausible justification for alignment of the parties”, the
plaintiff’s tactical prerogative should be upheld. See id. at *4.
In the present matter, the Defendants argue that realignment is proper because the parties
are not currently aligned according to their true interests. The Defendants posit that both Mr.
Camacho and his deceased wife acted negligently and caused or at least contributed to the
occurrence of the accident.
See Defendant’s Briefing Regarding Conflict of Interest and
Realignment (Doc. 15) at ¶ 2. According to the Defendants, the “primary and controlling matter
in dispute is determining whose negligence caused the crash and death of [Decedent].” Id. at ¶ 5.
From the perspective of the minor children, the Defendants continue, Mr. Piña-Martinez and the
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Estate of Mrs. Camacho should be aligned as additional defendants. Id.
Although the Defendants raise the colorable defense that Mr. Piña-Martinez and his
deceased wife may have proportionate responsibility in connection with the accident, this
defense does not in itself justify realignment. Mr. Piña-Martinez, in his individual capacity and
as representative of the Estate of Mrs. Camacho, has also presented colorable claims against the
defendants. The Plaintiffs deny responsibility and any negligence on their part. At this stage in
the case, the court accepts these allegations as presenting a bona fide dispute between Mr. PiñaMartinez and the Estate of Mrs. Camacho against the Defendants.
While the Defendants
rightfully raise the possibility that the minor children could potentially assert claims against Mr.
Piña-Martinez and the Estate of Mrs. Camacho, the Plaintiffs have not chosen to do so at this
time, and have presented a unified front against the Defendants.3
The Plaintiffs have
demonstrated a “plausible justification for alignment of the parties”, and this alignment is their
tactical prerogative that the Court will not disturb.
The Defendants rely on Keen v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation to support
their request for realignment and maintaining the action in federal court. While this decision
demonstrates that federal courts possess the authority to realign cases in a manner that creates
complete diversity, the facts in Keen render it distinguishable from the present lawsuit. The
Keen case arose following an accident in which a vehicle that Ruth Keen was driving collided
with a train. After her husband sued the railroad in state court, Ruth Keen intervened as an
additional plaintiff. Mr. Keen then filed a cross-claim against Ruth Keen, ostensibly making her
a non-diverse defendant with respect to Mr. Keen. The railroad company removed the action to
federal court. In declining the motion to remand, the court realigned Ruth Keen as a plaintiff,
3
In a sealed filing, the guardian ad litem for the minor children provided conclusions supporting this finding. See
Guardian Ad Litem Brief (Doc. 17).
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highlighting that Mr. Keen did not actually plead a cause of action against her, that he alleged
that “she was only a 1% cause of the collision”, and that the “railroad Defendants were 100%
responsible . . . for the accident.” Id. In contrast, in the present case, Mr. Piña-Martinez, both
individually and as representative of the Estate of Mrs. Camacho, has non-trivial claims against
the Defendants. Although the Defendants argue that these two Plaintiffs’ own negligence may
have played a role in the accident, this argument does not mean that Mr. Piña-Martinez and the
Estate of Mrs. Camacho have no true interest in their causes of action. For that reason, the
rationale in Keen does not apply.4
III.
Conclusion
Accordingly, it is:
Ordered that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand is GRANTED; and
Ordered that this case is REMANDED to the 103rd Judicial District Court of Cameron
County, Texas.
SIGNED this 30th day of August, 2018.
___________________________________
Fernando Rodriguez, Jr.
United States District Judge
4
The Dawson case is similarly inapposite. See Dawson v. Legion Indem. Co., No. Civ. 3:99–CV–2772–H, 2000
WL 124813, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2000). In that case, the non-diverse plaintiff had “no real pecuniary interest in
the outcome of the declaratory judgment action.”
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